Reconstitution: Implications for a Force Projection Army
Abstract
This study analyzes the adequacy of current US Army reconstitution doctrine in light of changes in Army warfighting doctrine. The study proposes that a smaller Army, operating primarily from CONUS bases, will conduct reconstitution differently than the way the Army conducted reconstitution under its previous warfighting doctrine. The analysis includes an explanation of the close relationship between changes in the strategic environment, warfighting doctrine, and reconstitution doctrine. After a historical review of past warfighting and reconstitution doctrine (including a review of historical examples), the analysis concludes that short-notice contingency operations into an immature theater will likely create a nearly imperceptible blend between the operational and tactical levels of war. Reconstitution in such operations may need to take advantage of strategic and operational lift capabilities to provide whole or sub-unit packages of combat forces to replace combat ineffective units. The potential rapid tempo of joint, combined, and interagency operations in the 1990s will reduce the feasibility of conducting detailed regeneration as proposed under the current reconstitution doctrine. The study concludes that current Army reconstitution doctrine inadequately addresses the requirements of a force projection Army. Reconstitution, Regeneration, Replacement operations, Force projection, Contingency operations, Doctrine, Warfighting, Strategic environment.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 04, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA272977
Entities
People
- Mark H. Armstrong
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College