Evolution of Cold War Rules of Engagement: The Soviet Combat Role in the Korean War, 1950-1953
Abstract
This historical study develops the evolution of de facto Cold War rules of engagement (ROE) from 1945 to 1953 from predominately American sources. Clausewitzen Coalition theory and a model of national power--diplomatic, informational, economic, and military--are used to develop and analyze the ROES. The traditional view holds that the Soviets' role was limited as a planner, adviser, and logistician for the communist forces. New American and Soviet sources, opened by the end of the Cold War, challenges the limited view of Soviet role. This study develops a new view of the Soviet role from the contemporaneous US Government, revisionist historians, and new sources. President Truman presumed that the commitment of American combat forces would prevent World War III, and that the Soviets would not commit combat forces. In November 1950, the Soviet 64th Detached Fighter Air Corps entered combat and fought to the end of the war in July 1953. The study concludes that the Korean War expanded the military ROEs to allow covert and deniable combat between American and Soviet armed forces in limited wars. Korean War, Limited war, Cold War, Coalition theory, Rules of Engagement, Elements of National Power, Diplomacy, Soviet Military.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 04, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA272982
Entities
People
- Thomas A. Lineer
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College