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TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1993

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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DID THE FIELD ARTILLERY MAKE THE RIGHT DECISION CHANGING FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING PROCEDURES FROM BOTTOM-UP TO TOP-DOWN?
by CPT David D. Haught, USA, 106 pages.

This study examines the change in fire support planning procedures from bottom-up to top-down. Prior to the mid-1980's, fire support planning at brigade and lower echelons was completed primarily in a bottom-up or decentralized mode. Now targets and fire support plans are being developed at the brigade level and disseminated through the battalion to the companies.

The author provides the reader with background definitions, the evolution of top-down fire support planning, descriptions of each procedure, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The author answers the research questions through descriptive analyses, a comparison matrix, and interviews with field artillery commanders and fire support officers.

The author concludes that the change to top-down fire support planning was prudent. Top-down fire support planning is faster, facilitates synchronization, contributes to mass, and better links the scheme of fires to the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver. The author recommends that we continue to use top-down fire support planning. Based on field interviews, the author determines that some company commanders and fire support officers do not support the procedure. Therefore, the author further recommends more education to our company grade commanders and fire support officers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Our goal must be to enable combined arms commanders to fight fire support systems with the same skill and vigor with which they employ direct fire systems.

Major General Fred F. Marty

Providing the combined arms commander effective fire support is a challenge for both the combined arms commander and his fire support officer. "Since the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, has been in operation, our ability to plan and execute fire support has been under constant scrutiny. In most cases, there's room for improvement."¹

According to our capstone fire support doctrine, "The purpose of fire support planning is to optimize the employment of the fire support system by integrating and synchronizing it with the battle plan."² Prior to the mid-1980's the primary procedure for fire support planning was very decentralized. Fire support officers starting at company level planned fires and submitted their targets and fire support plans to the next higher fire support officer/fire support element. The result of this decentralized bottom-up fire support planning was target

overload. Particularly at the company and battalion task force level, fire support officers were placing targets on terrain with little or no regard for the enemy situation.³ In many instances, targets did not support the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver. Targets placed solely on terrain for the purposes of shifting fires from that point on the ground have little chance to support the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver. Fire support officers were targeting just to target.

In an attempt to improve fire support to the combined arms commander, the field artillery community in the mid 1980's developed a procedure where fire support planning and targeting was done primarily at the brigade and higher echelons. Hence, the birth of top-down fire support planning.

This study will examine the process of top-down fire support planning and the underlying reasons for the field artillery's change in fire support planning procedures. It will also address the current status of that change and through discussions with the field determine if the decision to change was a good one.

Research Questions

The primary research question is: Did the Field Artillery make the right decision changing fire support

planning procedures from bottom-up to top-down? Subordinate questions are:

1. What is top-down fire support planning?
2. What is bottom-up fire support planning?
3. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each?
4. How did top-down fire support planning evolve?
5. What are units using today and what are the results/trends so far?

Definition of Terms

Combined Arms Commander. A commander who integrates and synchronizes all his battlefield operating systems to maximize his combat potential. He understands the capabilities and limitations of each battlefield operating system and provides a clear vision of what each must accomplish for his plan to succeed. The lowest level where a combined arms commander normally is found is the battalion/task force level.

Commander's Intent. Commander's vision of the battle--how he expects to fight and what he expects to accomplish.

Concept of Operations. A graphic, verbal, or written statement in broad outline that gives an overall picture of a commander's assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations; includes at a minimum

the scheme of maneuver and fire support plan (read scheme of fires). The concept of operations is embodied in campaign plans and operations plans particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is described in sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do and how to fight the battle without further instructions.

Delay. To postpone the occurrence of an activity or event for a period of time.

Destroy. To render the opposing force combat ineffective unless reconstituted.

Disrupt. To break apart or cause confusion in the execution of an activity or event.

Fire Planning. Fire planning is the continual process of selecting targets on which fires are prearranged to support a phase of the commander's plan.

Fire Support. Fire support is the collective and coordinated use of indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means in support of a battle plan. Fire support includes mortars, field artillery, naval gunfire, air defense artillery in secondary mission, and air-delivered weapons. Nonlethal means are electronic warfare capabilities of military intelligence organizations, illumination, and smoke. The force commander employs these means to support his scheme of maneuver; to mass firepower;

and to delay, disrupt, or destroy enemy forces in depth. Fire support planning and coordination exists at all echelons of maneuver. Fire support destroys, neutralizes, and suppresses enemy weapons, enemy formations or facilities, and fires from the enemy rear area. In deep operations, fire support could be the principal means of destroying enemy forces. In this event, the scheme of maneuver would be designed specifically to capitalize on the effects of fire support.

Fire Support Assets. Fire support assets include: (1) field artillery (cannon, missiles, rockets); (2) mortars; (3) naval gunfire; (4) attack helicopters; and (5) electronic warfare. The effective coordination of fire support assets helps the maneuver commander achieve maximum combat power through synchronization.

Fire Support Coordination. Fire support coordination is the continual process of implementing fire support planning and managing the fire support assets that are available to a maneuver force.

Fire Support Coordinator. The senior field artillery officer at each echelon above maneuver platoon who serves as the principal advisor to the commander for the planning and coordination of all available fire support.

Fire Support Element. A functional portion of a tactical operations center that provides centralized targeting, coordination, and integration of fires delivered

on surface targets by fire support means under the control of or in support of the force. This element is staffed from the field artillery headquarters or field artillery staff section of the force and representatives of other fire support means.

Fire Support Officer. In fire support operations, the officer who is the full-time coordinator of all fire support and the field artillery commander's representative at the supported headquarters.

Fire Support Planning. Fire support planning is the continual process of analyzing, allocating, and scheduling fire support. The goal of fire support planning is to effectively integrate fire support into battle plans to optimize combat power. It is performed concurrently with battle planning.

Fire Support System. Fire support is the product of a system consisting of three parts: (1) fire support command, control, and coordination facilities and personnel; (2) target acquisition and battlefield surveillance; and (3) fire support resources--weapons.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. A systematic approach to analyzing the enemy, terrain, and weather in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain as they relate to the mission and the specific battlefield environment. This is

done to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

List of Targets/Target List. A tabulation of confirmed or suspect targets maintained by any echelon for information and fire support planning purposes.

Neutralize. To render ineffective or unusable. To render enemy personnel or material incapable of interfering with a particular operation.

Scheme of Maneuver. That part of a tactical plan to be executed by a maneuver force to achieve its assigned objectives or to hold its assigned area.

Suppress. Direct and indirect fires, electronic countermeasures, or smoke brought to bear on enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment to prevent effective fire on friendly forces.

Assumptions

As mentioned previously, feedback from the field will be used to evaluate the status of fire support planning. We must therefore assume that the information respondents provide is accurate and honest. We must further assume that the sample and their responses accurately portray the remainder of the population.

Much of the information and discussion presented in this study refers to the National Training Center. The National Training Center is a vast training center located

in the Mojave desert in California. It is a premier training facility for mechanized forces. It is regarded by some as making a significant contribution to our Army's victory in Operation Desert Storm. It is assumed that the tactics, techniques, and procedures utilized at the National Training Center replicate those that we will use again in combat.

The same assumption applies to the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Chafee, Arkansas, as well as the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels, Germany. After observing the success of the National Training Center, the Department of the Army decided that the light forces, as well as the forces stationed in Europe, needed a training facility. Hence, the establishment in the late 1980's and early 1990's of the Joint Readiness Training Center and the Combat Maneuver Training Center. Light forces train at the Joint Readiness Training Center while mechanized forces stationed in Europe utilize the Combat Maneuver Training Center.

Limitations

Although not a "war stopper," the shortage of published doctrinal information available on top-down fire support planning has proven to be a challenge. As will be seen in chapter 2, the majority of information on top-down

fire support planning comes from sources other than doctrinal manuals.

Delimitations

This study will discuss all levels of fire support planning from corps to company level. However, the seven inherent responsibilities of the field artillery standard tactical missions lead us to focus this study primarily at the brigade, battalion task force, and company fire support levels.

This delimitation is necessary since field artillery units that do not have a mission of direct support receive their fire support plans and targets from units or agencies not organic to their units. For example, a field artillery unit with a tactical mission of reinforcing the fires of another field artillery unit has its fires planned by the reinforced unit. Appendix A contains a chart detailing the seven inherent responsibilities of field artillery standard tactical missions (figure 1).

The reader should bear in mind that the data obtained through telephonic interviews is perishable and represents only a snapshot in time. This implies then that the conclusions reached are valid only for the portion of time that the interviews were conducted, or a reasonable time thereafter.

Significance of the Study

The research of this topic is important to the field. Combined arms commanders depend on fire support for mission accomplishment. They may refer to this document as they study and incorporate fire support into their schemes of maneuver.

Providing effective fire support to the combined arms commander is a field artilleryman's bread and butter. Field Artillerymen must do everything possible to provide the commander with timely and accurate fires. The innovation of top-down fire support planning should help them in this endeavor. Both the command arms commanders and field artillery commanders can use this paper to see the evolution and current status of top-down fire support planning. Finally, during a recent interview with a Division Artillery Commander, he remarked that he was preparing an Officer Professional Development class on top-down fire support planning. Both combined arms and field artillery commanders may benefit from using this document or portions of it for instructional purposes. Additionally, trends and information from other units' position on top-down fire support planning may help other units. A thorough understanding of top-down fire support planning can only contribute to success on battlefields in the future.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Fire support provides us the capability to rapidly project combat power to hold enemy centers of gravity hostage and protect our forces.

General Gordon R. Sullivan

Before examining top-down and bottom-up fire support planning, it is necessary to review the principles of fire support. This review is necessary as the principles of fire support planning form the foundation upon which fire support planning is conducted--regardless of whether it is top-down or bottom-up. The following principles apply at all echelons, from company to echelons above corps.

Plan Early and Continuously. For effective fire support, the fire support plan must be developed early in the battle planning process. Not only must the plan be developed early, it must always be updated as more information becomes available. This updating occurs all of the time and must keep up with the tempo of the battle.

Exploit All Available Targeting Assets. The fire support system must be employed against enemy targets that are important to the combined arms commander. Using the

correct target acquisition asset greatly assists in this effort. Examples of target acquisition assets include radio direction finding, weapons and ground locating radars, aerial observers, and enemy prisoners of war.

Consider The Use Of All Lethal/Non-lethal Attack Means. One usually associates field artillery, close air support, naval gun fire, etc with fire support. The fire support coordinator should not forget to use non-lethal assets such as electronic warfare and smoke as part of the fire support plan.

Use Lowest Echelon Capable of Furnishing Effective Support. As the fire support coordinator develops his plan, he must examine all available delivery means. Responsive fire support is best provided by the lowest echelon available. It is more responsive and requires fewer channels of communication.

Use most effective means. When building a house, you probably would not use a hack saw to cut lumber. The same concept applies when planning and providing fire support--use the proper tool for the job. FM 6-20 provides:

An example of this is a situation in which air support is the most desired means but is about 20 minutes away. In this case, indirect fire weapons can fix the target until aircraft arrive.¹

Furnish The Type Of Support Requested. The requester of fire support normally will best know what is needed. The fire support coordinator should balance the

requester's needs with the combined arms commanders' priorities. If the type of fire support requested cannot be provided, a suitable substitute should be provided.

Avoid Unnecessary Duplication. This principle is a fundamental principle of fire support planning. The fire support coordinator must ensure that the targeting and attack of those targets are not duplicated. He must ensure that only the minimum amount of force needed be applied.

Consider Airspace Coordination. Airspace in today's modern battlefield is quite crowded. Both troop safety and target engagements must be reviewed. Otherwise, the delivery of fire support may be cut off. The preferred solution is to plan and consider airspace to allow the simultaneous engagement of targets with multiple means of fire support.

Provide Adequate Support. The fire support coordinator is responsible to the combined arms commander for effective fire support. If the available fire support assets will not contribute to mission accomplishment or support the combined arms commander's guidance, the fire support coordinator must inform the combined arms commander.

Provide Rapid And Effective Coordination. Not only must the fire support coordinator monitor the combined arms commander's battle, he must also know the status of fire support resources and their availability.

Provide For Flexibility. Flexibility--a watchword for today's combined arms commander. Hand in hand with agility and new emerging doctrine--versatility,² the fire support coordinator must anticipate. He must be able to recognize the need for and execute changes rapidly.

Provide For Safeguarding And Survivability of Friendly Forces/Installations. Troop safety is of paramount importance--both in peace and war. The use of restrictive fire support coordinating measures, consideration of friendly locations, and selection of firing positions all contribute to troop safety.

As previously stated, the principles of fire support planning are applicable to either top-down or bottom-up fire support planning. Let us now determine what exactly is top-down fire support planning and what is bottom-up fire support planning.

Bottom-up fire support planning is an informal process--information is provided and support is requested from the lower to the higher echelons. The process is typically initiated at the company level by the company fire support officer in response to the maneuver company commander's guidance. It is not a deliberate process and the company fire support officer normally completes his fire support plan at his level without guidance from higher echelons. In addition to his company commander's guidance, the company fire support officer selects targets for the

fire support plan based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available; and input from any platoon forward observers.

Once the company fire support officer, a field artillery lieutenant, selects his targets as described above, he usually briefs key leaders in the company and then forwards the fire support plan to the battalion task force fire support officer.

The battalion task force fire support officer, normally a field artillery captain, performs functions similar to those of a company fire support officer but at the battalion level. He is responsible for planning fires that support the task force commander. After receiving all subordinate company fire support plans, the battalion fire support officer must consolidate and resolve duplications. This may require him to modify a subordinate company fire support officer's fire support plan. Upon approval of the task force commander, the task force fire support officer sends the fire support plan and associated target list(s) to the brigade fire support element.

The brigade fire support officer, usually a field artillery major, receives and reviews all fire support plans and target lists from the battalion task force fire support elements. He too reviews the plans for duplications and completeness--completeness in the sense that it supports the commander's overall plan. The brigade fire support officer

will also develop his own plan and targets in support of the brigade commander's concept and intent. Once the brigade commander approves the plans, the brigade fire support officer sends it back down the chain of command to task force and company fire support officers. In most cases, the completed brigade plan is also sent to division.

There are two elements at division level that conduct fire support planning--the tactical fire support element and the main fire support element. The tactical fire support element is located with the division tactical command post and is normally involved with requesting and coordinating fire support for current operations. In addition to planning fire support for the division current fight, they review, process, and forward requests for fire support from their subordinate brigade fire support elements. The tactical fire support element is as mobile as the maneuver division's tactical command post.

When required, the main fire support element, located at the division main command post, augments the capabilities of the tactical fire support element. The main fire support element doctrinally focuses their fire support planning efforts on future and/or deep operations. They are responsible for the publication of fire support portions of the division's plans and orders. Providing the division is operating subordinate to a corps, the main fire support element also acts as a coordination and communication link

between the tactical fire support element and the corps fire support element.

Fire support planning at corps level is similar to that at division. The corps tactical fire support element provides and coordinates fire support for the current battle. The corps main fire support element at the corps main command post concentrates on fire support issues for the deep and future operations. Corps tactical and main fire support elements participation in bottom-up fire support planning is minimal. The Corps fire support elements basically assist with coordinating close air support requests and requests for fire support that can not be met or planned for at lower echelons.

Top-down fire support planning is essentially the same as bottom-up, but in reverse. It is a deliberate process--a technique, tactic, and procedure. At brigade and battalion levels, it is usually used in time constrained operations--those operations where there is little time between receipt of mission and execution. The procedures of top-down fire support planning provide for input and refinement from subordinate echelons.

Found primarily at brigade level, top-down fire support planning has always been at corps and division levels. Corps and division fire support elements normally provide targeting data and fire support plans to lower echelons. Most of the targeting information in the fire

support plan at corps and division levels comes from the process known as intelligence preparation of the battlefield. Brigades and battalions can perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield, the lowest level where the process is appropriately resourced, however, is the division. In conjunction with the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, current targeting doctrine uses a three-phase methodology called decide, detect, deliver to produce targets for attack by organic or subordinate assets. When subordinate assets are used, we are now in a top-down scenario.

The decide phase is where the combined arms commander's intent is turned into targeting priorities and guidance. It determines which targets should be acquired and attacked, the location and time when those targets will be acquired, who or what should attack the target, and if target damage assessment is required. This process is done during the war gaming portion of the command estimate process. Figure 2 in appendix A is a graphical portrayal of the link between the decide, detect, and deliver targeting methodology and the command estimate process. The results of the decide phase are the high payoff target list and attack guidance matrix.

The high payoff target list contains a prioritized listing of high payoff targets--those targets that if attacked, will significantly contribute to successful

friendly operations. Examples of targets on a high payoff target list would be enemy air defense radar and missile sites, maneuver command posts, artillery command and control radio frequencies and facilities, and long range artillery or rockets. An example of a high payoff target list is at figure 3, appendix A.

The attack guidance matrix identifies which high payoff targets will be attacked, how and when they will be attacked, and any attack restrictions. Attack guidance matrices provide the subordinate commanders and fire support elements with the desired effects on a specific target. The desired effects are the required amount of damage needed to satisfy the combined arms commander's goals of delaying, disrupting, or limiting a target. These effects are normally expressed in the terms of suppress, neutralize, destroy, or a percentage of destruction determined by the targeting team. Figure 4 at appendix A is an example of the attack guidance matrix.

The detect phase places target acquisition and surveillance assets at the appropriate time and place to monitor the target identified in the detect phase. Detection of the target occurs through signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and/or human intelligence (HUMINT). The G2 is the key staff element in this phase since they control and coordinate detection assets.

The deliver phase culminates the decide, detect, deliver methodology by attacking the target with the fire support system. Simply put, the deliver phase attacks the targets identified in the decide phase and detected in the detect phase.

The meat of top-down fire support planning is at the brigade level. According to the United States Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, top-down fire support planning "has become the more predominate type of fire planning for brigades and below."³ The process begins with the brigade fire support officer developing a target list and fire support execution matrix for the entire brigade. These documents are based on the brigade commander's intent and concept of the operation. Since the plan and targets are coming from the brigade commander, it automatically incorporates the commander's intent for fire support. Figures 5 and 6 at appendix A are examples of a target list and fire support execution matrix, respectively.

Upon approval from the brigade commander, his fire support officer will send the target list down to task force fire support officers, company fire support officers, and fire direction centers. As mentioned earlier, the task force and company fire support officers can refine targets as necessary. The refinement will usually not be significant since the task forces and companies are executing the brigade commander's intent. The brigade fire

support officer will normally provide a cut-off time for task force and company fire support officers to review and provide their refinement. They cut-off time is important to ensure the fire support plan is completed prior to the beginning of the fight. In January 1986, the Center For Army Lessons Learned recognized the importance of this cut-off and published a lesson learned on fire support planning: "Even though fire planning is a continuous process, there must be a 'drop dead' time for making changes to an existing fire plan."⁴

It is important to note here that task force and company fire support officers can in fact plan fire support under a top-down scenario. During a 1991 Joint Readiness Training Center rotation, an observer controller remarked, "In the absence of top down fire planning subordinate units must develop their own target lists and forward them higher for integration into the fire support plan."⁵ In fact, subordinate fire support element input is crucial to the success of top-down fire support planning. The Center for Army Lessons Learned states:

This is not to imply that company fire support officers should not be developing their own fire plans prior to the receipt of the task force fire plan and target list. The company/team fire support officer should use their fire plan to provide the 'Bottom-up' refinement to the task force fire support plan and target list.⁶

Let us now examine how top-down fire support planning came about. In a 1985 memorandum from the commander of the National Training Center to LTG Riscassi, Brigadier General E.S. Leland remarked:

Although execution is mostly decentralized, fire support planning needs to be more tightly controlled at task force level than I previously believed. Specific guidance from battalion concerning where, when, and what to shoot rather than an allocation of priorities to specific companies is often the most effective method of synchronizing fires with maneuver. The fire plan should originate at task force level and then be modified and expanded based upon company input. Given that there is never sufficient artillery to do all things, a centralized approach guards against the risk of firing a few rounds at a large number of low priority targets. The preferred solution is a lot of rounds on a few particularly critical targets.⁷

Although Brigadier General Leland is commenting on fire support planning at the task force and company levels, the points he advocates can be applied to all levels of fire support planning.

Top-down fire support planning is a relatively new procedure; the mid-1980's saw its birth. It evolved primarily from experiences of many units at the combat training centers, particularly the National Training Center. Units were having difficulty completing their fire support plans in a timely and effective manner. Many times, units would not properly incorporate the commander's intent for fire support and often would not have completed the plan prior to the beginning of the battle. One observer

controller remarked following a 1987 National Training Center Rotation:

The point to be made is that a battalion FSO can only plan for so much fire support efficiently and ensure effective use. The bulk of formal planning should be accomplished at brigade and distributed to the battalion FSO in formal plans complete with target lists, schedules, etc.⁸

The artillery school at Fort Sill further amplifies the observer controller's remarks: "Our experiences at the combat training centers have shown repeatedly that top-down fire planning is the most effective technique to be used, particularly in a time constrained operation."⁹ The Center for Army Lessons Learned echoes Fort Sill:

The fire support coordinator or fire support officer do not have the luxury of time to develop a 'bottom-up' fire support plan. Operational requirements do not allow the observers to develop, identify, and plan targets or fires in support of the maneuver force, and forward them up through fire support channels for consolidation at each higher level.

The lack of available planning time requires the fire support coordinator and fire support officer to conduct the planning for their subordinate units, and to disseminate the plan down to the units for refinements, adjustments, and execution.¹⁰

Additional observations following combat training centers rotations continued to surface the difficulties the fire support community was having providing timely fire support. In 1987, a Center For Army Lessons Learned Commander's Comments bulletin further remarked:

Centralized planning is essential to ensure that a uniform plan is available to support the operation. Fire planning should be both formal and informal, regardless of the time available, to be executable and successful. A fire plan formulated and disseminated from higher to lower, will allow the fire plan to be communicated to support the commander's concept but feedback from the lower echelons is vital to refine the plan according to conditions that lower units meet.¹¹

Less than one year later, the Center For Army Lessons

Learned published yet another lesson learned:

Inflated target lists and failure to prioritize targets cause unnecessary delays and confusion during the execution of the fire support plan. The brigade FSO in conjunction with the TF FSO's must develop and streamline the target list before it is sent to the DS Bn FDC for execution.¹²

In the same year, The Center For Army Lessons Learned again remarked:

Fire plans executed at the company/team and platoon level frequently fail to reflect the brigade or task force commander's intent. The brigade FSO may or may not include targets submitted by forward observers, company and task force FSOs in the brigade fire plan. There often isn't enough time to collect target lists and fire plans from the companies, resolve duplications and redundancies, and consolidate them into a single cohesive plan at brigade.¹³

Lessons on fire support planning continued to be learned into the 1990's. The Center For Army Lessons learned commented in May of 1990:

There is normally not enough time during preparation for combat for the brigade FSO to wait for platoon Forward Observers (FO's) and company/battalion FSO's to identify, consolidate, and forward targets for inclusion into the fire support plan. Fire support plans developed by the brigade FSO include the commander's intent

and can be refined by the subordinate battalion and company FSO's much quicker than having the plan 'bubble up.'¹⁴

It should be noted here that the fire support community recognized that top-down fire support planning was probably a good change. Major Jeffrey W. Yaeger remarked in 1990,

with the growing emphasis on top-down fire planning as the most promising technique --clear, concise, and structured methods of conveying guidance must be used.¹⁵

Tactical operations at the combat training centers were not the only contributing factor into the evolution of top-down fire support planning. The doctrinal separation of the battlefield into close, deep, and rear operations naturally leads us to top-down fire planning.

Although somewhat limited in capabilities, the division is the first echelon that can conduct deep operations. The division commander has both the acquisition and attack assets to fight deep. He can acquire targets with assets from the Military Intelligence Battalion that habitually provides intelligence and electronic warfare support to the division. The division commander can attack deep targets with assets from Division Artillery, non-lethal fires from the Military Intelligence Battalion, and/or maneuver--both Army aviation and mechanized forces. Subordinate elements will, at times, execute fire support plans or participate in a fire support plan conceived at division level, thus top-down.

The purpose of the deep battle is to provide leverage for the close fight--to isolate the close battle. The echelon truly capable of this and properly resourced is the Corps. Appropriately, it is charged with the responsibility of fighting the deep battle. A Corps normally has a Military Intelligence Brigade, and Aviation Brigade, and Field Artillery Brigade which can be used for the deep battle. Just as in the limited division deep fight, subordinate divisions and brigades will at times be executing fire support plans or participating in a fire support plan conceived at Corps. This too is top-down.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

But the top-down planning process shouldn't preclude specific targets picked by subordinate commanders from being put into the fire plan. We need to balance top-down planning with the bottom-up requirements of subordinate commanders.

Brigadier General Wesley K. Clark

This chapter will outline the research methodology used to answer the research questions. A combination of descriptive analyses based on deductive reasoning and a completed comparison matrix will be presented.

The descriptive analyses will be based on the advantages and disadvantages of both top-down and bottom-up fire support planning. Additional descriptive analysis will be presented based on the application of the best procedure (top-down or bottom-up) to the principles of fire support. Finally, based on the results of telephonic interviews with field artillery commanders or their designated representatives and fire support officers, a comparison will be made of top-down and bottom-up fire support planning using a matrix based on the following criteria:

Effectiveness. Which procedure provides the combined arms commander with better fire support? Which

procedure results in a better scheme of fires to support the scheme of maneuver?

Speed. Which procedure is faster? Which permits the fire support plan to be completed soonest?

Combined Arms Commander Support. Which procedure do combined arms commanders endorse?

In conducting the field interviews, I will ask the respondents the following questions:

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?
2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?
3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?
4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?
5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?
6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?
7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?
8. Have you deployed to any Combat Training Center? If so, how many? What, if any, were After Action Review comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

While the scientific methodology of analysis is preferred for most studies, it is inappropriate in this case. It is possible that empirical data could be generated, but at great expense. Generating empirical data

would require developing a fire support plan under both scenarios and executing it, measuring any number of variables from speed to effects on targets. The resources required to conduct this type of data gathering are enormous: personnel, weapon systems, land, monies, and ammunition to name just a few. That type of data gathering and analysis are beyond the scope of this paper.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The purpose of top-down fire planning is not to provide a short cut in the planning process. It's a technique for accomplishing what doctrine has always dictated - developing a plan for fire support that supports the intent of the maneuver commander concurrent with the preparation of the maneuver plan.¹

A three part analysis will be conducted to determine the answer(s) to the primary research question. The advantages and disadvantages of both top-down and bottom-up fire support planning will be examined first. Next, the principles of fire support that were reviewed in chapter 2 will be applied to top-down and bottom-up fire support planning. Finally, the results of the 24 interviews with field artillery commanders and fire support officers will be presented and reviewed.

Advantages and Disadvantages

Like any procedure, both top down-fire support planning and bottom-up fire support planning have their advantages and disadvantages. Let us first examine the advantages and disadvantages of top-down fire support planning.

Top-Down Fire Support Planning Advantages

Speed

Top-down fire support planning is faster. The process permits the fire support plan to be completed sooner than in a bottom-up environment. When asked which procedure got the fire support plan completed faster, all commanders and fire support officers responded with top-down fire support planning. Top-down fire support planning largely removes the requirement for the fire support officers to go back and forth coordinating the plan. It may, in fact, be considered planning by exception--this is inherently faster.

Top-down fire support planning gets the fire support plan into the hands of subordinate fire support officers and combined arms commanders faster than bottom-up does. This works hand in glove with the one-thirds--two-thirds planning rule. This planning rule provides each subordinate level two-thirds of the total time available for planning while the immediately higher echelon has one third of the total planning time. Top-down fire support planning facilitates this rule by quickly completing the plan and providing it to subordinate echelons in enough time for them to review the fire support plan and complete their planning.

Top-down fire support planning is particularly useful in short-notice or time critical missions. In the military profession, many, if not most of the tactical plans

and operations are often developed under extreme time constrained circumstances. Top-down fire support planning provides the tools to complete the fire support plan in sufficient time to meet the constraints. Major Peter S. Corpac remarks:

The advantages of top-down fire planning are that the concept for fire support is developed early, and the artillery battalions and task forces can plan for the battle concurrently.²

Combined Arms Commander Intent

The procedures of top-down fire support planning allow the person responsible for synchronizing the battle--the combined arms commander--to synchronize the battle. In order to obtain the most effective results on the battlefield, the combined arms commander must synchronize all of his combat power at the right time and place. Synchronization is defined in the Army's capstone doctrine manual as "the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce relative combat power at the decisive point."³ As a tenet of AirLand Battle doctrine, synchronization is fundamental to success. Top-down fire support planning provides a tool for the combined arms commander to synchronize his operations. Put another way, the lower the fire support plan is developed, the farther away from the synchronizer the fire support plan is. Obviously, this is not the preferred solution.

Synchronization is not the only responsibility of a combined arms commander. Critical to his success is a clear conveyance of his intent for an operation. If the combined arms commander employs top-down fire support planning, the fire support plan will then already include his intent. This is advantageous over bottom-up fire support planning, since there is no longer a requirement to review subordinate fire support plans for supporting the combined arms commander's intent. Only the bottom-up refinement needs review to ensure subordinate units are still within the parameters of the combined arms commander's intent.

Utilizing top-down fire support planning allows the combined arms commander to directly influence the battle plan as he sees fit. Subordinate echelons submitting their targets and fire support plans in a bottom-up environment may not understand where, when, why, or how the combined arms commander wants to influence the battle.

Using top-down fire support planning provides all subordinate commanders and their units a focus--how the combined arms commander sees and wants the fight to progress. Piecemealing the plan with bottom-up fire support planning does not provide that focus. Here, the advantage is that all players are operating on the same sheet of music.

Target Lists

One unique advantage of top-down fire support planning is the availability of target lists. Target lists are generally available sooner in a top-down scenario compared to a bottom-up one. Since they are available sooner, they can be sent to subordinate commanders sooner. The subordinate commander, now having the approved target list, can review it to determine and/or confirm his higher commander's intent. This also permits the subordinate commander to develop his plan based on his superior's intent. Under these circumstances, the subordinate commander does not have to develop his plan and then have it needlessly changed because the combined arms commander's intent was not disseminated or understood.

Another advantage concerning the development of target lists under top-down fire support planning is it provides a workable solution early on in the planning process. "In high-tempo operations, the top-down fire plan provides a workable plan in a relatively short time."⁴ General George S. Patton, Jr., once said, "A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan next week." Applying fire support planning to General Patton's remarks, we find it may be to our disadvantage if we wait for the perfect fire support plan to be developed by subordinate units, sent up for approval, and sent back down again. Further, if mission requirements cut the planning

process short, top-down fire support planning procedures have already placed the target list in subordinate units. This can only improve chances for success.

Rehearsals

Top-down fire support planning allows more time for rehearsals. "An important step in clearly understanding a plan is to rehearse it--a principle no less applicable to the fire support plan than to the maneuver plan."⁵ As one Division Artillery Commander remarked, "Without top-down fire support planning, the plan is unrehearsable."⁶

The probability of success in any given battle increases exponentially with the amount and quality of rehearsals conducted. Granted, rehearsals can not be conducted all of the time, but they should be conducted whenever the circumstances permit. When they do, top-down fire support planning can get the fire support plan completed and sent to subordinates in sufficient time to facilitate the conduct of a rehearsal.

A recent publication by The Center For Army Lessons Learned addresses the importance of conducting rehearsals and states, "Rehearsals still need to be conducted . . . because everyone must understand the commander's definition of success."⁷ Top-down fire support planning can ensure that the fire support plan is completed thereby contributing to a successful rehearsal.

Target Duplications

In the old days of bottom-up fire support planning, fire support officers tended to target terrain without consideration of the enemy and friendly situations. This was particularly the case in the company and battalion fire support elements. Commonly referred to as "measle sheeting," the end result was a fire support plan that was unreasonable, unmanageable, and more often than not, did not support the combined arms commander's intent for the operation nor his intent for fires. Procedurally, the challenge in a bottom-up environment was resolving duplications between three or four company fire support officers and three or four battalion fire support officers. Here then is another advantage of top-down fire support planning--fewer if any target duplications.

Using top-down fire support planning reduces the amount of target duplications. This is essentially the case because the higher commander is selecting the targets and pushing them down. If a subordinate fire support officer has selected a target that the higher commander has selected, that target then automatically is a target in the plan, because the higher commander feels it is important for his plan.

Senior/experienced Personnel

It goes without saying that in our Army as well as in any organization, the less experienced personnel are at lower echelons. Sergeants are at the squad/section level; lieutenants are at the platoon level; and apprentices are at the entry level in civilian industry, etc. Therefore, the lower we go in the organization; the less experience we usually will encounter. Logically then, the opposite is true that more experience exists at the upper levels. This is an advantage in top-down fire support planning.

The personnel with more experience are making the decisions that will ultimately go into developing and executing the fire support plan. Lieutenant Colonel Robert D. Sander remarks, "Planning originates at the higher levels and is performed under the supervision of the most experienced fire support planner in the force."⁸ Herein lies the advantage--the fire support plan is being developed, disseminated, and executed by the most experienced personnel available. Major Peter S. Corpac further amplifies Lieutenant Colonel Sanders by remarking, "The brigade planning then relies on the most experienced Field Artillerymen in the brigade, the direct support (DS) battalion commander and brigade FSO, and not on the less experienced company FSOs."⁹

Integration of Fire Support

When discussing synchronization earlier, I mentioned combat power. In the discussion on the fundamentals of AirLand Battle doctrine, combat power is defined as "the ability to fight."¹⁰ Our doctrine further stipulates that, "superior combat power is generated through a commander's skillful combination of the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership."¹¹ Implied in these two statements is the incorporation of all seven battlefield operating systems in the plan. Our seven doctrinal battlefield operating systems are intelligence, maneuver, fire support, mobility/countermobility/survivability, air defense, combat service support, and command and control. The advantage to using top-down fire support planning here is that the fire support plan can now be integrated--at the top--where the remaining six battlefield operating systems are developed into the battle plan.

Resource Allocation

A distinct advantage of top-down fire support planning is that the commander and fire support officer can determine the best use of fire support resources. From most people's perspective, there never seems to be enough artillery, close air support, air interdiction, or any other fire support asset. This is an accurate perception because fire support assets are truly a scarce commodity. During

top-down fire support planning the commander, based on recommendations from his staff and fire support officer, determines who will get these scarce assets. The advantage is two-fold. First, the decision is being made early in the planning process, at the appropriate level, and in conjunction with the distribution and allocation of other combat multipliers. Second, since the decision is being made early on, subordinate commanders can now plan for the use of that asset and make necessary arrangements and coordination.

Clear Identification of Responsibilities

Another advantage of top-down fire support planning is the clear delineation of target responsibilities. Bottom-up fire support planning identified the target, but did not assign the target to a specific unit or agency. In a top-down environment, the commander now selects the target and during the wargaming process identifies who will be responsible for that target.

Concurrent Planning

In my assessment, the most important advantage of top-down fire support planning is the development of the fire support plan concurrently with the combined arms commander's intent and scheme of maneuver. Maneuver and firepower are two key elements of combat power. If their

use is planned and executed simultaneously, the results will be decisive. Top-down fire support planning contributes to this decisive effect of maneuver and firepower since the fire support plan is being developed along with the maneuver plan. Under a bottom-up scenario, the subordinate echelons often planned with little or no understanding of the combined arms commander's intended use of maneuver and firepower.

Intent For Fire Support

Hand in glove with concurrent planning is the advantage in top-down fire support planning of the conveyance of the combined arms commander's intent for fires. One may ask what is the difference between the commander's intent for the operation and his intent for fires. The commander's intent for fires is how the combined arms commanders envisions all of his fire support assets supporting his scheme of maneuver. Put another way, the commander's intent for fires delineates what he wants fire support assets to accomplish in the battle. Here again, the advantage lies in that subordinate echelons in a bottom-up environment may not understand the intent for fires.

Top-Down Fire Support Planning Disadvantages

Input From Subordinate Commanders

As mentioned previously in this paper, top-down fire support planning is a formal process. It is rather centralized. A distinct disadvantage to the process is little input from subordinate unit commanders and their fire support officers.

Particularly in the defense, the commander who knows the situation best is the commander on the ground at that location. This is where top-down fire support planning has a disadvantage. Compared to bottom-up fire support planning, the commander on the ground has little input into the development of the fire support plan. His only input is through bottom-up refinement. If the combined arms commander does not recognize this, the top-down fire support plan may be developed with missing or erroneous information.

Initiative

One may infer from the discussion thus far that top-down fire support planning stifles initiative. This may be the case, and therefore a disadvantage. With all of the information and resources being managed and distributed at the top, subordinate leaders may tend to wait for their piece of the pie. This in my mind, is more of a leadership

issue than a fire support issue. It is however, a situation that warrants consideration of the combined arms commander.

Bottom-up Refinement

Another potential disadvantage of top-down fire support planning is the loss or confusion of bottom-up refinement. As mentioned earlier, top-down fire support planning is especially advantageous in time critical situations. If commanders and fire support officers are not being proactive in refining the data, the refinement may never get into the system in time for the battle. This now presents a totally disjointed fire support plan that will have no effect. As I mentioned earlier, the best person to understand a given situation is the person on the ground. He must take all necessary actions to get the refinement up, and of equal importance, provide accurate refinement. Bottom-up refinement is crucial to the success of a top-down fire support plan. Unit standard operating procedures and training can reduce and even negate this potential disadvantage.

Bottom-Up Fire Support Planning Advantages

Subordinate Commander Input

In a bottom-up environment, fire support planning is essentially left up to the discretion of subordinate

commanders. From their perspective, this is a distinct advantage over top-down fire support planning. They now have more influence in the fire support planning process. From the perspective of the higher commander, he now has an idea of the situation at the subordinate commander's location. Bottom-up fire support planning may paint a more accurate picture for the combined arms commander.

Method Of Attack

Bottom-up fire support planning permits a subordinate commander and his fire support officer to recommend methods of attack. This is particularly advantageous to the commander since one method of attack may better suit his plan for battle. In other words, he may prefer to have a specific weapon or munition attack a target to complement his scheme of maneuver.

Plan Familiarity

Since they developed it at their level, commanders and their fire support officers are initially more familiar with the fire support plan. This is an advantage if the planning cycle suddenly becomes abbreviated. They have the targets they selected and the fire support plan that supports their scheme of maneuver.

Bottom-Up Fire Support Planning Disadvantages

Time Consuming

Fire support planning conducted from bottom-up consumes an enormous amount of time. This is the case regardless of which level we consider. It takes time to review each subordinate level fire support officer's fire support plan. Then, if there is a problem, it takes more time to resolve the problem and forward the plan to the next higher echelon.

Rehearsals

As mentioned earlier, rehearsals are crucial for success on the battlefield. Bottom-up fire support planning may not permit commanders and staff to conduct their rehearsals. If there is time to conduct rehearsals, it most likely will not be enough. Valuable time is lost while subordinate commanders and fire support officers develop their plans and forward them up the chain.

Confusion To Direct Support Artillery

When organizing field artillery for combat, we normally provide one field artillery battalion in direct support to a combined arms brigade. The brigade normally has three to four battalion task forces. Under a bottom-up scenario, the brigade fire support officer must incorporate

the battalion task force fire support plans into one brigade fire support plan that can be sent to the direct support field artillery battalion for execution. If the brigade fire support officer does not carefully integrate the plans of the subordinate battalion task forces, he will have an uncoordinated fire support plan. The direct support field artillery battalion will then have a disjointed fire support plan that when executed will most likely fail to support the brigade commander.

Failure To Recognize Combined Arms Commander's Intent

The potential loss or confusion of the combined arms commander's intent during bottom-up refinement is a disadvantage for bottom-up fire support planning. The combined arms commander's intent may "become watered down as each battalion/company commander's intent is integrated into the fire plan."¹²

Application of the Principles of Fire Support

In chapter 2, we reviewed the principles of fire support planning. It would be inappropriate not to consider them when analyzing fire support planning techniques.

In applying the principles of fire support to an analysis of top-down and bottom-up fire support planning, I will basically answer the question: which procedure better

satisfies or is better suited for that particular principle of fire support.

Plan Early and Continuously

Top-down fire support planning facilitates the planning early portion of this principle. Top-down fire support planning begins during the mission analysis phase of the tactical decision making process. As soon as the mission is received, the commander and his fire support officer begin identifying targets and resources to support the mission. Already, under a top-down scenario, the development of fire support plan has started, in many cases, hours before the plan could be developed and received in a bottom-up scenario. This gives the combined arms commander and his fire support officer a jump on the system and will thereby facilitate continuous planning.

Fire support planning does not stop once the battle starts. It must be a continuous process. Continuous fire support planning essentially occurs in either a top-down or bottom-up environment. However, the process is more efficient in a top-down scenario than in a bottom-up one. This is primarily the case because in a bottom-up fire support plan, the plan has to be sent up, consolidated, and sent down again. Top-down, on the other hand, only needs the refinement--small changes to the fire support plan prior to execution. Therefore, it is more efficient to plan

continuously when only minor changes to the plan are required.

In addition to making only minor changes to the fire support plan, changes should be made based on updates from subordinate units. The focal point where these updates generally occur is brigade level. Battlefield updates, situation reports, etc., normally are passed to higher headquarters in order for the combined arms commander to remain informed. Here, at this level, the fire support plan can be adjusted if necessary and sent back down.

Exploit All Available Targeting Assets

Top-down fire support planning better applies to this principle of fire support. Particularly at brigade and higher fire support elements, top-down fire support planning is the better suited technique. Most operations cells and fire support elements at these higher echelons have the organic targeting capabilities and/or direct access to a targeting asset. This provides the fire support coordinator at those levels the opportunity to tie directly in to a targeting asset. In some cases, there may be more than one asset to tap, thus a good opportunity to exploit. Fire support officers at company and battalion level ultimately have access to targeting assets, but gaining access to and obtaining information from the targeting asset is not timely.

Use All Lethal And Non-Lethal Fire Support Means

Similar to exploiting all available targeting assets, the availability of both lethal and non-lethal fire support means are normally managed by combined arms commanders at brigade and higher. Top-down fire support planning is better suited to satisfy this principle.

When the combined arms commander and his fire support coordinator apply the decide, detect, deliver methodology, they can best determine the use and/or combination of lethal and non-lethal fires. At times, the best effects on some targets are a combination of lethal and non-lethal fires. Other times, non-lethal fires may be required on targets that are beyond the range of lethal indirect fires. The point here is that the commander and his fire support officer can determine the best available asset, lethal and/or non-lethal, to attack the target as part of the fire support plan. Again, top-down in earnest.

Use Lowest Echelon Capable Of Furnishing Effective Fire Support

While the mention of lowest echelon might lead some to think bottom-up, top-down fire support planning is more appropriately applied to this principle. Here, we want to select the type and level of fire support that best supports the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver and that

can best accomplish the commander's desired effects on the target. As mentioned in chapter 2, we want the level to be as low as possible , but not so low as to lose sight the commander's intent. The best person(s) to accomplish this are, again, the combined arms commander and his fire support coordinator in a top-down scenario.

Use The Most Effective Means

"Do not hunt bear with a BB gun, or a fly with a shotgun. Targets must be evaluated and attacked with the most effective means."¹³ Similar to determining the lowest echelon that can accomplish the mission, the combined arms commander and his fire support officer in a top-down fire support planning environment are best suited to select the appropriate weapon. Granted, subordinate fire support officers could identify the appropriate system, but the combined arms commander is in the best position to determine the weapon system's availability and suitability, but most importantly how that system and its use best supports the scheme of maneuver.

Furnish The Type Of Support Requested

The fire support coordinator must ensure that the fire support requested supports the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver and guidance. If it does and the means of fire support are available, he is bound to

provide that means of fire support. While the request may be initiated at lower echelons, it is the fire support coordinator who must weigh the request against the commander's concept of the operation. This top-down influence is particularly important since the fire support coordinator must also consider and facilitate future operations.

If the request for fire support does not meet the combined arms commander's guidance, is not available, or does not facilitate future operations, the fire support coordinator should provide a substitute means of fire support. In a top-down environment, subordinate fire support elements may not have the information on fire support asset availability or future operations considerations.

Avoid Unnecessary Duplication

We have already addressed duplication in earlier discussions on advantages on disadvantages. This principle, however, is probably best supported by top-down fire support planning. Fire support assets, both lethal and non-lethal, are and will continue to be scarce resource. It is to our advantage to ensure only sufficient force be applied that accomplishes the combined arms commander's intent. Top-down fire support planning, through target and attack selections

can simultaneously ensure only minimum force be used while managing the fire support assets.

Consider Airspace Coordination

Top-down fire support planning better suits this principle. Excluding close air support distributed to subordinate units, army aviation and tactical air support are planned and controlled at higher echelons. It is more efficient to coordinate and deconflict airspace at higher echelons.

Provide Adequate Support

What is adequate support? The answer is that amount of fire support that supports the combined arms commander's scheme of maneuver. That amount is best determined in a top-down environment where the fire support coordinator is in a position to integrate fire support with maneuver. Usually, the fire support coordinator in conjunction with the battle staff will determine what supports the operation.

Provide Rapid and Effective Coordination

Fire support plans developed under a top-down environment better suit this principle. Commenting on this principle of fire support, the Center For Army Lessons Learned remarks:

The locations of the supported units, the plans of the maneuver force, the locations and status of the fire support elements, the fire support coordination measures, and guidance of the maneuver must continually be updated, evaluated, and coordinated throughout the entire battle.¹⁴

Obviously, if the fire support planning is conducted at the higher echelons, it can better accomplish those things mentioned in the Center For Army Lessons Learned comment. Put another way, a company fire support officer would have a difficult if not insurmountable task of managing those items above while providing rapid and effective fire support to his company commander.

Flexibility

As we will see further on in this paper, top-down fire support planning appears to be faster than bottom-up. This being the case, top-down fire support planning better supports the principle of flexibility.

Under the top-down scenario, the fire support plan is completed sooner and is placed in the hands of those subordinate commanders and fire support officers who will execute it. Under the bottom-up scenario, the plan goes up and then back down. This may prevent the commander and fire support officer from anticipating and thereby becomes inflexible. Granted, changes will undoubtedly occur and in battle, more often than not. A completed plan in the hands of the personnel who will execute is easier to modify than one still being coordinated.

Provide For Safeguarding and Survivability Of Friendly Forces/Installations

This principle of fire support normally is associated with establishing fire support coordinating measures. Troop safety and the coordination of fires must be addressed in the fire support plan. The logical place to accomplish this is at the higher echelons, where, under a top-down scenario, they are responsible for synchronizing the maneuver plan with the fires plan. In other words, a company fire support officer can not efficiently plan his fire support if he is not aware of the fire support coordinating measures in effect. Fire support coordinating measures are usually established at the brigade and higher echelons. It will be more efficient for the fire support coordinator to plan the fire support in conjunction with the maneuver plan and establishment of fire support coordinating measures and then provide a complete plan to subordinate fire support elements.

Telephone Interview Results

While the doctrinal review and analysis of top-down fire support planning leads us to recognize it as probably a good procedure, this study would not be complete without a sensing of what is actually going on in the field. What are units using today?

Accordingly, over a period of several weeks, field artillery commanders were telephonically interviewed to determine the latest status of top-down fire support planning. Questioning was prefaced with a guarantee of non-attribution to the officer or his unit. The results of the interview will only be presented by unit type or duty position of the respondent.

A total of 24 interviews were conducted. The results of the interviews are at appendix B. Of the 24 officers questioned, nine were Division Artillery Commanders, nine were Direct Support Field Artillery Battalion Commanders, five were Brigade Fire Support Officers, and one Battalion Adjutant. While the Battalion Adjutant is not currently in a fire support duty position, his remarks are considered valid. He was a Company Fire Support Officer in Operation Desert Storm. The 24 officers interviewed represent our Army's divisional force structure in the United States, Europe, Alaska, and Hawaii. The following questions were posed:

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?
2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?
3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

All 24 respondents were familiar with top-down fire support planning. All knew the basic procedures, language, and problems. The purpose of asking this question was to obtain a sensing if the field had a grasp of the fundamentals of top-down fire support planning. Although not extensively pursued, the respondents did have a general understanding of the procedures.

All respondents indicated they are currently using top-down fire support planning. As evidenced by the next question, some are experiencing more success than others. The fact that all respondents are using top-down fire

support planning indicates that the fire support community took the lessons learned of the mid to late 1980's to heart.

Fifteen of twenty-four respondents felt that top-down fire support planning permitted them to provide above average fire support. The remaining nine respondents categorized the effectiveness of their fire support as average. Based on the conversations we had, I believe this is more attributable to the state of training and experience of personnel in key fire support positions than it is to the validity of the procedure. Seven of these nine respondents had been in their current duty positions less than 12 months. Further, more than one respondent indicated that the success and effectiveness of top-down fire support planning depended somewhat on the experience of the fire support personnel.

The lower we go in the maneuver chain of command, the less support for top-down fire support planning apparently exists. Several respondents indicated that battalion task force and particularly company commanders are not as supportive as brigade commanders. For the most part though, maneuver and combined arms commanders support top-down fire support planning. This perception has not changed since I last served in a direct support field artillery battalion. Company commander support of top-down fire support planning is a problem that warrants attention.

All respondents replied that they considered top-down fire support planning faster. When asked to reflect back to the days when the respondents were forward observers, battalion, and/or brigade fire support officers, most replied that there was no comparison--top-down was faster.

Officers who are presently in units that fought in Operation Desert Storm were interviewed. Of the officers interviewed, nine divisions that fought in the Gulf War were represented. With the exception of one division, all respondents indicated their divisions used top-down fire support planning in the Gulf War. It should be noted that the respondent who did not reply in the affirmative stated he did not know if the division used top-down fire support planning in the Gulf War.

Twenty-two of the twenty-four respondents have been on at least one Combat Training Center rotation. All respondents indicated that all three Combat Training Centers recognize top-down fire support planning as the way fire support should be planned.

As addressed in chapter three, we now need to apply the criteria of effectiveness, speed, and combined arms support to both fire support planning procedures. The definitions of the criteria are stated in chapter three; they will not be repeated here. In the matrix that follows, lower numbers are better.

	Top-Down	Bottom-Up
Effectiveness	1	2
Speed	1	2
Combined Arms Commander Support	1.5	1.5
Totals	3.5	5.5

Similar to a decision matrix, the above matrix represents a graphical portrayal of an analysis. Put this way, when deciding which fire support planning procedure is better, a decision matrix would yield top-down.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The most significant change in fire support in twenty years.¹

Conclusions

The decision to change fire support planning procedures from bottom-up to top-down was a smart one. Although far from being a perfect (nothing in military operations is perfect) procedure to conduct fire support planning, top-down fire support planning is better than bottom-up. Top-down fire support planning facilitates synchronization, contributes to mass, integrates different fire support means, is faster, and links the scheme of fires with the scheme of maneuver.

"The result of this failure to synchronize the fire support system to the maneuver plan is fire support does not contribute to success and maneuver forces fail without it."² After 57 rotations as an observer controller at the National Training Center, Major Marion L. Burn III remarks talk to one of the most difficult tasks to accomplish when preparing for and executing fire support--synchronizing it with the other battlefield operating systems. Top-down fire support planning makes synchronizing the battle more efficient since

the fire support plan is developed simultaneously with the combined arms commander's planned use of other combat multipliers. Most importantly though, the fire support plan is being developed at the location where the combined arms commander can directly influence the contents of the plan-- at his headquarters/command post.

As related by a captured Iraqi artillery commander, prior to the ground war he had lost only 10 percent of his cannon tubes, but in the initial phase of the ground assault, he lost all of his remaining guns to massed (emphasis mine) indirect fires.³

The above remarks by the United States Field Artillery School highlight another reason why top-down fire support planning is superior to bottom-up. Top-down fire support planning allows combined arms commanders to mass their fires--not just indirect fires, but the synergistic effects of massed lethal and non-lethal fires. Our doctrine, common sense, experiences at Combat Training Centers, and experiences in Operation Desert Storm tell us that it requires massed fire support to provide the best effects on the battlefield.

Top-down fire support planning best accomplishes the task of massing our fires. Similar to synchronization, the combined arms commander can select the best fire support assets to provide mass. The assets he chooses will be based on those assets organic or attached to his organization and

the availability of those assets. Here, the combined arms commander best knows those assets and the status of them.

Hand in glove with synchronization and mass is the task of integration. Again, the United States Army Field Artillery School comments,

Despite a significant Iraqi range advantage and superiority in numbers, our Fire Support 'system of systems' overwhelmed the threat. The integration (emphasis mine) of target acquisition, C3, and cannon, rocket, and missile systems, took away his 'eyes', fixed him in position and silenced all Iraqi artillery that dared to fire.⁴

The procedures of bottom-up fire support planning do not permit the combined arms commander to efficiently and effectively integrate his fire support. Here again, the fire support plan developed at the top has a better chance of success since it is developed where all the elements of combat power can be focused into one integrated plan.

As evidenced by discussions with commanders and fire support officers (appendix B), top-down fire support planning is being used in the field with overall success. According to all commanders and fire support officers queried, it is a faster procedure. It gets the fire support plan in the hands of the executors quickly. Brigade and battalion task force commanders generally support top-down fire support planning. Some company commanders, however, are reluctant to accept the procedure. They perceive they are being left out of the picture. Observe controllers at

our Combat Training Centers feel that top-down fire support planning is the preferred method of planning fire support.

One area that surfaces through the study and analysis of top-down fire support planning is the question of centralization. Does the procedure lead to over-centralization of planning and allocation of resources? Without bottom-up refinement, the answer obviously would be yes. There has to be a balance between centralization and decentralization. Only the combined arms commander can determine this balance based on his experience, unit, staff, and subordinate leaders. After observing 29 units rotate through the National Training Center, LTC Andrew M. Peterson comments on centralization,

The brigade commanders and staffs want to help win but often forget that help does not necessarily mean giving more assets to subordinates. More assets may overload subordinate element's ability to command and control and reduce their focus of effort. Help may well mean retaining control and responsibility of an asset.⁵

Top-down fire support planning, however, does not relieve commanders and their fire support officers of the responsibility to check on the status and progress of the fire support plan. For instance, the fire support officer should review bottom-up refinement information and ensure the subordinate fire support plans are complete. Specifically, the fire support officer should ensure the plan is doctrinally sound, meets the combined arms

commander's intent, does not contain duplicate targets or duplication of effort, and uses all available fire support assets. Major John W. Harbison, a former Combat Maneuver Training Center observer controller remarks,

The brigade fire support officer's checking the task force plan helps him identify problems or mistakes in the overall plan and facilitates solving problems before a rehearsal.⁶

While none of the respondents during the interviews indicated an interference problem from higher headquarters or fire support elements, there is a new technique, tactic, and procedure that may in fact generate some interference. Called Joint Precision Strike, this procedure may be considered by some as the ultimate in top-down fire support planning.

JPS is the attack of high value targets at extended ranges with precision accuracy in support of national military objectives. The Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy all have something to contribute.⁷

The procedure was born in Operation Desert Storm when a Corps high payoff target with a short loiter time was detected by the Joint Surveillance And Target Attack Radar System, a United States Air Force asset. After the Air Force passed the target essentially to the United States Army delivery unit, the target was attacked by tactical missiles with devastating effects.⁸

With Joint Precision Strike, we now have joint top-down fire support planning. For truly critical high payoff

targets, Joint Precision Strike provides the commander with an awesome capability, particularly with the ranges of our tactical missiles reaching 150 + kilometers. As the Chief of Field Artillery, Major General Fred F. Marty remarked in his 1992 state of the branch address,

With participants from all services providing devastating, coordinated fires in concert with one another....the combined arms commander can control the tempo of the battle by attacking the enemy to the depth of his weapon systems at the times and places of his choosing; his foe--any foe--will have no place to hide and no time to rest.⁹

Caution must be exercised though that only those targets clearly meeting the definition of high payoff are selected as Joint Precision Strike candidates. Further, the commander must ensure that the assets he selects to attack the targets are not engaged in another commander's fight. Joint Precision strike promises to be an interesting application of top-down fires.

Finally, one may ponder the future of decentralized operations altogether--not just in the fire support arena. In my assessment, one of the great success stories in our Army is the initiative displayed by our junior leaders. Generally, this initiative is due to the fact that they have been permitted to execute their missions with minimal centralized control. Our doctrine generally supports a centralized planning, decentralized execution scenario.

This should not change, and applies equally, just as the name says, to top-down fire support planning.

Recommendations

Based on what I have learned through this study, I recommend we continue using top-down fire support planning as the primary fire support planning tool. It has many advantages over bottom-up. In the long run, it is the better alternative. While some may argue that it's over centralized, the benefits of synchronized, integrated, and massed fire support and the effects that fire support will have on potential enemies override that argument.

Specifically though, we must educate our junior leaders, particularly the company commanders, that top-down is the preferred method of planning fire support. It is in their best long-term interest. They must understand that the combined arms commander may have to utilize all of his fire support assets elsewhere--most likely to mass in support of the main effort. Of equal importance though is that the combined arms commander must build in sufficient flexibility in the fire support plan to permit fire support assets to redirect.

Further recommend we continue our development and acquisition of an unmanned aerial vehicle. This asset has great capabilities. A potential use suggested by a direct support field artillery battalion commander is for bottom-up refinement.

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

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Chapter 2

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²U.S. Army, FM 6-20, Fire Support in Combined Arms Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1984), 3-6.

³The 19 January 1993 Final Draft Version of FM 100-5 provides a new tenet for Army operations - versatility. Versatility is defined as the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements. Commanders shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently.

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⁵U.S. Army, NTC Lessons Learned (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned/Combined Arms Training Activity, 1986), 7.

⁶U.S. Army, Observation Report Number 2873 (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1991), 1.

⁷U.S. Army, Fire Support for the Maneuver Commander (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned/Combined Arms Training Activity, 1990), 11. (Cited hereafter as CALL 90-1.)

⁸U.S. Army, NTC Lessons Learned Commanders Memorandum (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned/Combined Arms Training Activity, 1985), 5.

⁹U.S. Army, Observation Report Number 3200 (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1987), 1

¹⁰U.S. Army, Top Down Fire Planning (Fort Sill: United States Field Artillery School, TA04SD HO1, 1990), 1.

¹¹CALL 90-1, 11.

¹²U.S. Army, NTC Lessons Learned Commanders Comments the CS Team (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Training Activity, 1987), 3.

¹³U.S. Army, Observation Report Number 3903 (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1988), 1

¹⁴U.S. Army, Center For Army Lessons Learned Compendium (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned/Combined Arms Training Activity, 1988), 15.

¹⁵CALL 90-1, 1.

¹⁶Jeffrey W. Yaeger, "Fire Support The Written Side,"
Infantry 2 (March-April 1990): 25.

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¹Sander, 45.

²Peter S. Corpac, "Brigade Top-Down Fire Planning and Execution," Field Artillery 4 (August 1989): 38. (Cited hereafter as Corpac.)

³U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1986), 17. (Cited hereafter as FM 100-5.)

⁴Corpac, 38.

⁵John W. Harbison, "Fire Support Coordination - Supervision of the Plan: A Brigade FSO's Perspective," Field Artillery 1 (February 1993): 32. (Cited hereafter as Harbison.)

⁶Respondent #2, interview by author, notes in author's possession, March 1993.

⁷U.S. Army, Newsletter - Rehearsals (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned/Combined Arms Training Activity, 1991), 8.

⁸Sander, 45.

⁹Corpac, 38.

¹⁰FM 100-5, 11.

¹¹FM 100-5, 12.

¹²TV01CF, 3.

¹³CALL 90-1, 3.

¹⁴CALL 90-1, 3.

Chapter 5

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²U.S. Army, Heavy-Light Operations Readings-A302 (Fort Leavenworth: Command and General Staff College, 1992), 113.

³U.S. Army, Desert Facts (Fort Sill: United States Field Artillery School, no date), unmarked page 1. (Cited hereafter as DF.)

⁴DF, unmarked page 3.

⁵U.S. Army, Combat Training Centers (NTC, JRTC, CMTC, BCTP) Lessons Learned/Selected Readings (Fort Sill: United States Field Artillery School, TA04SD HO7, 1990), 5.

⁶Harbison, 32.

⁷Johnnie L. Bone, Jr., "Joint Precision Strike - The Field Artillery Contribution," Field Artillery 1 (February 1993); 16.

⁸Lecture, Advanced Tactics, Command and General Staff College, January 1993.

⁹Fred F. Marty, "State-of-the-Branch 1992," Field Artillery 6 (December 1992): 1.

APPENDIX A

FIGURES

SEVEN INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIELD ARTILLERY STANDARD TACTICAL MISSIONS

AN FA UNIT WITH A MISSION OF—	DIRECT SUPPORT	REINFORCING	GENERAL SUPPORT REINFORCING	GENERAL SUPPORT
Answers calls for fire in priority from—	1. Supported unit. 2. Own observers. ¹ 3. Force FA HQ.	1. Reinforced FA. 2. Own observers. ¹ 3. Force FA HQ.	1. Force FA HQ. 2. Reinforced unit. 3. Own observers. ¹	1. Force FA HQ. 2. Own observers. ¹
Has as its zone of fire—	Zone of action of supported unit.	Zone of fire of reinforced FA.	Zone of action of supported unit to include zone of fire of reinforced FA unit.	Zone of action of supported unit.
Furnishes FIST or FSE ² —	Provides temporary replacements for casualty losses as required.	No requirement.	No requirement.	No requirement.
Furnishes liaison officer—	No requirement.	To reinforced FA unit HQ.	To reinforced FA unit HQ.	No requirement.
Establishes communications with—	FSOs and supported maneuver unit HQ.	Reinforced FA unit HQ.	Reinforced FA unit HQ.	No requirement.
Is positioned by—	DS FA unit commander or as ordered by force FA HQ.	Reinforced FA unit or as ordered by force FA HQ.	Force FA HQ or reinforced FA unit if approved by force FA HQ.	Force FA HQ.
Has its fires planned by—	Develops own fire plans.	Reinforced FA unit HQ.	Force FA HQ.	Force FA HQ.

¹Includes all target acquisition means not deployed with supported unit (radar, aerial observers, survey parties, and so forth.)

²An FSE for each maneuver brigade, battalion, or cavalry squadron and one FIST with each maneuver company or ground cavalry troop are trained and deployed by the FA unit authorized these assets by TOE. After deployment, FISTs and FSEs remain with the supported maneuver unit throughout the conflict.

Fig. 1. Seven Inherent Responsibilities of Field Artillery
Standard Tactical Missions

Source: FM 6-20




Fig. 2. Decide, Detect, Deliver and the Command Estimate Process

Source: FM 6-20-10

EXAMPLE HIGH-PAYOFF TARGET LIST

PRIORITY	CATEGORY	SHEET NUMBER	DESCRIPTION
1	8 N/CH (TS)	77, 79	PRTB, nuclear depot
2	1 C ³ (TS)	29, 34	Division, army main CP
3	2 FS (TS)	5	Division artillery command btry
4	2 FS	1, 2, 18	Arty bn FDC, COP, FA btry
5	1 C ³	25, 30	Regimental main CP, div fwd CP
6	3 MAN	51, 50, 46, 48	Bn assy area, march column, MR/TK co
7	4 ADA 7 REC	63, 64, 91, 92	AD EW site, radio/radar inter sites
8	9 POL	115, 116	Regimental/division POL points
9	10 AMMO	120, 121	Division/army ammo depots

NOTE: The list may have any number of target priorities.

LEGEND:

AD	= air defense	FDC	= fire direction center
ADA	= air defense artillery	FS	= fire support
ammo	= ammunition	fwd	= forward
assy	= assembly	inter	= intercept
bn	= battalion	MAN	= maneuver
btry	= battery	MR/TK	= motorized rifle/tank
C	= command, control, and communications	N/CH	= nuclear/chemical
co	= company	POL	= petroleum, oil and lubricants
COP	= command observation post	PRTB	= mobile repair technical base (rocket and missile)
div	= division	REC	= radio electronic combat
FA	= field artillery	TS	= time sensitive

Fig. 3. Example High-Payoff Target

Source: FM 6-20-30

EXAMPLE ATTACK GUIDANCE MATRIX				
CATEGORY	HIGH PAYOFF	WHEN	HOW	RESTRICTIONS
1 (C ³)	46, 48	I	N/EW	Coordinate attack with EW
2 (FS)	1, 2, 7	A	N	DNE MRL older than 10 minutes
3 (MAN)	25, 28	A	25%	Last volley RAAMS/ADAM
4 (ADA)	58	P	S/G2	SEAD program 120800A
5 (ENGR)	85	P	N	Countermobility program O/O
6 (RSTA)	103, 105	P	EW	
7 (REC)	111, 112	P	N	
8 (N/CH)		I	D	Accuracy 0-200 meters; TDA required
9 (POL)		A	D	
10 (AMMO)		A	D	
11 (MAINT)		P	N	Not HVT or HPT
12 (LIFT)		P	N	Not HVT or HPT
13 (LOC)		P	N/G3	Not HVT or HPT - no FASCAM

NOTE: This is only a type attack guidance matrix. Actual matrices are developed by the G3 or S3 and the FSE on the basis of the tactical situation.

LEGEND:

ADAM	= area denial artillery munition	MRL	= multiple rocket launcher
DNE	= do not engage	O/O	= on order
ENGR	= engineer	RAAMS	= remote antiarmor mine system
FASCAM	= family of scatterable mines	RSTA	= reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
LOC	= lines of communication	SEAD	= suppression of enemy air defenses
MAINT	= maintenance	SOP	= standing operating procedures

Fig. 4. Example Attack Guidance Matrix

Source: FM 6-20-30

TARGET LIST WORK SHEET										SHEET _____ OF _____	
For use of this form see FM 6-20-40 or FM 6-20-50, the preponent agency is TADOC											
LINE NO	TARGET NO	DESCRIPTION	LOCATION	ALTITUDE	ALTITUDE	SIZE LENGTH	WIDTH	SOURCE ACCURACY	REMARKS		
1											
2											
3											
4											
5											
6											
7											
8											
9											
10											
11											
12											
13											
14											
15											
16											
17											
18											
19											
20											

Fig. 5. Example Target List Worksheet

Source: FM 6-20-40

FIRE SUPPORT EXECUTION MATRIX - 2D BRIGADE

	PL				COUNTER- ATTACK
	BUICK	PLYMOUTH	FORD		
2-6 MECH	FA POF 155 PRI TBT AR 0002	FA POF 155 PRI TBT AR 0004 155 FPF 2 FASCAM			4
3-8 MECH	O/O FA POF 155 PRI TBT AR 0005	2 COLTS O/O FA POF 155 FPF			3
1-6 MECH			FA POF 155 PRI TBT (2) 2 CAS 1 COLT		2
BDE		{ F-16 0100-1100 } { A-10 0900-1100 }			1
A	B	C	D	E	

Fig. 6. Example Fire Support Execution Matrix

Source: FM 6-20-30

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW RESULTS

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 1 RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - WITHOUT A DOUBT - ALL OF THE TIME

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES, ESPECIALLY BRIGADE COMMANDERS. TF/CO CDRS "SOFT"

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL TARGETS WERE SENT TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

YES - NTC - NTC IS PUSHING TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

REMARKS:

ALSO NEED TOP-DOWN OBSERVATION PLAN.

ALSO WE USE A CUTOFF TIME FOR BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 2

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - BOTH TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP OCCUR SIMULTANEOUSLY

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES - WITHOUT IT, THE FIRE SUPPORT PLAN IS UNEXECUTABLE AND UNREHEARSABLE

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

JRTC - THEY ARE TALKING IT, BUT ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH RESULTS THAN PROCEDURES

REMARKS:

BOTTOM-UP DOESN'T WORK.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 3

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES, BUT THEY WANT TO PAINT THEIR OWN PICTURE

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - USED TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

NTC - THEY ARE PUSHING IT

REMARKS:

POSSIBLY TOO MUCH TOP-DOWN. LET TASK FORCE USE MISSION ORDERS. FIRE SUPPORT IS A BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM - COMBINED ARMS COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE - LET HIM FIGHT IT.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 4

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - ONLY WAY TO GO

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE - WE CAN DO BETTER IN SOME OTHER AREAS THOUGH

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

I THINK SO

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

DON'T KNOW

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES

USED TOP-DOWN - NO INTERFERENCE- ALL TARGETS WERE TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

YES - ONE ROTATION TO NTC. THEY RECOMMEND IT

REMARKS:

MAKES SENSE TO LINK TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING WITH THE COMMAND ESTIMATE PROCESS. WE NEVER HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES FOR EVERYONE'S DESIRES.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 5

RANK: MAJ

POSITION: BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES PROVIDED THERE IS TIME FOR BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER - HELPS WITH SHORT-NOTICE/TIME CRITICAL MISSIONS.

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE ROTATION TO JRTC AND 6 OTHER TRAINING DEPLOYMENTS. USED TOP-DOWN WITH NO PROBLEMS - GOOD TO GO. JRTC SELLING TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING.

REMARKS:

CONTRIBUTES TO AN EFFECTIVE REHEARSAL.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 6

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

HAPPY WITH SUPPORT

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE - JRTC. TOP-DOWN WORKING WELL. THEY RECOMMEND IT.

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 7

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - ONLY WAY TO GO

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE - QUALITY OF FIRE SUPPORT PLANS IS ANOTHER ISSUE.

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES, BUT THEY STILL WANT BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

YES - NTC. NTC IS PUSHING TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING.

REMARKS:

EXPERIENCE AT THE TOP.

RESOURCE ALLOCATORS AT THE TOP.

HAVE COMPLETED FOUR EXERCISES WITH DIFFERENT CORPS EACH TIME. NO SIGNIFICANT INTERFERENCE AT DS LEVEL FROM CORPS TARGETS.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 8

RANK: MAJ

POSITION: BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES - THE ONLY WAY TO GO

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER - HAVE INTEL ASSES AT BRIGADE. STILL NEED BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO-RESPONDENT WAS AN AFSCOORD AT A DIVISION MAIN. ALL FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING WAS TOP-DOWN.

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE ROTATION TO NTC. TOP-DOWN PLANNING IS WORKING. EXECUTION NEEDS SOME WORK

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 9

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

ONLY WAY TO BE SUCCESSFUL. LOWER UNITS DON'T HAVE ASSETS.

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES - BRIGADE COMMANDER SELECTS TARGETS AND TASK FORCE AND COMPANY COMMANDERS UNDERSTAND.

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING WAS TOP-DOWN. RESPONDENT WAS DIVISION FIRE SUPPORT ELEMENT CHIEF FOR BREACH.

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE ROTATION TO NTC - THEY'RE PUSHING IT.

REMARKS:

WE HAVEN'T BROKEN THE CODE ON BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT. WE NEED AN UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE AT BRIGADE LEVEL FOR REFINEMENT. RESPONDENT USED UAV IN ODS FOR REFINEMENT WITH SUCCESS.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 10

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES, BUT COMMENSURATE WITH LEVEL OF TRAINING

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER IF 1/3 2/3 RULE IS FOLLOWED

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL TARGETS RECEIVED FROM HIGHER. WE SPENT MORE TIME ON THE ROAD THAN FIRING.

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE TO NTC - NO SPECIFIC AAR COMMENTS ON TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING. HOWEVER, NTC IS PUSHING TOP-DOWN.

REMARKS:

REQUIRES BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

REQUIRES TARGET CUTOFF.

IF TARGET IS WITHIN 1,000 METERS OF PLANNED TARGET, ADJUST AND SHOOT.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 11

RANK: MAJ

POSITION: BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - USED TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE ROTATION - JRTC. THEY ARE PUSHING IT.

REMARKS:

RESTRICT SUBORDINATE TARGETING BY LIMITING TARGET NUMBERS.
BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT IMPORTANT

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 12

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES - IN FACT, WE'RE PREPARING AN OPD SESSION FOR THE NEXT DIVISION OPD.

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE ROTATION TO CMTTC. THEY ARE USING IT.

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 13

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES AT BRIGADE AND TASK FORCE LEVELS. COMPANY COMMANDERS ARE SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT.

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

UNIT DEPLOYED - USED TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING.

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

3 ROTATIONS TO NTC - USED TOP-DOWN. NO SIGNIFICANT AAR COMMENTS OTHER THAN TOP-DOWN IS BEING PREACHED BY NTC.

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 14

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES PROVIDING THERE IS BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE COMMANDER FULLY SUPPORTS

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE TRIP TO JRTC. NO PROBLEMS IN AAR. THEY'RE PUSHING TOP-DOWN.

REMARKS:

REQUIRES BOTTOM-UP REFINEMENT.

MAKES SENSE TO DO.

REQUIRES A TARGET CUTOFF.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 15

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - INCORPORATED INTO BATTALION AND DIVISION FIELD
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning
successful?

YES - MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN FIRE SUPPORT IN 20 YEARS

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average,
has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire
support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire
support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the
same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If
so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets
from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES

DON'T KNOW IF THEY USED TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What,
if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support
planning?

TWO ROTATIONS TO JRTC - THEY'RE PUSHING IT.

REMARKS:

ENSURES SYNCHRONIZATION.

MAKES SENSE TO HAVE THE SYNCHRONIZER DEFINE
RESPONSIBILITIES.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 16

RANK: COL

POSITION: DIVISION ARTILLERY COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - 1/3 TOP-DOWN WITH 2/3 BOTTOM-UP

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

DEPENDS ON THE MISSION

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE FOR CROSS FLOT OPERATIONS
AVERAGE FOR OTHER OPERATIONS. THE MECHANICS ARE IN GOOD
SHAPE. EXPERIENCE IS A FACTOR.

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES - HIGH MARKS

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER - BOTTOM-UP DOES NOT ALLOW A FOCUS

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

UNIT DID - THEY USED TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

2 JRTC ROTATIONS

REMARKS:

JRTC WANTED OUR TACSOP ON TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 17

RANK: CPT

POSITION: BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE - DON'T HAVE TIME FOR BOTTOM-UP

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

VERY SUPPORTIVE

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

INCREDIBLY FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO - RESPONDENT WAS A COMPANY FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER IN ODS. 40-50 TARGETS IN TF SECTOR (6-8X20 KM) - 8/9 IN COMPANY SECTOR - ALL TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE TO JRTC - USED TOP-DOWN WITH GOOD RESULTS. AAR COMMENTS GOOD - 70% ENEMY SUPPLY POINT DESTROYED WITH 25-30% KIA.

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 18

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

ONLY THING WE DO

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE - REFINEMENT IS WEAK LINK IN THE CHAIN. REFINEMENT NEEDS WORK.

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES BUT THEY "WINCE" WHEN THE NUMBER OF TARGETS IS RESTRICTED

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

YES BUT NOT IN COMMAND. PARTICIPATED IN CMTC - ALL TOP-DOWN

REMARKS:

WE TEND TO PLAN AT THE COLLEGIATE LEVEL AND EXECUTE AT THE HIGH SCHOOL LEVEL.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 19

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES - THE ONLY WAY TO GO

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE COMMANDER WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORTS. TASK FORCE AND COMPANY BELIEVE (EMPHASIS RESPONDENT'S) THAT THEY NO LONGER HAVE AVAILABLE/TIMELY FIRE SUPPORT

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

NONE - BUT THROUGH CLIENT UPDATES WE UNDERSTAND IT'S THE ONLY WAY TO GO

REMARKS:

FIRE SUPPORT ASSETS TOO IMPORTANT TO SQUANDER AWAY. TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING IS A MUST. BATTALION FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER SHOULD USE TOP-DOWN WITH MORTARS. INFANTRY IN OPEN POOR TARGET UNLESS MAIN EFFORT. USE TOP-DOWN TO MASS.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 20

RANK: MAJ

POSITION: BRIGADE FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE COMMANDER DOES. BATTALION AND COMPANY COMMANDERS SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

2 ROTATIONS TO JRTC - AAR COMMENTS WERE THAT WE WEREN'T EMPLOYING TOP-DOWN FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING TO ITS FULLEST EXTENT - NOT CONTROLLING SUBORDINATE TARGET NUMBERS.

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT PARTICIPATED IN THREE DIVISIONAL EXERCISES WHERE DIVISION PROVIDED ROUGHLY TEN TARGETS - DID NOT INTERFERE WITH BRIGADE OPERATIONS.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 21

RANK: 1LT

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION ADJUTANT

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - ALSO USED IN SWA

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES - SAVES TIME, ESTABLISHES PRIORITIES, REDUCES DUPLICITY OF EFFORT?

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE - YES, TASK FORCE - SKEPTICAL, COMPANY - DO NOT LIKE

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER THAN BOTTOM-UP. BOTTOM-UP DOES NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME TO DECONFLICT

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL TOP-DOWN

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE NTC AS A PLATOON LEADER - USED TOP-DOWN THOUGH WITH SUCCESS

REMARKS:

RESPONDENT WAS COMPANY FSO IN SWA. HE ALSO WORKED WITH MARINES IN MARFOR - THEY TOO USED TOP-DOWN.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 22

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES - WITH FEW EXCEPTIONS, THE ONLY WAY TO GO

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES - THE FIELD ARTILLERY OBSERVER AT COMPANY LEVEL IS AN ANOMALY

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

ABOVE AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

YES

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

ABSOLUTELY FASTER - IT PROVIDES THE LINK BETWEEN TARGETING AND FIRE PLANNING

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

YES - ALL TOP-DOWN - RESPONDENT WAS DIVARTY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

2 ROTATIONS TO NTC - AAR PUSHING TOP-DOWN

REMARKS:

BATTALION IS THE FIRST TACTICAL LEVEL THAT SHOULD CONDUCT FIRE PLANNING. ALSO NEED TOP-DOWN OBSERVATION PLAN - WE'RE HAVING DIFFICULTIES SEEING THE BATTLEFIELD.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 23

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

YES

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE AND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS LOVE IT - COMPANY COMMANDERS DO NOT UNDERSTAND IT

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER - NO COMPARISON

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE - NTC DOESN'T BELIEVE WE CAN DO WITHOUT

REMARKS:

FRUSTRATING TO COMPANY COMMANDERS BECAUSE THEY WANT TO PLAN. WE HAVE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TARGETS.

RESPONDENT NUMBER: 24

RANK: LTC

POSITION: DIRECT SUPPORT BATTALION COMMANDER

1. Are you familiar with top-down fire support planning?

YES

2. Are you using top-down fire support planning now?

YES

3. Have you found top-down fire support planning successful?

THE ONLY WAY TO GO

4. On a scale of above average, average, or below average, has top-down fire support planning provided effective fire support?

AVERAGE

5. Does your combined arms commander support top-down fire support planning?

BRIGADE COMMANDER 100%, TASK FORCE - 50%, COMPANY - DOESN'T LIKE BEING RESTRICTED

6. Is top-down fire support planning faster, about the same, or slower than bottom-up fire support planning?

FASTER - BOTTOM-UP NOT WORKABLE

7. Did your unit participate in Operation Desert Storm? If so, did it use top-down fire support planning? Did targets from higher interfere with your current operations?

NO

8. Have you deployed to any CTC? If so, how many? What, if any, were AAR comments regarding top-down fire support planning?

ONE NTC ROTATION FIVE DAYS AFTER ASSUMING COMMAND. NTC PUSHING TOP-DOWN

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