Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941

Abstract

The purpose of this monograph is to determine the significant lessons that the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 offers for modern campaign planners when considering operations in that part of the world. The monograph first reviews the history of the invasion in 1941. The monograph then analyzes the campaign from both the German and Yugoslav perspectives using modern operational design criteria. Lastly, the monograph analyzes the lessons to be learned by operational planners from this campaign that are relevant to the conditions that exist today in Yugoslavia. The monograph concludes that Germany, despite its effective military campaign and decisive victory in 1941, failed to create peace for Yugoslavia. Because it did not envision the full scope or uniqueness of the problems that existed in that region of Europe, Germany's victory turned indecisive. Yugoslavia, World War II, Balkans, War plans, Operational art, Campaign, Germany, German army, Yugoslav army.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 13, 1993
Accession Number
ADA274019

Entities

People

  • Michael R. Barefield

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Force
  • Civil War
  • Combat Forces
  • Ethnic Groups
  • Europe
  • Governments
  • Military Art
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Minority Groups
  • National Governments
  • New York
  • United States
  • United States Military Academy
  • Warfare
  • Yugoslavia

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.