Quick Decisive Victory: The Search for the Holy Grail.
Abstract
The monograph evaluates the viability of quick decisive victory as a principle of U.S. military strategy. Modern concepts of quick decisive victory form the cornerstone of present U.S. military strategy. These concepts originated from the Weinberger Doctrine, but the principle of decisive force in the 1992 National Military Strategy Document, now establishes the framework for quick decisive victory. Today the U.S. military is using quick decisive victory to provide a clear focus while moving from a grand strategy based on a Cold War global context to a grand strategy based on a Post-Cold War regional context. Although the idea of quick decisive victory has strong support within the military services some political-military analysts claim ;it too narrowly defines-the limits of U.S. military power in a monopolar strategic environment. Therefore, this monograph examines the suitability of quick decisive victory as a defining element of U.S. military strategy. To accomplish this examination, the monograph first conducts a historical analysis of two decisive victories: the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805; and the 1940 campaign for France. This analysis identifies the strategic and operational conditions supporting quick decisive victory. Secondly, the monograph assesses the present strategic environment and compares present conditions with the historical analysis. Finally, the monograph evaluates the comparative assessment to determine possible benefits and risks for codifying quick decisive victory in U.S. military strategy.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 15, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA274047
Entities
People
- Marc I. Alderman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College