The Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940 Getting the Doctrine Right

Abstract

This monograph conducts a doctrinal analysis of Red Army planning and execution of the Soviet-Finnish War to determine if poorly developed doctrine was the cause of Soviet failures. Military doctrine is critical to a nation. Sound doctrine will contribute to accomplishing missions in an economical manner. A poorly developed doctrine will lead to disaster. Stalin believed the Red Army's first major test in modern war was the 'Winter War' in Finland. After the war, Stalin blamed the generation of officers that developed Red Army doctrine for failing to prepare the Soviets for the rigors of modern war. This study reviews the development of the Red Army doctrine during the interwar years. This paper then analyzes the status of Red Army doctrine in 1939 in term of eight major features. The study than conducts a doctrinal analysis of Red Army planning and execution of the Soviet-Finnish War to determine if the doctrine was the cause of the Soviet failures in Finland.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 21, 1993
Accession Number
ADA274093

Entities

People

  • Gregory J. Bozek

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Civil War
  • Doctrine
  • Governments
  • Military Art
  • Military Doctrine
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Science
  • New York
  • Security
  • Terrain
  • Training
  • Ussr
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • East Asian Political and Security Studies within the Soviet Union
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Military Training and Readiness Simulation