

AD-A274 101



2

**Army Contingency Forces and Marine Corps  
Expeditionary Forces:  
Unique or Redundant?**

**A Monograph  
by  
Major William B. Garrett, III  
Infantry**



**DTIC**  
SELECTED  
DEC 23 1993

**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**Second Term AY 92-93**

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

**93-30910**



02 12 22 024

# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved  
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Army Contingency Forces and Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces: Unique or Redundant?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major William B. Garrett, III		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies ATTN: ATZL-SWV Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 Comm (913) 684-3437 DSN 552-3437		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) See attached sheet.			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Contingency                      Roles                      Functions Expeditionary                      Missions                      Forces			15. NUMBER OF PAGES
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified			16. PRICE CODE
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unlimited			

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major William B. Garrett, III


Title of Monograph: Army Contingency Forces and Marine Corps Expeditionary Forces: Unique or Redundant?

Approved by:




LTC Douglas L. Tystad, MA

Monograph Director



COL James R. McDonough, MS

Director, School of  
Advanced Military  
Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate  
Degree Program

Accepted this 14th day of May, 1993



TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction.....	1
II. Roots of Controversy.....	5
III. The Strategic Link.....	19
IV. Comparative Analysis.....	22
V. Conclusion and Implications.....	48
Endnotes.....	52
Bibliography.....	58

## Section I

### INTRODUCTION

If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character.

Clausewitz  
On War

The international security setting is undergoing dramatic change, the most consequential since the end of World War II. The precepts of the Cold War-- ideological hostility, bipolar global competition, and the unitary Soviet military threat--are no longer valid. While military force remains an important part of national power, its forms and restrictions are evolving as a result of the increased lethality and financial cost of warfare as well as changes in the geopolitical character of the world. As a result, U.S. forces are in transition from a posture directed primarily at the Soviet Union to a posture characterized by a smaller overall force, fewer forward-deployed forces and an orientation toward regional contingencies.

These changes are generating a major debate about the shape and size of American forces necessary to "provide for the common defense." On July 2, 1992, Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, increased the intensity of the debate with a speech to members of the U.S. Senate entitled: *The*

**Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions.**

Citing changes in the nature of the threat and a deepening budget deficit crisis, he maintained that the U.S. is at a unique point in history--a point at which we can and should eliminate "unnecessary" duplication among the Armed Forces and "shape a new force in light of the changed circumstances." Subsequently, he identified ten broad areas where there appears to be "substantial duplication and potential opportunity for streamlining." One of the areas listed was contingency or expeditionary ground forces.<sup>2</sup>

The 1992 National Military Strategy requires the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps to maintain forces that are capable of quick response to crises around the world. The Army maintains one U.S.-based airborne corps headquarters and five combat divisions earmarked for contingency operations. Likewise, the Marine Corps maintains three Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs), one on each coast and one forward based in the Pacific, with a total of three divisions available for contingency operations.<sup>3</sup>

In his speech, Senator Nunn questioned the necessity of maintaining such numbers:

Obviously both the Army and the Marine Corps will assert their respective capabilities are unique. But do we need 8 divisions of contingency or expeditionary forces?<sup>4</sup>

There is obvious merit to avoiding duplication and ensuring that the emerging structure of our Armed Forces truly fits the changed circumstances. The challenge is to determine whether Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces represent unique or redundant capabilities and more importantly, which redundancies actually represent complementary capabilities.

To help answer this question, a brief review of the historical underpinnings of the Army and Marine Corps roles and missions debate is necessary. Then, the impact of contemporary U.S. defense strategy on roles and missions will be examined. Next, a comparative analysis of contingency and expeditionary forces will be conducted to assess unique capabilities and possible interservice redundancy. Criteria for comparison and judgement are derived from defense strategy requirements and include:

a) Deployability: the ability to rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world by use of airlift, sealift, and prepositioned equipment.

b) Lethality: the ability to match all foes with agile, synchronized application of overwhelming combat power. These forces must be more deadly and more effective than those of any opponent.

c) Versatility: the ability to adapt to rapidly

changing scenarios and requirements across the continuum of military operations.<sup>5</sup>

Lastly, conclusions and implications for military and civilian defense planners will be presented and discussed.

Before proceeding, it is important to understand that the roles and missions controversy is primarily derived from the battle over the dollar--the effort by each Service to secure what it regards as its proper share of the defense budget. A Service's share of the budget affects not only its size but also the development and deployment of its weapons systems, which profoundly influence force structure and consequently the capacity to carry out missions. Moreover, the imposition of increasingly tighter budget ceilings by the administration during a time of increasing political and military commitments abroad exacerbates already intense interservice differences.

Hence, further discussion of such a divisive issue must reflect Senator Nunn's final observation: "The fundamental question is not what is best for the Army or Marine Corps. The question is what is best for America?"<sup>6</sup> In this spirit, we begin our search for answers by examining the historical roots of the current roles and missions debate.

## Section II

### ROOTS OF CONTROVERSY

Effective utilization of U.S. military power requires that the efforts of the separate military Services be closely integrated. Key to unity of effort is assignment of responsibility. The Army and Marine Corps are organized, trained, and equipped to perform specific combatant functions--commonly termed roles and missions--which Congress defines in law. The explanation of why these roles and missions are still in contention rests in an understanding of their historical origin.

Disputes and disagreements over Army and Marine Corps roles and missions are not new. However, interservice rivalry did not pose a significant problem until the 20th century. As historian Rudolf A. Winnacker notes,

During the 19th century...Army and Navy missions seldom overlapped, and, in the absence of instant communications, such problems as arose in the field had to be resolved in the field anyway.<sup>7</sup>

Decisions about roles and missions invariably adhered to the accepted protocol. By custom and tradition, the Army's mission was to wage war on land, while the Navy's was to patrol and protect the sea lanes, using the Marine Corps to conduct limited operations ashore in support of the naval objectives.

Only the interservice difficulties of World War II

finally and convincingly demonstrated the need for revision of roles and missions. Agreements during the war to resolve interservice differences were ad hoc and driven by necessity. For example, Operation Overlord (the invasion of France) called for a massive amphibious assault on the beaches of Normandy. The U.S. Marine Corps, the force most capable of leading such an assault, was not available because of its involvement in the Pacific campaign. Consequently, Army units conducted the largest amphibious assault in history bereft of Marine support.

In Washington, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) arrangement, informally established without legislative sanction and without a legal charter, reached agreements by persuasion and compromise. Lacking a formal decision mechanism, the initiatives to codify the Services' roles and missions could not be accomplished until the post-World War II period.<sup>8</sup>

Rapid World War II advances in military technology also contributed greatly to interservice friction. A wave of innovations and discoveries suddenly thrust modern warfare into the age of high technology. Because new weapons, such as long-range aircraft and guided rockets, had a wide range of applications, it was seldom clear whether one Service should or could claim sole responsibility for their use. In many

instances it proved virtually impossible to avoid overlapping or redundant effort in the employment of these weapons. By the end of the war, as President Eisenhower later observed, science and technology had so "scrambled" traditional service functions that the traditional idea of separate ground, sea, and air warfare was "gone forever."<sup>9</sup>

By 1945, with the United States confronting security problems unprecedented in scale and scope, the need for revision of the Services' roles and missions appeared more urgent than ever. Resistance to change and a reluctance to give up traditional Service prerogatives would require many difficult compromises. Furthermore, postwar discussions of unification made it clear that conflict over roles and missions was much more than an organizational problem, that it involved basic disagreement over strategy and weapons to be used in fighting future wars.<sup>10</sup>

In the wake of rapidly deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relations from 1945 on, the Services essentially agreed that for planning purposes the Soviet Union should be considered the primary military threat. Proponents of the Navy and a separate air force were quick to argue for vastly expanded roles. From the Navy's standpoint, World War II conclusively demonstrated the need to maintain and upgrade a versatile and fairly large

Marine Corps.

The Army, mindful of its unreadiness for World War II, saw a definite need in the postwar era for a sizeable ground force in being, ideally about 25 combat divisions. With funds again meager after 1945, Army leaders felt that the nation could ill afford both a large Army and a large Marine Corps. "Once Marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions," the Army argued, "they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army and we have in effect two land armies."<sup>11</sup> To solve this problem, the Army advocated that the Marine Corps be reorganized into "a force within the fleet to provide small readily available and lightly-armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries."<sup>12</sup>

Such disagreements fueled the roles and missions controversy to the boiling point and threatened to turn traditional service rivalries into one of the most bitter feuds ever experienced by the military. Realizing the significance of the question, the JCS initiated a study (JCS 1478 series) to assist in restoring some semblance of order to the assignment of service functions. The Army and the Army Air Force wanted missions defined in terms of weapons and the medium in which the Service operated, i.e., land, sea,

and air. Under this arrangement, virtually all aircraft would be controlled by the Air Force, all seagoing forces by the Navy, and all ground forces by the Army.<sup>13</sup>

The Navy, realizing that it could lose its air component to the Air Force and the Marine Corps to the Army, mounted resolute and determined resistance. Navy leaders argued that military functions and objectives rather than weapons or the medium of operation should be the determining factor in assignment of missions. The more the JCS discussed the matter, the more entrenched their differences became. Finally, in June 1946, they suspended deliberation of roles and missions until such time as "Presidential or legislative action requires that consideration be revived."<sup>14</sup>

In an attempt to break the stalemate in November 1946, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, with Army concurrence, asked General Lauris Norstad (an advisor to the Air Force Chief of Staff) and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman (Chief of Naval Operations, 1949-1951) to prepare a joint statement on Service functions for possible use by Congress and the administration in developing roles and missions legislation. Norstad and Sherman tendered their paper in the form of a draft executive order, forwarded to President Truman in January 1947, together with their final recommendations

on roles and missions. After much negotiation between Congress, the President, and the War and Navy Departments, President Truman approved the National Security Act of 1947. Shortly afterward, President Truman issued the Sherman-Norstad statement as Executive Order 9877, which then became, for budgetary and administrative purposes, the official assignment of Service roles and missions.<sup>15</sup>

The delineation of functions in Executive Order 9877 adhered closely to the previous assignment of roles and missions based on the physical environment in which each service normally operated. The Army received primary responsibility for warfare on land and the Marine Corps "for service with the Fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of limited land operations in connection therewith...."<sup>16</sup> The order also directed that "the armed forces shall formulate integrated plans and make coordinated preparations" and that each Service "shall make use of the personnel, equipment, and facilities of the other services in all cases where economy and effectiveness will thereby be increased."<sup>17</sup> But the order failed to specify how to achieve such coordination and avoid redundancy, relying instead on voluntary cooperation between the Services.

James Forrestal assumed office as Secretary of

Defense on September 17, 1947. Unable to coordinate Service policies and strategies by any means except force of personality, Forrestal soon found himself frustrated by the inconsistent treatment of roles and missions in Executive Order 9877. Consequently, he decided to hold a prolonged meeting with the JCS, away from Washington, to resolve the dysfunctional dilemma over the Services' roles and missions. If the Service chiefs failed to reach agreement, said Forrestal, "I shall have to make my own decisions."<sup>18</sup>

Forrestal convened the meeting at Key West, Florida, in March, 1948. The conference resulted in the Key West Agreement--a new roles and missions statement entitled "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." On Forrestal's recommendation, President Truman revoked Executive Order 9877, clearing the way for the Secretary of Defense to issue the Functions Paper in the Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1 series.<sup>19</sup>

In contrast to the broad delineation of roles and missions in Executive Order 9877, the Functions Paper attempted to define both the primary and secondary responsibilities of each Service. In reality, it resolved very little. It reaffirmed the Army's primary mission to organize, train, and equip forces for sustained combat on land. It also repeated the Marine

Corps' responsibility for amphibious warfare, including the defense of advanced naval bases and operations on land as necessary for the prosecution of a naval campaign.<sup>20</sup>

The Functions Paper addressed redundancy by calling for the Services, under the guidance of the JCS, to coordinate their efforts closely, avoid duplication, and work toward "maximum practicable" integration of policies and procedures.<sup>21</sup> However, as with Executive Order 9877, there were no specific implementing instructions.

The most useful, albeit peripheral, feature of the Key West Functions Paper was its treatment of secondary or collateral roles and missions that each Service would perform in support of or in collaboration with another Service in the execution of a mission. Finding it impossible to define the entire range of Service responsibilities in terms that completely eliminated overlapping activity, Forrestal and the chiefs resolved that the only way to minimize duplication was by fostering joint efforts. Thus, two or more of the Services were to collaborate in common functions as directed by the JCS. The JCS member having primary responsibility for a particular task was to act as JCS agent in the preparation of plans and establishment of requirements for all forces to carry out the

function.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to formal assignments of responsibility, the Key West conferees reached several oral understandings subsequently summarized in a memorandum for record as a means of clarifying and interpreting the principles contained in the Functions Paper. They agreed that while there should be no attempt to abolish the Marine Corps or to restrict it unduly in the performance of its functions, "these functions do not contemplate the creation of a second land army."<sup>23</sup> Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley conceded that the Navy should be allowed to deploy Marine units, he just wanted to protect the Army's premier tactical role. The Navy agreed to deploy no more than four Marine divisions or have a field headquarters higher than a corps.<sup>24</sup>

However, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee during October 1949, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General C.B. Cates asserted, "there is widespread apprehension that the functions assigned our corps by law are being usurped by others," namely the Army, which he accused of coveting full control of amphibious warfare.<sup>25</sup> In rebuttal testimony, Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins vehemently denied that the Army wanted to restrict either the size or legitimate functions of the

Marine Corps.<sup>26</sup>

In a conciliatory speech given at the National War College on October 30, 1950, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower warned:

If, as Services, we get too critical among ourselves, hunting for exact limiting lines in the shadow land of responsibility as between [the Services]..., hunting for and spending our time arguing about it, we will deserve the very fate we will get in war, which is defeat. We have got to be of one family, and it is more important today than it ever has been.<sup>27</sup>

Despite Eisenhower's warning, interservice rivalry over roles and missions continued unabated.

In 1952, Congress passed Title 10, U.S. Code which amended and codified the National Security Act of 1947 and amplified the DOD Directive 5100.1 series (Functions Paper). It finally provided a statutory basis for the combatant functions assigned to the Services:

Army (10 U.S.C. 3062). In general, the Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Marine Corps (10 U.S.C. 5013). The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as

may be organic therein. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.<sup>28</sup>

Other than providing a statutory foundation for the Services' functions and permanently establishing the composition of the Marine Corps, Title 10 did little to address redundancy in roles and missions.

Now President and Commander-in-Chief, Eisenhower still faced the same interservice rivalry. "So far as I am personally concerned," Eisenhower confided to a friend in 1956, "my most frustrating domestic problem is that of attempting to achieve any real coordination among the services...."<sup>29</sup> Eisenhower's unhappiness with what he considered interservice parochialism eventually led to the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, an attempt to increase the authority of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the Services. In proposing these changes, Eisenhower stated:

Separate ground, sea and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight it in all elements with all Services, as one single concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to this fact.<sup>30</sup>

Accordingly, the 1958 Act reorganized the operating forces and directed their assignment to the unified and

specified commands.

Following the 1958 Act, no major legislation affecting the Services' roles and missions occurred until 1986. In the meantime, the Cold War buildup and the outbreak of the Vietnam War in the 1960s reduced the controversy as roles and missions issues gave way to more urgent and practical concerns. Above all, rapidly increasing military funding alleviated pressures on the Services to compete with each other. The Vietnam War encouraged closer interservice cooperation, creating the impression that the Services had put their differences behind them--at least for the time being. However, when the war ended, there followed a period of retrenchment in which the Services again had to compete for limited funds, and the old disputes and disagreements resurfaced.

On October 1, 1986, Congress passed Public Law 99-433, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This act was the culmination of lengthy debate and Congressional hearings, ongoing since the Vietnam era, on the capabilities of defense organizations to plan and direct warfighting operations. The act specifically addressed the Services' roles and missions.

During deliberations on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, General David Jones commented that one of the problems "too hard" to solve as Chairman was the problem of the Services' roles and missions.<sup>31</sup> Consequently, Congress included in the Goldwater-Nichols Act a provision requiring that every three years, or upon request of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit:

...a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces.<sup>32</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Act further specified that the Chairman should consider three items as he reviews roles and missions:

- a) Changes in the nature of the threats faced by the United States.
- b) Unnecessary duplication of effort among the armed forces.
- c) Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.<sup>33</sup>

The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the most thorough legislative attempt ever to address the issue of interservice redundancy. However, it essentially kept largely intact the roles and missions established by the National Security Act of 1947. Since 1986, the debate continued to move along in fits and starts, receiving attention for only a few months each year when Congress wrestled over the defense budget.

In February 1993, General Colin Powell, the

Chairman of the JCS, submitted his triennial report on the roles, missions, and functions of the Armed Forces to Congress. In it, he recommended that

The capabilities of the contingency and expeditionary forces in the Army and Marine Corps provide decision makers with valuable alternatives and should be retained.<sup>34</sup>

However, he also stated that "the possibility of further decreases in the Army's light infantry will be studied as force structure is reduced."<sup>35</sup> Later, when questioned if his report constituted only "nibbling at the edges" of the Services' redundancies, Powell replied strongly: "I'm not going to apologize for the fact that we're trying to protect a broad range of capabilities to serve the nation's interests."<sup>36</sup>

Given the potential cuts in force structure that might accompany any revision in roles and missions, it is probably unfair to expect either the Army or Marine Corps to compromise on this issue. Thus, the more important questions of identifying the capabilities we will need in the future, in what quantity we need them, and in which Services we find them can perhaps best be answered by an examination of contemporary U.S. defense strategy.

### Section III

#### THE STRATEGIC LINK

Inseparable from the roles and missions debate is the issue of strategy. The evolutionary process of developing Service capabilities, such as Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces, does not occur in a vacuum. These capabilities flow from requirements, which in turn, flow from the National Military Strategy and ultimately, from the National Security Strategy which delineates our national interests and objectives and the military contributions required to attain them. U.S. national interests and objectives outlined in the National Security Strategy include:

- The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions and people secure. Included are:

a) Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress.

b) Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.

c) An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.

d) An enduring global faith in America--that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises.<sup>37</sup>

While conflict deterrence remains the foremost objective, the ability to respond to regional crises is one of the fundamental elements of this strategy:

We must maintain an adequate capability to project power in response to crises should our efforts to deter fail. The very existence of a robust crisis response capability strengthens deterrence. Our force structure must be flexible enough to ensure we can fulfill both traditional and non-traditional requirements. In addition, the capability to generate decisive combat power, if and when needed, strengthens our ability to terminate a conflict swiftly on terms favorable to us and with minimum loss of life.<sup>38</sup>

In short, the National Security Strategy envisions a global crisis response capability for United States military forces.

Codified in the National Security Strategy of the United States and further developed by the Secretary of Defense, the National Military Strategy is built upon the four foundations of strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.<sup>39</sup> The National Military Strategy provides the following strategic principles to guide the employment of military forces: readiness; collective security; arms control; maritime and aerospace superiority; strategic agility; power projection; technological superiority; and decisive force.<sup>40</sup> The central idea in the National Military Strategy is the change from a focus on global warfighting to a focus on regional contingencies.

The biennial Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) outlines the nation's military strategy, assigns preparation of specific contingency plans to the theater Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and apportions major combat forces for those plans. In turn, the Unified Actions Armed Forces (UNAAF) requires the Services to organize, train, equip and provide forces through the component commanders to the CINCs for employment in response to crises.

Termed "contingency forces," they are to be fully-trained, highly-ready, rapidly deliverable, and initially self-sufficient.<sup>41</sup> The time from their initial alert to movement is measured in hours and minutes, not in days.<sup>42</sup> Drawn primarily from the active force structure, these forces are then tailored into joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service.

As a result, a CINC has the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: light infantry, airborne, air assault, and heavy forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power of the Marine Corps,

particularly when access ashore is contested; and the unique capabilities of special operations forces.<sup>43</sup> Contingency forces designated by the National Military Strategy include forward stationed and deployed Army, Navy, Marine and Air Forces; special operations forces; and U.S.-based units.<sup>44</sup>

The Army and Marine Corps organize, train, and equip their forces to provide a distinct capability for a CINC to select for a specific mission. If viewed in isolation, the capability to perform a mission may appear redundant. For example, both Army and Marine forces have the capability, derived from their roles and missions, for operations on land. The nature of land combat dictates similar principles and tactics for both Services which are essential for success--an apparent duplication. Hence, a brief comparative analysis is necessary to assist in determining whether these forces represent truly unique or merely redundant capabilities.

#### Section IV

##### COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy provide clear guidance on the capabilities for crisis response that must be resident in the Army and Marine Corps. This section analyzes

those capabilities by both qualitative and quantitative methods. Analytical results are tempered with military judgement throughout the process.

Before proceeding further, we must realize that attempts to isolate one Service's forces from those of the other and then derive conclusions about effectiveness are all too common--particularly during times of budget reductions. Such attempts are risky for three reasons. First, one can falsely assume that either one Service or another must be decisive. This assumption forgets that the combined effects of all the Services could also be a legitimate source of decisiveness. Second, one can mistakenly elevate a contributing reason for success to the status of the sole reason for success. Third, one can erroneously change the contribution of a single-Service force from being necessary for victory to being both necessary and sufficient, in and of itself, for victory.<sup>45</sup> It is important to understand and reduce these risks as we begin our search for unique and redundant capabilities among Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces.

#### *Army Contingency Forces*

Power projection is a central element of the National Military Strategy. The U.S. Army contributes to strategy through force projection--an ability to

rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, and conduct operations anywhere in the world. The Army anticipates that force projection will usually begin as a contingency operation in response to a crisis.<sup>46</sup> To ensure a rapid response, the Army designates heavy, light, and special operations forces as crisis response forces. According to former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, these forces will "be tailored to comply with operational demands, including the retention of forcible entry and crisis response capabilities."<sup>47</sup>

**U.S.-based Army**

**I. ARMY CONTINGENCY FORCES**

contingency forces currently consist of the XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters and five combat divisions--three light and two heavy. Corps are the largest tactical units in the Army, the instruments with which the theater CINCs conduct operational maneuver. While corps normally fight as part of a larger land force (army group), they may also be employed in contingency operations as the land component of a joint task force or as the joint task force headquarters with supporting air and maritime forces.<sup>48</sup>

**XVIII Airborne Corps HQ  
7th Infantry Div (Lt)<sup>1</sup>  
82d Airborne Division  
101st Abn Div (Air Aslt)  
24th Infantry Div (Mech)  
1st Cavalry Division**

**OTHER CORPS UNITS: Aviation Bde, Corps Artillery, MI Bde, Engineer Bde, Air Defense Bde, Signal Bde, Chemical Bde, MP Bde, CA Bde, PSYOPS Bde, Corps Support Command, Finance Group, Personnel Group.**

**Note 1: 7th ID(L) may be inactivated and replaced.**

The corps is not a fixed force. It can be tailored to any contingency worldwide based on factors of mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T). Once tailored, however, it contains all the organic combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities required to sustain operations for a considerable period.<sup>49</sup>

The capabilities of the XVIII Airborne Corps are predicated to a large extent on the dictates of the operational environment. The objective area could be defended or benign; the enemy might be mobile and armored, or a light paramilitary force; the terrain could vary from the deserts of the Middle East to the jungles of Central America.<sup>50</sup>

Likewise, the XVIII Airborne Corps' mission could range from a simple show-of-force (Honduras 1988) to providing a deterrent force against a major and immediate threat (Saudi Arabia 1990). The corps will often have to operate in underdeveloped, austere environments lacking in-place logistic and communications infrastructures. Moreover, the most likely contingencies will require the corps to simultaneously fight in the objective area while continuing to deploy additional forces to amass the combat power necessary for decisive operations.<sup>51</sup>

For this reason, the XVIII Airborne Corps is

organized with an emphasis on mixed types of maneuver forces, capable of both rapid deployment and the ability to fight in a variety of situations. Depending on METT-T, the corps commander can increase the lethality of his deploying light forces by the early introduction of heavy forces.<sup>52</sup> This ability to mix and match light, heavy, and special operations forces to meet a particular threat is essential in a rapidly evolving crisis.

The 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 82d Airborne Division, and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) form the tip of the spear for the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 7th Infantry Division (Light) is the most rapidly and strategically deployable of the various types of Army contingency divisions. However, lacking a forced entry capability, it can only be airlanded into secured airfields. The light infantry division also lacks the mechanized assets to close with and destroy the enemy's heavy forces in open terrain without augmentation.

## II. LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISION

### Organization

9 Infantry Battalions  
3 Artillery Battalions  
1 Air Cav Squadron  
1 Atk Helo Battalion  
1 Lift Helo Battalion  
1 Air Defense Battalion  
1 Engineer Battalion  
1 Mil Intel Battalion  
1 Signal Battalion  
1 Div Support Command

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: AH-1 Atk Helo, M119  
105mm Howitzer, TOW, Dragon.

Instead, it is more effectively employed in terrain favoring dismounted operations such as large urban areas, mountains, and jungles.<sup>53</sup>

The light infantry division has the capability to attack or defeat light enemy forces or seize terrain. If properly task organized and augmented, it can attack to defeat heavy enemy forces on close terrain. It can function as an economy of force unit on close terrain, thereby allowing mechanized or armored units the freedom for decisive employment elsewhere on the battlefield. It can also operate for 48 hours without external support.<sup>54</sup>

A significant limitation of the light division not already mentioned is its severe lack of tactical mobility--it is constrained by a very limited number of organic vehicles and aircraft. It is also vulnerable to enemy heavy artillery attack; nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack; and attack by heavy forces. Finally, it has a requirement for external combat service support after 48 hours.<sup>55</sup>

The 82d Airborne is one of two Army divisions with a rapid, strategic, combined arms, forced entry capability. The airborne division achieves tactical and/or strategic surprise by its timely arrival on or near the battlefield. Even in situations not requiring forced entry, it may often be desirable to use the

division's airdrop capability, either for psychological impact or to rapidly insert forces in areas where the airfield capability is limited. More combat power can be deployed by airdrop in a shorter amount of time than by any other means of insertion.<sup>56</sup>

### 3. AIRBORNE DIVISION

#### Organization

9 Infantry Battalions  
1 Light Armor Battalion  
3 Artillery Battalions  
1 Air Cav Squadron  
1 Attack Helo Battalion  
1 Lift Helo Battalion  
1 Air Defense Battalion  
1 Engineer Battalion  
1 Mil Intel Battalion  
1 Signal Battalion  
1 Div Support Command

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: AH-64 Atk Helo, M551 Tank, M119 105mm Howitzer, TOW, Dragon.

Like the light infantry division, the airborne division must rely on U.S. Air Force airlift for initial entry into battle and usually for resupply until linkup with other ground forces if no ground or sea lines of communication (LOCs) exist. Once on the ground, the airborne division fights like the light infantry division. The airborne division's capability is limited by lack of tactical mobility once delivered into the objective area. It is also vulnerable to enemy heavy artillery attack, NBC attack, and attack by heavy forces.<sup>57</sup>

The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) combines

strategic deployability and forced entry with an extremely high degree of tactical mobility within its area of operations. The air assault division can conduct combat

operations with infantry, aviation, and the necessary combat support and combat service support, to strike over extended distances and terrain obstacles to attack the enemy.

The air assault division is light, mobile, and relies on helicopter support throughout air assault operations. Once deployed on the ground, air assault infantry battalions fight like those of the light infantry division and are subject to the same limitations. However, the air assault division's normal task organization of organic aviation provides unequalled tactical mobility.<sup>58</sup>

The limiting factor in the deployability of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is strategic lift. Because of its organization and equipment, the

#### IV. AIR ASSAULT DIVISION

##### Organization

9 Infantry Battalions  
3 Artillery Battalions  
1 Air Cav Squadron  
3 Atk Helo Battalions  
4 Lift Helo Battalions  
1 Air Defense Battalion  
1 Engineer Battalion  
1 Mil Intel Battalion  
1 Signal Battalion  
1 Div Support Command

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: AH-64 Atk Helo, M198 155mm Howitzer, M119 105mm Howitzer, TOW, Dragon.

air assault division requires significantly more strategic lift than a light or airborne division -- although not as much as a heavy division.<sup>59</sup> However, the division can self-deploy from the continental United States to an intermediate staging base (ISB) where aviation and ground forces can prepare for employment in theater, including forcible entry.

Other significant limitations include operational constraints due to adverse weather, hostile aircraft, air defense, electronic warfare, availability of suitable pickup/landing zones, and reduced ground mobility once inserted. Also, initial assault elements are often separated from weapon systems, equipment, and materiel that provide protection and survivability on the battlefield.<sup>60</sup>

The 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry Division provide mobile armor-protected firepower--the Sunday punch--to Army contingency forces. Both divisions are very similar in their organizations and

#### V. HEAVY DIVISION

##### Organization

5 Mech Inf Battalions  
5 Armor Battalions  
3 Artillery Battalions  
1 Cavalry Squadron  
2 Atk Helo Battalions  
1 Air Defense Battalion  
3 Engineer Battalions  
1 Mil Intel Battalion  
1 Signal Battalion  
1 Div Support Command  
1 MLRS Battery

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: AH-64 Atk Helo, M1 Tank, M2 IFV, MLRS, M109 155mm SF Howitzer.

capabilities and are commonly referred to collectively as heavy divisions.

Heavy divisions have the capability to close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, mobility, and shock effect. They can conduct sustained, mobile, combat operations against enemy heavy forces in conventional, chemical, and nuclear environments. They can conduct defensive operations, dispersing over great distances and concentrating rapidly from widely separated areas. They can also operate as an attack or counterattack force and accomplish rapid movement in exploitation and pursuit.<sup>61</sup>

Heavy divisions operate best in basically open terrain where they can use their mobility and long-range, direct-fire weapon systems to best advantage.<sup>62</sup> Their mobility advantage is restricted when operating in jungles, dense forests, steep and rugged terrain, built-up areas, and water obstacles. They also have a high consumption rate of supply items, especially fuel and ammunition. Lastly, their ability to deploy in a contingency operation is primarily dependent on sealift, which is considerably slower than deployment by air.<sup>63</sup>

Meanwhile, deployability remains the long pole in the tent for Army contingency forces. The ability of Army contingency forces, particularly heavy divisions,

to deploy rapidly is linked to Navy and Air Force procurement of strategic lift. In 1992, as a result of the Congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Study, DOD initiated a strategic mobility program that will put the Army's entire five division contingency corps on the ground in any theater 75 days after the order is given. The Navy is required to purchase or convert the ships necessary and the Air Force is to provide necessary aircraft, which envisions purchase of the C-17 transport. The Army is to ensure that on-post rail systems can support deployment, including having on hand sufficient rail cars, and that forces are fully trained and capable of meeting deployment timetables.<sup>64</sup>

The Army recognizes that improving deployability is much more than merely increasing force closure by buying additional planes, trains, and ships. Consequently, it is moving to preposition equipment on land and sea--including a heavy brigade's equipment and supplies afloat. The Army is also establishing military-related infrastructure in potentially volatile regions, designing forces and equipment that are easily transportable, and training those forces in deployment.<sup>65</sup>

#### *Marine Expeditionary Forces*

A significant part of America's power projection capability resides in its naval expeditionary forces

composed of Navy expeditionary fleets and Marine Corps expeditionary forces.<sup>66</sup> An elusive concept, "expeditionary" implies a mindset, a culture, and a commitment to forces that are designed to operate forward and to respond swiftly.<sup>67</sup>

Assigned a mission, Fleet Marine Force commanders organize their forces by forming

integrated combined arms Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) specifically tailored to accomplish that mission. All MAGTFs are comprised of four elements: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and a Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).<sup>68</sup> MAGTFs have no standard structure, but instead are constituted as appropriate for the situation.<sup>69</sup> There are four basic configurations: the Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF), the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).<sup>70</sup>

SPMAGTFs are organized to accomplish specialized missions for which another MAGTF would be inappropriate or too large. SPMAGTFs fill the niche of providing

**VI. MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

- I MEF (E. Coast)
- II MEF (W. Coast)
- III MEF (Pacific)

NOTE: Each MEF is organized around a Marine division, an air wing, and force service support group.

Marine capabilities for special missions such as disaster relief or unique instances such as an oil spill. They are also capable of limited combat operations such as noncombatant evacuations.<sup>71</sup>

The MEU is normally composed of a reinforced infantry battalion, a helicopter squadron reinforced with fixed wing AV-8B aircraft, and a MEU service support group. MEUs are routinely deployed as an immediately responsive, sea-based MAGTF to provide forward presence and limited power projection. The forward-deployed MEU has the capability to conduct a wide variety of short-duration conventional and selected maritime special purpose operations. All forward-deployed MEUs have completed specialized training and evaluation and are designated special operation capable, MEU(SOC). Currently, one forward deployed MEU(SOC) is maintained in the Mediterranean, one in the Persian Gulf region, and one on a part time basis in the Western Pacific.<sup>72</sup>

A MEB is normally composed of a reinforced infantry regiment, a Marine aircraft group, and a brigade service support group. The MEB can be configured for deployment by strategic airlift, as a maritime or geographical prepositioning force, or as an amphibious force. When a MEF is to be deployed, the MEB is normally the forward echelon of the MEF.<sup>73</sup>

The MEF is the U.S. Marine Corps' principal warfighting organization, particularly for a larger crisis or contingency. MEFs are the only "standing MAGTFs," Marine Air-Ground Task Forces designed to exploit the combat power inherent in carefully integrated air and ground operations.<sup>74</sup> The MEF is the type of MAGTF

appropriate for most contingency operations because of the enhanced command and control capabilities of its command element. A MEF will normally

#### VII. MEF

**Organization**  
Force Headquarters  
Marine Aircraft Wing  
Reinforced Division  
Force Service Spt Group

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: FA-18,  
AV-8B, AH-1 Atk Helo, M-1  
Tank, Light Armored Recon  
Vehicle, M198 155mm Howitzer,  
M101 105mm Howitzer.

deploy by echelon and will designate its lead echelon, usually of MEB size, as its MEF (Forward). The MEF command element is capable of functioning as a joint task force headquarters with appropriate augmentation.<sup>75</sup> Thus, a MEF can serve as a JTF in the initial stage of a regional crisis, providing transition from seapower to landpower and buying time necessary to establish a more permanent joint force ashore.

The GCE of a MEF is normally a Marine combat division reinforced with the appropriate combat support

units. The Marine division is the basic ground organization possessing combined arms and services capable of sustained combat. Its mission is to execute amphibious assault operations and other such operations as may be directed,

while supported by Marine aviation and force troops units.<sup>76</sup>

The ACE of a MEF consists of a task organized Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW). A MAW (notionally about 350 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft) contains

groups with subordinate squadrons and air defense missile battalions. It is capable of providing the following support: offensive air support, antiair warfare, electronic warfare, assault support, air reconnaissance, and control of aircraft and missiles.<sup>77</sup> No other force combines organic air and ground forces under one commander at the tactical level.

The CSSE of a MEF is task organized to provide the full range of combat service support functions and capabilities necessary to support the mission. It is formed around a combat service support headquarters and

#### VIII. MARINE DIVISION

##### Organization

- 9 Infantry Battalions
- 1 Tank Battalion
- 2 Light Armor Recon Bn
- 1 Recon Bn
- 3 Artillery Battalions
- 1 Aslt Amphib Battalion
- 1 Engineer Battalion

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS: M1 Tank, Light Armor Recon Vehicle, LVTP-7 Tracked Amphibian, M198 155mm Howitzer, M101 105mm Howitzer, TOW, Dragon.

can vary in size and composition from a support detachment to one or more Force Service Support Groups. The CSSE includes other combat service support units from the wing and division in most instances. With their 60 days of accompanying supplies, the CSSE is capable of sustaining operations ashore in any geographic environment.<sup>78</sup>

Significant capabilities of the MAGTF include: stability operations, limited objective operations, amphibious operations, and operations ashore. Stability operations encompass humanitarian assistance programs, mobile training teams, security operations, peacekeeping operations, counternarcotics operations, and counterinsurgency operations. Limited objective operations include noncombatant evacuations (opposed or unopposed); seizure of advanced naval bases, airfields, or facilities; reinforcement of U.S. or allied forces; stabilizing influence or deterrence in a crisis; tactical recovery of aircraft, equipment, and personnel; and *in extremis* hostage recovery operations. Amphibious operations provide three key capabilities: forcible entry, the ability to operate without waiting for theater buildup of logistic structure, and the ability to function as a mobile strategic/theater reserve. Operations ashore include: conducting amphibious operations to threaten the enemy's flank or

rear, providing the initial expeditionary forces (enabling force) which allows the introduction of heavier follow-on forces, and augmenting forces already committed to combat operations ashore.<sup>79</sup>

Significant limitations of a Marine division conducting an amphibious operation include the normal constraints of a heavy sea state, reduced visibility, or rugged coastlines. More significantly, Marine forces face an eroding ability to execute forced entry operations due to shortfalls in amphibious lift, naval gunfire, and minesweeping ability. Even during unopposed entry, deployability of Marine Prepositioning Force (MPF) MEBS is contingent upon strategic airlift, available airfields, and proximity to geographic or maritime prepositioning programs.

Once ashore, the Marine division does not lend itself well to the somewhat restricted confines of a ground battlefield. By virtue of its expeditionary nature, it lacks the mobility and logistics structure for maneuver over long distances. It is relatively light in armor, artillery, and ground vehicle support and is thus vulnerable to attack by enemy heavy armored forces. Because of its organization and equipment, it is also vulnerable to heavy artillery attack, NBC attack, and electronic warfare--particularly during the early phases of an assault. Close integration of

Marine aviation with ground forces is required to alleviate this shortfall in firepower and mobility.

Therein lies another limitation. The area of responsibility of the Marine division (GCE), delineated by boundaries, zones of action, fire support coordination and airspace control measures, can constrain the air wing (ACE). The MAGTF solution, to designate a larger, three-dimensional area of responsibility within which the air-ground team can maneuver, is tactically sound, but fails operationally when placed in the midst of adjacent Army units or inserted into a larger, centralized air offensive being conducted by the JTF. Indeed, joint doctrine does not accommodate the MAGTF concept, preferring instead to divide the battlefield into land, air, and maritime functional areas in order to maintain unity of command and exploit the unique capabilities of each Service.<sup>80</sup>

#### *Summary Assessment*

Our analysis indicates that Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces represent both unique and complementary capabilities. For example, forcible entry from the sea remains a *sine qua non* for Marine expeditionary forces. The significance of this is underscored by the fact that all American embassies and most of the politico-economic centers of gravity in the Third World are located in cities, and

sixty percent of these are within 25 miles of the sea-- well within range of Marine amphibious capabilities.<sup>81</sup> Thus, if a crisis occurs in a littoral region, employment of an amphibious readiness group/MEU might be an appropriate response--but only if this force is close or time permits it to reposition from its station elsewhere.

On the other hand, if time was essential and the crisis occurred inland, commitment of the XVIII Airborne Corps might be more appropriate. Only Army contingency forces have the capability to project decisive force into the heartland of a belligerent nation. They can deploy forces quickly to a crisis area, conduct an airborne or air assault forced entry, and then eventually follow up with a heavy, decisive Sunday punch. Moreover, Marine forces usually connote a short-term U.S. commitment--an idea that is appealing to potential adversaries as well as to the American public. In either case, as Stephen Ambrose points out in his recent essay, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy," the "power to destroy is not the power to control. Power is the man on the spot with the gun in his hand."<sup>82</sup>

The most important difference between Army and Marine operations is related to objectives--why a force is committed directly influences how it operates and

with what. Generally speaking, Marine expeditionary forces support campaigns; they do not wage them. Accordingly, their missions and objectives feature greater limitations than Army contingency forces. Operational objectives for Marine forces are usually related to seizure and protection of geographical decisive points (ports, airfields) essential for the conduct of a larger contingency operation.

Marine forces have the capability for extended operations from ships, forcible entry from the sea, and then for operations ashore while being supported from the sea. Although capable of operations along the entire operational continuum, Marine forces primarily fulfill the role of a light-medium force that provides the bridge from complementary light forces to heavier, sustained combat forces. In other words, Marine expeditionary forces can shape the battlefield and influence the action until Army contingency forces arrive and begin the transition to decisive combat operations.

In contrast, Army contingency forces are designed for decisive engagement. This capability ultimately shifts the focus of Army forces from terrain-oriented objectives to force-oriented objectives involving engagement, rapid exploitation, pursuit, and defeat or destruction of an enemy force. A Marine force

attempting such a follow-up might be diverted away from the objectives it landed to seize thereby reducing its capability to defend them against subsequent attack.

Our analysis also indicates that Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces represent redundant capabilities in terms of rapid deployment and forced entry (Table IX). Although similar in these respects, neither force is configured or trained to successfully execute the other's mission. For example, Marine forces do not have the capability to conduct an airborne assault to secure an airfield. Likewise, Army forces cannot conduct an amphibious assault to seize a port.

**IX. SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES OF ARMY CONTINGENCY FORCES & MARINE CORPS EXPEDITIONARY FORCES**

	<b>RAPID DEPLOYMENT</b>	<b>FORCED ENTRY</b>	<b>LITTORAL OPNS<sup>1</sup></b>	<b>SUSTAINED LAND OPNS<sup>2</sup></b>
<b>MARINE DIVISION</b>	YES	YES	YES	NO
<b>LIGHT DIVISION</b>	YES	NO	NO	YES
<b>AIRBORNE DIVISION</b>	YES	YES	NO	YES
<b>AIR ASLT DIVISION</b>	YES <sup>3</sup>	YES	NO	YES
<b>HEAVY DIVISION</b>	NO	NO	NO	YES

1: ARMY FORCES MAY BE USED WHEN MARINE FORCES ARE NOT AVAILABLE OR TIME IS ESSENTIAL (GRENADA, PANAMA). ARMY FORCES MAY ALSO AUGMENT MARINE FORCES (SOMALIA).  
 2: MARINE FORCES MAY AUGMENT ARMY FORCES (VIETNAM, SOUTHWEST ASIA).  
 3: SELF-DEPLOY FROM CONUS TO ISB TO OBJECTIVE AREA.

Unnecessary duplication may exist within Army contingency forces--specifically, between the light infantry division, the airborne division, and the air assault division. Regardless of their manner of entry into battle--parachute, helicopter, or aircraft--all three divisions fight as infantry. However, the light infantry division duplicates capabilities already found in the airborne division and the air assault division, yet possesses no unique capabilities of its own.

The fact that no light infantry divisions deployed to Southwest Asia during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991) underscores their inherent shortfall in capabilities.<sup>83</sup> During contingency planning for Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989), this shortfall forced planners to replace the 7th Infantry Division (Light) with the 82d Airborne Division as the primary early entry force.<sup>84</sup> As Lieutenant General Thomas Kelly, the JCS J-3, noted:

The fact is, we could get an airborne division on the ground in ten minutes or we could get an airlanded brigade in a day and a half.<sup>85</sup>

Actually, operational planners estimated it would take at least twenty-four hours to land a brigade of the 7th Infantry Division (Light) into one of the Panamanian airfields. However, by parachuting a brigade of the 82d Airborne Division into Panama, more than 2000 soldiers could be introduced into the battle within six

hours after the planes took off from the United States.<sup>86</sup>

To further examine the capabilities of Army and Marine Corps forces for future regional crisis response, a comparison can be made by applying scenario-based analysis similar to the methodology used in the 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA). For this comparison, we will adopt the JMNA scenarios: a crisis in Korea in 1993 and a crisis in Southwest Asia in 1999. The selected scenarios are chosen because they are plausible, demanding, and representative of current and future U.S. alliance commitments and vital interests. Our selected criteria--deployability, lethality, and versatility--are difficult to measure. However, by carefully quantifying these criteria in Table X and XI, we can obtain a more objective view of Army and Marine Corps capabilities.

CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY: KOREA 1993.

JMNA wargaming of a Korea 1993 scenario postulates that a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) offensive will achieve most of its success relatively early. Rapidly deployable Army light forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces will arrive in time to assist in repelling the attack. Once sufficient U.S. forces arrive in theater, U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces will successfully stop DPRK advances and

restore the international border. However, JMNA wargaming indicates that FY 1993 mobility forces do not deliver Army heavy forces as fast as desired by scenario guidelines.<sup>87</sup>

**X. CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY:  
KOREA 1993**

	<b>DEPLOYABILITY (3)</b>	<b>LETHALITY (2)</b>	<b>VERSATILITY (1)</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>MARINE DIVISION</b>	3/9	3/6	4/4	10/19
<b>LIGHT DIVISION</b>	5/15	1/2	1/1	7/18
<b>AIRBORNE DIVISION</b>	4/12	2/4	3/3	9/19
<b>AIR ASLT DIVISION</b>	2/6	4/8	5/5	11/19
<b>HEAVY DIVISION</b>	1/3	5/10	2/2	8/15
<p><b>NOTE: Higher numbers indicate increased capability. Weights are then assigned to each criterion based on relative importance in the scenario.</b></p>				

As Table X illustrates, Army light forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces are the most capable forces for initial response in the early defensive phase of the Korea 1993 scenario. Table X also reinforces the importance of maintaining redundant yet complementary forces. With the initial attack contained, the steadily increasing deployment of forces to Korea will produce steadily increasing combat capabilities, creating a number of additional options for the theater CINC. This analysis adds impetus to

the need for the mobility enhancements, identified by the Mobility Requirements Study, that will speed the introduction of Army heavy forces into theater.

CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY: SOUTHWEST ASIA 1999.

JMNA wargaming of a Southwest Asia 1999 scenario indicates that the combination of early arriving U.S. forces and forces from friendly nations in the region will stop the enemy's advance and force a stalemate soon after the fighting begins. At this point, enemy forces remain short of the ports, oilfields, and oil trans-shipment facilities that are their primary objectives. Early deploying MEBs and prepositioned U.S. ground force equipment, combined with air supremacy and the capabilities of friendly states in the region, produce a relatively strong defensive capability. Enemy forces are attrited by air attack until Army heavy forces arrive in theater. Eventually, arriving Army forces are sufficient to initiate a counteroffensive, eject enemy forces, and restore international borders.<sup>88</sup>

By 1999, with the prepositioning and surge sealift improvements recommended by the Mobility Requirements Study and initially funded in the FY 1993 budget, deployment capability for Army heavy divisions will be dramatically improved. In fact, the mobility improvements during this period will be able to close

the force the U.S. sent to Operation Desert Storm in about 90 days, in contrast to the 180 day deployment in 1990.<sup>89</sup> Consequently, lethality becomes the most important criterion. As Table XI illustrates, Army contingency forces--specifically, the air assault division and the two heavy divisions--are the most capable force for employment in a Southwest Asia 1999 scenario.

**XI. CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY:  
SOUTHWEST ASIA 1999**

	<b>DEPLOYABILITY (2)</b>	<b>LETHALITY (3)</b>	<b>VERSATILITY (1)</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>MARINE DIVISION</b>	3/6	3/9	3/3	9/18
<b>LIGHT DIVISION</b>	5/10	1/3	1/1	7/14
<b>AIRBORNE DIVISION</b>	4/8	2/6	2/2	8/16
<b>AIR ASLT DIVISION</b>	1/2	4/12	5/5	10/19
<b>HEAVY DIVISION</b>	2/4	5/15	4/4	11/23

**NOTE:** Higher numbers indicate increased capability. Weights are then assigned to each criterion based on relative importance in the scenario.

This analysis did not address the capability to respond to more than one major regional contingency at a time. If two major regional contingencies occur at the same time, the U.S. will have no alternative but to employ economy of force and sequential operations. As the 1992 JMNA notes: "the Base Force is capable of

resolving quickly--with low risk--only one major regional crisis at a time."<sup>90</sup> Lacking options, the U.S. will be forced to make difficult strategic choices regarding application of force and resources.

### Section V

#### CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

You should not have a favorite weapon. To become overfamiliar with one weapon is as much a fault as not knowing it sufficiently well....It is bad for commanders to have likes and dislikes.<sup>91</sup>

Miyamoto Musashi  
17th century Japanese warrior  
A Book of Five Rings

Over the past decade, crises in Grenada, Panama, and Southwest Asia have required theater combatant CINCs to actively employ every capability represented in both Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces. There is every reason to believe that regional crises will arise in the near future that will once again require the capabilities of these forces to meet the needs of U.S. interests. Consequently, Army and Marine forces must continue to provide a diverse portfolio of ground combat capabilities--armored, mechanized, infantry, air assault, airborne, and amphibious.

The assignment of roles and missions should be such that there is no unnecessary redundancy in these required capabilities; however, it is also important that there be no gaps. While it is true that both the

Army and Marine Corps possess the ability to respond to crises with land forces as outlined in DOD Directive 5100.1, their unique capabilities complement rather than duplicate each other. Complementary capabilities provide a CINC with a broad selection of operational and tactical choices--a tool box--from which he can choose the right tool to accomplish a specific mission. During a crisis, those tools are the capabilities provided by Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces.

An analogy may help clarify this idea. In football, when a team takes to the field, individual specialists work together to win. The fact that wide receivers, tight ends, and running backs can catch passes does not make that capability unnecessarily redundant for the team. These players have different but complementary abilities which allow the offense to present a multi-faceted offense. In turn their opponents must concern themselves with defending against several possibilities. No one would suggest that the team save money by eliminating tight ends on the assumption that there would still be a capability to catch passes.

Unfortunately, a team cannot have an unlimited number of receivers, tight ends, and running backs. Therefore, we must consider cutting any player who

lacks unique capabilities--namely, the Army light infantry division. Originally established in the mid-1980s to fight in a low-intensity conflict, light infantry divisions now serve in this role only as an augmentation to forces from the more recently established U.S. Special Operations Command. Within Army contingency forces, this role can be assumed by other players--the 82d Airborne Division or the 101st Airborne Division--with low risk. Any larger commitment of U.S. forces must be in the form of operations that seek decisive victory rather than a protracted stalemate.

Regional contingencies of the future will be met with a smaller, restructured U.S. force. At the same time, this smaller force will be required to accomplish an increasing number of missions as the military's role expands in today's more complex geopolitical setting. Consequently, we must look to synergism--the product of the combined effects of the actions of each Service in combination with the others--as the decisive element in producing victory.

Reducing redundancy in this envisioned force is certainly a laudable aim. However, erring on the low side in military force structure can lead to consequences that are as unacceptable as errors made in maintaining a military that is too large. Many

Americans would die unnecessarily--paying the price for excessive cuts in defense--even if U.S. forces managed to carry on and muddle through to eventual victory. The ghosts of Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor, Kasserine, and Korea bear witness to the folly of this traditional U.S. approach to defense policy.<sup>92</sup>

Ultimately, the true test of our smaller force will come not in peace, but in war. To meet this challenge, we must retain the carefully developed, complementary capabilities offered by current Army contingency forces and Marine Corps expeditionary forces. Only through the synergism created by the simultaneous application of complementary capabilities can our CINCs continue to accomplish their missions and the United States continue to win. That, after all, is the ultimate reason for roles and missions.

NOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 606.
2. Senator Sam Nunn, "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul The Services' Roles and Missions," From a speech delivered to the United States Senate, (Washington, DC: July 2, 1992). The other nine areas listed include: projection of air power, theater air defenses, space operations, helicopter forces, intelligence, functional organizations and activities, logistics and support activities, administrative and management headquarters, guard and reserve component forces.
3. The National Military Strategy 1992, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 23.
4. Nunn.
5. FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), p. 2-17.
6. Nunn.
7. Rudolf A. Winnacker, "The Historical Framework," in Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix A: Mechanisms for Change - Organizational History, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1970), p. 4.
8. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Its Impact on the Army--A Primer, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army), p. 2.
9. Steven L. Rearden, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 388.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p. 389.
12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 391.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. "Functions of the Armed Forces," Executive Order 9877, 1947. From U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
17. Ibid.
18. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973) p. 375.
19. Rearden, p. 395.
20. "Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," DOD Directive 5100.1, (April 21, 1948), p. 2-10. From U.S. Army Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
21. Ibid., p. 3.
22. Ibid., p. 8.
23. Rearden, p. 396.
24. Mark Perry, Four Stars, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), p. 12.
25. Rearden, p. 417.
26. Ibid., p. 418.
27. Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 75.
28. United States Code, "Title 10 - Armed Forces," (1952), 3062 & 5013.
29. A. J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986), p. 146.
30. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Its Impact on the Army--A Primer, p. 3.
31. Nunn.

32. Public Law 99-433, "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986," (October 1, 1986), Section 201.
33. Ibid.
34. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1993), p. III-37.
35. Ibid.
36. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Powell's Roles and Missions Report Retains Service's Major Redundancies," Armed Forces Journal International, (March 1993), p. 10.
37. National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), p. 3.
38. Ibid., p. 14.
39. The National Military Strategy, p. 6.
40. Ibid., p. 6-10.
41. Ibid., p. 23.
42. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992/93), p. 43.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. James M. Dubik, "Military Force: Preparing for the Future," Military Review, (March 1992), p. 82.
46. FM 100-5, p. 3-3.
47. Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992), p. 69.
48. FM 100-15, Corps Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1989), p.1-0 - 1-3.
49. Ibid.

50. Gary E. Luck, "The XVIII Airborne Corps: Puttin' Power on the Ground," Military Review, (April 1992), p. 10.
51. Ibid.
52. "The Reshaping of an Army," Interview with General Frederick M. Franks, Infantry, (May-June 1992), p. 10.
53. FM 71-100, Division Operations, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1990), p. 1-3, D-1.
54. Ibid., p. D-2 - D-3.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., p. D-4 - D-5.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 1-4.
59. MTMCTEA Report OA 90-4f-22, Deployment Planning Guide, (Newport News, VA: Military Traffic Management Command, August 1991), p. C-3 to C-8, C-13 to C-18.
60. FM 71-100, p. D-11.
61. Ibid., p. C-2.
62. FM 100-15, p. 2-4.
63. FM 71-100, p. C-2.
64. Dennis Steele, "New Strategic Mobility Initiative," Army, (January 1993), p. 41.
65. The U.S. Army Posture Statement, FY 93, p. 14.
66. ...From the Sea, U.S. Navy and Marine Corps White Paper, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 3-7.
67. Ibid.
68. Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume 1, [MCP], (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 7-8.
69. FMFM 1, Warfighting, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 42.

70. MCP, p. 8.
71. Ibid., p. 11.
72. Ibid., p. 10-11.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid., p. 9.
75. Ibid., p. 8-9, 30.
76. FMFM 6-1, Marine Division, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 1.
77. MCP, p. 14.
78. Ibid., p. 8.
79. Ibid., p. 12.
80. R. Scott Moore, "Rethinking the MAGTF," Marine Corps Gazette, (June 1992), p. 21.
81. FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in National Defense, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 3-13.
82. Stephen F. Ambrose, "The Presidency and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1991/1992), p. 120-137.
83. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, DOD Final Report to Congress, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 382-390.
84. Thomas Donnelly, Margaret Roth, and Caleb Baker, Operation Just Cause, (New York: Lexington Books, 1991), p. 89.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., p. 191-192.
87. 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), p. 9-4 - 9-5.
88. Ibid., p. 9-8.
89. Ibid., p. 9-9.
90. Ibid., p. 9-15.

91. Miyamoto Musashi, A Book of Five Rings, translated by Victor Harris, (Woodstock, New York: The Overlook Press, 1982), p. 48.

92. Dennis M. Drew, "Recasting the Flawed Downsizing Debate," Parameters, (Spring 1993), p. 47.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

Bacevich, A. J. The Pentomic Era. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986.

Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Michael Howard. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Donnelly, Thomas, Margeret Roth and Caleb Baker. Operation Just Cause. New York: Lexington Books, 1991.

Gates, David. Western Light Forces and Defence Planning. Aberdeen, Scotland: Centre for Defence Studies, 1986.

Musashi, Miyamoto. A Book of Five Rings. Translated by Victor Harris. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press, 1982.

Perry, Mark. Four Stars. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989.

Rearden, Steven L. History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.

### Articles and Periodicals

Ambrose, Stephan F. "The Presidency and Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs, Winter 1991/92.

Batcheller, Gordon D. "If Not Tarawa, What?" Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992.

Bolger, Daniel P. "A Power Projection Force: Some Concrete Proposals." Parameters, Winter 1992-93.

Drew, Dennis M. "Recasting the Flawed Downsizing Debate." Parameters, Spring 1993.

Dubik, James M. "Military Force: Preparing for the Future." Military Review, March 1992.

Dunn, Colin K. "The Reshaping of an Army." Interview with General Frederick M. Franks, Jr. Infantry, May-June 1992.

Gatchel, Theodore L. "A Matter of Style: Varying Approaches to the Challenges of Amphibious Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992.

Goodman, Glenn W., Jr. "Powell's Roles and Missions Report Retains Services' Major Redundancies." Armed Forces Journal International, March 1993.

Hayes, Mark L. "Sealift: The Achilles' Heel of our National Strategy." Marine Corps Gazette, November 1992.

Hittle, James D. "Roles and Missions Fight is Endless." Marine Corps Gazette, December 1992.

Hoffman, F. G. "The New National Security Strategy." Marine Corps Gazette, February 1992.

Hyde, James C. "Current Roles and Missions Skirmish Just the Latest Battle in a Lengthy War." Armed Forces Journal International, September 1992.

Kelly, John J., John B. LaPlante, and Harry W. Jenkins, Jr. "Amphibious Warfare: A Roundtable Discussion." Marine Corps Gazette, August 1992.

Krulak, Charles C. "A Corps of Marines for the Future: Relevant, Ready, Capable." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992.

Linn, Thomas C. "The Marine Corps and Joint Warfare." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992.

Luck, Gary E. "The XVIII Airborne Corps: Puttin' Power on the Ground." Military Review, April 1992.

Moore, R. Scott. "Rethinking the MAGTAF." Marine Corps Gazette, June 1992.

Mundy, Carl E., Jr. "Naval Expeditionary Forces and Power Projection: Into the 21st Century." Marine Corps Gazette, January 1992.

Mundy, Carl E., Jr. "Capabilities Are Key to US Forces Reorganization." Armed Forces Journal International,

October 1992.

Powell, Colin L. "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead."  
Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93.

Roos, John G. Interview with General Frederick M.  
Franks, Jr. Armed Forces Journal International,  
October 1992.

Steele, Dennis. "New Strategic Mobility Initiative."  
Army, January 1993.

#### U.S. Government Publications

AFSC Pub 2 (Draft), Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces. Norfolk, VA: National Defense University, October, 1991.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Cheney, Dick. Annual Report to the President and the Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. DOD Final Report to Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

FMFM 1, Warfighting. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

FMFM 1-1, Campaigning. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

FMFM 1-2, The Role of the Marine Corps in National Defense. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

FMFM 6-1, Marine Division. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

FM 71-100, Division Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

FM 100-5, Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government

Printing Office, 1986.

FM 100-5, Operations (Final Draft). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993.

FM 100-15, Corps Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989.

...From the Sea. U.S. Navy and Marine Corps White Paper. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.

Joint Military Net Assessment. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

Light Infantry Divisions. U.S. Army White Paper. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume 1. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

MTMCTEA Report OA 90-4f-22, Deployment Planning Guide. Newport News, VA: Military Traffic Management Command, 1991.

National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993.

Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense by the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Appendix A: "Mechanisms for Change--Organizational History," Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1970.

The National Military Strategy 1992. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.

The United States Army Posture Statement FY93. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

### Monographs and Unpublished Research Projects

Finehout, Arthur W. "The Contingency Army: Structured for Operational Success?" Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991.

Hendricks, Douglas O. "Marine Prepositioning Force in Theater Level Campaigning." Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991.

Mornston, Harry E. "The Emerging National Military Strategy of Power Projection and the Army's Contingency Corps." Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991.

### Other Sources

Floor Speech by Senator Sam Nunn. "The Defense Department Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services Roles and Missions." Washington, DC: July 2, 1992.

"Functions of the Armed Forces." Executive Order 9877, 1947. From Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

"Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff." DOD Directive 5100.1, 1948. From Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Act of 1986: Its Impact on the Army--A Primer. Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army.

Public Law 99-433. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986." Section 201. 1986.

"Title 10 - Armed Forces." United States Code. Sections 3062 & 5013. 1952.