U.N. Peacekeeping in Yugoslavia: Background, Analysis, and Lessons Learned
Abstract
This study seeks to answer the question: How effective were U.N. peacekeeping operations in the disputed areas of Yugoslavia in 1992? In doing so, the study embraces three themes. First, it explores the causes of the Yugoslav Conflict. Second, it analyzes the peacekeeping operation in terms of change over time-focusing on changes to conditions, objectives, and resources. Finally, it assesses the performance of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on each of its eleven missions. The study concludes that UNPROFOR was not very effective. Of the eleven missions assigned, it achieved complete success on but one of them, and it failed outright on three. The Serbian Knin authorities and Serbian militia forces were largely to blame. The U.N. itself made several critical mistakes: failing to identify and address the causes of the conflict, assigning UNPROFOR an impracticable mandate, and failing to achieve a cease-fire over Bosnia-Herzegovina or to gain cooperation between the three sides fighting there. The study also concludes that if the United States wants the U.N. to be effective in the future, the United States should incorporate peacekeeping into its national security strategy. It should also address shortfalls in both peacekeeping doctrine and training within its military.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 04, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA274108
Entities
People
- David A. Mosinski
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College