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# Leadership of the Operational Commander: Combat Multiplier or Myth?

A Monograph
by

Lieutenant Colonel George P. Ritter

Armor




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

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

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# Abstract

LEADERSHIP OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER: COMBAT MULTIPLIER OR MYTH? By LTC George P. Ritter, USA, 54 pages

The exercise of operational leadership becomes increasingly difficult as technology makes the battlefield more lethal, as the pace of combat accelerates, and as combat forces become more joint and combined. U.S. Army senior level leadership doctrine states that high level leaders exercise leadership through indirect methods. This monograph answers the question: Is it possible for the modern, operational commander to exercise leadership as a combat multiplier, or have battlefield conditions made operational leadership a myth?

The monograph examines two case studies of operational commanders in the modern era: General Erwin Rommel in the North African Campaign of 1941-1942 and General Matthew Ridgway in the Korean campaign of 1951. The case studies analyze the leadership, or lack of it, in terms of the four functions of leadership as described by U. S. Army doctrine and expanded upon by U.S. Army Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege: providing purpose, establishing direction, generating motivation, and sustaining force effectiveness. To determine the effectiveness of these functions as exercised by Rommel and Ridgway, the analysis uses battle outcomes, casualty/loss rates, and condition of forces at the conclusion of operations. The evidence cited shows that much of Rommel's defeat can be attributed to his failure to exercise leadership at the operational level. In contrast, Ridgway's victory, in great part, was the result of his successful, operational leadership.

The monograph concludes that operational leadership is a combat multiplier, but that the functions of leadership--as demonstrated by these two commanders--are not equal in importance to operational outcomes. Establishing direction is the most imprtant function of the four and can have significant impact on sustaining force effectiveness. Provision of purpose must be consistant with that of the operational commander's higher headquarters, and the generation of motivation must be accomplished at the operational level; tactical motivation alone is not sufficient for operational success.

# Leadership of the Operational Commander: Combat Multiplier or Myth?

## INTRODUCTION

The authors of the United States Army's keystone field manual, FM 100-5 Operations, describe leadership as "the most essential element of combat power" and state that "in the final analysis and once the force is engaged, superior combat power derives from the courage and competence of soldiers . . . and **above all the quality of their leadership** [emphasis added]."[1] The draft revision of the manual, repeats this stand on the importance of leadership in military operations and notes that "the personal influence of large joint and combined force, field, corps, and division commanders have a major bearing on the outcomes of battles and campaigns" and that leadership is one of two components of command.[2] Clearly, from the position of current United States Army doctrine, leadership is the most important element on the battlefield, but the way in which commanders have led on the battlefield has changed over time.

Prior to the 18th century, army commanders performed this leadership in a face-to-face environment. Commanders such as Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Henry IV, Cromwell, and Marlborough found that they could observe and personally lead most, if not all, of their forces on the battlefield. These great commanders massed their armies to get the most shock and firepower effect of their weapons. However, as the sizes of armies increased, as battlefields became larger, and as armies dispersed, commanders learned that this face-to-face leadership was nearly impossible for them to execute.

In the late 19th and 20th centuries, armies were based on the popular/citizen model developed during the French Revolution. Armies of from one million to over five million men were not uncommon. Improved technology (e.g. the rifled musket and cannon, the railroad, mechanization, airpower, and weapons of mass destruction) made the battlefield a more mobile and lethal place. As a result, armies dispersed or fought from fortifications making the battlefield more "empty." To maintain freedom of action, army commanders had to maneuver large masses of men over great distances and time: they had to become operational artists. Now army commanders found that the face-to-face leadership of their predecessors was extremely difficult. The distances between units within their armies were great; the commanders were at great risk when they came onto the

battlefield because of its increased lethality; and battles progressed so quickly that commanders had difficulty keeping up with the tempo and with being able to lead at the critical place and time. Additionally, the armies were changing in nature.

Armies were now often composed of more than just ground forces from one nation. Forces took on a joint and combined nature. Armies composed of soldiers, sailors, and airmen of diverse nations and the employment of naval and air forces now became army commanders' responsibilities. These commanders also found that their professional experience, education, and training sometimes did not prepare them for the responsibilities of naval and air force employment or for coalition warfare. All of these factors made leading such forces more complex for the modern army commander than for his pre-industrial-revolution predecessor. In fact, not only does United States Army doctrine see this problem of leadership as the most important element on the battlefield, but doctrine also sees it as the greatest challenge on the battlefield of the future.[3]

The United States Army devotes a significant effort in teaching leadership in its pre-commissioning training, in its military schools, and at its colleges. The U.S. Army's basic leadership manual describes leadership as "a process by which a soldier influences others to accomplish the mission."[4] In its manual on senior level leadership, the U.S. Army states that leadership of the sort that an operational level commander might exercise "is the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result. But above all, it is the art of taking a vision of what must be done, communicating it in a way that the intent is clearly understood, and then being tough enough to ensure its execution."[5] This, then, is the institutional definition of what the operational-level commander must do.

Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, author of the 1986 version of FM 100-5 and founding director of the United States Army's School of Advanced Military Studies, in his article titled "A Comprensive View of Leadership," agrees with U.S. Army doctrine and writes that "senior leaders rely more on indirect processes in proportion to their seniority" and explains that leadership has four functions: "providing purpose, establishing direction, generating motivation for unit actions, and sustaining the effectiveness of the unit for future tasks."[6] Here Wass de Czege attempts to break into components what the effective leader must do and how he does it.

According to Wass de Czege, for the effective leader to provide purpose, he must impart "a coherent picture of how the unit mission fits into the 'big picture'. . . [to give his unit] . . .a sense of importance of the tasks to be accomplished and how success or failure of the unit mission will affect the world beyond the unit."[7] This view conforms to U.S. Army doctrine that states that for the senior commander to establish purpose he must have "an ability to understand what is required of an organization . . . [and] . . . a well-informed ability to communicate the intent clearly so that

it links the larger aims to the organizational mission. . . ."[8] The authors of this doctrine write that the senior commander's ability to do this "is based on an appreciation of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war."[9] Clearly, then, an operational-level commander providing purpose to his force gives it a starting point in relation to the overall scheme of the war. However, it is the function of establishing direction that provides the "how-to" in moving that force from the starting point.

Establishing direction is the function of leadership that gives the force a way to accomplish its mission. "Setting goals and standards, developing teams, ensuring discipline, and training the organization are the means senior leaders and commanders use to chart organizational direction."[10] Wass de Czege goes further to describe this function:

> Effective leaders provide unambiguous direction and guidance for action. They have a clear vision of what must be done, what is necessary to get the job done and how to proceed. They clearly articulate and assign objectives, missions and goals to subordinates. In addition to such direct guidance, they also provide indirect guidance. They promote values; set standards for accomplishment of tasks; enforce discipline; establish standard operating procedures; ensure the training of soldiers and units in appropriate doctrine, methods and techniques; and establish policies and regulations.[11]

It is through this function of establishing direction that the operational commander develops his force as a machine to accomplish its purpose. The "fuel" that keeps this machine working towards its purpose, though, is motivation.

Generating motivation gives the operational commander's force the impetus to act and maintains that force's momentum. Official Army doctrine states that "senior leaders and commanders are responsible for ensuring that the required motivation exists. They do this by developing the proper ethical perspective, sustaining a positive and progressive command climate, and fostering a sense of unit that generates an unshakable organizational cohesion."[12] Wass de Czege is more specific as to what the operational level commander must do to generate motivation. He cites "personal displays of courageous example, self-discipline, fairness, competence and force of personality" as being "occasionally necessary and effective," but states further that "a more complex system of authority, mutual trust and confidence must be established" between the led and the leader.[13] This "more complex system" is necessary at the operational level because the majority of the force's soldiers must be motivated by a trust and confidence developed by the commander while unable physically to be near that majority of soldiers. The commander does this, according to Wass de Czege, by influencing "soldiers through layers of their subordinate leaders. They cultivate positive leadership among their immediate subordinates and resort to face-to-face persuasion to bolster will as the occasion warrants (but

usually with subordinate commanders and staffs)."[14] Explicitly there is recognition that higher level commanders exercise the leadership function of motivation not directly to soldiers, but through subordinates to these soldiers. However, it is the final function of leadership (sustaining the effectiveness of the unit for future tasks) that makes possible the maintenance of effective organizations produced by the first three functions of leadership.

U.S. Army doctrine does not include in its discussion of leadership imperatives at senior levels this final function of sustaining the effectiveness of the unit for future tasks.[15] Wass de Czege, however, is quite specific about this important function of higher level commanders. He writes that this function becomes more systematic and institutionalized at higher levels. He is also very specific about what this function requires of operational level commanders. They must plan for the loss of key leaders, the impact of new weapons, and the effects of "a myriad of environmental changes affecting the health and effectiveness of their command."[16] Hence, this fourth function of leadership seeks to ensure that the force can survive the present and remain prepared for the future. It seeks to ensure that the provision of purpose, the establishment of direction, and the generation of motivation continue to make the force effective for the operational level commander. Yet in all this doctrinal discussion, there are few examples of modern operational level commanders actually performing these functions.[17]

Is operational leadership still possible as a combat multiplier or is it a myth, something made impossible by the modern conditions faced by the operational level leader? The monograph will examine how two operational commanders (General Erwin Rommel[18] in his North African campaigns of 1941 and 1942 and General Matthew Ridgway[19] in Korea during early 1951) exercised leadership in a combined environment and what, if any, impact this leadership had on the success or failure of their forces.

The case studies of Rommel and Ridgway are significant and relevant because they both commanded armies in environments similar to those which U.S. Army/U.S. Unified Command Commanders-in-Chief may encounter in the future. Each of these generals commanded a multi-national (combined) force and had to plan for the employment of naval and air forces (joint operations). Each commander was at the end of a long line of communication from his sustainment base (requiring power projection in terms of forces and logistics). Each commander was faced with the difficult situation of taking over command of forces that that been severely beaten by their opponents. Finally, each was commanding in a geographical setting different than any other in which he had fought before.

This monograph evaluatesthe methods and procedures these two commanders used to: provide purpose, establish direction, generate motivation, and sustain their organizations' effectiveness. These leadership functions are the basis of analysis because they are, according to doctrine and Wass de Czege's view, the fuctions of leadership. Then the monograph will illustrate the results of

each commander's methods and procedures through a look at the commander's force effectiveness. Because the objective of military leadership is a force that is effective on the battlefield, the criteria selected for this examination are the outcomes of battles and campaigns in which each force participated (i.e. the ability of a commander to impose his will on the opposing commander and force at the operational level), the number of battle and non-battle casualties, and the condition of the force at the conclusion of battles/campaigns for subsequent operations. The objective of this analysis, as stated above, is to determine if the leadership of a modern operational commander is a combat multiplier for his force and, if so, how does he make it so.

## PROVIDING PURPOSE

Mitchell M. Zais, a colonel in the United States Army, examined theater commanders for their key attributes and found two imperatives for success at this operational level: strategic vision and strength of will.[20] This strategic vision, or a view of the larger goal to which a theater commander's campaign must lead, is the centerpiece for providing purpose to an organization. Yet, having a strategic vision and strength of will cannot stand alone. The strategic vision must be one that is compatible with the strategy of the operational commander's superior command, whether that be the national command authority or a theater-of-war commander. If it is not compatible, the operational commander may set his force on a course that is inconsistent with the course of his nation or his coalition. In the cases of Rommel and Ridgway, both of these operational commanders had strength of will. Ridgway's strategic vision, though he did little to provide purpose effectively to his force, did fit into the strategy of his superior, General MacArthur. Rommel's strategic vision, his provision of purpose, was purely his own, and it led to the eventual defeat of Axis forces in North Africa.

During 1940, the British 8th Army had soundly defeated the Italian 10th Army in North Africa after the Italians had attempted an invasion of Egypt from Libya. At the conclusion of this defeat, British forces pursued the Italians back through Libya and then established a thin defense line in order to reconstitute forces and move them to other theaters of operation (i.e. the Balkans and Sudan). This Italian defeat was so thorough in Adolf Hitler's mind that he feared the ultimate collapse of his ally in North Africa and the ultimate endangering of Vichy French Tunesia. In an effort to shore up the Italians, he sent two German divisions under command of one of Germany's fastest rising general officers and a hero in the *blitzkrieg* defeat of France: Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel. In his role, Rommel was to be subordinate to the Italian Commander in Chief, Marshall Graziani.[21]

Prior to travelling to North Africa, Rommel received his instructions from the commander-in-chief of the German army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch. Von Brauchitsch reiterated that Rommel was to come under the command of Graziani, but was to have direct command of the German Afrika Korps composed of 5th Light Division and 15th Panzer Division, both of whom would soon be enroute to the theater of operations. He would also command the remains of the Italian Motorized Corps that that been so badly defeated by the British. In essence, he was to become an army commander though officially he was still a corps commander in terms of the German units that he commanded. "Rommel was further instructed not to assume the offensive until after the arrival of all German units. Rommel listened but apparently did not take these instructions very seriously, particularly the part about being under the command of the Italians."[22]

Upon arrival at Tripoli on 12 February 1941, he found that Graziani had turned over command to his chief of staff, General Garibaldi. Rommel soon learned that Garibaldi was not in favor of his plan to defend in vicinity of the Gulf of Sirte.[23] Then Rommel made his first decision to violate the strategic instructions that he received from the German High Command:

> I had already decided, in view of the tenseness of the situation and sluggishness of the Italian command, to depart from my instructions to confine myself to a reconnaissance and to take the command at the front into my own hands as soon as possible. . . . General von Rintelen, to whom I had given a hint of my intention in Rome, had advised me against it . . . .[24]

He then went to inspect the Italian regiment defending the Sirte position, and he determined that the one regiment was insufficient for defense; three days later he was rushing the first of two German units to arrive in theater (the 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion and an anti-tank battalion) to the line.[25]

In order to provide purpose to a force according to current U.S. Army doctrine, the operational commander must ensure that his force ("at least two echelons below") understands how it fits into the "big picture," understands the priority of the tasks before it, and understands "how success or failure of the organization will impact on the world beyond the unit."[26] Heinz Werner Schmidt, a member of Rommel's staff, relates how the Desert Fox did just that when addressing the officers of the newly arrived 5th Light Division. Rommel clearly informed this subordinate unit of the purpose of their presence in North Africa: they were to "restore the confidence of the Italian people in their arms and to bolster up the fighting spirit of" the Italians. Additionally, he strongly emphasized that they "must save Trepolitania from the attack of the British Army. We must hold them!"[27] There is every indication here that Rommel stayed with the strategic goal he received from the German High Command. Clearly, his purpose is one of operational defense: the German forces were to "save Trepolitania" and "hold" the British. Nothing is indicated of an operational

offense. During Rommel's trip to Fuehrer Headquarters on 19 March, 1941, von Brauchitsch reiterated those instructions and told Rommel that "the High Command had no intention of launching a major offensive in North Africa, . . . no further German divisions would be sent to Libya after the 15th Panzer, . . .[and that] Rommel was not to risk even a minor advance until all elements of the Afrika Korps had arrived."[28] Rommel had already decided to disobey those instructions.

By the end of March, Rommel sensed a weakness in the British lines and sent his Afrika Korps (without the yet-to-arrive 15th Panzer Division) forward in the attack. By the end of April, his forces had pushed the British all the way back to the border of Egypt and laid seige to the fortress of Tobruk. In June Rommel's tired units held off the British attack called Operation Battleaxe. Hailed as gigantic success for German and Italian arms (though most of the serious fighting was accomplished by the two, now complete, German divisions, and the British were nowhere near as strong as they had been five months earlier), this operation nevertheless expended irreplaceable German and Italian soldiers, tons of ammunition, and massive amounts of fuel. All of these assets were scarce commodities in North Africa due to the inability of the Axis to supply their forces across the Mediterranean, due to the long land supply route required to bring supplies forward if they did arrive in North Africa, and due the theater's low priority from the German High Command as it was preparing for the invasion of the Soviet Union, its strategic main effort.

In August of 1941, Rommel's command was designated a panzer group, and he now had control of two German armored divisions (the 15th and the renamed 5th Light, now called the 21st); the German 90th Light (formed from resources in North Africa and composed of only four infantry battalions, three artillery battalions, and anti-tank battalion, and a battalion of 88 mm guns); and the six weak Italian divisions of the XX Motorised Corps (of which three were investing Tobruk and one was serving garrison duty.[29] In November, while Rommel was in Germany on leave and consulting with the High Command about another assault on Tobruk, the British launched Operation Crusader with seven divisons which initially pushed the Axis forces nearly 100 miles back toward Tobruk, but which Rommel blunted at Sidi Rezegh. Then Rommel launched his raid into Egypt and the rear of British forces. Again, Rommel had stopped the British and initiated a daring operational offensive, but the costs had been great for the Desert Fox, so great that when the British began to add reinforcements to their attacking formations in December, the exhausted Axis formations had to withdraw. They did so all the way back to the Gazala line where they had been in April.

At this point in the campaign, Rommel should have realized that his purpose of making this theater a strategically offensive one was doomed. Even he admits that the German High command would never make his theater a strategic priority:

> Our demands for additional formations were refused on the grounds that with

> the huge demand for transport which the eastern front was making on Germany's limited productive capacity, the creation of further motorised units for Africa was out of the question.
>
> It was obvious that the High Command's opinion had not changed from that which they had expressed in 1941, namely, that Africa was a "lost cause" and that any large-scale investment of material and troops in that theater would pay no dividends.[30]

There can be no doubt here that Rommel, as theater commander, knew that his campaign would not get the support that he needed to make it a successfully offensive one. Yet, on 1 June 1942, his divisions were on the attack again, and this time they would take him to the capture of Tobruk and promotion to Field Marshall, all the way into Egypt to the outskirts of a small desert town called El Alamein, and eventually to their own defeat.

The Battle of El Alamein and the subsequent retreat of Axis forces was a defeat from which Rommel's units never recovered. By 9 November 1942, Rommel's panzer army numbered but 7,500 fighting troops, 35 anti-tank guns, 24 anti-aircraft guns, no more than 75 field guns, and but 21 tanks. Killed in action numbered 3,000, and wounded numbered 5,4000; nearly 28,000 Axis soldiers had been taken prisoner.[31] Rommel's forces were back at Sollum, still retreating, eventually to Cyrenaica and finally in Tunesia, trapped between the Americans in the west and the British in the east. By 13 November, even Rommel knew that the fight was nearly over. In a letter to his wife, he wrote:

> The battle in [French] North Africa is nearing its end. This will put the odds even further against us. Here, too, the end will not be long for we're being simply crushed by the enemy superiority. The army is in no way to blame. It has fought magnificently.[32]

The army had indeed fought magnificently, but it had fought with the wrong strategic purpose. Its stated purpose had been to keep the Italians from being destroyed in North Africa with the subsequent loss of Vichy French Tunesia; the army was to "hold" the British. Instead, Rommel's purpose became the destruction of the British Army and the conquest of North Africa to include Egypt, and it was a purpose that was clearly inconsistent with what the German High Command would accept. The German strategic main effort was Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. To accomplish Rommel's purpose would have diverted resources away from this main effort, and OKH and OKW would have nothing of it. The result was that Rommel's offensive efforts, even his magnificently successful ones, did nothing more than wear down his own forces, forces that he could not reconstitute effectively.

The world will never know for sure if Rommel could have accomplished the defensive purpose of the German High Command, even with his supply difficulties; however, even when outnumbered

on the battlefield (as during Battleaxe or Crusader), Rommel's forces were tactically defensive winners with a supremacy of anti-tank weapons, an initally large amount of infantry suited for defense, and a sense of tactical mobility that far outpaced every British or American opponent that Rommel faced. Hence, while no campaign failure is the result of only one factor, Rommel's failure to provide a purpose to this force that was consistent with the strategy of the German High Command definitely was at least one contributing factor to his defeat. This commander's continuous press for the attack and the destruction of the British in North Africa exhausted his forces to the point of being incapable of effective defense. Ten years later and on the other side of the world, another Lieutenant General--this time an American--took command of a coalition army that was also on the verge of total defeat. Only in this case, the army commander won.

By the end of December 1950, United Nations Forces in Korea had been soundly defeated by the invading, combined forces of the North Korean Peoples Army (NKPA) and the Communist Chinese Army (CCF). The U.S. Eighth Army had retreated nearly 150 miles down the penninsula, leaving tons of military supplies and abandoned weapons in its wake and suffering thousands of casualties. The X Corps, on the eastern side of Korea, had been severely mauled by the enemy and forced to re-embark aboard ships to be transported south to join Eighth Army. Then, on 23 December, the commander of UN forces in Korea, Lieutenant General Walton Walker, was killed in a jeep accident. His replacement was Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, an American paratrooper and former commander of an airborne division and corps in World War II.

Flying from Washington, General Ridgway's first stop was at the headquarters of General MacArthur, Ridgway's immediate commander. At this initial meeting, Ridgway asked MacArthur if he would have any objection to Ridgway's attacking, given the situation was acceptable. MacArthur replied, "The Eighth Army is yours. Do what you think best."[33] On 26 December, Ridgway sent a General Order to the Eighth Army chief of staff that was to:

> . . . be read as soon as practicable by every officer assigned, attached to, or serving with Eighth Army; and that as circumstances permit, its text be made known to as many of the men as may be practicable, and made available to members of each of our foreign language United Nations contingents.
> General Order: I have with little notice assumed heavy responsibilities before in battle, but never with greater opportunites for service to our loved ones and our Nation in beating back a world menace which free men cannot tolerate.
> It is an honored privilege to share this service with you and with our comrades of the Navy and Air Force. You will have my utmost. I shall expect yours.[34]

In this first message to his army, Ridgway was providing purpose: "beating back a world

menance." Clearly, this general did not intend to stay on the defensive, but a much more detailed attempt at provision of purpose was yet to come.

General Ridgway arrived in Korea on 27 December and after meeting with South Korean President Rhee and assuring him that UN Forces were not going to withdraw from Korea in retreat, Ridgway begun a tour of corps and division headquarters. At each command post "Ridgway would jump from the jeep before it came to a full stop, give a high salute, and say, 'I am not here to get real estate--don't give a damn for that. I am here to defeat the enemy,' and pointing his finger at the group in front of him, he added,'and you are going to do it, now!" According to Lieutenant Colonel Paul Smith, who accompanied Ridgway that day: "This performance did not impress most of the viewers."[34] For the next four days he travelled thoroughout his command; with every opportunity, he emphasized his purpose of pushing the enemy back, of going on the offense: "I don't want your plans for defense," was his famous retort to officers who had fallen into the mood of the time. "I want to see your plan for attack."[35] He spoke with the enlisted men also. What he heard from these men drove him to believe that "this was a bewildered army, not sure of itself or its leaders, not sure of what they were doing here, wondering when they would hear the whistle of that homebound transport."[36] What he had found was an army without knowlege of purpose and definitely not of the spirit needed to launch an offensive.

By 8 January he had completed his initial tour of the command posts and in a letter to General Lawton Collins, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, he reported that all his corps and division commanders were of the same mind: "any major offensive action on our part would fail and probably with heavy losses. . . . [He] concurred in that estimate and put aside the hope . . . of offensive action to inflict losses and gain the initiative."[37] In order to restore the confidence of his army, Ridgway needed to provide it with success, but to get success it needed to fight. At this moment, the Eighth Army had neither the spirit (motivation) or the skills (direction) to do so. So General Ridgway started at the foundation: he decided to give it a purpose.

In General Ridgway's memoirs, he writes:

> There was still one great question that lurked in the minds of the troops, and it was basic. That question was simply this: Why do we fight at all? What the hell are we doing here, in this God-forgotten spot? Back in the States some commentator had said that in Korea we were fighting the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy, and that glib generalization had made a deep impression on the men of Eighth Army. One night in my room I sat down, and **out of the depths of my own great faith** in our cause, I tried to answer.[38] [emphasis added]

Eighth Army allegedly sent this statement out to all commanders with instructions that "all men in all ranks should be given a chance to see it."[39] General Ridgway makes some interesting points in

this memorandum. He writes that the UN Forces are there "because of the decisions of properly constituted authorities of our respective governments." [40] In other words, the UN Forces are there because they were ordered there. This is, at the least, a simplistic argument, and at the worst, a circular one. As to an answer to the question of "What are we fighting for?" Ridgway offers a seven-paragraph statement that, after much rhetoric and emotional appeal, comes down to the conclusion that UN Forces are fighting for individual freedom vs Communism. When questioned about the terseness of his General Order announcing his assumption of command a few weeks earlier, General Ridgway had responded: "American soldiers do not like rhetoric. They react with either ridicule or indifference." [41] One wonders at the reaction of the soldiers in Eighth Army to this rhetoric-filled statement of purpose?

Roy S. Appleman, a retired Army lieutenant colonel, veteran of the Korean war and author of an extremely well-researched and authoritative four volume history on the war, interviewed hundreds of soldiers and officers during and after the war, and he reported that a "high-ranking officer" told him that he "never saw the document," Appleman believed that "it is doubtful if most men in Eigth Army knew of it." When asked about the memo, General Ridgway replied: "It was not a long-studied carefully written statement. It was dictated within a few moments during a quick visit to my rear echelon command post . . . .It was dictated in about ten minutes." [42] This seems to conflict with Ridgway's earlier words that the statement came "out of the depths of my own great faith in our cause." Was this statement of purpose a seriously thought-out, deeply felt foundational document, or was it a ten-minute dictation? This is an important question in order to determine the seriousness of Ridgway's attempt at providing purpose to his army. The very ambiguity of how much effort and seriousness Ridgway put into this statement and the doubt that many, if any, men in Eighth Army ever saw this document, lead to the conclusion that the statement was not a provision of purpose to the UN Forces in Korea, because it never reached them. How then did General Ridgway, once he came to the conclusion that "beating back a world menace" was no longer an option, provide purpose to his force? There is no evidence that he ever did.

These two case studies illustrate that providing purpose as a function of leadership is, with the exception of some insignificant or ineffective speeches and documents, neither commander made any effective attempt to provide a purpose to his total force that was consistent with that set by higher strategy. In Rommel's case, he provided a purpose that, in effect, brought about the defeat of his force because that purpose (the offensive destruction of the British Eighth Army and the conquest of Egypt) was at odds with the strategy of the German High Command. In the case of Ridgway, once he realized that his force was not capable of "beating back a world menace" he made an attempt to formulate a purpose for that force through mass distribution of a memorandum: it

apparently never got down to the soldiers and, hence, he never did effectively provide purpose. However, he was ultimately successful. By the time of his change of command four months later, UN Forces had indeed "beaten back the menace," and a defensive line north of the 38th Parallel stands today as the border between South and North Korea, a border that, in fact, is north of where it was when the Korean War began. In an analysis of how he established direction for his army there is an answer as to how leadership was the combat multiplier that helped him win.

## ESTABLISHING DIRECTION

The traditional view of the Desert Fox is one of a sand-covered, bold, desert commander, forward with the combat troops, captured dust goggles high on his hat and always urging his panzer troops forward in innovative, sweeping, and successful attacks against the slow moving and conservative British. Though not far from the truth, this view misses some significant aspects about the way the Erwin Rommel led his army.

Much of Rommel's tactical success was due to his ability to establish tactical direction: he assigned missions to subordinates with clarity and force, he promoted a set of battlefield values through an example of personal courage, he enforced discipline with a strong hand, and developed new desert fighting techniques, such as turning the 88 mm. anti-aircraft gun into the most feared anti-tank weapon of World War II. However, he failed to establish operational direction as a result of his need to assume personal command of subordinate units on the battlefield, his tendency to relieve commanders who did not meet his goals and his failure to provide training to his forces.

General Alfred Gause, Rommel's chief of staff during much of the North African campaign, wrote that "as a matter of principle [Rommel] directed operations personally from the area of the main effort and based his decisions on his own observations . . . basic decisions on the field of battle he left to no other person . . . [and]. . . he never allowed any slack in the reigns of control."[43] Gause described Rommel leading panzer attacks from the foremost line in a clearly marked command car, setting the pace and direction of the attack by the speed and direction of his vehicle, and making any desired change by instructing the "nearest tank commander to radio the appropriate compass direction or some other brief order."[44] This preempting of local commanders by Rommel was common. Of his successful attack to occupy Cyrenaica in March-February of 1941, Rommel wrote: "I intended, as soon as the situation permitted, to go up to the forward units myself, take over command and personally lead the advance on Timini or Mechili." In fact he did so, taking command of the operation on the afternoon of 5 April.[45] In Rommel's wide-sweeping attack at Gazala in May he "personally led supply and fuel trucks through

a minefield gap that he had discovered the day before, and steered them to 15th Panzer north of Rigel Ridge. He took personal command of Afrika Korps to get his scattered formations together again."[46] Again, on 31 May Rommel personally led the forward infantry platoon into the British Box at Sidi Muftah, and on 5 June, to beat back a British counterattack, Rommel personally led a task force of 88 mm. guns and tanks that "thundered north from Bir el Harmat . . .[and] . . . overwhelmed the single battalion of light infantry posted as a British left flank guard."[47] What is readily apparent here is <u>not</u> a commander who believes he should just be present at the point of main effort to give advice or assist with resources while, at the same time, ensuring that the rest of the operational force is proceeding as directed; it is a commander who believes he should be in <u>command</u> at the main effort.

This method of establishing direction through personal command of subordinate units reflects a commander who lacked trust in his subordinates to accomplish missions given them or lacked patience in their accomplishment of the missions. It is a method that leads to subordinate commanders being frustrated or perhaps even unsure of the operational direction required and results in a force that may be unable to fight operationally effectively in the absence of the operational commander. "He often exasperated his officers by such changes. He did not know how to delegate authority; he not only wanted to do everything himself but he wanted to be everywhere."[48] Even Gause, a loyal subordinate, recognized "that the method described here was inconvenient for some subordinate commanders because Rommel used to interfere in the control of individual units if he thought it necessary."[49] One of Rommel's aides writes that "his subordinate commanders found this a real thorn in the flesh, and resented it bitterly."[50] Even at the highest levels of the German High Command (OKW), this difficulty caused by Rommel's methods was apparent. David Irving, an author noted for his criticism of Rommel, quotes General Boderwin Keitel, the OKW Chief of Personnel:

> But in the Afrika Korps there is quite another burden too: that is the general's personality, and his way of expressing it and of giving orders." Indeed, Rommel frequently issued impossible orders--which nobody could take seriously--and then revoked them immediately. He thought nothing of insulting senior commanders like Kirchheim. Courts-martial ordered by Rommel mostly acquited the officers he charged. "It is remarkable that in the case of one officer, a battalion commander in the Fifth Panzer Regiment," Bodwewin Keitel commented, "a recommendation for the Knight's Cross, a cowardice charge and his dismissal followed one another in the briefest interval.[51]

Dismissal, like Rommel's personal assumption of command of subordinate units at the front, was also not an unusual event.

It did not take much to bring Rommel's ire down upon a subordinate. Officers, even generals,

could find themselves relieved for even the smallest infractions. Once, finding a subordinate general still at breakfast at 6:30 AM, Rommel relieved him and sent him home to Germany. "The number of commanders who failed to meet his standards was, at the beginning, very high, and their turnover was great."[52] Following the failed first attempts to take Tobruk, Rommel set to relieving many unit commanders and staff officers. Mitcham writes: "Shortly afterward, both the 5th Light Division and the 5th Panzer Regiment had new commanders. Indeed, there were almost wholesale firings in the higher ranks of the Afrika Korps."[53] These relieved commanders had led Rommel's forces from arrival in theater to the gates of Tobruk, and yet, when they failed to take this fortress, Rommel relieved them. Kenneth Macksey sees most of Rommel's relief actions as an attempt to shift blame: "[He] ill-treated or abused close collegues and subordinates; and, on too many occassions, he sought to find scapegoats rather than shoulder the blame himself."[54] Failure can be the fault of subordinates, but in battle it is more likely the result of a lack of training in those subordinates. Relieving them does not solve that fault.

Erwin Rommel's best known quotation is: "The best form of welfare for the troops is first-class training, for this saves unnecessary casualties."[55] Yet, this thought is more likely a lesson that he learned in North Africa, than one he demonstrated there as an operational commander. He writes: "Unfortunately, I had not had the opportunity of training my formations personally before the raid through Cyrenaica, otherwise we would have measured up much better to the tasks which faced us at Tobruk."[56] Yet it was Rommel who launched the operation through Cyrenaica, despite the instructions of German High Command. It was Rommel who took the opportunity for training away from his soldiers.

The results of Rommel's failures to establish operational direction were many. As a result of a lack of training prior to the first assault on Tobruck, the 5th Light Division, losing much of its infantry, suffered considerably, and the fortress remained a thorn in Rommel's side until June of 1942 when he finally seized it. Colonel General Halder, of the German General Staff wrote in his diary on 23 April: "Reports from officers coming from this theater, as well as a personal letter, show that Rommel is in no way equal to his task . . . . By overstepping his orders, Rommel has brought about a position for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient."[57] Had he taken the time to train his forces prior to rushing into the offensive in March of 1941, he might have been able to take Tobruk in 1941, at the end of his initial attack (as he did later after extensive training and preperation of his forces). With Tobruk in hand, three of his six Italian infantry divisions (instead of laying seige to the fortress) would have been free to participate the defense against the British Crusader and Battleaxe operations (thus reducing British gains and resulting German losses); the captured supplies in Tobruck would have served to replace those lost or needed as a result of his long attack (thus eliminating a German culminating point); and Rommel would have had a port much closer to the front that would have permitted faster and more

efficient resupply of his army.

The result on the battlefield of Rommel's relief of commanders is hard to determine. He did receive replacements that were more satisfactory to him, but there is no evidence that the performance improvement of the army was a result of these changes in command. Moreover, the indications are that these changes in key leadership, all coming at the same time, may have had a negative impact on the force. Immediately following most of these reliefs from command (after the failure to take Tobruk), the British launched their successful counter-offensives that sent Rommel's forces reeling back to Gazala.

The impact of Rommel's nearly constant presence on the battlefield and his taking over personal command is relatively easy to assess. On the tactical level, these actions had extremely positive impacts (especially on motivation, discussed in the next section of this monograph); in nearly every case when he personally interevened at the tactical level, German forces were successful. However, success at the operational level suffered. Field Marshal Kesselring, visiting the Gazala battle, criticized Rommel for being always at the front, unable to be reached, and influenced too much by local events.[58] In Cordier's view, "leading from the front had its drawbacks. The impact of local successes or failures upon Rommel's decisions was often way out of proportion to the total battlefield picture."[59] Another negative impact of this presence on the battlefield was, ironically, that "every unit commander and every man knew that in the most difficult situations, and no matter how heavy the fire was, Rommel would appear in person and would master the situation."[60] The irony is that the tactical elements of the Panzer Army began to depend on Rommel for success no matter how difficult the battle or operation. It is not suprising that the greatest successes of the British, therefore, commenced when Rommel was unable to be on the battlefield due to absences in Germany or sickness (i.e., Operation Crusader, the Battle of Alam Halfa Ridge, and Montgomery's offensive from El Alamein). Perhaps no one described this situation better than Rommel who, in a 5 March 1941 letter that is eerily prescient, wrote to his wife: "Too much depends on my own person and my driving power."[61] Like Rommel, Matthew Ridgway also had "driving power," which he used to establish direction in his army so that it could win.

Of the four functions of leadership, providing direction was definitely the one function at which General Matthew Ridgway excelled. As seen in the preceeding analysis of how Ridgway attempted to provide purpose to his force, an attempt on Ridgway's part to restore the fighting spirit through formal methods (i.e. memorandums or general orders) or informal means (i.e. pep talks, etc.) was ineffective. "General Ridgway adopted a different approach. Disciplined, well-trained men, he thought, who took a professional pride in their toughness and ability to fight, needed little in the way of ideological inspiration . . . ."[62] In order to get that "toughness and

ability to fight," he ensured a command presence on the battlefield without giving up operational command and control, established standard tactical operating procedures, and directed that operations take place so that there was low risk and high pay-off in ground gained and low casualties.

Ridgway established direction not by taking command of subordinate units, as Rommel did, but rather by ensuring that his subordinate commanders knew the standards expected and by ensuring that those subordinates maintained those standards down the chain of command:

> The leadership I found in many instances sadly lacking, and I said so out loud. The unwillingness of the army to forgo certain creature comforts, its temerity about getting off the scanty roads, its reluctance to move without radio or telephone contact, and its lack of imagination in dealing with a foe whom they soon outmatched in firepower and dominated in the air and on the surrounding seas--these were not the fault of the GI but of the policy makers at the top. I'm afraid my language in pointing out these faults was often impolite.[63]

He ensured that his corps and division commanders knew the standards by telling them face to face. He spent most of his day out with them and during this time he passed to them his standards; subsequent visits allowed him to check to see if those commanders were meeting the standards. For example, on 4 February 1951, he convened a corps commanders' conference in which he again emphasized the need for continuous training of the troops, better coordination of artillery fire beween adjacent units, and more emphasis on the taking of high ground.[64] These were some of the things he had been trying to establish in units for the past month, his first month of command. After telling his subordinates about the standards, he ensured that they got out on the ground and enforced them too. He wanted division commanders "up with their forward battalions, and corps commanders to stay with their engaged regiments."[65] The important difference between this and Rommel's situation is that here the commanders were checking and enforcing standards, not taking command of the subordinate units and thus interrupting the chain of command. More important than this command presence, though, were the standards that Ridgway enforced in the Eighth Army, for these led to success in combat for soldiers, unit confidence on the battlefield, and, ultimately, Army success in the campaign.

One way to ensure that units meet standards and comply with directions is to observe units personally, as Ridgway did much of the time. However, Ridgway realized, as perhaps Rommel did not, that he could not let this personal observation get in the way of his requirement to monitor the entire Army's compliance with directions. Initially, he could not accomplish this because of the poor quality of this reporting:

> This sort of slipshod reporting, indicative of complacency, or inadequate

> supervision, or insufficient staff visits to front-line units was unforgivable in my book. If I was to maintain proper control of this army, reports to my headquarters were to be complete, truthful, and specific, with no glossing over of unpleasent facts and with sufficient details included to enable me to draw swift and proper conclusions.[66]

In order to get the information he needed, one of the first standards that he directed was that the division and corps commanders give him reports that would "be specific in giving the locations and movements of all friendly units. Vague and carelessly worded reports, without dates, without times, without circumstancial details. . .could lead to foul-ups as serious as any that might be caused by enemy action."[67] Through these directed, accurate reports, then, Ridgway could continue to maintain his presence on the battlefield and maintain control over his army.

The second standard upon which Ridgway insisted was mutual support between units. At the time he had two corps (I and IX Corps) on the ground and one (X Corps) still afloat. His assessment was that the corps were working independently rather than cooperating; in order to get that he directed "intimate contact, patrols and everything [because] the lack of cooperation between adjacent units was deplorable.[68] While he recognized that he did not have sufficient troop strength to "man a solid line across the peninsula," he did believe that he could get mutual support between divisions and corps through the use of interlocking, long range howitzer fires and through the tieing in of these units with communications or with aggressive patrols when communications failed.[69] Besides the tactical and operational defensive benefits such procedures provided, there was a cohesion that developed under such circumstances, a teamwork that built spirit and led to motivation.

The third standard procedure that Ridgway directed was the securing of high ground. Far too often in the last month of 1950, U.S. units were under constant fires from CCF and NKPA forces on the numerous ridges that paralleled the roads on which U.S. forces invariably attacked or, more frequently, were forced to retreat. Ridgway directed that an attacking unit would "seize the high ground along its route . . .[take] advantage of it . . .[and] get off its bloody wheels and put shoe leather to the earth to get into the hills and among the scrub and meet the enemy where he lived."[70] This direction, while it slowed attack speed and forced tactical attacks against small enemy units with an initial terrain advantage, was a much more secure way of operating for large units (battalion and higher): it reduced risk to the formation from ambush and facilitated the tieing in with adjacent units that were attacking in parallel formations, and thus concentrated friendly operational strength.

In order to increase operational security and build confidence, Ridgway directed that units develop defended patrol bases from which patrols reinforced with quad-.50 caliber machinegun anti-aircraft weapons "ranged far and wide in pursuit of North Korean units and guerrillas and gradually destroyed them in the rear and flank areas of the X Corps in the central corridor" of

Korea.[71] Besides the obvious tactical security that such operations provided, there was a training role that these patrols filled. Guerrillas typically did not stand and fight organized regular forces that had an advantage in firepower. By pitting these reinforced patrols, operating in friendly territory, against less capable enemy forces, Ridgway was in effect "scrimaging" much as a football team does in practice before a game. As the patrols won firefight after firefight and as soldiers saw the benefits of securing high ground and using their inherently superior firepower, the soldiers became more confident and tougher physically. They became ready for "the big game:" the push north.

The first "push" might more likely be characterized as a "small shove," for it was designed as a large reconnaisance in force in I Corps but at basically regimental strength. Ridgway called it Operation Wolfhound. More importantly, however, Ridgway designed this operation as a low risk mission that would: (1) get his forces moving north; (2) keep his enemy off balance; (3) demonstrate some of the tactical principles he had been directing; and (4) build confidence in his troops and commanders. He preceeded the operation with air support from twenty-four B-26 bombers and 126 fighter planes for a period of forty minutes prior to the movement of forces, and of significant note are his instructions to the commander of I Corps who would supervise this first offensive mission of Ridgway's command:

> I expect that by dark today [15 January 1951], or at the latest on 16 January, this operation will be completed and participating forces pulled back to within close supporting assistance of your corps.
>
> I desire to caution you against permiting a situation to develop which would demand commitment of additional major elements to extricate your forces. The preventative for this is reconnaissance, ground and air, but particularly ground. Large scale exploitation, if opportunity occurs, will be on Army order only.[72]

These are not the orders that might be expected from Rommel in his initial operation. Instead, Ridgway wants to ensure success with minimum risk, and success is what he got. I Corps reported that the Wolfhound Task Force had moved to the southern edge of Suwon and returned with only four friendly killed and six wounded. In contrast, enemy casualties numbered 195 killed and 5 prisoners from ground action and 1,180 killed from air action.[73] Ridgway's procedures of using coordinated firepower, mutual support of units, seizure of high ground, and accurate reporting had worked at the tactical level, but would they work to ensure success at the operational level? Ridgway and Eighth Army were about to find out.

Operation Thunderbolt was to be an operation similar to Wolfhound but on a much larger scale, and the forces used were to stay in position once they reached their objectives. Both I and IX Corps were to participate, beginning on 25 January, with an armor-reinforced infantry division

and attached Republic of Korea (ROK) regiment from each corps. Ridgway planned Thunderbolt as a coordinated operation in which army firepower would cover the advancing infantry as they secured each of their objectives in turn and push the enemy out of their prepared positions and into the open where air support would kill them.[74] Within six days, this reconnaissance in force turned into an all-out attack that had taken back twenty miles of terrain in moderate fighting that cost the Chinese dearly. Initially, the CCF had been screening south of the Han River with only two divisions; as they saw the UN forces begin to move north, they reinforced south of the Han with five more divisions.[75] By 9 February UN forces were at the Han River, overlooking the approaches to Seoul, between forty and fifty miles from the starting point of Operation Wolfhound.[76]

Two important aspects of Thunderbolt are valuable for this study of operational leadership. First, not only had Ridgway's establishment of direction through training and standards brought success at tactical level, but it had now brought success at operational level. Second, the units that brought about this success were, for the first time under Ridgway's command, truly combined units: the Turkish Brigade, and the Greek and French battalions fought alongside of American and South Korean soldiers. Ridgway had definitely established direction at the operational level. Donald Knox and Alfred Coppel described Thunderbolt as "an enormous, deadly snow plow" with which "the UN was serving notice that it had regained the initiative and intended to keep it."[77] However, in the central corridor of Korea, the situation was not going quite as well for X Corps.

Unknown to General Ridgway at the beginning of February, the Chinese were planning their own offensive in the central corridor as he was with X Corps. Planned in conjuction with the execution of Operation Thunderbolt, the UN operation was called "Roundup," and the X Corps was to conduct the major action with "ROK 8th Division on the left (west). . .to attack from the Hoengsong area northward to Hongchan; the ROK 5th Division on the right (east) . . . to attack toward the same objective." Supporting these two ROK divisions would be tank-infantry-artillery teams from the U.S. 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions. This would be the first time that American units would be attached to ROK divisions and under their command.[78]

On the evening of 11 February and early morning of 12 February, the Chinese struck the advancing ROK 8th Division with four divisions from three different CCF armies. Within four hours the ROK 8th Division was destroyed, and further to the east the ROK 5th and 3d Divisions were hit hard also.[79] Most of the heavy fighting was in the vicinity of the town of Hoengsong. UN losses between 11 and 13 February numbered 18,360 soldiers (including 112 from the Netherlands battalion and its commander), forty-seven howitzers, six tanks, and hundreds of trucks.[80] According to an investigation directed by General Almond, commander of X Corps, "the cause for the heavy losses in equipment and personnel from the forces provided by the 2d Division . . .was the sudden and complete rout and disintegration of the 8th ROK Division which came with

little or no warning. . . ." The investigation further recommended that "no US units be intermingled with ROK units in the future."[81] But neither General Ridgway nor General Almond could take time to be worried about the future; the Chinese attacks had pushed back the X Corps fifteen miles and had cut off and surrounded the 23d Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and the French Battalion at a town called Chipyong-ni.

Appleman sees the battle at Chipyong-ni as the turning point for X Corps in its attempts to regain the initiative. Four battalions of the 23d RCT and the French Battalion were surrounded and attacked between 13 and 15 February by the CCF 126th, 125th, 119th, and 115th divisions while the CCF 116th division attacked a task force from the 5th Cavalry Regiment trying to relieve the encircled force.[82] The commander of the 23d RCT, the commanding general of 2d Division (23d RCT's parent division), and General Almond all wanted to withdraw the 23d RCT; General Ridgway refused to allow it. "Ridgway said he was determined to hold Chipyong-ni, the hinge between IX and X Corps, even if he had to send all of Eighth Army reserves and part of the IX Corps into the battle there to do so."[83] Ridgway's refusal to withdraw the 23d RCT should not have come as a suprise to anyone; for weeks Ridgway had been directing that units work hard to remain tied in on their flanks. If he had allowed the withdrawl of the 23d RCT, he would have opened a huge gap between two of his corps and invited the Chinese to penetrate his main line of defense, get into the rear of IX and/or X Corps and perhaps bring about the final destruction of Eighth Army. Now that he nearly had operational initiative, Ridgway could not afford to permit such a defeat.

The 23d RCT and its French Battalion, supported by a battalion of 105 mm howitzers, a battery of anti-aircraft machineguns, a battery of 155 mm howitzers, a Ranger company, a platoon of the 2d Medical Company, and B Company of the 2d Engineer Battalion, conducted agressive patrolling to locate enemy forces, closely coordinated their units' defensive fires, called on air sorties for both supply and fires, and held out until 16 February when the beseiged force was finally relieved. Ridgway supported them with countless airstrikes and gave X Corps additional maneuver forces, to include the 1st Marine Division, to put pressure on the surrounding Chinese. In the end, Ridgway's decision proved correct: UN losses for the battle numbered but 404 of all kinds; Chinese losses numbered "on the order of 5,000 casualties in killed or wounded."[84] But there is more of significance to this battle than body count. The Battle of Chipyong-ni demonstrated that Ridgway's standards of closely coordinated units, aggressive patrolling, and use of massive indirect fire support matched with confidence could win tactically and maintain the operational initiative against even overwhelming Chinese odds. Eighth Army's units did not have to run south now when facing the Chinese, even when they were in strength. Indeed, north was the direction in which Eigth Army would continue to move.

Ridgway's next major operation was Operation Killer. It began on 21 February in the midst of cold rains and a lot of mud. The plan called for three divisions from the IX and X Corps to attack to

envelope and destroy enemy forces in a pocket formed by cities of Hoengsong, Pyongchang, and Wonju. 1st Marine Division would attack on the left, and US 7th Division would attack on the right. The US 2d Division would attack then in the center while the ROK I Corps and ROK III Corps would protect the right and left flanks, respectively.[85] One of Ridgway's last messages to his two participating corps commanders was to warn them that "they must not bypass any hostile force of sufficient strength to jeopardize the safety of your forces."[86] By 4 March the attacking divisions had reached their last objectives. The mud and rain had slowed their attack appreciably, and some of the enemy had escaped north, "but for the first time since the UN forces begain fighting in Korea, they had a solid line, with no gaps, no appreciable guerrilla resistance behind them, and no soft spots."[87] Now Ridgway had, at the operational level, what he had been directing his tactical commanders to develop: security of the force through coordinated positions and fires, but it is important to note how he had gotten it through a series of operations that were sequentially more difficult with each operation.

The first offensive operation that Ridgway conducted was Operation Wolfhound, which was essentially one regimental combat team conducting a short reconnaissance in force and returning to its start point. The next operation was "Thunderbolt." Here, Ridgway directed two divisions, one each from I and IX Corps to do a much stronger and more aggressive reconnaissance in force that became an all-out attack. After Operation Thunderbolt, came the abortive "Roundup" which, under its original conception was, even without the disasterous attachment of US Forces to ROK divisions, even more complex because in Roundup, two divisions were converging on exterior lines to envelope an enemy force. However, even "Roundup" provided success at the operational level as a result of the battle of Chipyong-ni. Operation Killer was Ridgway's next effort and his most complex to date. Here were three U.S. Divisions (one a Marine Division) operating on exterior lines to envelope and destroy an enemy force while allied corps protected the flanks of the operation. Through this sequential increase in complexity, Ridgway was training his army and accomplishing his operational goals, much as a prizefighter's manager puts his charge against increasingly tougher and better boxers. With each effort, the contender gains in knowledge and experience without being too damaged to continue his quest for the championship. For Ridgway and Eighth Army, the championship fight was about to begin: the crossing of the Han River and the retaking of Seoul.

The crossing of the Han River by Eighth Army and the retaking of the South Korean capital, were, in themselves, not the reasons for Eighth Army's success in Korea. However, they were the results of that success. The retaking of Seoul, while not operationally important, was politically important, for its capture would symbolize of the return of the South Korean government to control. The crossing of the Han River was significant both militarily and psychologically because it was the final physical barrier for Eighth Army in its return to its starting position at the

beginning of the war. The Eighth Army had made up all the ground it had lost, regained, and then lost again. For Ridgway, these two actions were the summit of the leadership mountain he had begun to climb upon his arrival in Korea three and a half months earlier:

> I had planned this action [Operation Ripper] personally on Sunday evening, February 18 . . . and had outlined it to the Commanding Generals of the US IX and X Corps and of the 1st Marine Division. It may be noted that this resumption of the offensive was the final implementation of the plan I had nourished from the time of my taking command of the Eighth Army--and had done so, it may be said, in the face of a retreat-psychology that seemed to have seized every commander from the Chief on down.[88]

The operation was joint, combined, and operational. While traditionally, crossings of the Han had occured northwest of Seoul, this time the crossings, by the 25th Division of I Corps, would be fourteen to eighteen miles east of the city. The remainder of I Corps would "carry out deceptive actions in the Kimpo peninsula area west of Seoul simulating preparations for a crossing there. At the same time, naval forces would demonstrate in the Chinnampo area to prevent the enemy from moving reinforcements south. . . .and aerial attacks were made in coordination with other deceptive actions."[89] The operation began with the ROK 1st Division making assault crossings as diversionary feints west of Seoul while the 24th Infantry and the Turkish Brigade sent recon patrols across the river. The operation lasted from 6 to 16 March with the 25th Infantry Division and its supporting artillery and armor forces doing most of the major fighting. "The division had 58 men killed, 333 wounded. and 7 missing in action for a total of 398 combat casualties. During the same period there were more than 3,000 counted enemy dead and an estimated 8,338 enemy casualties overall in the 25th Division sector.[90] Despite heavy Chinese and North Korean resistance across the rest of the Korean Peninsula, Operation Ripper went much the same way. By 11 April, UN Forces, in a continuation of their advance, now called Operation Rugged, had reached and crossed the 38th Parallel to establish a solid line of defense at what Ridgway called Phase Line Kansas and what was essentially the farthest north UN Forces progressed by intent. It was that day that General Ridgway was made Commander in Chief Far East Command, to replace the relieved General MacArthur.

Much of General Ridgway's operational success was the result of his ability to establish direction for his force. While spending a lot of time with subordinates, he never supplanted them by taking personal command of their formations. He recognized that he had to set new standards in his army, and he did so. Then, through his monitoring of performance, he ensured execution of those standards. Finally, building on the results of the establishment of those standards, he directed a series of sequentially more complex and difficult operations that built upon success to gain operational objectives and ultimately success for his force.

Clearly, the establishment of direction as a leadership function was important to the operational success of Ridgway's army. For Rommel's forces, his techniques of establishing direction were primarily oriented at the tactical levels where they were successful. However, by their very nature of short term, tactical success, they predicated long-term, operational failure. Hence, it is clear from these two case studies that the establishment of direction is an important function of operational leadership, for it evidently directly drives success or failure of the operational force.

## GENERATING MOTIVATION

Sir John Hacket, in the introduction to Wolf Heckmann's book, Rommel's War In Africa, wrote that Rommel "could inspire troops to follow him to a degree few have equaled. . . and no one was more willingly followed by troops. They understood him as thoroughly as he understood them. He led, as all good leaders [do], from the inside."[91] According to U.S. Army doctrine the function of generating motivation at senior levels is one that creates moral force through a proper ethical perspective, a postive command climate and a sense of unit that brings about an "unshakable cohesion."[92] If Rommel was such an inspirational leader and leadership is such a powerful combat multiplier, then how could his army lose? This occurred because, while Rommel was indeed a most effective tactical motivator through his personal contact with soldiers and the legend that grew up around him, he failed to develop a solid cohesion with the Italians, and his command climate, especially with his subordinate commanders, was not sufficiently positive to reinforce the motivation he generated by his personal presence. In short, he did not generate motivation at the operational level.

Rommel led almost totally by example. He ate the same food as his men, travelled in an open, tracked command vehicle, slept under a canvas, and placed himself in the "beaten zone" along with his soldiers. Quoting a war reporter, David Irving provides a stiring portrait of Rommel's relationship with his soldiers: Rommel radiates a "strange magic strength," meets his soldiers "man to man" using their language, praising them, encouraging them, offering suggestions, and making "complicated subjects easily comprehensible to them."[93] This nearly constant and familiar presence on the battlefield with his men produced a rapport with them: German soldiers under his command were inspired to a devoted loyalty and a fierce pride in battle, whether win, lose, or draw."[94] This was the result of seeing Rommel as one of themselves. In doing that, they

saw that if a Field Marshall could survive on a dangerous battlefield, could beat the enemy when outnumbered or suprised, could even lose but come back to win, and do so all while eating the same rations that they ate and living in the same conditions that they lived, then they could survive and win also! In some small, inexplicable way they became "field marshalls" too:

> His commanders might grumble, but his troops loved him. They were not a hand-picked elite, but somehow he gave them the feeling that they were. Major Friedreich Wilhelm von Mellenthen, the amiable cavalry officer who was his new intelligence officer, put it like this: "Between Rommel and his troops there was that mutual understanding that cannot be explained and analyzed, but which is the gift of the gods . . . .The men knew that 'Rommel' was the last man Rommel spared; they saw him in their midst, and they felt, 'This is our leader!' He knew how to make them feel somehow immortal." [95]

However, soldiers are not immortal, and units can lose battles, especially when there is no operational-level leadership.

Apparently the Italian soldiers felt for Rommel much like his own German soldiers did. In fact, a general such as Rommel was a rarity for the Italians: they rarely saw any sort of general officer on the battlefield, yet here was a Field Marshal coming onto the battlefield. "They relished the brusqueness with which he treated those of the porky and indifferent Italian generals who fell afoul of him." [96] Not only did he dislike the Italian generals he had in his panzer army, but he also refused to accept that he was under the command of the Italian Supreme Command, and he had little time for conservative, command-from-the-rear Italian generals who, from Rommel's perspective, had done nothing to prosecute the campaign succesfully. Yet it would be those generals who would direct his Italian divisions when he was not present with them, and it was the Italian high command who controlled of supply priorities for his theater of operations. "The Panzer Army contained approximately two Germans for every one Italian (82,000 to 42,000),[yet] during the month of August [1942] the German element of the Panzer Army received 8,200 tons of supplies (32 % of requirements) while the Italian elements of the Panzer Army, the Italian troops in Libya and the civilian population received 25,700 tons (800 tons of which were for civilian needs)."[97] If an operational commander is fighting as part of a coalition, he must ensure a cohesive entity that includes his coalition partners. Rommel evidently did that on the tactical level with Italian soldiers. However, there is no evidence that he did so with more senior officers at the operational level, and some evidence that he did or said things that made such cohesion extremely unlikely with harmful results for his campaign. In Kenneth Macksey's view, effective leadership at high levels of command requires "the ability to get on well with all kinds of people. . . and it is because Rommel fell short in these requirements that he was eventually ruined."[98] In his decision to abandon Cyrenaica in the winter retreat of December 1941-January

1942, Rommel totally split with his Italian Allies. In Macksey's view, Rommel's "acrimonious" relationship with his allies was one of his "failings in high command" that negatively affected his army.[99] Rommel fell short not only with his allies, but often also with his own officers.

This monograph has already discussed Rommel's actions of relieving commanders who failed to execute according to Rommel's desires, instead of Rommel's developing or training them. However, this attitude toward officers may have been much more pervasive. It may have been one that did not permit officers to have their own persona, but rather required them to be nearly clones of Rommel himself: "He could not tolerate subordinates who were not as enthusiastic and active as himself, and he was merciless in his treatment of anybody who displayed lack of initiative. Out! Back to Germany they went at once."[100] Kenneth Macksey also cites Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Siegfried Westphal, who served as Rommel's operations officer, in the relation of an anecdote when Rommel refused to permit the medical transfer of one of his officers for a doctor-certified heart problem: "That is out of the question. You are looking all right and standing upright. This theatre of war will only be left in a horizontal position on a stretcher."[101] Yet Rommel, himself, would leave North Africa for medical attention on at least two separate occasions. Certainly, such demonstrated lack of consideration for subordinates--along with the threat of immediate relief if failing to execute as Rommel desired and if promulgated over time--would do nothing to develop or sustain a positive and progressive command climate.

Hence, while Rommel was a superb tactical motivator of soldiers, he lacked the ability to generate motivation at the operational level. Did this failure result in his defeat? Again, attributng his operational defeat to one factor is probably an overstatement; however, it is clear that his failure to produce an effective working relationship with the Italian High Command and their generals in the theater probably affected the prioritization of supplies that came into the theater. Additionally, the command climate that he established with his own subordinates, while effective in the short term, did not contribute to a lasting loyalty or support of his aims if he was not present. As an example, note the words from a letter written by Rommel's aide to his wife describing his visit to the 10th Panzer Division after their victory at Kasserine against the Americans:

> You should have seen their eyes light up as he suddenly appeared, just like the old days, among the very foremost infantry and tanks, in the midst of their attack, and had to hit the dirt just like the riflemen when the enemy's artillery opened up! What other commander is there who can call on such respect? Rommel's leather coat was covered with mud, he was wet and weary, but he was happier than at any time since Langerone: it was like being a platoon leader all over again.
>
> Inexplicably, he now turned and drove back to Kasserine Pass. Without Rommel on the scene, all the fire and impetus went out of the Tenth Panzer's

advance.[102]

That was the problem: for Rommel, leading was "like being a platoon leader all over again." Without his presence, leadership failed, and at the operational level of leadership, Rommel was hardly ever "present." Matthew Ridgway, however, was present at the operational level.

Throughout much of Matthew Ridgway's army career, he had little experience with troops and units that lacked spirit and motivation. U.S. Army paratroopers are characteristically motivated by their very nature. However, when he arrived in Korea, he found an army that was dispirited; "having been defeated so decisively by the Chinese, the Eighth Army's unit commanders now talked of retreat and even withdrawal" from Korea altogether.[103] As discussed above, one of Ridgway's initial techniques at establishing direction was an emphasis to his subordinate commanders on attacking the Chinese rather than running from them. "But the old feeling died hard. When Colonel [William] Kelleher, commanding the 35th Infantry, said to his men, 'We are going to attack,' the comment from many out of his hearing was, 'Bull_____, who does he think he is kidding?'"[104] Clearly this was an army that lacked a lot of things, and motivation was definitely one of them. General Ridgway generated motivation in Eigth Army by making a thorough assessment of his army and its leadership, developing cohesion within his force, maintaining a obvious physical presence on the battlefield, and by being very careful about how he relieved subordinates who clearly could not function effectively. In following this process--in conjunction with his efforts to establish direction--General Matthew Ridway, almost totally by himself, produced a fighting spirit in his soldiers and their commanders and a driving motivation in the Eighth Army that brought it all the way back to the 38th Parallel and beyond.

General Ridgway knew, like all men who have been in combat, that "fighting spirit is not something that can be described or spelled out to you. An experienced commander can feel it through all his senses, in the posture, the manner, the talk, the very gestures of the men on the fighting front."[105] In order to get a sense of this fighting spirit, he set out to visit every major unit in his army, to include the allied units, and he did so in the first two weeks of his command. Everywhere he went he found "the same sense of lost confidence and lack of spirit. The leaders, from sergeant on up, seemed unresponsive, reluctant to answer my questions. Even their gripes had to be dragged out of them and information was provided glumly, without the alertness of men whose spirits are high."[106] His assessment became clear: the Eighth Army lacked the motivation necessary to take the fight to the enemy and win. Now his job was to restore that motivation.

Restoring the motivation of Eighth Army became even more difficult when, within five days of Ridgway's arrival in Korea, the Chinese began their 3d Phase Offensive. Inside of eight days, the Chinese had pushed the Eighth Army out of Seoul, across the Han River, and south nearly fifty

miles. Ridgway realized that he had to bring his army together, to form it into a cohesive force that had confidence. In fact, for Ridgway building that cohesion was central to restoring the fighting spirit of his army, and in his mind, that cohesion had to come from below, not from above:

> I was still much concerned with restoring the Army's fighting spirit, a quality that cannot be imposed from above but must be cultivated in every heart, from private on up. It is rooted, I believe, in the individual's sense of security, of belonging to a unit that will stand by him, as units on both sides and in the rear stand by all other units too. Good training should help a soldier get rid of that awful sense of alone-ness that can sometime overtake a man in battle, the feeling that nobody gives a damn about him, and that he has only his own resources to depend on. Americans, I think, are often more self-sufficient than soldiers of other nations. But still they need help in cultivating that assurance that they belong to a group that will return their loyalty no matter what danger threatens.[107]

To build cohesion in his army, Ridgway took several actions. One of the standards that he set and maintained was the tieing in (through physical contact, communications, and overlapping fires) of adjacent units. This brought about a physical cohesion. However, cohesion is more than a physical construct. Especially in leadership, cohesion is an emotional construct as well.

Like Rommel, Ridgway commanded a coalition force. Unlike Rommel's force, though, this coalition was much more multinational. Units ranging from brigade to company in size came into Ridgway's army from all over the world: from Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, Great Britain, France, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Belgium, Canada, India, and even Sweden. These forces numbered 21,855 soldiers, and the ROK soldiers augmenting US divisions (i.e. KATUSA, which stood for Korean Augmentee to United States Army) numbered another 13,475.[108] Hence, within Eighth Army proper, nearly twenty percent of Ridgway's soldiers were not Americans. In order to build cohesion, Ridgway ensured that "these small allied combat troop units were attached to the U.S. divisions which made them well overstrength. This filling out of the Army, combined with Ridgway's infectious confidence made the big difference. . . .Forces came to regard themselves as something far superior to an emergency improvisation."[109] Of course, each of these units had their own special requirements (e.g. customs, diet, relationships between officers and enlisted men), but Ridgway made it a major goal for himself and his staff to ensure that the problems were fixed, the requirements handled, and that these multi-national units felt a part of the Eighth Army team. Even during times of crisis and important action, General Ridgway took time out to ensure that this sense of cohesion was maintained; "during the heavy action at the beginning of Operation Ripper" he took time to attend the funeral of Lieutenant Colonel den Ouden, the Netherlands Battalion Commander killed at Hoengson on 11 February.[110]

In addition to these many small international contingents, Ridgway also had been given command of all ROK units in Korea; these amounted to 249,815 soldiers, over half of his total combat power.[111] Ridgway fully understood the significance of these numbers, and he made sure that his American corps commanders, who had been given ROK divisions as part of their corps, understood the significance too: When Ridgway discovered "that the ROK commanders of the ROK 8th, 3d, and 5th divisions, which were attached to X Corps were very resentful" of their treatment in X Corps, he gave a "heart-to-heart talk" to the X Corps chief of staff, Colonel John S. Guthrie, and he directed that General Almond correct the situation.[112] General Ridgway clearly was emphasizing the importance of his coalition partners here, and this emphsis was all part of building cohesion. Another part of generating motivation is the improvement of morale, and as was the case of Rommel, Ridgway's physical presence on the battlefield contributed to this also.

Like Rommel, when Ridgway went forward, his staff had to fill in for him on many problems. But unlike Rommel, apparently Ridgway could both spend time forward to exercise leadership, maintain control and knowledge of the overall picture (through the accurate reporting that he instituted and maintained), and complete his required administrative tasks (usually at night at his tactical command post). General S.L.A. Marshall throughout his years of service witnessed hundereds of commanders from all levels of command. Additionally, he was able through his assignment as a battle historian to interview thousands of soldiers after battles. His comments about General Ridgway and motivation are revealing. He described Ridgway as "a commander of much more independent mind and personal magnetism than General Walker," as a leader who "breathed a new spirit into his army" through a nearly constant forward presence with his divisions.[113] Flying in light observation planes and riding in an open jeep, Ridgway, like Rommel, seemingly was everywhere. Unlike Rommel, though, he was not there to take command; Ridgway was there to encourage, to assist, sometimes even to prod a bit. At Munsan-ni on 23 March, Ridgway was awaiting on the ground for the commander of the 187th Regimental Combat Team (Airborne) as the 187th conducted a combat parachute assault. When the 187th's commander, Brigadier Frank S. Bowen, Jr. landed, it was in a deep mud puddle. "Sombody reached down to help him up, and the tardy general was more chagrined than suprised to see it was the Army Commander."[114] During Operation Ripper, Ridgway landed at least twice, once to walk with lead elements of an infantry unit as it "worked its way up the valley of the Pukhan River" and again at Chunchon where he accompanied a 1st Cavalry Division engineer patrol checking out a major bridge for enemy demolition charges.[115] Always carrying an extra pair of gloves to give to some soldier who had lost his, Ridgway, with his battle harness on and a hand genade taped to it, was a soldier's commander who, in the words of Brigadier General James Brittingham, the I Corps Artillery Commander, was the "finest soldier I ever served with. [He] had ability to inspire

confidence."[116]

Of more significance are the words of two parents of soldiers who served in Eighth Army and who wrote to Ridgway. Mrs. Margaret Visco described the improved morale of her son and the better food and discipline of which he wrote her; Mrs. Violet Meyer wrote of Ridgway's being "such a wonderful man to the boys, regardless of what branch of the service they were serving."[117] Any commander who has received such letters knows that he is doing the right thing when it comes to leadership. If the morale of his soldiers is so good that their parents can recognize it and feel like they should write him, he knows that he is achieving success. However, all did not always go well in Eigth Army. Like Rommel, Ridgway had to relieve subordinates, but unlike Rommel, Ridgway took a different tack when doing so.

Had it been Erwin Rommel taking over the Eighth Army in December of 1950, many, many commanders and staff officers might have been on their way back to the United States in January. In his own staff Ridgway found some of the strongest opposition to his attempts at establishing direction and generating motivation; he had initially decided to relieve his G3 for his pessimistic and negative attitude, but decided to defer that action for a couple of months.[118] That was probably the result of his philosophy on relieving officers, one that is considerably different than that demonstrated by Rommel: "When you take over in an emergency like that you just can't sweep them out, your effect may be devastating. So . . . the main thing to do [is] to build confidence, and then you allow it to grow."[119] His G3, by the way, was promoted to brigadier general two months later. Ridgway did, in fact, relieve two division commanders, but only after personally observing them over a length of time, ensuring the there would be no derogatory effect on the units they commanded, and making sure that he had a better commander to place in charge.[120]

How can one determine what the results of Ridgway's attempts at generating motivation in Eighth Army? The results are more than the ground gained in the series of offensive operations that followed first three weeks of command. Roy Appleman, in the summer and autumn of 1951,

> talked in Korea with hundreds of officers and men of all ranks, about Ridgway's influence on the Korean war. Almost without exception, all who had any opinion at all (and most of them did) said that Ridgway made the difference in the outcome of the war--that he prevented the Eighth Army from marching out of Korea, that he had singlehandedly given it a new spirit in two months after he assumed command and had turned it around to face the enemy and then driven that enemy north out of South Korea. He led the American troops in retrieving the military honor of the United States.[121]

To do this Ridgway had to make an assessment of the army's motivation. What he found was that it lacked the spirit needed to remain an effective fighting force. To improve that spirit, he set about, as he established direction, to build cohesion in the force, to be a physical presence on the

battlefield to improve morale, and to construct a command climate in which subordinates had the opportunity to learn and then demonstrate that they were capable of holding their positions. If they could not, he relieved them, but the most important factor was always the morale and effectiveness of his army.

For both Rommel and Ridgway, generating motivation was an important task, and they both spent a lot of time forward with their soldiers and units doing so. For Rommel, however, that motivation was at the tactical level, and he was a master of creating it. Ironically, because he was so good at motivating soldiers at the tactical level, motivation at the operational level suffered. His failure to develop a cohesive force that was supported by his Italian allies led to his ultimate defeat. Ridgway, on the other hand, went to great efforts to develop cohesion in his army because he saw cohesion as the basis of good morale and, hence, effectiveness on the battlefield. He did not insist that his officers be a copies of himself or be relieved. Through Ridgway's almost singlehanded efforts and his ability to affect his army through his subordinate commanders, he produced an effective and motivated army.

## SUSTAINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ORGANIZATION

In an analysis of Rommel's and Ridgway's attempts to sustain their armies' effectiveness, that neither man's total effort was successful becomes clear. However, though most of Ridgway's efforts proved fruitless, or even counter-productive, he was able to sustain force effectiveness through the provision of direction in tactics. In Rommel's case, the best that the evidence shows is a benign neglect on the part of the Desert Fox for sustaining the effectiveness of his army.

General Geuse wrote that Rommel's "constant close contact with troops in combat enabled him to recognize in time not only the limits of the units in action but also of the entire army and of the entire military potential available in North Africa."[122] What the evidence shows, however, is that Erwin Rommel paid scant attention to supply and failed to emphasize preventive medical actions in his command. As a result, his forces consistently lost strength over time in relation to their opponents and eventually became unable to win the campaign of North Africa. In Rommel's mind, combat was the single most important aspect of war, and supply was simply something left to his staff to figure out. The difficulty was that often his staff did not know what Rommel was going to do next.[123] While changing the direction of an attack may be as simple as making a radio call or directing the force to "follow me," the planning, coordinating, and moving of tons of

supplies to support an army engaged in an operation takes time and are not actions easily changed in the middle of an operation. Rommel may have understood this, but he certainly did not believe that it was his responsibility to worry about it.

After the Comander in Chief of the German Army directed Rommel not to go on a major offensive in North Africa, Romel replied that with two more panzer corps he could easily conquer Egypt, the Suez, and East Africa, but when asked by Colonel General Franze Halder, the chief of the General Staff, how he would supply and feed thse forces, Rommel replied "That's quite immaterial to me. That's your pigeon."[124] In reference to the campaign of 1942, Rommel admits that he "had made tremendous demands" on his army but was unable to overrun Alamein not because of a lack of will but because his "sources of supply had dried up--thanks to the idleness and muddle of the supply authorities on the mainland."[125] Rommel, as the operational commander, failed to think about the results of his "demands" when it was clear that he would not have sufficient supplies on hand to sustain his army's operations over the long term. In fact, success did not depend on will; it depended on an effective force, and a mechanized/motorized force without fuel, ammunition, food, and water was not an effective force to defeat the British Eighth Army of the desert who had sufficient supplies. This neglect of the importance of supply was apparent to Rommel's subordinates as well as to those men above him in the German chain of command.

During the first battles of Cyrenaica, the 5th Light Division reported to Rommel that it was low on fuel and would have to pause to refuel. Rommel told the division's commander to "sort it out yourself. . . .I couldn't care less. We are not going to let the chance of a victory slip on the rediculous pretext that you have no more fuel."[126] This response is mind-boggleing coming from an officer whom history notes as a foremost mechanized commander, and the comment would be laughable were it not that throughout his own memoirs, Rommel blames his own operational defeat in North Africa on a lack of supply from his higher command (for which he sees himself not a fault).[127] Yet, a commander is responsible for his force's effectiveness, and, if as Rommel did, he continues to pursue objectives that his force cannot reach due to supply shortages, then he is to blame for the result. Even more important to success than supply, though, are the men who use these suppplies to win battles and to execute successful campaigns. If a force does not have sufficient manpower to overcome its opponent, it will fail. The evidence shows that Rommel paid even less attention to the health of his men than he did to their supplies.

Ronald Bellamy and Craig Llewellyn, two retired U.S. Army doctors, have shown that "Rommel's inattention to the health of his command led to massive attrition of irreplaceable seasoned veteran trooops and contributed significantly to his ultimate defeat."[128] These two retired colonels, who both served in combat, did extensive analysis of both German and British records of the North African fighting. Their examination revealed that "a German soldier was 2.6

times as likely to become medically noneffective as his British opponent."[129] In 1942, the year of Rommel's initial victories and the battles leading up to his defeat at Alamein in October and Nvember, "of the 40,867 German troops medically evacuated from North Africa . . . disease was the cause in 28,488 cases."[130] Bellamy and Llewellyn quote Colonel H.S. Gear, the British Assistant Director of Hygiene in the Middle East: "Enemy defensive localities are obvious from the amount of feces lying on the surface of the gound . . . . This contempt for hygiene became such a menace to the enemy as to affect from 40 to 50 percent of his front-line trops, as interrogation of captured medical officers revealed."[131] Hence, while Rommel "was dashing about the battlefield performing the exploits for which he is now acclaimed, his army was literally rotting away."[132] But that was not the case for the British.

Because the British were aware of the impact of the environment, they took actions to sustain their force's effectiveness through an emphasis on preventive medicene and hygiene. The following chart indicates the difference betweeen the Germans and the British as a result of sickness in North Africa during the critical periods of Rommel's campaign.

**Attrition Rates Due to Sickness**[133]

(per 1,000 men per month)

| Period | German | British |
|---|---|---|
| October-December 1941 | 154 | 52 |
| January-March 1942 | 95 | 51 |
| April-June 1942 | 105 | 42 |
| July-September 1942 | 158 | 67 |
| October-December 1942 | 153 | 48 |
| Average | 133 | 52 |

As a result, by the end of 1942 Rommel's forces had been severely weakened by both the battles of that year and by sickness. In fact, "in the two months preceeding the second battle of Alamein, the German attrition rate exceeded 200. More than one in every five Germans had become ill. No wonder that elite units such as the 15th Panzer Division were terribly understrength (3,840 men versus a TOE . . . strength of more than 10,000)."[134] Moreover, it was not the case that Rommel's failure to sustain his force's health was the result of ignorance of the situation.

Rommel clearly knew of the health problem in his command. On 2 August 1942 he wrote of "a lot of sickness," the fact that "many of the older officers are going down now," and "we've all got

heat diarrhea now."[135] Rommel's papers often mention the illnesses of his senior officers such as Lieutenant Colonel Westphal (his operations officer), General Cruewell (appointed to command Afrika Korps when Rommel became Army commander), and Lieutenant General Bayerlin (chief of staff of Afrika Korps and later of Army Group Afrika). Yet there is no evidence that Rommel took any actions to correct this significant problem in his command. Instead, his force and its leadership continued to decrease in strength and effectiveness even as the German High Command was telling him that there would be few, if any, replacements.[136] Again, this was not the case for the British, and Rommel knew it.

> While we, on our side, had to fight every new action with the same formations, the British had been able to take their battered divisions out of the line for refitting, and to throw in fresh formations fully equipped and up to full battle strength. My troops had remained in the fight. Their numbers had grown continually smaller, while losses from dead, wounded, and **sick** [emphasis added] had steadily increased.[137]

Clearly Rommel was aware that he was not getting fresh formations to replace those that he had worn out and knew that his force was getting steadily less effective due to sickness and battles, yet he continued his attacks until he could not attack anymore, became overwhelmed by Allied superiority in number, and was defeated.

Rommel's failure to sustain organizational effectiveness is definitely linked to his earlier failure to set an operational purpose for his army consistent with the strategy of OKH. His disregard of OKH's guidance concerning the limited nature of North African operations led to the conduct of a campaign that was unsustainable since German supply and replacement priority was not to the North African theater. Additionally, Rommel's failure to do anything effective about his command's serious health problems further exacerbated the losses his force experienced as a result of his offensive campaign. In the end, his force became ineffective and the British defeated it. Like Rommel, Matthew Ridgway's force fought in a harsh enviornment at the end of a long line of communication and also experienced difficulties in supply and health, but unlike Rommel's force, the Eighth Army in Korea sustained organizational effectiveness.

General Ridgway wrote in his memoirs that "an army commander must be ambidexterous. With one hand he must guide and direct his corps commanders as they fight their divisions. With the other hand he must control the vast logistical complex which supplies the men in combat."[138] These words reflect a distinct difference in attitude with Rommel, who believed that supply was a quartermaster's concern. Yet while Ridgway attempted to sustain his army's effectiveness through a focus on prevention of cold weather injuries, supply economy, and the establishment of a rest

and recreation program, there is little evidence that any of these attempts at sustainment were successful. Rather, Ridgway's efforts at establishing direction led directly to the sustainment of force effectiveness.

In Ridgway's initial conference with General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Far East told the new Eighth Army Commander that his troops "were taking inadequate care of themselves in cold weather."[139] In Ridgway's first visits to units during the last week of December, he found this assessment to be true. On 28 December he found one-third of the 24th (US) Infantry Division to be without winter clothing. He immediately ordered it issued, and it left depots in Korea for the division by 5:15 PM that day.[140] In most other units he visited, he found that food "was often insufficient, not always on time, and not always hot."[141] Ridgway's solution was to order the kitchens closer and request an "immediate increase in the quality and quantity of rations."[142] Yet such orders can, and did, backfire at times.

A key component of the winter clothing he ordered issued was the Army's new, insulated shoepac that soldiers soon found to contribute to, rather than prevent, cold weather injuries to the feet, especially during energetic exercise such as combat or in situations when they could not frequently change socks.[143] In fact, in I Corps during the month of March (after three months of Ridgway's command), non-battle casualties outnumbered battle casualties by 2,421 to 1,975.[144] By April, the situation had improved somewhat, but non-battle casualties still amounted to over thirty-four percent of total casualties.[145] Overall non-battle casualties for UN Forces in April 1951 were 12,522 of the total casualty loss of 53,917 or twenty-three percent of all losses.[146] These non-battle attrition rates exceed those of Rommel's forces during their worst period (July-September 1942) when his rate was about sixteen percent. The difference, though, is that while Rommel was receiving few replacements, Ridgway was receiving sufficient personnel (25,012 in April alone) to maintain a credible force.[147] To supply this force, Ridgway focused on supply economy because of the long time it took to get supplies from the supply base (the United States). However, this attempt was especially difficult since American troops were apparently throwing away supplies and equipment as fast as Ridgway was getting them to the troops.

During his first visits to his division, Ridgway emphasized to the soldiers that their supplies had to come over a nine thousand mile supply line. He told commanders that he "didn't want to hear of any more precious equipment being abandoned" and he said that "any man who lost or threw away or needlessly damaged any piece of equipment or property was going to be courtmartialed."[148] The abandonment of equipment and supplies that were difficult to replace was so pervasive that Chinese soldiers captured during January and February 1951 reported that "while still in Manchuria before leaving for Korea, they were told they could pick up abandoned American weapons at the front" and were often not even issued Chinese small arms.[149] Further,

many Chinese and North Korean soldiers favored American weapons "because it was easier to get ammunition resupply for these from that abandoned or discarded by American soldiers."[150] Ridgway had to halt the waste of supplies and its resulting equipping of the enemy.

Despite Ridgway's threats and orders, the situation did not improve. A month and a half after Ridgway's initial directives concering the problem, the X Corps Comander had to send a message to his 2d (US) Infantry Division that: reported further use by the enemy of captured American weapons; directed that investigations into lost equipment would not be satisfied by the conclusion "loss due to enemy action"; required facts showing that the item was "in no manner lost by failure to perform to the utmost to protect property"; and threatened "immediate and severe" disciplinary action against violators.[151] A few weeks later, the commanding general of the American 1st Cavalry Division found that so many of his men had thrown away their helmets, bayonets, web gear, and entrenching tools, that he ordered his provost marshall to pick up any soldier found out of proper field uniform.[152] When on 7 March General Ridgway ordered that "all troops in range of enemy guns had to wear helmets" because of an increase in head wounds in the army, the 25th (US) Infantry Division found that nearly 8,500 of its soldiers had thrown away their helmets.[153] On 23 March after three months of Ridgway's command, the 187th Regimental Combat Team made its airborne assault into Munson-ri against light opposition. A week later, I Corps had to divert the 1st ROK Division to "police the battlefield" of abandoned supplies and equipment: 257 tons of all types of ammunition, two 75mm pack howitzers and one 105mm howitzer, 140 truck-loads of parachutes, an unstated amount of gasoline, 3,000 rations, and an additional 97 tons of ammunition found in the 3d (US) Division sector to the east of the 187th RCT's drop zone.[154] Ridgway was only four weeks away from his change of command, but he had been unable to solve this problem with his orders and directives. Another problem facing him was the physical and mental exhaustion of his soldiers.

Combat in the mountains of Korea was hard, exhausting, and lonely duty. In order to provide rest to these soldiers, Eighth Army instituted "a new program of five-day, Rest and Recuperation (R&R) leaves to Japan, for which the lowliest GI and the highest officer were eligible . . . and it soon became an extremely significant factor in the capacity of American and other UN soldiers . . . to endure their assignments."[155] However, this program that was intended to assist in sustaining force effectiveness actually degraded the army's effectiveness through an increase in sick rates. As a result of the program "an epidemic of venereal disease broke out in the troops returning from R&R . . . . In Korea venereal disease had not been a major problem thus far."[156] Hence, neither the R&R program, nor Ridgway's efforts at cold weather injury prevention, nor his emphasis on supply discipline were successful at sustaining force effectiveness as intended. Yet the army remained effective on the battlefield and remaind prepared to fight and win.

Ridgway sustained the effectiveness of his force by the way in which he used it. He never permitted a subordinate commander to use up his units. For example, during the battle for Wonju on 15 February, Ridgway directed the X Corps commander to pull out the French and Netherlands battalions because he believed they might "be on the verge of becoming battle weary."[157] Additionally, Ridgway realized that he had to ensure that his combat operations were essentially complete by June because of the rains that would turn Korea into "quagmires of mud" and increase non-battle casualties.[158] Hence, he planned his operations to be complete by that time. Above all other efforts to sustain force effectiveness, though, was his determination to ensure:

> infliction of maximum damage on the enemy with minimum to ourselves, the maintaining of all major units intact, and a careful avoidance of being sucked into an enemy trap--by ruse or as a result of our own aggressiveness--to be destroyed piecemeal. We ware to persue only to the point where we were still able to provide powerful support or at least manage a timely disengagement and local withdrawl.[159]

Here was the essence of how Ridgway sustained his force effectivenss. He did so by directing cautious, mutually supporting, and secure operations with an eye on the future well-being of his force, not on immediate gains in terrain or destruction of enemy forces. This monograph discussed Ridgway's tactical and operational technique in detail in an earlier section (Providing Direction) and how it brought success on the battlefield in terms of wining engagements and operations. Here, the technique provided a force sustainment quality all its own that overrode all the other, rather ineffective, attempts on Ridgway's part to sustanin his force's effectiveness.

This case study of Rommel and Ridgway demonstrates that efforts by an operational commander to sustain his force's effectiveness are important. Rommel failed to take responsibility and personal action in supply matters and paid little or no attention to the health of his command. These factors contributed to his defeat. Ridgway's order-oriented efforts at sustaining force effectiveness ( in cold weather injury prevention, supply discipline, and rest and recuperation programs) were ineffective at best and counter-productive at worst. However, he recognized that if he could direct his forces to fight in a specific way, the very nature of those tactical engagements and operations would, at the same time, inflict damgage on the enemy and conserve his force for future endeavors. In doing this, he sustained the effectiveness of his army and kept it in condition to win.

## CONCLUSION

The analysis of these two case studies has shown that leadership at the operational level is, indeed, a combat multiplier. However, the relative importance of the four separate functions of leadership varies. Provision of purpose at the operational level of leadership does have an effect on the outcome of campaigns, especially if that purpose is inconsistent with the purpose set by the next higher level of command. Leadership efforts at sustaining the organizational effectiveness of a force at the operational level are extremely difficult and for these two case studies, apparently had little positive effect in a traditional sense. Generating motivation is significant as a combat multiplier only if the leader concentrates his efforts at the operational level. Establishing direction, the fourth function of leadership, was the most significant factor of the operational leader's ability to influence the outcome of his campaigns.

The provision of purpose is potentially a very powerful leadership function but one apparently difficult to accomplish. In the negative sense, Rommel's failure to set an operational purpose of defense and assistance to his Italian allies--instead of the offensive purpose to which he set his forces--led to the failure of the Axis campaign in North Africa. Because the Axis' strategic purpose for this theater was one of an economy of force, one that did not envision extensive offensive action, when Rommel put his army on an offensive course, the Axis High Command could not support Rommel's army logistically either in manpower or materiel. Ridgway, on the other hand, made an assessment of his force's capabilities and decided that the operationally offensive purpose that he initially desired was not possible until he was able to generate motivation and establish direction for his army. However, even when he attempted to provide a sense of that purpose to the members of his army through a formal communicative process, he was apparently unable to do so. This failure is illustrative of the difficulty that operational commanders have in communicating their ideas throughout their force today due to the size of field armies, even with the extensive communications capability available to the commanders. Just as an operational commander's failure to provide a purpose consistent with the purpose of his higher headquarters can lead to failure, so can a failure to sustain the organizational effectiveness of the operational force.

Both of the operational commanders in this study were unable to sustain the organizational effectiveness in the traditional ways associated with this concept. Rommel, as a direct result of his failure to provide appropriate purpose, his lack of command concern over the mechanics of supply, and his apparent disregard for the health of his command or the impact of the desert environment, simply used up his force. Ridgway, was unable to impose a solution to the lack of

supply discipline in his army--and its resulting re-equipping of enemy forces--and efforts to improve the health of his command apparently did little good. However, fortunately for Ridgway, he had a sufficient supply of manpower and materiel to make up for these failures. Additionally, he made a conscious decision in the way that he established direction for his force to conserve his force and its effectiveness; he did not use it up as did Rommel. In essence, Ridgway circumvented the traditional concept of sustaining force effectiveness (through effective/efficient supply, through maintenance of the command's health, etc.) with the effective use of another function of leadership: establishing direction. The significance of this analysis is that for modern operational commanders, sustaining the effectiveness of the force is important inasmuch as it permits the accomplishment of the operational purpose. However, at least in this case study--like the instance of establishing purpose--this function of leadership is one that keeps the operational force from failing, but does not clearly multiply its chances of winning. Additionally, there are more than just the traditional ways of sustaining force effectiveness; clearly, the manner in which a commander establishes direction and provides purpose impact on his ability to sustain the effectiveness of his force. The way and the level at which both Ridgway and Rommel generated motivation were also different.

The case studies in this monograph show that the generation of motivation at tactical level alone is not sufficient to put an army on the course to victory, but if done effectively at the operational level, generating motivation can have significant, positive results when combined with effective motivation at the tactical level. Rommel failed to generate motivation in his army at the operational level; however, at the tactical level, he was an expert. This situation is illustrative of the difficulty between generating motivation at these two levels. While both Ridgway and Rommel were effective at face-to-face leadership, Rommel was best at it while at the tactical level; he did not do well generating motivation at the operational level due to the relationships he failed to cultivate with his Axis partners and due to the poor command climate he established with many of his subordinate commanders. Ridgway amply demonstrated that he could communicate with soldiers at the tactical level as well as Rommel could, but Ridgway could also motivate commanders very effectively at the operational level. Ridgway was able to build cohesion with his coalition members and build teamwork among his subordinate corps commanders. The result was an army that fought together and won. These are important lessons for leaders of the United States armed forces who may find themselves as operational commanders in the future. They must emphasize the generation of motivation at the operational level to ensure effective coalitions (in both the joint and combined sense) and ensure that their command climate is supportive of subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of purpose and direction. The final function of operational leadership, the establishing of direction, is also significant to future

operational commanders.

The case studies of Rommel and Ridgway, as in the function of generating motivation, show that the establishment of direction is done at both tactical and operational levels. However, in order for an operational commander's force to win its campaign, he must establish this direction at the operational level. Rommel's battlefield performance shows many distinct instances when he established direction at the tactical level with superb battlefield results. In fact, nearly all of his tactical victories were the result of his presence and his personal directive action on the battlefield. Clearly, however, his army began to rely on his presence at the tactical level as a combat multiplier in itself. However, because the operational field of conflict is so large and forces are so dispersed, the operational commander cannot be physically present everywhere at the same time. Both Rommel and Ridgway recognized this, and both attempted to be at the "critical point at the critical time" in the battle. Though this presence may bring tactical success at that point, it does not guarentee operational success, nor is it possible if the commander is absent due to sickness or enemy action that shifts the critical point faster than the commander can travel to it. This is the significant difference between Ridgway and Rommel. Ridgway established direction at the operational level so that despite his personal location, his subordinates understood his standards, his desired procedures and policies, his methods, and the mission. In this way, Ridgway did not have to be present to ensure success. It is an example of a much used definition of discipline: discipline is knowing and doing what is expected without having to be ordered to do so at the moment.

Operational level leadership is not a myth, and it can be a combat multiplier. U.S. operational commanders of the future must understand that operational leadership is not the same as leadership at the tactical level. In many respects operational leadership is more difficult due to the "empty battlefield" on which the operational force fights. The operational commander, despite the wonders of modern command and control technology, will still find it difficult to influence the course of the campaign in a direct sense. He must rely on more indirect methods. He must provide a purpose that is consistent with that of his higher headquarters. Hence, in designing campaigns, he must ensure that his campaign objectives match the strategic objectives set forth by the theater commander or the national command authority. In the generation of motivation, the command climate that he establishes must promote teamwork and loyalty. The operational comander, no matter how desireable observing the visible results of generating motivation at the tactical level is, must never sacrifice his efforts at generating motivation at the operational level for the more enjoyable and, perhaps, easier task of walking and talking with soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen. Tactical motivation is important; operational motivation is essential. Sustaining the effectiveness of his force is one of the operational commander's responsibilities; he neglects it at

the risk of failure. There is much more to sustainment than the traditional aspects of supply, health, and other functions of logistics. At the operational level, how the commander uses his force--the direction that he establishes at the operational level to accomplish purpose--can be a very effective way of sustaining his army. Amatures may talk tactics, and professionals may talk logistics, but operational professionals talk both. Finally, the establishment of direction is the most important of the four functions of leadership. The operational commander, even when he is unable to communicate his purpose to the force, can still win if he has established proper operational direction. The establishment of proper direction can, in itself, lead to the generation of motivation through success on the battlefield, first at the tactical level and, sequentially, at the operational level. Additionally, proper direction can materially contribute to the sustainment of the force, even when more traditional methods of sustainment are ineffective.

These are the lessons that the case studies of Rommel and Ridgway teach. The leadership of the operational commander is not a myth. Operational leadership can be a combat multiplier if the operational commander exercises it much as he would any other combat multiplier: in a conscious, organized way, and structured toward providing purpose, sustaining force effectiveness, generating motivation, and establishing direction in ordered way to win in the operational theater.

## ENDNOTES

[1] U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1986) pp. 13-14.

[2] U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Preliminary Draft) (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1992), pp. 2-14 - 2-15.

[3] U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations, p. 14.

[4] U.S. Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington, D. C. : Department of the Army), p. 44.

[5] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Senior Levels (Washington, D. C. : Department of the Army), p. 6.

[6] Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege, "A Comprehensive View of Leadership," Military Review, 72 (August 1992), 21.

[7] Wass de Czege, p. 22.

[8] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 13.

[9] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 14.

[10] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 14.

[11] Wass de Czege, p. 23.

[12] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 14.

[13] Wass de Czege, p. 25.

[14] Wass de Czege, p. 25.

[15] FM 22-103 lists Purpose, Direction, and Motivation as the only "imperatives" of leadership.

[16] Wass de Czege, p. 27.

[17] FM 22-103 offers the reader only two, incomplete case studies: General Robert Eichelberger on the Island of Buna and General Clarence Huebner in Europe, both during World War II.

[18] Born in 1891 at Heidenheim, Germany near Ulm, Erwin Johhannes Eugen Rommel was the son of a school master and was raised in a bourgeois background, in contrast to most of his future contemporary general officers who came from aristocratic backgrounds. He joined the German infantry in 1910 as a cadet and, after attending the War Academy at Danzig, received his commission as a lieutenant of infantry in the 124th Infantry Regiment in 1912. During World War I, he initially served near Verdun where he was wounded, and after three months in the hospital, returned for the First Battle of the Argonne where, as a company commander, he was decorated with the Iron Cross, First Class, for valor. Returning to Germany, he joined the

Wuerrtemberg Mountain Battalion as the commander of 2d Company and went to Rumania where he took part in the battle for Gegesti Rumania. In 1917, the battalion moved to the Italian Front where, during combat at Monte Matajur, Rommel's battle group of less than 600 men captured two enemy brigades and other units totalling over 9,000 men and 81 pieces of artillery. For this action, Rommel received the Pour le Merite, the "Blue Max," and much of his later published book, Infantry in the Attack, came about as a result of his experiences in this mountain theater of operations.

Allowed to remain as one of 4,000 officers permitted in the restricted German Army as a result of the WWI Armistice, Rommel spent the inter-war years in peaceful garrison duty and as an instructor at the German Inantry School at Dresden. Promted to the rank of major, Rommel went to Goslar to assume the command of the 3d Battalion of the 17th Infantry, where he met Dr. Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and Adolf Hitler at a parade in Hitler's honor. By 1935 Rommel was a lieutenant colonel and an instructor at the German War Academy at Potsdam. His book's popularity was immense, and even Hitler had read it. By 1937, Rommel was a colonel and the commander of the Infantry School at Wiener Neustadt, when he was summoned to Berlin and the command of Hitler's personal bodyguard during the entry into the Sudetenland and the invasion of Poland. He then requested and received command from Hitler of an armored division (the 7th Panzer) which he led in the invasion of Belgium in May of 1940. During the campaign in France, Rommel's 7th Panzer earned the nickname of the Ghost Division for its lightening fast attacks and seemingly invulnerability to Allied efforts. It also suffered the highest casualties of any other division in the German Army during the campaign, and captured the imagination of Gobbel's propaganda writers who included it, and Rommel specifically, in Victory in the West, a propaganda movie about the conquest of France.

With Rommel's rise in national popularity, as much the result of Goebbel's propaganda efforts as for Rommel's actual combat record, he received another promotion, this time to lieutenant general and command of German Forces in North Africa. His initial successes not only put off Italian defeat, but also drove the British back into Egypt, Rommel's popularity rose even higher, both with the German people and with Hitler. However, as Rommel began to suffer defeats at the hands of a more strengthened Allied force, and as internal arguments with OKW increased, Rommel began to drop from the "limelight." Brought home to Germany by Hitler, decorated, and sent to Italy, Rommel's assignment kept him out of combat. Then sent to Normandy, first to inspect the Channel defenses with no comand authority and subsequently as commander of Army Group B, he again argued with his immediate superior, Field Marshal von Rundstadt over the proper tactics for a defense of the western theater.

Barely a month after the successful Allied invasion of Normandy, a British plane strafed Rommel's car. The resulting head wound (a quadrupal skull fracture) sent Rommel to the hospital and then to his home on convalescent leave. While there, he was implicated by one of the conspirators to Hitler's assasination attempt. On 14 October 1944, two German SS generals appeared at Rommel's home. Given the choice of a trial by people's tribunal for treason, an ensured guilty verdict, and an execution in dishonor or the choice of suicide, care for his family, the made-up story of his death as a result of wounds, and a promised state funeral with full military and national honors, Rommel drank poison that afternoon and died.

While there are several excellent studies on Rommel in North Africa, the best biography remains The Rommel Papers edited by Liddel Hart (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953). Desmond Young has also written two books that have good analyses of Rommel's life: Rommel (Athens: D. Ex Genicau, 1982) and Rommel: The Desert Fox (New York: Harper Brothers, 1950). For an excellent , first person account of Rommel's North African experiences from the soldier's point of view, see Heinz Werner Schmidt's With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrups, 1951).

[19] Matthew Bunker Ridgway, born on 3 March 1895 at Fort Monroe, Virginia, was the son of a U.S. Army colonel. Attending and graduating from the United States Military Academy at West Point, Ridgway received a commission in infantry in 1917 and served his initial tour of

duty with the 3d Infantry at Eagle Pass, Texas. He then returned to West Point as an instructor of tactics and athletics for six years. Subsequent assignments included a year in Tientsin China with the 15th Infantry, a year with the 9th Infantry at Ft. Sam Houston, Texas, and three years in Central America (one year with the Electoral Commission in Nicaragua, and two years at Ft. Clayton, Panama with the 33d Infantry). He then returned to the Pacific as the United States Army's liason officer to the Phillippine insular government in 1932 and personal advisor to the United States Governor General, Theodore Rooseveldt, Jr.

Following two years at the United States Command and General Staff School, Ridgway served first as assistant chief of staff for operations and training at 6th Corps and 2d Army in Chicago, Illinois and then in the same position at the 4th Army Headquarters at Presidio, California. Following his graduation from the Army War College, he then served in the War Plans Division of the War Departement General Staff. Upon promotion to brigadier general, he became the assistant division commander of the 82 Infantry Division and led it as its commanding general through transisition to the U.S. Army's first airborne infantry division within a year.

General Ridgway saw his first combat as the commanding general of the 82d as it went to North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France during World War II. Assuming command of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Ridgway saw action as a corps commander during the Allied invasion of Holland, the Battle of the Bulge,m the campaign for the Ruhr Pocket, and ended the war in Europe with the crossing of the Elbe River and subsequent link-up with Russian forces. Brought back to the United States, Ridgway and his corps prepared for the invasion of the Japanese home islands, but when the war ended before this operation could take place, Ridgway was reassigned back to Europe in command of the Mediteranean Theater of Operations. While in this position he also served as the personal representative of the Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, to the United Nations Military Committe.

Returning to the States once again, Ridgway assumed the position of deputy chief of staff for operations and administration in the Department of the Army until being ordered to assume command of Eighth Army and United Nations Forces in Korea. When General MacArthur was relieved in Japan, Ridgway replaced him as Supreme Commander, Far East. Following command of NATO forces in Europe as Supreme Commander, Europe (replacing Eisenhower), at the age of 58, Ridgway became Chief of Staff of the United States Army and retired two years later in June of 1955.

In contrast to numerous biographies of Rommel's life and histories of Rommel's combat experiences in North Africa, there are relatively few works dedicated specifically to Ridgway's life. His autobiography, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper, 1956) is the most complete work on his life and career. His second book, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge ( Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1967) is an excellent, first person account of his command experience in the Korean War. However, the best researched and most detailed account of Ridgway's actions as Eighth Army Commander is Roy Appleman's Ridgway Duels For Korea (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1990). This work was the third in Appleman's superb trilogy on the Korean conflict.

[20] Mitchel M. Zais, "Strategic Vision and Strength of Will: Imperatives for Theater Command" in The Challenge of Military Leadership, ed. Lloyd J. Matthews and Dale E. Brown (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1989), p.88.

[21] Larry H. Addignton, "Operation Sunflower: Rommel vs the General Staff," Military Affairs, 31 (Fall 1967), 120-121.

[22] Samuel Mitcham, Triumphant Fox: Erwin Rommel and the Rise of the Afrika Corps (New York: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 63.

[23] Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers ed. B.H. Liddell Hart (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1953), p. 100.

[24] Rommel, p. 101.

[25] Charles Douglas-Home, Rommel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1973), p. 26.

[26] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 14.

[27] Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (London: Harrup, 1951), pp. 13-14.

[28] Mitcham, p.68.

[29] Rommel, p. 153.

[30] Rommel, p. 191.

[31] Rommel, pp. 347, 358.

[32] Rommel, p. 351.

[33] Roy E. Appleman, Ridgway Duels for Korea (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University, 1990), p. 6.

[34] Appleman, p. 10.

[35] John Dille, Substitute for Victory (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1954), p.23.

[36] Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967), p. 86.

[37] Appleman, p. 37.

[38] Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 207-208. Text: "The answer to the first question, 'Why are we here?" [I wrote] is simple and conclusive. We are here because of the decisions of the properly constituted authorities of our respective governments. As the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur has said: 'This command intends to maintain a military position in Korea just as long as the Statesmen of the United Nations decide we should do so.' The answer is simple because further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the loyalty we give, and expect, precludes any slightest questioning of these orders.

The second question is of much greater significance, and every member of this command is entitled to a full and reasoned answer. Mine follows.

To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is, here, incidental. It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean Allies, whose fidelity and valor under the severest stresses of battle we recognize though that freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.

The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with God's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.

If these be true, and to me they are, beyond any possibility of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean Allies alone and for their national survival.

It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence.

The sacrifices we have made, and those we shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct defense.

In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here in Korea is whether Communism or individual freedom shall prevail; whether the flight of fear-driven people we have witnessed here shall be checked, or shall at some future time, however distant, engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and despair.

These are the things for which we fight. Never have members of any military command had a greater challenge than we, or a finer opportunity to show ourselves and our people at their best--and thus to do honor to the profession of arms, and to those brave men who bred us."

[39] Appleman, p. 157.

[40] Appleman, p. 208.

[41] Appleman, p. 7.

[42] Appleman, p. 158.

[43] Alfred Gause, "Command Techniques Employed by Field Marshal Rommel in Africa," Armor 67 (July-August 1958), 23.

[44] Gause, p. 24.

[45] Rommel, pp. 112-113.

[46] Sherwood S. Cordier, "Rommel's Greatest Triumph--the Gazala Campaign, 1942," Armor 72 (May-June 1963), p. 60.

[47] Cordier, pp. 61-62.

[48] Herman W. W. Lange, "Rommel at Thala," Military Review 41 (September 1961), pp 77-78.

[49] Gause, p. 23.

[50] Schmidt, p. 42.

[51] David John Caudell Irving, The Trail of the Fox (New York: Dutton, 1977), p.110.

[52] Irving, p. 103.

[53] Mitcham, p. 89.

[54] John Kenneth Macksey, Afrika Korps (New York: Ballentine Books, 1968), p. 219.

[55] Rommel, p. 226.

[56] Rommel, p. 124.

[57] Mitcham, p. 97.

[58] Douglas-Home, p. 142.

[59] Cordier, p. 17.

[60] Gause, p. 23.

[61] Rommel, p. 104.

[62] Edgar O'ballance, Korea: 1950-1953 (Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1969), p. 82.

[63] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 88.

[64] Appleman, p. 182.

[65] Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History of the Korean War, 1950-53, (New York: Putnam, 1962), p. 240.

[66] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 118.

[67] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 117-118.

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[70] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 88-89.

[71] Appleman, pp. 125-126.

[72] Appleman, p. 150.

[73] Appleman, p. 152-153.

[74] Bevin Alexander, Korea: The First War We Lost (New York: Hippocrene, 1986), pp. 390-391.

[75] Appleman, p. 175.

[76] Appleman, p. 192.

[77] Donald Knox and Alfred Coppel, The Korean War: Uncertain Victory (San Diego, California: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988), p.31.

[78] Appleman, pp. 219-220.

[79] Appleman, p. 245.

[80] Appleman, p. 249.

[81] Appleman, p 252.

[82] Appleman, pp. 254-314.

[83] Appleman, p.258.

[84] Appleman, p. 287-288.

[85] Appleman, p. 307.

[86] Edwin Palmer Hoyt, The Bloody Road to Panmunion (New York: Stein and Day, 1985), p. 186.

[87] Hoyt, p. 189.

[88] Appleman, p. 331.

[89] Appleman, p. 333.

[90] Appleman, p. 347.

[91] Wolf Heckmann, Rommel's War in Africa (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1981), pp. xvi-xvii.

[92] U.S. Army, FM 22-103, p. 14.

[93] Irving, The Trail of the Fox, p. 156.

[94] Sherwood S. Cordier, "Erwin Rommel: A Study in Command" Armor 69 (September-October 1960), p. 17.

[95] Irving, The Trail of the Fox, pp. 116-117.

[96] Irving, The Trail of the Fox, p. 103.

[97] Rommel, p. 267.

[98] Macksey, Afrika Korps, p. 219.

[99] Macksey, Afrika Korps, pp. 83-84.

[100] Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert, p. 42.

[101] Macksey, Afrika Korps, p. 76.

[102] Irving, The Trail of the Fox, p. 273.

[103] Edwin Palmer Hoyt, The Bloody Road to Panmunion (New York: Steing and Day, 1985), p. 152.

[104] Appleman, p. 145.

[105] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, pp. 85.

[106] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, pp. 85.7

[107] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 97.

[108] Appleman, p. 407.

[109] S.L.A. Marshall, The Military History of the Korean War (New York: F. Watts, 1963), p. 58.

[110] Appleman, p. 360.

[111] Appleman, p. 407.

[112] Appleman, p. 301.

[113] Marshall, p.48.

[114] John Dille, Substitute for Victory (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1954), p.23.

[115] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, pp. 113-114.

[116] Appleman, p. 119.

[117] Appleman, p. 389.

[118] Appleman, p. 147.

[119] Ridgway and Winton, p. 62.

[120] Ridgway and Winton, pp. 61-62.

[121] Appleman, p. 148.

[122] Gause, p. 24.

[123] Macksey, Afrika Korps, p. 49.

[124] Mitcham, pp. 68-69.

[125] Rommel, p. 261.

[126] Mitcham, p. 78.

[127] Rommel, pp. 134, 186-187, 191-193, 243-244, 251, 263, 265-267, 280, 285, 287, 294, 302, 304, 307, 311, 315.

[128] Ronald F. Bellamy and Craig H. Llewellyn, "Preventable Casualties: Rommel's Flaw," Army 40 (May 1990), pp. 52-56.

[129] Bellamy and Llewellyn, pp. 53-54.

[130] Bellamy and Llewellyn, pp. 53.

[131] Bellamy and Llewellyn, p. 54. Quoted from Colonel H.S. Gear, "Hygiene Aspects of the El Alamein Victory," British Medical Journal, March 1944.

[132] Bellamy and Llewellyn, p. 54.

[133] Bellamy and Llewellyn, p. 56. Cited from Fischer, Der deutche Sanitatisdienst 1921-1945 and Vols I and II of F.A.E. Crew's The Army Medical Service-Campaign (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956-1957).

[134] Bellamy and Llewellyn, p. 54.

[135] Rommel, p. 263.

[136] Rommel, p. 191.

[137] Rommel, p. 261.

[138] Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, pp. 6.

[139] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p. 82.

[140] Appleman, p. 25.

[141] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p.86.

[142] Ridgway, The Korean War: How We Met the Challenge, p.87.

[143] Appleman, pp. 123, 131, 154.

[144] Appleman, p. 395.

[145] Appleman, p. 494.

[146] Appleman, p. 493.

[147] Appleman, p. 405.

[148] Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway, p. 206.

[149] Appleman, p. 298.

[150] Appleman, p. 112.

[151] Appleman, p. 298.

[152] Appleman, p. 186.

[153] Appleman, p.342.

[154] Appleman, pp. 387-388.

[155] Alexander, pp. 397-398.

[156] Appleman, p. 421.

[157] Appleman, p. 301.

[158] Appleman, p. 193. In a letter to General MacArthur on 9 February Ridgway wrote: "Weather and its effects on terrain will condition military operations during the next 6 months. Ther period of good weather for operations by 8th Army and supporting naval and air service expires about 31 March; a period of fair weather for such opoerations about 31 May."

[159] Appleman, p. 331.

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