Quick Decisive Victory - Wisdom or Mirage?
Abstract
This monograph explores the US Army's recently announced goal of quick decisive victory. This concept has emerged in the wake of US victories in Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM and reflects one of the National Military Strategy's principles-the use of decisive, overwhelming force. Generally this concept calls for an unambiguous victory, rapidly achieved through very precise use of proportional force, and is carefully crafted to insure minimum or m US casualties and limited collateral damage. In view of emerging post Cold War global and domestic situations this is a daunting standard to place before the US Army. This monograph reviews the definitions and meanings of the phrase quick decisive victory in some detail. It then examines two case studies in history where quick decisive victories seemed to occur. Specifically Napoleon Bonaparte's 1805 and 1806 campaigns and Nazi Germany's triumphs over Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 are analyzed. Each case study is evaluated within the physical, cybernetic and moral domains of war for common attributes of these types of campaigns. These are also compared to Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM as more modern examples of decisive campaigns. The proposition that the victors possessed, recognized and exploited major advantages which made there forces asymmetrically superior is explored. The monograph finds that these 19th and 20th century decisive campaigns provide clues and warnings about the pursuit of quick decisive victory in the 21st century.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 14, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA274435
Entities
People
- John M. Peppers
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College