


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THE GERMAN DEBATE
OVER MILITARY PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS:
THE FIRST STEP TOWARD
AN EVENTUAL COMBAT ROLE

By

Richard Michael Schmitz

December 1993

Thesis Advisor:

Donald Abenheim

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AN EVENTUAL COMBAT ROLE**

by

Richard Michael Schmitz

Captain, United States Marine Corps

B.A., Auburn University 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of


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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, western European security policy has undergone a radical transformation. Western European countries are grappling with a new international security environment that is less clear than during the former bipolar balance of power era. The western European democracies are faced with changing their national security policies to reflect and keep pace with the transformation in the Post-Cold War world. The central issue of participation in military operations outside one's borders affects the Federal Republic of Germany in a vastly different context based primarily on Germany's past, than the older, yet equally stable democracies. This study analyzes the steps taken by the German Federal Government to transform the character of German security policy from the customs of forward defense on the inner-German border to the strategic realities of the present.

The Persian Gulf War became the watershed event in the debate over united Germany's use of military force outside of accepted constitutional, let alone historical and geographical, parameters. The out-of-area issue raised

during the Persian Gulf War reflects a more complex question of German national identity in the Post-Cold War world. The German debate over military missions initially has focused on "Blue Helmet" peacekeeping operations within regional and global collective security organizations. The debate further developed toward the potential for combat missions. This study is important because Germany's politicians are at a crossroads. While this author believes quite firmly that the time is drawing near when German soldiers will participate in combat within the framework of collective defense and security in a future conflict, considerable obstacles to such a contingency remain.

This thesis highlights the historical perspective concerning the development of Germany's national identity and its impact upon the formulation of national security policy. The study interprets the interaction of the elements of government, the military, political parties and the international system in the transformation of German defense policy since the shock of the Post-Cold War world has overwhelmed Atlantic security institutions. This thesis describes the strategic interaction of how Germany's political leaders have adjusted themselves to an unfamiliar and uncomfortable world of war and peace. In the process,

Germany is discarding the security policy of so-called reticence.

The strategic revolution of unification, the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, and all that followed in the Persian Gulf War, the Balkan crisis, Somalia and beyond has cast all of the above into a cockeyed perspective. The debate on peacekeeping missions has come to its first parliamentary vote with less than optimal results. The political gridlock over the divisive issue has not been resolved. The Kohl government's attempts to re-formulate national security and foreign policy have met with mixed results both at home and abroad. Yet, it is clear to all of the Germany's political leadership that the front-line defense policy has become obsolete in a changing international security environment.

However, the new policy that will finally replace it remains unclear as Europe and Germany struggle with the primacy of domestic politics, the stalling of efforts at international union, and the return of war to Europe. This thesis attests to this reality and its author looks forward hopefully to a time when a democratic Germany can assume its full role abroad on equal terms and in the ranks of the world's democratic powers.

I. INTRODUCTION

Twenty-six year old Alexander Arndt, a Sergeant assigned to a German military medical unit, was in the fourth month of his deployment outside of Germany. In two weeks time at the end of his unit's mission, Sergeant Arndt was to rotate back to the Fatherland. Undoubtedly, like many German soldiers before him who also were near the end of an arduous and potentially dangerous tour, his thoughts included returning to loved ones and enjoying the simple pleasures in life such as a home-cooked meal. Unfortunately, Sgt. Arndt would never step foot into Germany again as he became another casualty in the 19 month-long operation.

Enroute back to his unit, after eating dinner in the capitol city, he was shot to death while driving his truck. The story of his death is not one of the millions of tragic tales to come out of the 1916 Somme Offensive or even the blitzkreig of Poland in 1939, but was unique in that Sgt. Arndt was the first German soldier killed overseas since the end of the Second World War. Sgt. Arndt was killed on 14 October 1993 while serving in the

UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia. Although the mission was humanitarian by nature, his death once again focused attention on the German military and its proper role in German foreign and security policy in a changing international environment.¹

This thesis describes the steps taken by the German Federal Government to transform the character of German security policy from the customs of forward defense on the inner-German border to the strategic realities of the present. While this author believes quite firmly that the time is drawing nearer that German soldiers will participate in combat within the framework of collective defense and security in a future conflict, considerable obstacles to such a contingency remain. The present study interprets the interaction of the elements of the Federal Government, the German military institution, the major political parties and the international system of states in the transformation of German defense policy since the shock of events in the Post-Cold War world has overwhelmed the Atlantic security institutions. This thesis thus describes the strategic interaction of how Germans, particularly in the cabinet and

¹"German Soldier Becomes the First Casualty of German Involvement in UN Missions," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 22 October 1993), p. 2.

in the Armed Forces, have adjusted themselves to an unfamiliar and uncomfortable world of war and peace. In the process, the Federal Republic of Germany is discarding the grand strategy of the so-called policy of reticence. However, the new policy that will finally replace it remains unclear as Europe and Germany struggle with the primacy of domestic politics, the stalling of efforts at international union, and the return of war to Europe.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, western European security policy has undergone a radical transformation. National security planning and strategic military preparation for ambiguous threats, coupled with shrinking defense budgets, are of utmost concern to today's politicians.² The fall of Communism and the Cold War victory signifies this change in Europe's view of security policy. The Cold War did not directly engage the opposing Eastern Bloc and Western countries in open hostilities. However, international conflicts, like the Persian Gulf War or the crises in eastern Europe and Africa, will continue to arise in the post-Cold War era.

Western European countries are grappling with a new international security environment that is less clear than during the former bipolar balance of power era. The linear

²"NATO and the Changing Geopolitical Environment," Global Affairs, vol. 6, no. 3, Summer 1991, p. 175.

defense of one's homeland, while still a concern, has lessened in importance in comparison to preventing or managing conflicts on the periphery before these crises have a chance to develop into first-order magnitude problems. The western European democracies are faced with changing their national security policies to reflect and keep pace with the transformation in the Post-Cold War world.

The change in national security policy requires the potential use of military rapid reaction or peacekeeping forces to prevent further instability or to make an adversary realize that the use of force is counter-productive to peace. The central issue of participation in military operations outside one's borders affects the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in a vastly different context based primarily on Germany's past, than the older, yet equally stable, democracies. The Persian Gulf War became the watershed event in the debate over united Germany's use of military force outside of accepted constitutional, let alone historical and geographical, parameters. The out-of-area issue raised during the Persian Gulf War reflects a more complex question of German national identity in the Post-Cold War world.³

³Clay Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation? Redefining Germany's Military Role Outside of NATO," in Armed Forces and Society, vol. 19, No. 2, Winter 1993, p. 247.

Just as the American Constitution is a revered document to American citizens, Germany's Federal Constitution (The Basic Law) is seen in the same light by Germans.⁴ The Basic Law also represents the fundamental beginnings of modern democratic rule in the Federal Republic of Germany. Like many democracies, Germany's Basic Law covers the use of military force which indirectly affects where German Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) can be deployed. There are several Basic Law Articles which specifically deal with the perceived limits on military deployment and involvement.

First, Article 24 of the Basic Law allows the FRG to "enter a system of mutual collective security...as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order...among the nations of the world."⁵ Germany's entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU) and the United Nations (UN) is covered by this Article. In addition, Article 25 gives international law precedence over national law.⁶ Next, Article 26 bans Germany from undertaking missions "with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations...[and]

⁴Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, 1991), p. 5.

⁵Ibid., p. 18.

⁶Ibid.

especially to prepare for war of aggression."⁷ Finally, Article 87(a) was inserted into the Basic Law in 1956 to "establish [the] Armed Forces for defence purposes...Apart from defence, the Armed Forces may only be used insofar as explicitly permitted by [the] Basic Law."⁸

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union diminished long standing conventional threats to Western European security and stability. The warning time for a potential attack by the former East Bloc countries now spans years instead of just minutes during the high water mark of the Cold War. Threats to a nation's well being have blurred with the downfall of Communism. External threats are now perceived to emanate from the rise in nationalism, religious fundamentalism and ethnic strife in the less developed, former second and the third world countries.

Since the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the German political parties' differing opinions regarding possible participation in extra-territorial military operations renewed the debate over amending the Basic Law provisions that cover the perceived limited strategic use of the military. This political debate evolved out of the unification process, which highlighted the obsolescence of the now "normalized

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

and completely sovereign" FRG's forty year old "front line defense" posture. The German debate over military missions in the Post-Cold War era initially has focused on "Blue Helmet" peacekeeping operations within regional and global collective security organizations.⁹ The debate further developed toward the potential for combat missions. This field of study is important because Germany's politicians are at a crossroads. Germany's leadership is responsible for adopting a national security policy attuned to the ongoing transformation in the international scene and also for maintaining a Post-Cold War military capable of responding to unforeseen external threats.

In properly understanding how the debate of utilizing the Bundeswehr in a peacekeeping role has evolved, this thesis will first highlight the historical perspective concerning the development of Germany's national identity and its impact upon the formulation of national security policy. Next, a discussion of the German leadership's decision not to take part in direct combat during the Persian Gulf War will highlight this internal struggle and foreshadow the dispute over a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr. After the Persian Gulf War ended, the senior

⁹These organizations would include NATO (albeit a collective defense organization), CSCE, WEU and the UN.

Bundeswehr leadership openly argued for broadening future military roles in regard to German national security policy.

German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's parliamentary government coalition of the Christian Democrat Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) and the Free Democrat Party (FDP) have differing viewpoints from the "loyal opposition" Social Democrat Party (SPD) position as to what extent and how the Bundeswehr should be used as an instrument of policy. The political debate centers around the perceived constitutional role that the Bundeswehr should play in international peacekeeping missions and a potential combat role. This debate not only concerns Germany's political leadership, but also greatly impacts upon the leaders of the other NATO countries. The implications of increased German military power causes inherent friction between Germany and the European nations.

Ambivalence toward an enlarged German security role is based on the disastrous historical record of Germany's past military indiscretions. After a protracted struggle over Hitler's Nazi Germany from September 1939 to May 1945, the victorious Allied Powers were determined not to make the same mistake of not checking German rearmament which

occurred during the 1920's and 1930's.¹⁰ To prevent a recurrence of German aggression, the Allies, immediately after World War II, embarked upon a vigorous program to sever all dysfunctional aspects of Germany's past by "setting the clock at zero (Stunde Null)."¹¹ The intent of the Allied Powers was to alter German society and its militaristic ways of thinking by rebuilding from the bottom up through re-education and stripping away entrenched belligerent attitudes.

The Allied Occupation Powers established regulations to prohibit all military facets of life even so far as to include military ceremonies, writings, uniforms and toy soldiers. The Allied Powers perceived the question of future German rearmament only within the framework of an integrated, subsuming structure that could continue to oversee control on any type of German unilateral military action.¹² (The collective defense organization of NATO eventually fulfilled this role). The mind set that Germany was never again to try its hand at hegemonic rule was re-

¹⁰Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," in Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace, ed. by Robert J. Art, (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, International Defense Publishers, 1984), p. 84.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

educated into society and its political leaders. Eventually, the Federal Armed Forces were raised and armed. However, the idea of using the military as a tool of foreign policy was absent except as a force for the direct defense of the Fatherland in maintaining Germany's sovereignty. This idea became firmly entrenched over time and was Germany's strategic policy in regard to the national interest of self-preservation.

The FRG adopted a security policy oriented toward multi-lateralism and collective defense to compensate for the German leadership's impression of restricted sovereignty in security issues. In addition, by maintaining a multilaterally-oriented security policy the Bonn government avoided the commitment toward a specific policy objective that might be misconstrued by the Allied Powers as anything but the widely accepted German national interest of direct defense of the Fatherland.¹³ The absence of old fashioned German national security interests resulted from the long held beliefs introduced by the Allied Powers after Germany's defeat in World War II.

As a rule, German national interests did not have a traditional lobby, voice or a channel, similar to those

¹³Wolfgang F. Schloer, "German Security Policy," Adelphi Paper 277, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, June 1993), p. 4.

found in countries like the United States or Great Britain, through which a dialogue or public debate could be pursued to arrive at a widely regarded common set of national interests. Even the German media, in the early period of the FRG's creation, did not consider its main task to be that of serious analysis of national interests or alternatives.¹⁴ The German government also initially failed to educate the public concerning anything but the basics of using military force as a foreign policy tool to ensure national interests were safeguarded.¹⁵

Thus today, German politicians are perceived, by both domestic and foreign critics, to be pursuing a policy of realpolitik¹⁶ when they speak of national interests. That is why many of today's German politicians feel ill at ease in stating German foreign and security intentions. However, stating national interests is a part of formulating foreign policy. Domestic political agreement on a common foreign and security policy can only be attained if Germans feel

¹⁴Foreign Broadcast Information Service Report: West Europe, (Hereafter referred as FBIS-WEU), 93-066, 8 April 1993, p. 18, "National Security Interests Viewed," in AU0504110393 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Apr 93, p. 1.

¹⁵Schloer, p. 13.

¹⁶According to the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co., (1977) edition, realpolitik is "politics based on practical and material factors rather than on theoretical or ethical objectives."

they are adequately and legitimately being taken care of and represented fairly.¹⁷

Yet, during the Cold War, the FRG's national security interests involved participation in only collective defense and security organizations. By design, the Bundeswehr was fully integrated into the NATO "layer cake" framework of defense against a Soviet led attack. A traditional National Command Authority (relative to the U.S. NCA) or an old style German General Staff never developed within the FRG. The German political culture of the Cold War era never seriously considered allowing the Bundeswehr, let alone strictly combat units, to venture beyond the NATO members' borders.¹⁸

The German people possessed a deep seated aversion to overtly militaristic policies as a result of the defeat in World War II, the re-education of political culture and the absence of armed conflict involving Germany for over forty years.¹⁹ There is no indication from the German government that the FRG will abandon NATO nor the UN in favor of unilateral military action. Therefore, the United States has a vested interest in the resolution of the debate over

¹⁷FBIS-WEU, 93-060, 31 March 1993, p. 20, "Commentary Views 'National Interests' Reservation," in AU2603203493 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Mar 93, p. 1.

¹⁸Schloer, p. 55-56.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 5.

peacekeeping missions and the trend toward an expanded combat role for the Bundeswehr for the obvious reasons of extended deterrence and increased security burdensharing by Germany in the collective security and defense of NATO and the European region.

A deeper level of cooperation in German-American relations could result if the debate resolves favorably toward a greater international security role for Germany. The United States would benefit from German international peacekeeping missions through an increase in the burden sharing of regional and global security responsibilities. Germany is a stable democratic state that is deeply committed to the same ideals that the U.S. promotes through maintaining free trade and preserving human rights throughout the international community. Initial German participation in missions similar to the Somalia operation would greatly assist U.S. efforts to stabilize global flash points before such crises might escalate into regional conflicts. When regional conflicts arise that affect the American government's interests or the national interests of America's allies, it would benefit the U.S. position if the German peacekeeping debate to allow for the use of military force for other than defense purposes should lead to an eventually expanded combat role for the Bundeswehr.

A positive resolution of the German debate would ensure that one of America's strongest security partners would be politically and militarily capable, when and if the need should arise in the uncertain future, of reacting to acts of violent, armed aggression.

II. GERMAN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

German foreign and security policy makes no sense in the present without a clear analysis of the past two centuries of German history. Current German foreign and security policy cannot objectively be viewed by itself without an understanding of the historical process of German national unification and the nation's inclusion into the system of states. To peer into Germany's future, one has to look back at its past. The uniqueness of German statecraft is deeply rooted in its historical legacy of being centered in the middle of Europe, surrounded by stronger sovereign states and fearful of invasion and subjugation.

At the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the relationship between the European states was stable primarily due to the success of Austrian Prince Metternich's statecraft and diplomacy in the form of the Concert of Europe and the Holy Alliance.²⁰ The modern German state did not yet exist. Prussia was the largest and most influential of the 39 Germanic principalities. The Old Regime, crafted

²⁰Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815: Alternate Edition, (Fort Worth, Texas: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1974), p. 17.

by Metternich and his generation, maintained peace and consensus from 1815 until 1848 when the ideas of liberalism and nationalism took hold in the form of revolution. Yet, by the 1850's, conservatism and the monarchies were still in control. However, Metternich and his generation, which espoused the ideals of open diplomacy in which international relations were conducted in an above board manner, began to fade from the limelight.²¹

The age of realism and Social Darwinism dawned. Mass politics and industrialization began to take shape also. The drive for national self-determination and unity was achieved during the coming decades of increased competition and mutual distrust between the European nations and the development of realpolitik (practical politics). The new politicians were to take matters into their own hands and shape events through shrewd diplomacy and the increasing use of limited war to reach their goals of consolidating power within the nation-state. Thus, political maneuvering and waging war took on a new light. Politics and war became the tools of the Realpolitiker. The Prussian envoy to the Germanic Confederation, Prince Otto von Bismarck, had a hidden agenda of seeking unity for the German states that

²¹Ibid. p. 97.

cluded Austria. Bismarck was determined to strengthen the Prussian Army and adopt an expansionist and aggressive foreign policy with the ultimate goal of consolidating German power into a unified state.²²

Bismarck epitomized the quintessential Realpolitiker by playing one power against another to his advantage. Through shrewd diplomacy and limited war, Bismarck was able to keep his enemies off balance and consolidate power for a Greater Germany. However, Prussia would not absorb Germany as many Prussian statesmen hoped for, but just the opposite; Prussia was subsumed within a Greater Germany. Bismarck's political maneuvering was interspersed with war against the Danes in 1864 (aided by the Austrians), war against Austria in 1866 and war against France in 1871.²³ Germany did not become a sovereign nation until Prussian Prince Otto von Bismarck's "blood and iron" realpolitik methods proved successful in the wars for German independence against Austria and then France from 1866 to 1871.²⁴ In uniting the disjointed German states under one ruler; Kaiser Wilhelm I, Bismarck as Minister-President was able to manipulate the "Old Soldier"

²²Ibid., p. 118-119.

²³Ibid., p. 151-153, 170.

²⁴Ibid., p. 110, 149-155, 169-171.

and wield considerable influence in German foreign policy-making.²⁵

Many times, Bismarck would conduct his ruthless, closed-door, heavy-handed diplomatic tactics (all in the name of German nationalism) with the leaders of the other great powers of Europe and then later inform the Emperor that his actions were in the best interests of the country. Bismarck's Germany was increasingly seen as a rising power that dealt with international relations in the same aggressive manner as Bismarck handled his duties as Prime Minister. Bismarck was quoted: "the great questions of the day will not be settled by resolutions and majority votes...but by blood and iron."²⁶ Yet, near the end of the nineteenth century, Bismarck found it increasingly difficult to maintain the balance of power he had fashioned through his secret treaties and alliances.

Upon the death of Kaiser Wilhelm I, in 1888, his grandson, Wilhelm II took the throne and coupled with the resignation of Bismarck in 1890 another generational change in leadership took place. The youthful and impetuous Wilhelm II had no desire to be led around by Bismarck (as his grandfather had been). Wilhelm II rejected Bismarck's

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Robert G.L. Waite, ed., Hitler and Nazi Germany, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1969) p. 31.

foreign policies and regarded his alliance network as too complex.²⁷ The generational change in statesmen eclipsed Bismarck's goal of ensuring Germany remained within the top three out of the five Great European Powers. The stage was set for a change in the balance of power within Europe.

Kaiser Wilhelm II's Chancellors abilities to influence the international scene did not compare to Bismarck's mastery of statecraft, which he attained over several decades of service. The German Chancellors Caprivi and Hohenlohe, from 1890 to 1900, tried and failed.²⁸ Wilhelm II was fond of boasting about Germany's power to lesser states and he began to practice a policy of Weltpolitik (world politics) or imperialism. The German claims for greater territorial expansion placed Germany in direct competition with the already established colonial empires of Great Britain and France. "Lebensraum" (living space) became the new German watchword professed by the Wilhelmine Foreign Ministers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²⁹

²⁷George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 421.

²⁸Craig, p. 258.

²⁹David Kaiser, Politics and War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9.

German Chancellor von Bulow revelled in his leading role of promoting imperialism and the growth of German navalism.³⁰ Admiral von Tirpitz was primarily responsible for the naval arms build up within Germany and the establishment of a "risk fleet" to defeat the great maritime power of Great Britain in a future war.³¹ Under Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg's tenure, German foreign policy followed a course with the common theme that war was inevitable. Many in Germany feared that their country would be crushed in the middle of Europe between a resurgent Russia and a vindictive France as a result of France's resounding loss during the Franco-Prussian War of 1871. This attitude fueled an aggressive arms build up which further isolated Germany.

Germany was thus drawn into the volkisch conflicts in the Balkans in 1914 by attempting to maintain the support and alliance framework established between Germany and the weakened Austrian Hapsburg Empire. The outcome of such a political "leap into the dark" led to World War I.³² The end result of the most violent European war up to that time was that a defeated Germany received the blame, from the victorious Allied Powers, for the cause of horrific war.

³⁰Craig, p. 259.

³¹Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 9.

³²Ibid., p. 37.

In the aftermath of the First World War, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was carved up, the Russian Empire was toppled by a civil war and Communist revolution and the German Monarchy and Second Reich gave way, through the German revolution, to the German Weimar Republic (an abortive attempt in the long run at liberal democracy). Yet, political issues of nationalism and imperialism were not resolved in World War I. The seeds of discontent and retribution were further sown in the punitive peace treaties concluded after hostilities ended.

Many historians regarded Bismarck's unique creation of a Prusso-Germanic nation-state as the beginnings of "a problem child of Europe" in which Bismarck, then Kaiser Wilhelm II and finally Adolf Hitler, each assisted by a headstrong military class, were successful in "inculcating a lust for power and domination, a passion for unbridled militarism...and a longing for authoritarianism."³³

Adolf Hitler's rise to power throughout the 1920's and his consolidation of power in the 1930's can be seen as a tragic outcome of the German dissatisfaction toward the punitive demands placed on a vanquished country. Hitler's Third Reich epitomized the high point in German totalitarian rule. Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany by

³³Waite, p. 21.

President Paul von Hindenberg on 30 January 1933 and upon Hindenberg's death a year later Hitler proclaimed himself as both Fuehrer and Chancellor. Hitler's assumption of dictatorial rule assured the National Socialist German Workers Party (Nazi party) of a leader (fuehrer) who would ensure Germany's rise to great power status would not be jeopardized again.³⁴

Hitler's rise to power was based on regaining Germany's proper place in Europe and uniting all of the European Germans under his control. Hitler saw the Russian Bolshevik movement, backed by the Jews, as the reason for Germany's fall from its rightful place as the hegemonic power of Europe.³⁵ Under the banner of National Socialism, Hitler consolidated his domestic power base for his imperialist push to seize control of the repressed German minorities throughout eastern Europe. Hitler, before abolishing the Reichstag (German Weimar Republic parliament), was given dictatorial powers by its members and he embarked upon a series of machtpolitik (power politics) actions to re-establish universal military service and raise the army back to a level of prestige from which it had fallen after its defeat in World War I.

³⁴Ibid., p. 11.

³⁵Hillgruber, p. 51.

German officers did not swear an oath of absolute allegiance to the constitution, but to Adolf Hitler himself.³⁶ Hitler, an ex-Corporal who survived heavy fighting throughout World War I and was decorated with the Iron Cross, both First and Second Class (a rarity for a Non-commissioned Officer), understood the need to have the strong support of the Armed Forces.³⁷ He needed the military behind him to ensure the enforcement of his decisions to promote violent racial nationalism, to oppose liberal democracy and to guarantee that the Germanic peoples throughout Europe were regarded as the master race over the "less-human" Slavic and Jewish peoples of eastern Europe.³⁸ His ambitions brought about the beginning of World War II and culminated in the downfall of the Third Reich. Hitler's goal of Germany as a world power gave way to the destruction of Germany and German national unity itself.³⁹ Josef Stalin, leader of the victorious Soviet Union, ensured that Germany would not rise again by securing a Soviet desired buffer zone in eastern Europe and also through the partition

³⁶Waite, p. 12.

³⁷Ibid., p. 9.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Hillgruber, p. 96.

of Germany itself.⁴⁰ New alignments of power within Europe resulted from the aftermath of World War II.

Stalin attempted to control Germany through unification under Communist rule by utilizing the surrogate German Communist party (Social Unity Party- SED). However, under Konrad Adenauer's leadership, which was a combination of realism and idealism, the western zones adopted a constitutional framework, known as the Basic Law, and transformed West Germany from a defeated enemy into a respected ally of the Western camp.⁴¹ Adenauer, a member of the Christian Democrat Union party and the first Chancellor of the nascent Federal Republic of Germany, paved the way for the FRG to become a cornerstone of Western democracy in the ideological Cold War against Communist aggression. Eventhough Germany was politically and physically divided into the two states of the Communist-run German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the democratic Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Adenauer did not officially recognize the GDR as a separate state. He maintained that Germany would eventually be reunited into one nation under a democratic government. By his actions, Adenauer ensured that the

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 98.

⁴¹Craig, p. 521.

division of Germany would remain an issue of contention during the Cold War.

The Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France, the United States, and the Benelux countries convened the London Conference from February to June 1948. One recommendation of the meeting was the introduction of the federal government system for Germany and authorization for the Minister Presidents of the western Laender (German states) to establish a constitutional assembly. This German Parliamentary Council, chaired by Konrad Adenauer, met on 1 September 1948. The Council, composed of 65 voting members from the political parties and five members from Berlin who only had advisory status, formulated and passed the Basic Law of the FRG by a vote of 53 to 12.⁴² The Western Occupation Powers also accepted the Basic Law. On 23 May 1949 the constitution became effective and the Federal Republic of Germany was born.⁴³

The origins of the Federal Republic of Germany's national security policy, as highlighted by the German

⁴²A Mandate For Democracy, (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, May 1980), p. 85, 88-89. The CDU/CSU had 27 members; SPD had 27; FDP had 5; the German Party (DP) 2; the Communist Party (KPD) 2; and the Center Party (Zentrum) 2 present at the Constitutional Assembly.

⁴³John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-89; A Political History, (London: Edward Arnold Inc., 1991), p. 58.

debate surrounding the Allied Powers' decision to allow German rearmament through Germany's inclusion into NATO on 5 May 1955, centered around the growing Soviet-dominated threat from the East. It should be noted that the FRG did not become a member of NATO (nor remilitarize) until after primarily U.S. urging forced the other NATO members to realize the strategic and geographic position that Germany occupied in countering the Soviet threat.⁴⁴ The Korean War played a substantial role in helping the U.S. to pressure the Allied countries of western Europe into allowing Germany to establish its Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr), rearm and join NATO.

The prevailing argument used by the U.S. was that the Korean War, as seen in the context of a Soviet engineered Cold War regional conflict, would escalate into another World War centered primarily in Europe. The perception of the "Domino Principle" of Communist expansion into western Europe necessitated the call among the Allied Powers to adopt a multilateral security policy of forward defense and burdensharing that included German military participation. Thus, a concerted Soviet military push into western Europe at that critical period would prove disastrous to western

⁴⁴The United Kingdom and to a lesser degree France also saw the need for Germany to be included into the NATO collective defense framework.

European stability and security. The debate between the European countries and within Germany itself eventually led to the realization that if a western European security policy was to be successful in containing Communist expansion, then the FRG must be remilitarized and become a member of NATO.

As the debate continued, the Soviet threat became more significant. Konrad Adenauer, in an attempt to garner as much control as possible for the FRG under the unique circumstances of Germany's limited sovereignty, played into the hands of the Allied Powers who sought Germany's inclusion within a multilateral security framework geared toward a forward strategy of extended deterrence. Within Germany, he was opposed in his efforts to ensure the FRG was included in the North Atlantic Alliance mainly by the Social Democrat Party.⁴⁵ However, since the next war was fearfully perceived to begin on the inner German border, the FRG was permitted to share in the burden of maintaining the collective defense of western Europe. Germany was initially authorized to build up an armed force of 500,000 men. On

⁴⁵Craig, p. 521.

14 May 1955, the Soviet Union countered by organizing the East Bloc states into the Warsaw Pact.⁴⁶ The sides were set for the long siege of the Cold War.

Numerous times throughout the Cold War, the German government debated the parameters to which German military forces should be utilized. This long standing debate began in earnest from 1949 through 1955 with the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany and its inclusion in NATO. West Germany's national security policy and military organizational structure became fully intertwined within the NATO collective defense framework and strategy of defending against a Soviet invasion. The Communist onslaught primarily would be across the FRG's eastern border and thus make West Germany the front line of defense. Upon the establishment of the Bundeswehr, Article 87(a) amended the constitution, by federal statute on 19 March 1956,⁴⁷ to permit the FRG to build up and use its military for "defense purposes."⁴⁸ In addition, Article 87(a) further specified

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 551.

⁴⁷Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 48.

⁴⁸Paul B. Stares, Allied Rights and Legal Constraints on German Military Power, (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 13.

that "apart from defense, the Armed Forces may only be used insofar as explicitly permitted by the Basic Law."⁴⁹

However, the role of the Bonn government in formulating foreign and defense policy was highlighted by the internal political struggle for power. This internal struggle for influence in making security policy has involved the trinity of the Chancellor and his Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs, the political parties within the more powerful Bundestag as opposed to the Bundesrat, and the military. The Federal Republic of Germany, unlike the United States, is a parliamentary democracy. The executive and legislative functions are more intertwined and closely linked in the FRG system of government than in the U.S. federal system of government. In Germany, only the members of the Bundestag are directly elected by the people. The Chancellor is elected by the members of the Bundestag and he acts as the head of government.

The German Federal President is elected by a majority vote of the Federal Convention which is an assembly composed of all the Bundestag members. The Federal President is elected every five years and can only be re-elected once. The President represents the state from a position above the daily political fray as a non-partisan player and acts as

⁴⁹Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, p. 48.

the head of state in a largely ceremonial capacity. The powers of the Presidency are based on the moral authority of the office rather than on any real political power. In contrast, the President of the United States acts as both head of state and government.⁵⁰

The political leader of the FRG is the Chancellor. The Chancellor, acting as Prime Minister, heads the executive branch of the Federal Government and is elected by the Bundestag for a four year term.⁵¹ The Chancellor formulates and executes the domestic and foreign affairs of the government and is responsible to the Bundestag in performing these duties. The Chancellor names his Cabinet Ministers who are directly responsible to him in carrying out their duties. The Ministers cannot be removed by the Bundestag. The Ministers are appointed and dismissed by the Federal President, but only upon the proposal of the Chancellor.⁵² The Defense Minister has traditionally been from the same party as the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister has been from the swing or junior party making up the coalition majority in the Bundestag. When the FRG was first

⁵⁰Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties, (New York: German Information Center, 1990), p. 2-3, 13-14.

⁵¹U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, June 1991, p. 5.

⁵²Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties, p. 12.

established, Konrad Adenauer was both Chancellor and Foreign Minister until 1955 and the Defense Minister's post was not established until 1955.⁵³

The political parties play a significantly greater role in the German Federal system of government than the American political parties do in the U.S. government. The political parties determine the executive head of government based on which party or coalition of parties possess a majority of seats (and thus votes) in the Bundestag. The Bundestag or Lower House is the largest freely elected parliament in the world.⁵⁴ The Bundestag is composed of 662 deputies whom also are elected for a four year term and closely approximates to the U.S. House of Representatives. The Bundestag represents 328 electoral districts throughout Germany and is the "chief repository of political power delegated by the sovereign people through their votes."⁵⁵ The main function of the Bundestag is to formulate, debate and pass legislation. The Bundestag significantly wields more power than the other Federal legislative house; the Bundesrat.

⁵³Kelleher, p. 107.

⁵⁴"Bundestag Is Largest Freely-Elected Parliament in the World," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 15 October 1993), p. 6.

⁵⁵Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties, p. 5-6.

The Bundesrat is the Upper Chamber or Federal Council composed of 68 members.⁵⁶ The number of votes cast in the Bundesrat by the state delegates is based on the respective population of the 16 Laender (German states). The Bundesrat delegates represent their state governments and primarily are responsible for matters concerning Laender interests. The Bundesrat can also object to legislation passed by the other House, but the Bundestag can override this veto by a simple majority vote. In addition, the Bundesrat shares in the nation's legislative process through its required consent on constitutional amendments. If the Bundesrat is controlled by a party or coalition that is different from the party or coalition in control of the Bundestag, the Bundesrat can also cause a degree of friction or gridlock in the passage of programs in the Federal government.⁵⁷

Thus, the political parties within the Bundestag, the Chancellor and his Ministers and to a lesser extent the military play an important role in identifying, formulating and approving foreign and security policy under the burdensharing collective defense umbrella of extended deterrence. Throughout the Cold War, the stationing of

⁵⁶U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, p. 5.

⁵⁷Germany: Elections, Parliament and Political Parties, p. 15.

nuclear weapons on German soil highlighted the limited sovereignty Germany maintained in defense related issues and also was cause for great debate within the domestic West German political environment. This security debate centered around the introduction into Germany of nuclear arms in the late 1950's without the guarantee that German input and influence on their use within the confines of the greater German nation would receive due consideration and continued through the shift in NATO's nuclear strategy from massive retaliation to flexible response in the 1960's. The German domestic attitude prevailed that both Germanies would be the next nuclear battleground in the event of an escalation of the Cold War. Therefore, war was seen as a worst case scenario for German society as a whole. This view was supported by the ensuing political argument over the idea of employing the Neutron bomb in the mid 1970's and finally culminated in the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty implementation in the early 1980's.

The German trinity of the state, seen through the actions of the Bonn government, the people, represented by the political parties in the Bundestag, and the military has clashed over the extent to which German security policy should have an impact beyond the geographic borders of the FRG and the NATO guaranteed area of defense. The policy of not allowing military forces to operate outside the

traditional parameters of NATO was effectively legitimized on 1 September 1982 when the Federal Security Council, under Chancellor Schmidt's term in office, committed the SPD-FDP coalition government to a restrictive interpretation of the Basic Law in not permitting out of area military missions. Furthermore, on 3 November 1982, after the formation of the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government headed by Chancellor Kohl, the Federal Security Council reaffirmed the view "that military operations outside the NATO area [were] out of the question."⁵⁸ Thus the security policy of military non-intervention outside of traditional boundaries was clearly spelled out by both major parties when each controlled the government.

The use of the Armed Forces for extra-territorial peacekeeping or peace enforcing means was not in the forefront of German politics during the Cold War. The general consensus within the FRG during the Cold War was to utilize the Armed Forces for national defense of West German territory within the collective defense alliance framework. A synergism of both domestic and foreign policy occurred within Germany. Attitudes within Germany shaped security policy which over the forty year Cold War period were

⁵⁸FBIS-WEU, 93-075, 21 April 1993, p. 17, "Constitutional Court Unhappy as Policy Arbitrator," in 93FN0381A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No. 15, 12 Apr 93, p. 22-25.

brought about by the "complex and contradictory emotions" of defeat in World War II, deliverance from the totalitarian Nazi regime and the physical division of the once powerful German nation into the democratic West Germany and the Communist-run East Germany.⁵⁹

Accordingly, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and German reunification fast becoming a reality in the post-Cold War 1990's, the long-held belief that Germany's national security policy should only be tied to front line defense began to give way to a more outward looking position.⁶⁰ A transformation in strategic thinking began as the possibility of German unification became apparent. The disintegration of Communist rule in East Germany, as signified by the opening of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, highlighted the efforts to begin the unification process.⁶¹ The first democratic parliamentary elections in the GDR occurred on 18 March 1990 in which the majority of East Germans voted to abandon their form of

⁵⁹Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 331.

⁶⁰Burkhard Koch, Germany's New Assertiveness In International Relations: Between Reality and Misperception, (Stanford University: The Hoover Institution, 1992), p. 6.

⁶¹A. James McAdams, Germany Divided, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 3.

government outright and to support the quickest means to unification with the FRG.⁶²

From the spring through the fall of 1990, the FRG grasped the opportunity to attain the long held desire to become a unified nation again. Chancellor Helmut Kohl, primarily with the help of the United States and to a lesser degree the other Allied nations, took advantage of the opportunity to unify the two Germanies within the NATO alliance. On 17 July 1990, the Soviet Union informally agreed to the terms of the unification plan of absorbing East Germany into a West Germany still structured within the NATO alliance. The Two Plus Four Treaty, signed in Moscow by the FRG, the GDR and the four Allied Powers (the U.S., France, Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) on 12 September 1990 gave Germany full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.⁶³ Furthermore, the Soviet troops stationed in East Germany were to leave by the end of 1994 and the Four Powers were to terminate their security related responsibilities within Germany and Berlin. The FRG also was granted the right to belong to any alliances incumbent with all the rights and responsibilities arising from membership into

⁶²Ibid., p. 4.

⁶³Hilmar Linnenkamp, "The Security Policy of the New Germany," in The New Germany and the New Europe, Paul B. Stares, ed., (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 97.

such organizations.⁶⁴ The signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty legitimized the formal political union which officially took place on 3 October 1990.⁶⁵

During the German unification process, a change in post-Cold War NATO strategy also occurred. This transformation was outlined in the London Declaration of 1990 whereby NATO began to extend its political and military ties outside of traditional bounds.⁶⁶ According to NATO's London Declaration issued on 6 July 1990, "the hand of friendship" was extended to the East Bloc countries and the Warsaw Pact was no longer viewed as adversaries to the North Atlantic Alliance.⁶⁷ The London Declaration also specified that "a united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance...will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of Europe."⁶⁸ As outlined in the NATO Declaration, the need to maintain a European defense policy and thus a German security policy directly tied to front-line defense became obsolete.⁶⁹

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, p. 5.

⁶⁶"NATO Transformed: The London Declaration," Selected Document no. 38, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington DC, (July 1990), p. 2.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Linnenkamp, p. 99.

These changes in the international and domestic political scene required a re-thinking of German foreign and security policy. Unfortunately, the Allied military build up in the Persian Gulf region (Operation Desert Shield), as a prelude to the Persian Gulf War (Operation Desert Storm), and the implications of not only NATO's assistance to Turkey through deployment of NATO military forces, but German military participation in the multilateral effort came at the most inopportune time. However, Germany did contribute enormous amounts of materiel and money to support the Allied effort and German military combat units did deploy as part of the NATO contingent to Turkey prior to the commencement of hostilities on 16 January 1991.⁷⁰

Germany's political leaders were not yet ready to deal with NATO out-of-area security policy issues brought about by the Persian Gulf War. The FRG was still dealing with the central issue of unification and negotiating with the Soviet Union on the final terms of the Treaty. The Persian Gulf War became the watershed event in the early Post-Cold War period for the FRG on determining the route that Germany should take in formulating a new security outlook. The

⁷⁰Karl Kaiser and Klaus Becher, "Germany and the Iraq Conflict," in Western Europe and the Gulf, Nicole Gnesotto and John Roper, ed., (Paris: The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, 1992), p. 55.

political security debate on the extent of using military forces for peacekeeping, let alone combat missions was ignited again.

On a regional level, in June 1992, NATO adopted a new strategy of using its troops and equipment for peacekeeping operations in European conflicts beyond the "NATO guaranteed area." This NATO position was qualified on the grounds that requests for peacekeeping missions would only be entertained from the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and on a case-by-case basis.⁷¹ Furthermore, the NATO ministers acknowledged that any NATO peacekeeping measures did not have to be fulfilled by all 16 member states.⁷² U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, at that time, aptly stated that this NATO decision was a "major step forward [in] putting r on the bones of the idea of peacekeeping."⁷³ Since Germany's defense posture and military forces were so intertwined within the NATO strategy and organizational structure, the debate on peacekeeping missions had taken on an even greater

⁷¹Craig R. Whitney. "NATO Sees a Role With Peacekeepers for Eastern Europe," New York Times, 5 June 1992, p. A1.

⁷²William Drozdiak. "NATO Widens Mandate on Forces." Washington Post, 5 June 1992, p. A41.

⁷³"Peacekeeping Role Expands NATO's Task." Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 136, no. 23, 8 June 1992, p. 71.

magnitude in the post-Cold War period. The debate among the political parties again became heated regarding the previous limitations placed on the Bundeswehr's role in relation to an altered German security policy.

In the Post-Cold War era, the Bundeswehr faced two problems; the first being that the immediate threat of invasion from the east was gone and the second pertaining to the increased threat of crises emanating on "distant horizons" which would affect European and thus German stability and security.⁷⁴ German politicians increasingly began to call upon the government to define the policy of adopting an international peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr.⁷⁵ This issue was in consonance with previous requests made in 1989 and 1990, from within the UN General Assembly, to seek out innovative approaches for member states to provide military units earmarked specifically for UN peacekeeping missions.⁷⁶ Yet, the UN Security Council recognized that peacekeeping commitments made by member states should only be assumed with the consent of the host

⁷⁴Christoph Bertram. "The Bundeswehr Is Still Trying to Find Its Real Place in the Changed World," Die Zeit, Hamburg, 4 Sept. 1992, translated in english in The German Tribune, 11 Sept. 1992, no. 1531, p. 5.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶"UN Peacekeeping Activities Need Broad Support," UN Chronicle, vol. 27, no. 1, March 1990, p. 74.

country and all parties concerned.⁷⁷ If such a mission were to be undertaken by the FRG, a political consensus would first have to be reached within the German Parliament to authorize the deployment of military units for peacekeeping purposes. However, the peacekeeping role debate between the political parties intensified concerning the perceived requirement for an amendment to the constitution (which would have to be passed by a two thirds majority vote of Parliament) to allow such a mission to take place.

Still, German military precedence for UN Blue Helmet operations has been set by non-Bundeswehr, non-combat oriented units. Small steps were undertaken by the government to further define the parameters in which the military could be used as a tool of diplomacy. Examples of these steps include the September 1989 deployment of 50 Federal Border Guards who travelled to Namibia to oversee elections in that African country. In August 1991, 15 Border Guards monitored the cease-fire between Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Movement in the Western Sahara. In June 1992, 75 Border Guards and 150 military medical

⁷⁷"Security Council Urges Support For UN Peacekeeping Operations," UN Chronicle, vol. 27, no. 3, September 1990, p. 11.

personnel travelled to Cambodia to support the UN's peacekeeping efforts.⁷⁸

Although these efforts have been symbolic gestures, the Kohl government has been accused by the loyal opposition parties of slowly edging closer toward a full fledged peacekeeping role without the necessary dialogue and formal constitutional legitimation. The German military deployment of combat troops to Turkey during the UN-mandated Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm marked a departure away from previous deployments. The combat troop movement into Turkey, although under the auspices of defense of a NATO partner, blurred old distinctions and gave a new quality to the idea of utilizing the military for possible extra-regional foreign and security policy actions.

German military involvement in the Bosnia-Hercegovina and the Somalia crises are further indicators that the military might be used for missions other than an intended humanitarian assistance role. The trend toward solving crisis situations through the use of peacekeeping forces has increased. In the past four years, the UN has established 11 peacekeeping operations throughout the globe. This is in

⁷⁸FBIS-WEU, 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-29.

contrast to 14 peacekeeping missions undertaken by the UN in the previous 40 years. During 1991, the UN deployed 51,000 peacekeeping troops, which was an increase of 40,000 from the previous year.⁷⁹

Also during 1991, the UN-mandated, U.S.-led coalition deployed approximately 600,000 military personnel to the Persian Gulf in anticipation of Operation Desert Storm. The Iraqi crisis proved that distant regional conflicts endangered national interests and even though a Cold War security policy of frontline defense against a Soviet threat had significantly diminished, a redefinition of extended deterrence and burdensharing responsibilities in a changed international security environment remained a valid concern. The actions of military coalitions and existing alliances, like NATO, continued to impact upon the Post-Cold War era.

⁷⁹Paul Lewis. "Europeans Urge the UN to Act More Aggressively to Prevent War," New York Times, 23 Sept. 1992, p. A16.

III. PERSIAN GULF WAR - WATERSHED EVENT

In the midst of the historic opportunity for German unification and the end of the East-West confrontation in Europe during the summer of 1990, Saddam Hussein triggered the first Post-Cold War confrontation by invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The Persian Gulf War became the watershed event in the political debate on German military involvement beyond the traditional "NATO guaranteed area." The FRG's decision not to use its military for direct combat caused a national debate within Germany over its proper burdensharing security role in the world.⁸⁰ The Gulf War, the first major regional conflict in the Post-Cold War era, indicated that the use of military force, to counter hegemonic aggression, would continue to be required in order to maintain stability and peace. The Gulf War proved to be an indicator that German military personnel could in the future be called upon

⁸⁰Ray Moseley, "Germany Debates Global Role," Chicago Tribune, 24 July 1991, Sec. 2C, p. 11.

to risk their lives if the proper conditions existed for their deployment.⁸¹

To understand fully the ramifications that the Persian Gulf War had on the divisive issue of German military participation in extra-territorial conflicts, one must first realize the historic events facing Germany's leadership during the Iraqi crisis. In the summer and fall of 1990, the utmost concern of German policy makers was the hope that the international condemnation and reaction to the Iraqi invasion would not interfere with the complex and still incomplete arrangements engineered by the FRG and its allies in negotiating the German unification with the Soviet Union's leadership.⁸² The process of unification completely absorbed the public's attention and the leadership's foreign policy actions.⁸³

The Persian Gulf War came at the worst time for Germany's leadership. German politicians were ill-equipped to handle the issue of military involvement in a distant regional conflict involving Germany's allies. Security and

⁸¹FBIS-WEU, 92-022, 3 February 1992, p. 19, "Stoltenberg on New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy," in 92GE0202A Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No. 1, Jan 92, pp. 9-12.

⁸²Kaiser and Becher, p. 39.

⁸³Harald Mueller, "German Foreign Policy After Unification," in The New Germany and the New Europe, Paul B. Stares, ed., (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 135

foreign affairs policy workers were thoroughly engrossed in trying to accomplish the task of unifying Germany while at the same time ensuring that the USSR would militarily disengage itself from East Germany through the adoption of the Two Plus Four Treaty. In addition, the Bonn government was attempting to enhance the development of the mechanisms for Europe to deal with the Post-Cold War environment through agreement of the tenets laid out in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE). The German Defense Ministry was also involved in the delicate task of integrating parts of the former East German Army into the Bundeswehr.⁸⁴

The Allied military build up and the Persian Gulf War suited neither the political desires of Germany's leadership, burdened with unification, nor the mood of the German people. The general euphoria experienced by German society in achieving full nationhood was severely constrained by the harsh realities that a regional conflict could erupt into a large scale war. The perception that any overt NATO military action might force the Soviet Union to withdraw from the unification process and jeopardize the German goal of attaining full sovereignty weighed heavily on

⁸⁴Ibid.

Chancellor Kohl's government. The initial hesitancy of the Bonn government to issue any policy statements supporting the U.S.-led effort to contain and reverse Iraqi aggression explained German fears of NATO and German military intervention in the crisis. The Bonn government did not issue a hard line stance toward the Iraqi invasion for fear that the security issue would be pushed to the forefront of the decision-making process at a critical period in the Two Plus Four negotiations and that Germany would be drawn into the conflagration.

On 20 August 1990, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, a leading member of the FDP, sought to find a way out of the political dilemma of pledging support to the Allied effort while also attempting not to alienate the Soviet Union. He reiterated that the legal means for direct military participation in an area not covered under the framework of the NATO defense guarantee was not constitutionally possible at that time without a clarification of the Basic Law.⁸⁵ However, Olaf Feldmann, security spokesman for the FDP, stated that his party was not against UN-coordinated peacekeeping missions. He qualified the statement by adding that this type of

⁸⁵FBIS-WEU, 90-161, 20 August 1990, p. 17, "Kohl, Genscher, Stoltenberg Confer," in AU2008105690 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0900 GMT 20 Aug 90.

Bundeswehr operation would first require clarification of the Basic Law.⁸⁶ The German public and the government were not mentally prepared to cast off the traditional Cold War security policy mentality of only providing for the direct defense of Germany and NATO. The thought of fighting a war on distant horizons was incomprehensible to both western and eastern Germans.⁸⁷

At the onset of Iraqi aggression, the German public was divided on the course to be taken in foreign affairs that directly concerned German interests in the Gulf region. The main concerns were for the safety of the German nationals who were held hostage in Iraq by Hussein's forces and the fear that Germany would be pulled into an unwanted war. Former Chancellor Willy Brandt of the SPD party and Germany's principal elder statesman privately travelled to Iraq with the intent to secure the freedom of the German hostages. Chancellor Kohl did not support Brandt's actions, yet he tolerated the breach of protocol.⁸⁸ Chancellor Kohl knew that a political resolution of the hostage situation, let alone the use of military force in reversing Hussein's

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 16, "Politicians Still Split on Issue, in AU1808140990 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0900 GMT 18 Aug 90.

⁸⁷Mueller, p. 136.

⁸⁸Ibid.

invasion of Kuwait, was not possible within the restrictive framework of Germany's Cold War security policy mentality. Willy Brandt returned to Germany on 9 November 1990 accompanied by 175 freed hostages of which 131 were Germans. The remainder of those freed were from ten other countries.⁸⁹

A survey conducted in September 1990 for the newspaper Die Zeit showed that only 47% of the German population polled thought that the Bundeswehr should be used outside NATO limits if German citizens were in danger and only 46% agreed to an out-of-area military deployment if the United Nations requested German assistance.⁹⁰ In early January 1991, another survey of German public opinion was conducted by the Emnid Institute of Frankfurt, which was commissioned by the Saudi Arabian Embassy, to determine if German attitudes toward greater involvement in the crisis were favorable. The results also showed hesitation on what type of action should be pursued by the German government in the Iraqi crisis. Only 14% of the Germans polled favored a greater commitment while 43% were satisfied with the FRG's

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Kaiser and Becher, p. 48.

current action and 40% favored further restraint by Germany in the Gulf conflict.⁹¹

As the public opinion surveys showed, a political consensus on taking decisive steps toward military involvement in the Gulf region was not possible nor present prior to the start of hostilities. After the UN mandate to permit the use of military force in the Gulf crisis was passed and war seemed inevitable, Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU), at a special Bundestag session on 14 January 1991, stated that, "Germany is not taking part in the military deployment in the Gulf...the decisive reason for that is the special constitutional situation and interpretation."⁹²

The Allied perceptions of German inaction strengthened the call within the German political parties and the government for a rethinking in both the scope and the means of foreign and security policy. An example of foreign pressure aimed at Germany to take a more active role was echoed in British Ambassador Sir Christopher Mallaby's

⁹¹FBIS-WEU, 91-008, 11 January 1991, p. 11, "Poll: Germans Reject Military Action in Gulf," in LD1001222991 Hamburg DPA in German 1414 GMT 10 Jan 91.

⁹²Ibid., 91-010, 15 January 1991, p. 14, "Defense Minister Delivers Statement to Bundestag," in AU1401202991 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1502 GMT 14 Jan 91.

railing, "We know your Constitution!"⁹³ His criticism addressed Bonn's objection to sending troops to the Persian Gulf which was based on the traditional interpretation of the Basic Law forbidding military action out-of-area and for other than defense purposes. German refusal to contribute combat troops to the Gulf region, based on the constitutional limitation, was perceived by some western democracies as a 'side step' for not having to make a political decision to send in troops. This criticism of Germany's abstention from direct military involvement also was perceived by some NATO members as an attempt to shy away from addressing the central issue of not only changing the Basic Law but of altering Germany's traditional stance on an obsolete Post-Cold War security and foreign policy.

Due in part to both domestic pressure (mainly from within Kohl's CDU/CSU party) and foreign insistence (in which the U.S. was not the driving force) to contribute toward the Allied effort, the Kohl government decided in the fall of 1990 to support the coalition's military build up primarily with financial backing.⁹⁴ The initial German contribution was DM 3.3 billion earmarked for the U.S. and

⁹³Ibid., 91-029, 12 February 1991, "Allies Want More German Military Action in Gulf," in AU1102130791 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 11 Feb 91 P. 18-26.

⁹⁴Mueller, p. 136.

also included the transfer of state-of-the-art West German and excess former-East German military equipment and munitions.⁹⁵ Germany was again accused by several NATO members of only exercising "checkbook diplomacy" and not realistically dealing with the issue of security burdensharing responsibilities.

As the Iraqi crisis escalated with the increased Allied military build up, the leadership of Turkey, one of NATO's staunch members, feared a possible attack from Iraq. On 20 December 1990, the Turkish government requested military defense assistance from NATO. The NATO Defense Planning Committee decided in early January 1991 to deploy the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force's air component (AMF(A)) to Turkish air bases as a show of force and a demonstration of Allied commitment to defend a NATO member.⁹⁶

At first, Germany was hesitant to commit its military contribution to the AMF(A) deployment. This reluctance to dispatch German units was based on the fear of being drawn into what many in the SPD party considered an illegal act of provocation on NATO's part to force Iraq to retaliate in kind if war should break out and U.S. planes specifically

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.

flew offensive missions from Turkish territory. Liberal minded members in the SPD party and some members of Kohl's coalition considered the deployment of German combat units to Turkey unconstitutional. The SPD, at their 1988 Party Congress meeting, agreed on a party stance that any military operation outside of NATO's sphere of influence was unconstitutional and should be considered "political adventurism."⁹⁷ These politicians felt that this provocative NATO act negated the constitutional use of German troops for strictly defensive purposes and also forfeited the legal basis for German participation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in the NATO deployment to Turkey.⁹⁸

Another important concern of the German government was that a symbolic deployment of NATO forces to Turkey in close proximity to the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Union would greatly jeopardize the ongoing negotiations between Germany and the USSR over final unification terms and the still unratified conventional disarmament and cooperative security treaties between western Europe and the Soviet Union. Many politicians in Germany believed that the NATO action could upset the delicate balance of power being formulated in

⁹⁷FBIS-WEU, 90-161, 20 August 1990, p. 16, "Considered by Kohl, Lambsdorff," in AU1808155090 in Hamburg DIE WELT in German 18-19 Aug 90, p. 1.

⁹⁸Mueller, p. 137.

Europe as a result of the end of the Cold War and German unification.⁹⁹

Chancellor Kohl strongly believed that Germany had a legal and moral responsibility to uphold the NATO security commitment to safeguard Turkey's territorial integrity from a potential Iraqi attack. He argued that for the past forty years the NATO members' steadfast defense commitment had ensured West Germany's continued existence in the face of a Soviet invasion threat and that likewise, Germany must demonstrate its loyalty and reliability to the same ideals by acting in accordance with the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the action was covered after a clear mandate was issued by the UN to allow for the use of military force in stopping Iraqi aggression.¹⁰¹ After a top level meeting on 2 January 1991, attended by the department heads of the Defense, Foreign, Justice and Interior Ministries, a decision was reached on the deployment of military personnel to Turkey. The SPD claim that military action under the aegis of NATO was unconstitutional was

⁹⁹Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹This UN mandate specifically pertains to UN resolution 678, passed on 29 November 1990 which authorized member states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement UN Resolution 660, which demanded that Iraq immediately and unconditionally withdraw all its forces from Kuwait.

rejected outright by the Kohl government. The troop deployment to Turkey within the framework of the Alliance was considered legal under Article 24 of the Basic Law which offered the possibility of relinquishing sovereign rights to international institutions¹⁰² and Article 87(a) for defense purposes (of a NATO partner) and as explicitly permitted by the Basic Law.

In the second week of January 1991, Germany deployed a squadron of 18 Alpha Jets with ground support personnel as part of the German contribution to the AMC(A) to Erhac Air Base in Southeastern Turkey.¹⁰³ In addition, in late January, the decision was made to send anti-air defense units to Turkey for the purpose of protecting the Bundeswehr aviation combat units already stationed in Turkey.¹⁰⁴ German-manned Roland and Hawk missile batteries were sent to Turkey in February 1991 which brought the total troop deployment up to 1600 Bundeswehr personnel in Turkey.¹⁰⁵ The Bonn government also approved the transfer of U.S. \$5.5 billion to cover

¹⁰²FBIS-WEU, 91-002, 3 January 1991, p. 13, "SPD Stand on Using Army in Turkey Rejected," in LD0201145491 Berlin ADN in German 1415 GMT 2 Jan 91.

¹⁰³Kaiser and Becher, p. 49.

¹⁰⁴FBIS-WEU, 91-020, 30 January 1991, p. 7, "Missiles to Turkey," in LD2901170491 Hamburg DPA in German 1600 GMT 29 Jan 91.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., "German Soldiers in Turkey to Total 1,600," in LD2901174491 Berlin ADN in German 1709 GMT 29 Jan 91.

military costs during the first three months of 1991. Government Spokesman Dieter Vogel stated that this action was to show a "clear sign of solidarity with the United States[-led effort]".¹⁰⁶

A ZDF Political Barometer Poll conducted in Germany shortly after the war started showed that 48% responded that German soldiers should get involved if Turkey was to be attacked and 47% said Germany should not get involved.¹⁰⁷ Even after the commencement of hostilities, a clear majority did not favor German involvement even if a NATO member's defense was at stake. However, 75% of the respondents agreed with the Allied military action in the Gulf War. Only 21% did not approve of the offensive operation.¹⁰⁸

In another opinion poll conducted for the German magazine DER SPIEGEL by the Emnid Opinion Research Institute from 21 through 23 January 1991, 66% of those surveyed stated that the military intervention of the United States

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 91-019, 29 January 1991, p. 6, "Germans Back Gulf War, Split on Sending Troops," in AU2901104991 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 29 Jan 91, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸Ibid.

and its Allies was necessary after the expiration of the UN mandated ultimatum for the Iraqi withdrawal of Kuwait.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, the Wickert Opinion Research Institute, in its poll, reported that only 10% of the citizens polled opposed the Gulf War.¹¹⁰ Public sentiment was clearly in favor of the Allied military effort, yet a consensus was still not formed on the extent to which German Armed Forces should be involved in the war. Cold War attitudes of traditional German security policy were still prevalent in a large proportion of German society.

A change of opinion took place within Germany after Israel was attacked on 18 January 1991 by SCUD missiles launched from Iraq. An overwhelming majority of Germans called upon the Bonn government to come to Israel defense. The attitudinal shift was based in part on the historical guilt felt by many Germans about the destruction of Jews during Hitler's reign of terror and the allegations that German industries assisted Iraq in the build up of its chemical weapons arsenal and missile technology.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹Ibid., "Poll Reflects Opinions About Gulf War, USSR," in AU2801181791 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 28 Jan 91, p. 32-38. The breakdown of the 66% majority opinion was that 81% of the CDU/CSU and FDP respondents and 52% of the SPD respondents answered the question affirmatively.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹¹Kaiser and Becher, p. 50.

On 30 January 1991, Mr. Kohl announced a defense pledge to Israel of DM 800 million.¹¹² This package included Patriot anti-air defense missiles with German technicians to train the Israeli forces on their use, chemical protective equipment (German state-of-the-art fuchs sniffer vehicles), medical supplies, financing for two German manufactured submarines¹¹³ and DM 250 million in humanitarian aid.¹¹⁴ This shift in attitudes and behavior toward a more active role beyond the front-line defense of German and NATO borders strengthened the Kohl coalition government position of providing a responsible contribution toward new multilateral approaches in the changing domestic and international political arenas.¹¹⁵

The total sum of German contributions in the Persian Gulf War far surpassed the perception that Germany only engaged in "check book diplomacy". The value of the entire German contribution to the Gulf effort was approximately DM 18,000 million. More than half of the contribution

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 51.

¹¹⁴Mueller, p. 137-138.

¹¹⁵Kaiser and Becher, p. 50.

(DM 10,200 million) was earmarked specifically for the United States.¹¹⁶ In addition, Israel, Turkey, France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands received large contributions in money, materiel, supplies, spare parts, munitions and transportation support.¹¹⁷

The FRG gave almost unlimited access to Allied forces enroute through Germany to the Gulf. Germany's naval contribution was sizeable in filling the gaps created in the Mediterranean Sea by Allied navies deploying from this region into the Persian Gulf. A seven ship detachment (later sent to the Persian Gulf to sweep for mines) was dispatched to a NATO base on the island of Crete to assist in protecting shipping lanes on the NATO Southern Flank. In February 1991, two frigates, two destroyers and two supply ships were deployed to the Mediterranean Sea to bolster NATO's presence. In addition, three naval maritime patrol aircraft and an additional frigate were also dispatched to augment NATO's Standing Naval Force Channel in the Eastern Mediterranean region.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 55.

¹¹⁷German contributions amounted to: Israel-DM 800 million, Turkey-DM 1,500 million, France-DM 300 million, Great Britain-DM 800 million, lesser amounts to Italy, the Netherlands and DM 2,500 million in economic assistance to the 'front line' states of Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Tunisia.

¹¹⁸Kaiser and Becher, p. 53.

Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia received economic aid to offset the effects of the economic embargo placed on Iraq by the UN and other regional organizations. Germany also contributed in the environmental clean up effort of the war-ravaged region after the cessation of hostilities.¹¹⁹ Before the end of the war, German taxpayers contributed the equivalent of more than one third of the annual German defense budget to the Allied effort.¹²⁰ A sample of the German pledge ranged from 79 fuchs NBC detection vehicles, an excess of 315,000 rounds of tank and artillery ammunition, 2,000 radio sets, 600 shower-bath vehicles, 220 10-ton trucks, 120 heavy duty tractors with 20-ton trailers, 200 heavy flat-bed trailers, 100,000 NBC suits (to Israel), 80 Leopard-1 main battle tanks (to Turkey), and access to the five largest Bundeswehr hospitals in Germany.¹²¹

A total of 3,200 military personnel deployed from Germany in support of Operations Desert Shield and Storm.¹²² Only Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Japan contributed more

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁰Mueller, p. 138.

¹²¹FBIS-WEU, 91-029, 12 February 1991, p. 7-8, "Details of Military Assistance to Gulf Allies," in 91P20182A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Feb 91 p. 6.

¹²²Mueller, p. 138.

financially to the U.S. in Operation Desert Storm. The German pledge amounted to 12.2% of the total cost.¹²³ The accusations made by some Allies that Germany did not adequately contribute to the Gulf War effort are erroneous in light of the total sum of the FRG's defense pledge.

Nevertheless, the FRG was not prepared to send combat troops into the Gulf region to fight in Operation Desert Storm. However, the Persian Gulf War became the decisive political fulcrum in changing attitudes toward a greater burdensharing role for the Bundeswehr in the Post-Cold War era. The Soviet Union's leadership specifically told members of Kohl's government not to participate in the combat operations in the Persian Gulf.¹²⁴ In January 1991, only after the Soviet Union supported the UN-mandated coalition's call for military action against Iraq, were German politicians ready to begin serious debate to alter traditional limits on the participation of German military forces beyond the NATO guaranteed area.¹²⁵

¹²³Ronald D. Asmus, Germany After the Gulf War, (A Rand Note N-3391-AF), p. 12.

¹²⁴Dr. Donald Abenheim (recalling Foreign Minister Genscher's response after his speech to the Bundeswehr on 4 April 1992 to the question of Soviet influence on German decision making during the Gulf crisis), interview by author, 2 November 1993, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.

¹²⁵Kaiser and Becher, p. 56.

A process of rethinking Germany's national interests, its proper role as a "normalized and fully sovereign" state and its responsibilities to preserve peace as a member of the global community was undertaken as a result of German unpreparedness in dealing with the issues of defense and use of military force in the Persian Gulf War.¹²⁶ After the war, Chancellor Kohl commented at a Bundestag session that, "We have dedicated ourselves to the side of freedom, law and justice during the Gulf conflict, using such means as were available in accord with our constitution."¹²⁷ The debate on out-of-area military missions evolved into the current debate over a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr. The lesson of the Gulf War for German politicians was that the central issue in the debate over military involvement beyond traditional limits directly concerned the course German security responsibilities and foreign policy should take in the "New World Order" and in defining Germany's national identity in the Post-Cold War era.¹²⁸

After the Persian Gulf War, the issue of Germany's participation in UN military actions, both armed and unarmed missions, dominated the debate over a new German security

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 57.

¹²⁷Mueller, p. 138-139.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 139.

and foreign policy stance.¹²⁹ As a result of German reticence in the Persian Gulf War, the formulation of a new German security policy and the debate surrounding the use of the military as a tool of foreign policy intensified due to catastrophic events in Yugoslavia. The Balkan crisis transformed the political dilemma of dealing with conflicts on a distant horizon to one of a more immediate concern due to the close proximity of the civil war in Yugoslavia. The threat of the regional conflict spreading further into Europe pressed the peacekeeping debate and the use of military force into the forefront of the German national political system.

Due to the pressing issue of mending a divided country, the Persian Gulf War caught Germany's leadership and its citizens completely off guard. For the first time in over forty years, German politicians were confronted with a security crisis, far removed from the traditional threat, which greatly impacted on German society and the Government's foreign policy. Operation Desert Storm was a turning point in the Post-Cold War era which signified the necessity to redefine Germany's role in security burdensharing responsibilities and its national identity in

¹²⁹FBIS-WEU, 92-192, 2 October 1992, p. 13, "Article Analyzes Future Foreign Policy Goals," in 92GE0528A Hamburg DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German no. 35, 28 Aug 92, p. 4.

a new multi-polar environment. If Germany was to assume an equal position among the more mature western democracies, then a re-interpretation on the use of military force for maintaining peace and stability in areas beyond German borders was required.

Operation Desert Storm, being the first major Post-Cold War conflict, highlighted the inadequacies of Germany's foreign and security policy in dealing with conflicts on distant horizons. In the transitional period from one historical paradigm to a new era of a changing international security environment, characterized by uncertainty and instability, states and organizations were forced to modify out-dated policy and ways of thinking to safeguard national interests and regional peace. The simultaneous events of the Persian Gulf War and unification did not allow adequate time for Germany's politicians to alter old security policies to better manage the challenges of the new political environment.

The process of redefining the obsolete frontline defense strategy was further hastened by the rise in nationalism of the Balkans. A sense of urgency in assuming new roles for the Bundeswehr increased due to the close proximity of the Yugoslav crisis. However, the necessary consensus on adopting a peacekeeping and combat role was still not

possible due to the historical legacy of past indiscretions and a long standing policy of reticence.

A change in fundamental perceptions of how the Armed Forces should be used as a tool of foreign policy in the changing security environment must be reached within a clear majority of society. The government inadequately attempted to shape foreign and security policy during the Persian Gulf War in order for Germany to assume a greater influence in regional and global affairs. However, Germany's actions in the Persian Gulf War were an awkward first step in the process of reforming foreign policy and the proper role of the Bundeswehr.

As a result of the immediacy of crises closer to the Fatherland as well as distant conflicts impacting on the collective defense and security organizations to which Germany was a member, the formulation of security policy required further clarification. The collective actions of the UN and NATO at resolving the Balkan crisis created further debate on the extent of German participation in not only out-of-area operations, but peacekeeping and combat missions as well. The UN operation in Somalia proved to be another qualitative step toward re-interpreting Germany's role in the changing security environment. The distinctions between humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat missions were greatly blurred in the factional Somalian war in which UN

troops were deployed. The Bundeswehr became a tool of foreign policy that still lacked a sense of legitimacy. In addition, the German government's decision to take part in military actions in both the Balkans and Somalia possessed neither a solid political consensus nor the requisite overwhelming support of the German people.

IV. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The Persian Gulf War ushered in a new era of Post-Cold War conflicts in which multi-lateral action became the trend in military enforcement. the use of military force did not diminish with the shift in the balance of power. On the contrary, the evolving multi-polar system was viewed as inherently more unstable than the old East-West dichotomy. Peace and stability in regions formerly controlled by the Communist regimes were increasingly becoming less secure. The rise in nationalism, ethnic strife and religious fundamentalism played a major role in changing the international security environment.

Stable democratic countries, like Germany and Japan, were placed in the new position of having to protect national interests within their regional areas. The redefinition of national security and foreign policy took a qualitative jump as a result of events closer to the periphery of NATO and Germany itself. The need to re-examine old Cold War doctrine and cast off the obsolete portions to formulate appropriate responses to new threats became increasingly important. The debate on using the

Armed Forces in non-traditional missions such as peacekeeping and extra-territorial combat operations highlighted the sense of urgency within the Kohl government to assist in the positive outcome of crises within the European security environment and beyond.

On the last day of the Persian Gulf War, during a ZDF studio interview, Chancellor Kohl (CDU) was asked if he was in favor of German troops being dispatched to the Gulf region. He replied:

Now that the war is over, we should calmly sit together and discuss the necessary constitutional amendments. I am in favor of such constitutional amendments. We are not responsible for the way our Basic Law was formulated in 1949. Many of those who criticize us now, including people in Western capitols, had a substantial interest at that time in the German constitution containing such restrictions. However, being a country of 80 million people, a country with a strong economy, and a UN member [since 1973] enjoying all the rights involved, but keeping in the background when duties have to be fulfilled; I would propose amending the constitution. I advocate doing so now, and not when there is a war. We should do what is necessary now within the framework of the United Nations.¹³⁰

Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the FDP party, during a BBC 2 Newsnight program interview, echoed Chancellor Kohl's call for a constitutional amendment. Genscher commented, "yes, we do opt for this[;] me

¹³⁰Ibid., 91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 8, "Kohl Interviewed About German Role in Gulf," in AU0103145391 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1900 GMT 28 Feb 91.

personally, and the Federal government."¹³¹ He further stated in an interview with WELT AM SONNTAG, that the government coalition was ready to make changes to the Basic Law.¹³² Mr. Genscher stated, after the war, that an amendment permitting military participation in all UN-mandated operations (similar to the UN Gulf resolution) would have allowed German troops to directly contribute to the coalition against Iraq.¹³³ Federal President Richard von Weizaecker also welcomed a change to the Basic Law allowing German soldiers to participate in UN peacekeeping missions.¹³⁴

In anticipation of war breaking out in the Persian Gulf, the SPD denounced the potential use of German Armed Forces in combat. This pacifist view was further spelled out after the Gulf War in the SPD Bremen party conference resolution in May 1991. At the conference, an SPD majority agreed to

¹³¹Ibid., 91-023, 4 February 1991, p. 23, "Genscher Defends Contribution to Gulf Effort," in PM0102164691 London BC Television Network in English 2230 GMT 30 Jan 91.

¹³²Ibid., "Constitution Amendment Discussed," in LD0202121591 Berlin ADN in German 1112 GMT 2 Feb 91.

¹³³Ibid., 91-042, 4 March 1991, p. 11, "Genscher on German Role, Aftermath in Gulf," in AU0103144891 Dusseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 1 Mar 91 p. 4.

¹³⁴Ibid., 91-052, 18 March 1991, p. 16, "Weizaecker Favors Military Role in UN Missions," in LD1703092191 Hamburg DPA 0743 GMT 17 Mar 91.

permit only Bundeswehr peacekeeping missions.¹³⁵ Originally taking a hard line stance against military involvement in UN-commanded or sanctioned operations, the SPD acquiesced to only allow specific participation outside the NATO area for: UN peacekeeping missions with mixed civilian/military personnel, UN observer missions, and overseeing UN truces.¹³⁶ Furthermore, the SPD saw an amendment to the Basic Law, to allow for more than peacekeeping missions, as inconsistent with their peace and security policy position. The SPD leadership argued that peacekeeping deployments could only be possible if a Basic Law amendment was first approved to allow Blue Helmet operations.¹³⁷

In an effort to show that his coalition government was willing to adapt to the changed international security environment, Chancellor Kohl carried out several post-Gulf War decisions directly related to German military participation beyond traditional boundaries. In March 1991 after the war's end, a German naval mine-sweeping unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf to assist in the clean up of

¹³⁵Ibid., 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-29.

¹³⁶John Tagliabue, "Kohl Opposed on Troops Outside NATO Area," New York Times, 2 June 1991, p. I12.

¹³⁷FBIS-WEU, 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 9, "Background to Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p. 22-29.

the Iraqi mines. The Kohl government defended its decision to deploy the naval units as a humanitarian mission that did not conflict with constitutional limitations.¹³⁸ Yet, the seven ship Bundesmarine (German Federal Navy) detachment signified the first step toward greater German military involvement beyond the traditional parameters of the obsolete Cold War security policy.¹³⁹

One month later, in April 1993, German military aviation and engineering units participated in Operation Provide Comfort in Turkey and Iran to assist the humanitarian effort of relocating the Iraqi Kurds back into their homeland after Saddam Hussein's army forced them across the border into neighboring Turkey.¹⁴⁰ Chancellor Kohl sent 2,000 troops, airlifted by the Luftwaffe (German Air Force), to the Turkish/Iranian border to help build refugee camps for the persecuted Iraqi Kurds.¹⁴¹ Although the SPD agreed to back the Bundeswehr's new role outside of traditional NATO bounds for humanitarian reasons, these military actions slowly

¹³⁸Ibid.

¹³⁹Ibid., 91-047, 11 March 1991, p. 7, "Minesweeping Unit Departs Crete for Persian Gulf," in LD1103114191 Hamburg DPA in German 1040 GMT 11 Mar 91.

¹⁴⁰Kaiser and Becher, p. 54.

¹⁴¹Marc Fisher, "Germany to Send Troops to Iran to Aid Refugees," Washington Post, 24 April 1991, p. A23.

edged Germany closer toward a looser interpretation of the constitutional ban.

With the downfall of Communism in eastern Europe and the break up of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the FRG played a pivotal role in the middle of Europe. Many of the break away former Soviet Union republics and the former Warsaw Pact central European countries began to look to Germany for financial assistance. Germany, although in the midst of internal unification itself, was seen by many of the nascent eastern European states as the means to turn their command-style economies into free market systems similar to the prosperous Western models and to help reform both obsolete and corrupt government systems and military institutions. As a normalized and fully sovereign nation, the FRG began to assume greater influence within the European region of states. German Cold War security policies gave way to increasing levels of engagement with the newly democratic countries of east and central Europe through cooperative ventures in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and within the CSCE.

Foreign Minister Genscher argued that the established political contacts among the former WTO members should be

enlarged.¹⁴² He sought to shape foreign policy goals without having to resort to the use of military force in the future if possible. He, along with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, originated the idea of forming a North Atlantic Cooperation Council under the auspices of NATO and on 2 October 1991, they issued a joint statement calling for affirmation on their proposal.¹⁴³ The German government view held that the NACC was a kind of formalized structure needed to prevent instability and promote cooperation between the democracies of eastern and western Europe.¹⁴⁴ A common belief held by many in the Foreign Ministry, at that time, was that east European instability would affect west European (and German) political and economic stability.¹⁴⁵

As previously noted, the start of World War I originated in the Balkans due to ethnic conflict. The outcome of

¹⁴²"Obscured Horizons," NATO's Sixteen Nations, vol. 35, no. 8, Dec 1990/Jan 1991, p. 47.

¹⁴³"Fact Sheet: Europe's Multilateral Organizations," U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 3, no. 26, 29 June 1992, p. 532.

¹⁴⁴Stephen J. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Eastern Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 2, Spring 1992, p. 148.

¹⁴⁵Frank Elbe, German Ambassador and Director General of Policy and Planning, Foreign Office, "The New Dimension of Euro-American Cooperation," p. 4, lecture given at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 28 October 1992.

Germany's defeat in World War I caused severe hardship within the Fatherland that also led to the rise of Nazism and another even more horrific World War. The World War II German occupation of Yugoslavia was no less brutal than any of the other east European countries invaded by the German Wehrmacht. Germany's actions in the Balkans during the Second World War were not easily forgotten by the affected Yugoslav populace.

Germany's historical legacy in the Balkan region was one of violent invasion, ethnic cleansing, occupation and subjugation. The Nazi regime instilled a fear and hatred of German soldiers that was still evident within the Balkan region in the Post-Cold War era. For this reason alone, German politicians were extremely hesitant to embark on a foreign policy of armed intervention in the violent affairs of Yugoslavia and its break away republics without stirring up dormant feelings of guilt within German society. Yet, the post-Cold War crisis within Yugoslavia began to affect the west European states' interests of maintaining regional stability.

The need to resolve the violence or at least contain it from spreading into the more developed and stable west European states became apparent to the members of NATO and the European Community. If these organizations were to maintain their usefulness in resolving regional conflict and

safeguarding the well being of member states, then decisive and preventive action was necessary in quelling the Balkan unrest. Germany, as a member of both organizations, was in the untenable situation of advocating collective security action by these institutions, yet, at the same time, the FRG was not in a position to offer any direct assistance in military operations. The need to become more active in managing regional conflicts was in direct contrast to the internal divisiveness of altering traditional attitudes of never again being perceived as the belligerent in areas like the Balkans.

The growing concern among German politicians was that the FRG again might be drawn into another similar situation if the internal Yugoslavian turmoil was not resolved quickly. Yet, due to the historical legacy of Germany's role in the region during World War II, the FRG was not in a politically, let alone militarily, tenable position to initiate a resolution to the Balkan unrest. Unlike the Persian Gulf War, which was seen as a conflict on the distant horizon, the violent unrest within the Balkans was viewed more as a immediate European problem. Furthermore, Germany's leadership was fearful of repeating history by being drawn into a proximate conflict with far reaching deleterious consequences.

The growing crisis in Yugoslavia was a prime example of a civil war erupting into a regional conflict with far reaching repercussions. In August 1991, the Kohl government made overtures to the break away republics of Croatia and Slovenia to formally recognize them as independent and sovereign states.¹⁴⁶ The intended hope of this recognition by Germany was to allow the countries of Slovenia and Croatia the ability to formally request assistance from the UN or other regional organizations in stopping the aggressive moves by primarily Serbia against their sovereign territory. The German plan for recognition was premature and misguided in the view of the European Community (EC) without first ensuring the republics met a complex set of guidelines laid out by the EC that included verification of human rights conditions. In particular, France and Great Britain voiced strong criticism that the FRG's headstrong recognition would create further instability in the region which would spread elsewhere within Europe. Regardless of the complaints of France, Great Britain, the U.S. and the UN Secretary General, Germany formally recognized the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶"Countdown to Recognition," The Economist, 21 December 1991, p. 57.

¹⁴⁷"Wreckognition," The Economist, 18 January 1992, p. 49.

In being the first to recognize the break away republics of Croatia and Slovenia, a fully sovereign Germany flexed its Post-Cold War foreign and security policy muscle and attempted to provide a stronger international leverage against Serbian aggression. Germany's decision to influence the international political scene forced the rest of the EC states to maintain a sense of European solidarity and show a concerted effort to solve the Balkan dispute.¹⁴⁸ Upon Germany's early insistence on recognizing the breakaway republics of Croatia and Slovenia, the 12 nation EC begrudgingly was compelled to follow suit.¹⁴⁹

Croatia's Foreign Minister, Zvonimir Separovic, commented that, "after recognition, Slovenia and Croatia will be exactly the same as Kuwait in the Persian Gulf crisis...[the Balkan dispute] will no longer be seen as just a civil war or the internal affairs of Yugoslavia."¹⁵⁰ The West, according to Mr. Separovic, would have a moral and legal obligation to safeguard and defend Croatia's independence and sovereignty. Croatian leaders assumed the

¹⁴⁸Craig R. Whitney, "As Germany Flexes Its Muscles, the New Europe Goes Along," New York Times, 17 December 1991, Sec. IV, p. 4.

¹⁴⁹John Tagliabue, "European Ties for Slovenia and Croatia," New York Times, 12 December 1991, p. A3.

¹⁵⁰Stephen Engelberg, "Germany Raising Hopes of Croatia," New York Times, 12 December 1991, A6.

next step would be to send arms or Western military forces to intervene on Croatia's behalf. Yet when Germany was asked by the UN Secretary General to contribute forces for a peacekeeping mission to the Balkan region, the FRG refused.¹⁵¹

Chancellor Kohl's two key Ministers directly involved in formulating Germany's security policy resigned their positions within two months of each other. Gerhard Stoltenberg, Minister of Defense (MOD) since 1989, stepped down on 31 March 1992 in the midst of an illicit arms transfer scandal that he felt would damage Chancellor Kohl's CDU/CSU-FDP coalition if he had remained in his post.¹⁵² The SPD previously called for Stoltenberg's resignation in December 1991 for the secret shipment of excess former East German weapons.¹⁵³ Stoltenberg claimed that the weapons were shipped without his prior knowledge and that he was unaware that they were labeled as "agricultural machinery."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²Marc Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms Scandal," The Washington Post, 1 April 1992, p. A25.

¹⁵³FBIS-WEU, 91-235, 6 December 1991, p. 14, "SPD Wants Stoltenberg Resignation for Tank Sale," in AU0512160691 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 5 Dec 91 p. 1.

¹⁵⁴Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms Scandal," p. A25.

Traditionally, the Minister of Defense position has been a comparatively vulnerable and weak post in initiating a forward looking security policy within the executive branch due to the history of Defense Minister resignations and firings associated with various scandals and poor performance. In peacetime, the Defense Minister is the overall commander of the Bundeswehr and acts as the supreme administrative authority of all servicemen.¹⁵⁵ The Defense Minister's power over the military is viewed as a symbol of the primacy of civilian control, to include the daily functions of the Bundeswehr, over the military.¹⁵⁶ In addition, Article 115b of the Basic Law dictates that only when a state of defense is officially declared does the power of command over the Armed Forces pass to the Chancellor.¹⁵⁷ The Defense Minister's role was structurally established to be a very strong security policy decision making position within the political system.

However, the political reality of the Minister of Defense post showed that the position was less influential than the Foreign Minister and Chancellor in determining

¹⁵⁵"The Situation and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces," White Paper 1985, German Ministry of Defense, 19 June 1985, p. 165.

¹⁵⁶Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," p. 91.

¹⁵⁷Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, p.72.

security policy. To a certain extent, even the General Inspector and the Armed Service Chiefs became political players in formulating security policy and behavior and in accepting responsibility for the functions of the Defense Ministry.¹⁵⁸ Only three of the ten Defense Ministers were termed "activists" with recognized expertise on security matters and clear cut ideas for policy actions.¹⁵⁹ Defense Minister Stoltenberg stayed firmly in the background during Germany's struggle to redefine its military and diplomatic policy in the Post-Cold War period.¹⁶⁰

The latest scandal that ousted Stoltenberg involved the illegal transfer of 15 Leopard main battle tanks to Turkey after the German Parliament banned shipments of arms to Turkey after confirmation that previous shipments of German weapons were used in attacks by Turkish troops against the minority Kurdish population of Turkey. This action by Turkey, along with accusations by Germany of human rights violations by the Ankara government against the Kurds, caused a halt in arms sales to Turkey by one of its main

¹⁵⁸Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," p. 96.

¹⁵⁹Ibid., p. 92. The three activists were Franz Josef Strauss (CSU) from 1956 to 1962, Helmut Schmidt (SPD) from 1969 to 1972 and Manfred Woerner (CDU) from 1982 to 1988.

¹⁶⁰Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms Scandal," p. A25

suppliers of weapons and the parliamentary ban on future arms transfers.¹⁶¹ Stoltenberg, 63, was compelled to resign since he bore overall responsibility for the actions of his subordinates, even if he was not aware of their illegal activity. As Hans-Ulrich Klose, parliamentary leader of the SPD, stated, "He [Stoltenberg] is clearly not in control [of the Defense Ministry] anymore."¹⁶²

CDU party manager, Volker Ruehe, was picked by Kohl to replace Stoltenberg as Defense Minister. Mr. Ruehe, a former English teacher, took over his defense position with the intent to push Germany toward a greater role in global security responsibilities.¹⁶³ Mr. Ruehe, 49, was termed as one of Germany's most U.S.-oriented politicians and was critical not of his predecessor, but of Foreign Minister Genscher. Mr. Ruehe was considered to be an Atlanticist where as Mr. Genscher was termed an ambivalent Euro-centrist. Mr. Ruehe felt that Mr. Genscher, Foreign Minister since 1974, was ineffective and not in touch with the political reality and "the trends in a changing

¹⁶¹Stephen Kinzer, "Turks Got Tanks, and German Minister Must Quit," New York Times, 1 April 1992, p. A3.

¹⁶²Ibid.

¹⁶³Fisher, "German Defense Minister Resigns Amid Arms Scandal," p. A25.

world."¹⁶⁴ Mr. Ruehe also did not hide the fact that he had previously made overtures to Kohl that he wanted to fill the position of Foreign Minister when it became vacant. Defense Minister Ruehe planned to exercise greater influence than his predecessors in shaping foreign and security policy upon assumption of his office.¹⁶⁵

Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on 17 May 1992, after exactly 18 years in office, resigned his position as Foreign Minister. He stated, "after such a long time in office, I think the time has come to give up the office...voluntarily."¹⁶⁶ Mr. Genscher was hailed as one of the most popular political leaders in Germany. He was elected to Parliament in 1965, served as Interior Minister in 1969 and in 1974 became Foreign Minister under the SPD-FDP coalition government of Helmut Schmidt. He was the world's senior Foreign Minister upon his resignation.¹⁶⁷ Throughout his tenure in office he dealt with such personalities as U.S.

¹⁶⁴Ibid.

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Marc Fisher, "Germany's Genscher Stepping Down After 18 Years as Foreign Minister," The Washington Post, 28 April 1992, p. A17.

¹⁶⁷Stephen Kinzer, "Genscher, Bonn's Foreign Minister 18 Years, Resigns," New York Times, 28 April 1992, p. A3

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Anatoly Gromyko.¹⁶⁸

At the end of his term in office, Mr. Genscher was largely credited with playing a crucial role in the unification of East and West Germany and the efforts at designing a European unity plan. In his article entitled, "Ten Points for Continuity in Foreign Policy of the Unified Germany," published in WELT AM SONNTAG, Mr. Genscher stated that, "after amending our constitution...[a] unified Germany is ready and willing to accept its responsibility for safeguarding world peace within the framework of the United Nations."¹⁶⁹ Mr. Genscher, 65, contemplated resigning as early as the first of the year but wanted to wait until his anniversary before publicly announcing his intentions to step down.

Mr. Genscher's resignation stemmed from his desire to leave office on a high note and not have to deal with the messy aftermath of unification, the growing economic problems and having to redefine a new role for Germany in the Post-Cold War security environment. Mr. Genscher was also criticized for his role in pushing for early

¹⁶⁸"As Germany Goes," New York Times, 30 April 1992, p. A22.

¹⁶⁹FBIS-WEU, 92-087, 5 May 1992, p. 21, "Genscher Cites 'Basic Constants'," in AU0405152692 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 3 May 1992, p. 9.

recognition of Croatia and Slovenia and the indecisive role played by Germany in the Persian Gulf War. His associates said that both of these controversies, not to mention two previous heart attacks, factored into his decision to resign his post.¹⁷⁰ He also delayed his resignation until after he was sure that Kohl's protege, Volker Ruehe, would not assume his position as Foreign Minister.¹⁷¹

Justice Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP) was chosen by the FDP Parliamentary members by vote of 63 to 25 to be the FDP candidate to succeed Genscher as Foreign Minister.¹⁷² This vote was carried out after the FDP party members rejected an earlier decision by the FDP leadership to name Mrs. Irmgard Schwaetzer, Housing Minister, as the first woman Foreign Minister. Mrs. Schwaetzer was not considered a strong nor experienced enough leader to handle the key position in the Kohl coalition.¹⁷³ Mr. Kinkel, on the other hand, was considered by his party members as "an innovative thinker who does not stand on tradition for its own sake."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰Kinzer, "Genscher, Bonn's Foreign Minister 18 Years, Resigns," p. A3.

¹⁷¹Fisher, "Germany's Genscher Stepping Down After 18 Years as Foreign Minister," p. A17.

¹⁷²Stephen Kinzer, "Party in Bonn Rebels on Genscher's Successor," New York Times, 29 April 1992, p. A5.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Ibid.

Mr. Kinkel, the former head of the German Secret Service, maintained a reputation for imaginative leadership and astute professionalism in carrying out tough tasks within the Justice and Interior Ministry.¹⁷⁵ Mr. Kinkel, who thought of himself as the son to Genscher's father figure, stated, "we [the Kohl government] shall continue to pursue a reliable, constructive and predictable foreign policy...open to new challenges."¹⁷⁶

Within the Kohl government, a redefinition of foreign and security policy was undertaken that fueled the political debate on the extent to which German military units should take part in not only out of area missions, but in peacekeeping and potential peacemaking missions. With the change in the Post-Cold War security environment, came an internal generational change in Germany's leadership that also sparked a change in the formulation of German foreign and security interests and policy. Defense Minister Ruehe and Foreign Minister Kinkel, representing not only their positions in government, but their respective parties as well, both stated that Germany must adapt to the changing political and security environment.

¹⁷⁵Ibid.

¹⁷⁶FBIS-WEU, 92-107, 3 June 1992, p. 13, "Says Give Sanctions Chance," in LD0206170392 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 1 Jun 92.

The Yugoslavian crisis was their first test of formulating a responsive foreign and security policy to meet the challenge of ensuring peace and stability within the European community of states. The call to militarily enforce the UN-mandated embargo on weapons entering Bosnia and Montenegro from the Adriatic Sea forced the Kohl government to take action within the multi-lateral framework of the NATO alliance and the Western European Union. The use of German military forces in the Adriatic Sea mission assumed another qualitative jump in engaging German foreign and security policy outside the traditional realm of involvement without first obtaining a clear consensus from the political parties and German society.

A. ADRIATIC SEA MISSION

In the case of the growing crisis in Yugoslavia, Foreign Minister Kinkel spoke out against German soldiers taking part, "if at all possible," in any European intervention in the conflict. He based this position on the historical legacy of German soldiers occupying the area during World War II and the resentment that would ensue among the local populace if Bundeswehr troops were to deploy to Yugoslavia

again.¹⁷⁷ However, Kinkel did not give up hope that a Basic Law amendment could be achieved that was more far reaching than what the SPD proposed. He reiterated that, "Germany will not be able to afford to watch world events from the spectator stand despite and particularly in view of its past...while constantly keeping in mind what has happened in the past, we must commit ourselves to a greater extent."¹⁷⁸

In July 1992, despite the ongoing debate on the Basic Law, Mr. Kohl decided to take part in the European effort at solving the Balkan crisis by dispatching navy units to contribute to the UN supervision of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.¹⁷⁹ He reiterated that the role of the naval task force was solely to observe shipping and to pass information on to the UN. He acknowledged that his decision entered a gray area of interpreting the Basic Law. By contributing a destroyer to the Adriatic Sea mission,

¹⁷⁷Ibid., "No Troops for Yugoslavia," in LD0206112692 Hamburg DPA in German 1037 GMT 2 Jun 92.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., 92-124, 26 June 1992, p. 21, "Kinkel Discusses EC, Serbia, Security Policy," in AU2506173092 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 25 Jun 92, p. 7.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., 92-136, 15 July 1992, p. 15, "Navy To Aid Supervision of UN Embargo on Serbia", in LD150710392 Hamburg DPA in German 0916 GMT 15 Jul 92.

Mr. Kohl not only symbolically supported the UN embargo, but also fueled the debate for an amendment change to permit peacekeeping missions beyond the NATO guaranteed area.¹⁸⁰

The Bundestag Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees met in a special joint session on 16 July 1992 to discuss the Adriatic role of the Bundeswehr. The debate devolved into the basic question of future out-of-area missions of the military and the relevant constitutional restrictions. The SPD was seriously considering a constitutional challenge to the government's action, yet there was disagreement within the SPD on this method of limiting military power projection in NATO out-of-area deployments. Not all members of the SPD felt the government was modifying its foreign and defense policy in a de facto manner and fostering the perception that out-of-area operations were proper and legal.¹⁸¹ However, the SPD still balked at committing military troops to the Balkan crisis. The SPD threatened to pursue legal recourse, through the Federal Constitutional Court in

¹⁸⁰Francine S. Kiefer, "Germany Tiptoes Toward Greater Use of Military", The Christian Science Monitor, 16 July 1992, p. 3.

¹⁸¹FBIS-WEU, 92-146, 29 July 1992, p. 5-6, "SPD Seeks Constitutional Ruling on Deployment," in 92GE0435A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, in German 17 Jul 92, p. 1-2.

Karlsruhe, if a Government decision to act militarily was carried out.¹⁸²

Bonn stopped short of deploying military forces to the Balkans primarily because the constitutional interpretation forbid such actions but more importantly due to the historic legacy of Germany's World War II occupation of Yugoslavia.¹⁸³ In regard to the Balkan issue and Germany's evolving Post-Cold War security policy, Defense Minister Volker Ruehe commented, "How do you want to build Europe, when German ships on principle steer a different course from ships of all other nations?"¹⁸⁴

FDP Parliamentary Manager Werner Hoyer requested that the SPD alter its view on passing an amendment to allow UN-mandated missions by the Bundeswehr.¹⁸⁵ Foreign Minister Kinkel also implored the SPD to give up its rejection of an amendment and to come to terms with permitting German

¹⁸²Ibid., 92-144, 27 July 1992, p. 8, "Commentary Views Political Risks of Adriatic Role," in 92GE0433A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German No. 30, 17 Jul 92, p. 1.

¹⁸³Ibid., 92-156, 12 August 1992, p. 6, "Kinkel Calls for Opposition to Serbia," in LD1108132192 Berlin DDP in German 1253 GMT 11 Aug 92.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 92-152, 6 August 1992, p. 7, "SPD Fails to Split Coalition on Security Issues," in 92GE0450A Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 23 Jul 92, p. 3.

¹⁸⁵Ibid., 92-154, 10 August 1992, p. 8, "Kinkel Advocates, SPD Rejects Combat Missions," in AU0708164492 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 7 Aug 92, p. 1-2.

military use, not only for Blue Helmet missions, but beyond. When the UN Secretary General requested German assistance in contributing armed forces to a UN intervention force in the Balkan dispute his plea demonstrated international expectations of German involvement.¹⁸⁶ Yet, SPD chairman Bjoern Engholm rejected pleas from within his own party to accept military action directed toward the Balkans.¹⁸⁷ The Wickert Institute straw poll of 1,788 Germans, conducted on 8 August 1992, resulted in a 77% rejection of military intervention in Serbia by either NATO or UN-led forces, clearly indicating a prevailing pacifist trend.¹⁸⁸

Even Mr. Kohl stated that after the German invasion of Yugoslavia in World War II, no one should expect Germany to send troops to the embattled Balkans. However, he did express the opinion that the FRG should not restrict its actions just to financial aid in the UN effort to quell the violence.¹⁸⁹ Historical precedence notwithstanding, it was

¹⁸⁶Ibid., 92-153, 7 August 1992, p. 6, "Kinkel Urges Role in UN Missions," in LD0608113292 Hamburg DPA in German 0937 GMT 6 Aug 92.

¹⁸⁷Ibid., 92-154, 10 August 1992, p. 7, "Engholm Rejects Role by West," in AU0808133892 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Television Network, 1100 GMT 8 Aug 92.

¹⁸⁸Ibid., "Citizens Oppose UN Action," in LD0808132692 Berlin ADN in German 1253 GMT 8 Aug 92.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., 92-158, 14 August 1992, p. 9, "Kohl Rules Out Military Deployment to Yugoslavia," in LD1308152492 Hamburg DPA in German 1303 GMT 13 Aug 92.

political suicide for Germany's leadership to pursue a unpopular security burdensharing policy that could endanger German soldiers' lives under circumspect reasons and without a solid consensus. Defense Minister Ruehe, commenting on the Adriatic Sea mission, stated that, "we've developed a culture of [military] reticence, and we must take many small steps to overcome it."¹⁹⁰

Another step in showing Germany's willingness to assume a greater international role took place in May 1992 when Chancellor Kohl sent 150 German military doctors and medical personnel to Cambodia to provide care to the deployed UN forces participating in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) peacekeeping mission.¹⁹¹ The UN peacekeeping mission's objectives were to implement a political settlement of the Cambodian conflict through supervising government functions and the eventual elections in Cambodia in accordance with the Paris Agreement while also rebuilding the country and disarming the warring

¹⁹⁰Gail E. Schares, "The German Military Comes Out of the Barracks," Business Week, 24 August 1992, no. 3280, p. 47.

¹⁹¹Volker Ruehe, "Change and New Departures in the Bundeswehr Armed Forces of a United Germany," speech at the 33rd Commander's Conference of the Federal Armed Forces in Leipzig, 14 May 1992, p. 4.

factions.¹⁹² Germany's participation in the peacekeeping mission was again solely of a humanitarian nature. However, even though the death of Sgt. Alexander Arndt of the Bundeswehr in Cambodia was the result of a random shooting, 70 other UN personnel died in Cambodia attesting to the uncertainty of the humanitarian nature of Germany's participation in the UNTAC mission.¹⁹³ In regard to Sgt. Arndt's death, Defense Minister Ruehe commented, "We are now going through the bitter experience that other nations before us have had."¹⁹⁴

The FRG was increasingly becoming militarily involved in UN actions beyond the traditional boundaries of German foreign and security policy. Regardless of the political debate within Germany over a peacekeeping and combat role for the Bundeswehr, the Kohl government continued to formulate foreign policy by reinterpreting the constitutional parameters of using the military for other than defense of the Fatherland. The government's decision to use the Bundeswehr for non-traditional missions in areas not within the realm of the NATO guaranteed area pushed the

¹⁹²Marjorie A. Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 2 February 1992), p. 15.

¹⁹³"German Soldier Becomes the First Casualty of German Involvement in UN Missions," p. 2.

¹⁹⁴Ibid.

issue of peacekeeping and ultimately combat operations to the forefront of foreign and security policy in the Post-Cold War era. Chancellor Kohl's intent to establish a precedent for German military involvement in a changing security environment highlighted his intent to increase the role that Germany was to play in the "new world order" and also helped to establish a tradition of increased security burdensharing among the regional and global alliance frameworks. The desire to change German attitudes toward greater participation in enforcing peace and security among the global community became apparent through Mr. Kohl's actions in not only the European region, but globally as well. His next step was to attempt to legitimize his foreign policy actions of military participation by changing the German constitution to permit peacekeeping and combat missions under the aegis of the UN and other regional security alliances.

B. AN ATTEMPT TO CHANGE THE GERMAN CONSTITUTION

In January 1993, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Germany and called upon the government to play a "bigger role" in the United Nations by contributing to military operations beyond the traditional scope of past

German participation.¹⁹⁵ His hope of securing a German commitment toward military participation in the evolving UN peacekeeping mission to Somalia was fruitless based on the unsettled debate over permitting Bundeswehr peacekeeping missions. The CDU/CSU position maintained that peacekeeping and peacemaking missions under the aegis of the UN were possible without an amendment to the Basic Law. The senior coalition partner argued that such actions were covered under Article 24 in which "the state may join a system of collective security to safeguard peace."¹⁹⁶ The CDU/CSU interpretation of the constitution permitted Blue Helmet and combat missions under the framework of collective security organizations regardless of previously held views on the physical limitations of German involvement.

The FDP, on the other hand, held the view that the CDU/CSU interpretation was too far-reaching and maintained that military missions, to include a combat role, first required a change to the Basic Law to allow action under a collective security organization like the UN, NATO, WEU or the CSCE.¹⁹⁷ However, Foreign Minister Kinkel (FDP) agreed

¹⁹⁵FBIS-WEU, 93-008, 13 January 1993, p. 12, "Calls for FRG Contribution to UN," in AU1201150293 Dusseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 12 Jan 93, p. 2.

¹⁹⁶Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁹⁷Ibid.

with the CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman Karl Lamers who advocated a change in the government restriction on military action which Lamers termed a "relic of history."¹⁹⁸ Mr. Kinkel also concurred with Boutros Ghali's opinion that the distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking missions was no longer clear cut. Mr. Kinkel cited the Somalia operation as a typical example of the "fraying" of Blue Helmet missions.¹⁹⁹ After the UN Secretary General's visit, Mr. Kinkel was confident that the coalition parties could reach a consensus on a proposed amendment to allow peacekeeping and combat participation in UN missions and that the SPD could be persuaded to reach an agreement on the proposed Basic Law amendment.

However, the SPD leadership reiterated its party's position that only peacekeeping missions under the control of the UN were possible after an amendment to restrict the military to such operations was first established. The SPD leadership argued that combat missions under the auspices of the UN or any other collective security organization was out of the question. The coalition parties held that the SPD position amounted to a shirking of Germany's global security responsibility in maintaining peace and was a stumbling

¹⁹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹⁹Ibid.

block to redefining German foreign and security policy in the changing political environment. The required two thirds majority vote within Parliament on an amendment to change the Basic Law allowing for UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions required the consensus of the SPD.

On 13 January 1993, Mr. Kinkel announced that the CDU/CSU and the FDP agreed on a compromise draft amendment which would permit the Bundeswehr to participate in international peacekeeping operations sanctioned by the UN and other regional collective security organizations.²⁰⁰ Draft legislation amending Article 24 which called for peacekeeping and peace-creating (friedensschaffende) military missions was introduced into the Bundestag which allowed German soldiers to participate in peacekeeping missions "in accordance with a UN Security Council resolution or within the framework of regional organizations in the sense of the UN Charter."²⁰¹ Secondly, the proposal allowed the Bundeswehr to take part in combat missions "when and if the UN Security Council adopts a relevant resolution on the use of enforcement measures."²⁰² In both cases,

²⁰⁰Craig R. Whitney. "Kohl and Partners Agree on German Peacekeeping Proposal," New York Times, 14 January 1993, p. A4.

²⁰¹FBIS-WEU, 93-010, 15 January 1993, p. 15, "Coalition Agrees on Participation," in AU1501081093 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jan 93, p. 1-2.

²⁰²Ibid.

approval by the absolute majority of the Bundestag would first have to be achieved before Bundeswehr units could take part in such missions.

Thirdly, the bill called for Bundeswehr participation "in exercising the right to collective defense under UN Charter Article 51"²⁰³ without first possessing a requisite UN Security Council's relevant resolution. However, such action could only be possible "along with other countries in the framework of alliances and other regional organizations of which the FRG was also a member."²⁰⁴ The third clause was intended to ensure the ability to participate in military missions outside the alliance area along with other NATO or WEU members. The participation of the Bundeswehr in

²⁰³UN Charter Article 51 states, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense [such as through NATO actions] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the UN, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." (Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow Shares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization, fourth edition, (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 476).

²⁰⁴FBIS-WEU, 93-010, 15 January 1993, "Coalition Agrees on Participation," p. 15.

missions under the third clause would first require approval by a two thirds majority of the Bundestag.²⁰⁵

However, on the first Bundestag vote, on 15 January 1993, the bill failed to amass the required two thirds majority vote for passage. The SPD effectively blocked the proposal from becoming a constitutional amendment.²⁰⁶ The SPD foreign policy spokesman Karsten Voigt expressed the SPD rejection to the draft amendment on the grounds that the third clause was unacceptable. He argued that the FRG could conceivably fight in the Middle East or Africa if a state requested military assistance from Germany and a relevant UN Security Council resolution was not first adopted.²⁰⁷ The Western members of the Security Council arguably could block the passage of a resolution which would lead to the militarization of German security and foreign policy which was counter to the SPD position of Germany remaining a peace power and not an international military interventionist state.

²⁰⁵Ibid.

²⁰⁶"Coalition in Conflict Over Military Intervention; Proposed Constitutional Change Fails in First Vote," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 29 January 1993), p. 2.

²⁰⁷FBIS-WEU, 92-010, 15 January 1993, p. 20, "Voigt Rejects Amendment," in AU1501133193 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 0818 GMT 15 Jan 93.

The SPD maintained that Germany should not pursue military objectives without the UN Security Council first mandating such action regardless of the Bundestag's approval by a two thirds majority vote in every case. Mr. Voigt used the example that in the case of an attack on France (an alliance member), a two thirds majority vote would be necessary to come to the defense of France if a UN resolution was not be passed to mandate combat action, whereas only a simple majority vote (under the second clause of the draft amendment) would be required for German soldiers to take part in combat operations in Kuwait (or any other distant country) if a UN Security Council resolution was already passed.²⁰⁸ The SPD regarded such an amendment as absurd and totally unacceptable. The coalition, in the opinion of the SPD, was trying to redefine German security and foreign policy toward an international military interventionist line at the expense of traditional alliance commitments.

Furthermore, the Social Democrats countered by calling on the coalition to adopt the SPD stance of amending the Basic Law to allow commonly agreed upon peacekeeping and humanitarian measures under the auspices of UN control similar to the Cambodian-type mission. If the coalition

²⁰⁸Ibid.

avoided such a move, then Germany would become isolated through non-participation in humanitarian UN peacekeeping missions. The other extreme of taking military action without the consent of the SPD in the Bundestag would leave the SPD with no choice but to consider such actions as unconstitutional. Mr. Voigt argued that the CDU/CSU position of not requiring a Basic Law change in the case of far reaching foreign policy decisions would also require a complete reversal of the FDP's traditional position of requiring an amendment to allow the government to participate in military actions.²⁰⁹ Therefore, the SPD and the FDP, according to Voigt, must then consider foreign policy decisions involving the Bundeswehr in non-humanitarian out-of-area missions as unconstitutional. The SPD would then be forced to appeal the military action to the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.²¹⁰

In response to the SPD's claim that the coalition government was haphazardly formulating foreign policy along the lines of intervening militarily in both distant and proximate regional conflicts without a sound legal basis and without the consent of the minority party in the Bundestag, Defense Minister Ruehe commented that the government's

²⁰⁹Ibid.

²¹⁰Ibid.

desire to send the Bundeswehr to every crisis region in the world was inaccurate.²¹¹ He further stated that Germany was never to act on its own, but only through its alliances and in consonance with its security partners. Every individual case was to be weighed against the background of German values and national interests, in awareness of Germany's historical responsibility, and only after an affirmative parliamentary decision. He argued that the coalition's actions to amend the Basic Law to permit a larger role for the Bundeswehr through collective security organizations was a responsible attempt at linking the lessons of history with the security challenges of the future.²¹²

²¹¹Ibid., 93-011, 19 January 1993, p. 12, "Ruehe Endorses Participation in UN Missions," in AU1501131993 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 0954 GMT 15 Jan 93.

²¹²Ibid.

V. GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR GREATER UN PARTICIPATION

German attempts to establish the legal basis for extra-territorial peacekeeping and combat missions was pre-mature due to the inflexibility of the SPD party's position on maintaining a pacifist foreign and security policy despite the changes in the Post-Cold War era. Nevertheless, the global and regional organizations played a larger role in enforcing the collective security actions necessary to resolve or contain violent unrest within the trouble spots around the globe. The rise in tension in areas like Bosnia and Somalia were indicators that increased action by the

lective security and defense organizations would be required to maintain regional stability. Member states with the requisite capability to contribute to military enforcement of UN mandates was necessary to fulfill the goal of stopping the bloodshed in these hot spots and containing the spread of violence on a regional and global scale.

Germany's leaders were called upon by UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the leadership of the FRG's security partners to assume a greater role of military participation the enforcement of peace and stability. The

issue of German participation in military operations beyond traditional limits was pushed to the forefront of national politics by events in the Balkans and Somalia. The time had come for Germany's leaders to make decisions concerning German involvement in areas of unrest both regionally and globally.

During 1993, the Balkan conflict, along with the Somalian crisis, was at the forefront of German national security and foreign policy. When the United States began the symbolic air drops of aid to the besieged towns of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the German Luftwaffe also joined in the humanitarian operation. Prior to the commencement of the air drops on 28 March 1993, the Luftwaffe participated in routine resupply flights to Sarajevo until the airport was shelled and a Transall aircrewman was severely wounded by ground fire directed at the airborne German aircraft.²¹³ German planes also flew 700 humanitarian aid missions to Somalia from August 1992 through April 1993.²¹⁴ In addition, German aircrew comprised one third of the NATO AWACS

²¹³Ibid., 93-060, 31 March 1993, p. 20, "Second Airdrop Reported," in LD2903212393 Hamburg DPA in German 2050 GMT 29 Mar 93.

²¹⁴Ibid., 92-062, 2 April 1993, p. 20, "Luftwaffe Completes Somalia Relief Missions," in 93EN0308B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 22 Mar 93, p. 7.

reconnaissance flight contingent which was responsible for "monitoring" the UN-mandated no fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina.²¹⁵

A. BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE MILITARY ENFORCEMENT

On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council voted to militarily enforce the no fly zone through the use of fighter aircraft stationed in Italy and off the Adriatic coast of Bosnia. UN Security Council resolution 816 became effective seven days later²¹⁶ and NATO began enforcement of the no fly zone on 12 April 1993.²¹⁷ The shift in the nature of the mission from monitoring the compliance of the no fly zone, directed primarily at the Serbs, to using combat aircraft to militarily enforce the ban placed German politicians in a position to further redefine the FRG's national security policy. The mission of vectoring fighter

²¹⁵"Ruehe Calls for German Participation in UN Military Operations, 'Solidarity Pact' With Eastern Europe," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 19 February 1993), p. 1.

²¹⁶"Security Council Decision on Bosnia Puts Pressure on Germany to Resolve Issue of the Role of the Military," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 2 April 1993), p. 1.

²¹⁷"Germany to Participate in Military Enforcement of Bosnia Flight Ban," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 9 April 1993), p. 1.

aircraft to intercept violators of the ban was now termed a combat role. The UN resolution forced the Germans to either pull the Luftwaffe crews out of the AWACS flights or the German government could keep the German aircrews in the NATO AWACS contingent ensuring that the mission could be carried out successfully and Germany's loyalty to the NATO alliance and the UN was not jeopardized.

Historically, German security and foreign policy goals were in consonance with the policies of NATO. The attitude expressed by the Kohl government was that any attempt by Germany to abandon the NATO policies was a direct blow not only to the North Atlantic Alliance, but also to Germany's national identity of maintaining loyalty to the collective defense organization that ensured the well being of the German state throughout the Cold War. The idea of abandoning NATO was out of the question to the ruling coalition. According to the CDU viewpoint, Germany's position within Europe and the world community would deteriorate into one of isolation if the FRG chose to assume a strategy of non-participation in NATO mandated military missions.

The CDU/CSU position on the AWACS no fly zone mission was to maintain the integrity of the NATO AWACS flights by keeping the Luftwaffe aircrews in place. The CDU maintained that German participation in the UN mandated NATO AWACS

operation was in compliance with the Basic Law which allows for military participation within a collective security system.²¹⁸ Furthermore, Chancellor Kohl clarified that German aircrew were flying in aircraft that did not inherently have an offensive capability other than acting as a link in vectoring fighter aircraft to the vicinity of violators of the no fly zone ban. The AWACS planes also did not fly over the former Yugoslav country in the performance of its mission and therefore did not constitute an out of area mission.²¹⁹ CSU Deputy Hartmut Koschyk commented, "Those who want the German military to leave the AWACS planes want Germany to leave its European and international responsibility and go into self-isolation."²²⁰

The SPD position on the use of German military personnel in the AWACS missions was clearly against using Germans in a combat role. SPD Bundestag Group foreign policy spokesman Karsten Voigt stressed that the SPD would apply for an interim injunction from the Constitutional Court as soon as

²¹⁸"Ruehe Calls for German Participation in UN Military Operations, 'Solidarity Pact' With Eastern Europe," p. 1.

²¹⁹FBIS-WEU, 93-063, 5 April 1993, p. 23, "Kohl Views AWACS Missions, Economic Problems," in AU0204192493 Mainz Sat1 Television Network in German 1700 GMT 2 Apr 93.

²²⁰Ibid., 93-064, 6 April 1993, p. 12, "Controversy Over AWACS Missions Escalates," in AU0604090793 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 4 Apr 93, p. 7.

the government decided on continuing the AWACS missions.²²¹ SPD chairman Bjoern Engholm reiterated his party's position that the SPD was prepared for new ideas in the political and diplomatic field and would support Blue Helmet operations, but only after an amendment was first passed.²²² He added that the AWACS missions are "covered neither by the Basic Law nor by a clearly defined NATO defense mandate."²²³

The FDP, junior partner in the Kohl coalition, maintained that the German aircrew would have to be pulled out of the AWACS missions. Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that if the AWACS planes were required to lead NATO fighter aircraft to firing positions against Serbian aircraft then his party would not support the CDU position unless an amendment was passed to allow combat missions. Kinkel was adamant that the government's decision to man the AWACS flights would be unjustifiable without an amendment to the Basic Law. "You won't get a violation of the constitution

²²¹Ibid., 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "SPD Criticizes Compromise," in LD2503092993 Hamburg DPA in German 0008 GMT 25 Mar 93.

²²²Ibid., 93-061, 1 April 1993, p. 22, "Engholm Discusses Political Goals, AWACS," in AU0104104593 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 2015 GMT 31 Mar 93.

²²³Ibid., 93-063, 5 April 1993, p. 27, "SPD's Engholm Attacks Decision," in LD0204145893 Berlin DDP in German 1322 GMT 2 Apr 93.

with me," he declared.²²⁴ FDP chairman Otto Count Lambsdorff indirectly threatened to break up the Bonn coalition if the Kohl government decided to keep the Germans in the AWCAS flights. He maintained that Bundeswehr soldiers would not be covered by the Basic Law due to the combat status of the missions.²²⁵

In light of the irreconcilable differences between the FDP and the CDU, the decision to support the NATO AWACS flights with the requisite German aircrew was made by the coalition with the understanding that the FDP would also challenge the decision by appealing to the Federal Constitutional Court to get a ruling on the validity of the operation.²²⁶ The FDP cited Article 26 in which "acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations" as the basis not to go ahead with the German contribution to the AWACS missions without clarifying the Basic Law first.²²⁷ Foreign Minister Kinkel's

²²⁴Ibid., 93-012, 21 January 1993, p. 31, "Ruehe Says Pilots to Retain AWACS Role Over Bosnia," in LD2001094293 Hamburg DPA in German 0855 GMT 20 Jan 93.

²²⁵Ibid., 93-015, 26 January 1993, p. 13, "FDP Warns of Coalition Breakup Over AWACS Use in FRY," in LD2501152893 Hamburg DPA in German 1214 GMT 25 Jan 93.

²²⁶Ibid., 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "CDU Announces Compromise Reached," in LD2403224693 Berlin DDP in German 2048 GMT 24 Mar 93.

²²⁷Alan Riding, "NATO Members Agree to Enforce UN Ban on Flights Over Bosnia," New York Times, 3 April 1993, p. 5.

opinion was that a split in the coalition at that point in time would have been senseless. He defended the coalition's decision to let the Constitutional Court decide the issue due to the impasse not only between the CDU and the FDP, but also because of the SPD's entrenched position.²²⁸ Mr. Kinkel commented that, "We [the government] have the dilemma of believing that while we should be able to do it, we can't, and are arguing about whether we can't go ahead anyway."²²⁹

In an Emnid Survey for DER SPIEGEL, conducted from 22-24 March 1993, 1,000 Germans were asked, "Should German soldiers participate in the implementation of the ban on flying over Bosnia imposed by the United Nations?" of which 53% responded favorably and 42% were against, while 5% gave no opinion.²³⁰ In another question, the survey asked, "Should Bundsewehr aircraft participate in the air lift to support the Muslims encircled in east Bosnia?" of which 86% answered

²²⁸FBIS-WEU, 93-056, 25 March 1993, p. 9, "Kinkel Defends Coalition's Agreement," in LD2503114293 Berlin ADN in German 1108 GMT 25 Mar 93.

²²⁹"Court Debates Germans' Air Role in Bosnia," New York Times, 8 April 1993, p. A6.

²³⁰FBIS-WEU, 93-064, 6 April 1993, p. 17, "Government Cedes AWACS Issue to Court Review," in 93EN0338A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No. 13, 29 Mar 93, p. 18-23. 59% of the CDU/CSU respondents were for the German participation and 54% of the SPD respondents were for it also.

affirmatively and 10% were against, while 4% had no opinion.²³¹

Foreign Minister Kinkel softened his party's stance on the issue by stating that the AWACS flights cannot be equated with a direct combat mission.²³² He also regretted that the government had no recourse but to allow the Constitutional Court to clarify the legal position on a possible German involvement in the AWACS operations.²³³ He primarily blamed the situation on the SPD's reluctance to compromise on an amendment to the Basic Law. He reiterated that the Bundeswehr must "be in a position to take part in peacekeeping blue helmet missions and in exceptional circumstances in peacemaking measures."²³⁴

On 8 April 1993, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled 5 to 3 not to invoke a temporary halting injunction and that German military personnel could participate in the AWACS missions.²³⁵ The Court, however, did not rule on the

²³¹Ibid. 89% of the CDU/CSU respondents were for the airlift and 88% of the SPD respondents were for the airlift also.

²³²Ibid., 93-065, 7 April 1993, p. 11, "Kinkel Says Bosnia AWACS Flights Not Combat Missions," in LD0704075593 Berlin ADN in German 2314 GMT 6 Apr 93.

²³³Ibid.

²³⁴Ibid.

²³⁵Craig R. Whitney, "German Court Backs Use of Armed Forces in Bosnia Air Patrol," New York Times, 9 April 1993, p. A6.

fundamental issue of peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in out of area instances. The legislative and executive branches were to decide upon the foreign and security policy issue of the Bundeswehr's role in the changing international environment. If another impasse were to occur on foreign and security policy in regard to the constitutionality of the issue, then the Court could be called upon again to make a ruling.

The argument put forth both by the CDU/CSU and FDP parties that the withdrawal of the 162 German aircrew would seriously impair the success of the AWACS missions and also cause severe political damage to Germany and the NATO alliance in resolving the Balkan crisis affected the Court's decision.²³⁶ The decision to take no action in the UN-mandated and NATO-led AWACS missions would cause a severe rupture in the NATO alliance that would be devastating not only to Germany's well being, but also to the western European states as a whole. The enduring stability of the region, maintained through the existence of NATO, would be jeopardized due to the German decision not to militarily participate in the NATO AWACS missions. The CDU/CSU argued that Germany's abstention on the vitally important NATO

²³⁶FBIS-WEU, 93-067, 9 April 1993, p. 16, "Constitutional Court Hears Arguments in AWACS Case," in AU0804131693 SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 8-9 Apr 93.

mission would create a worse situation for Germany's stature and well being within the European region than if the aircrew were allowed to assume the combat support role within the confines of the NATO guaranteed area.²³⁷

The Federal Constitutional Court agreed to allow the German military participation of its aircrews specifically on the basis of the CDU/CSU's argument. The Court felt that Germany would suffer enormous and irreparable foreign policy damage if the German military did not participate in the NATO AWACS missions.²³⁸ If the Court had ruled the other way and not allowed the German participation, then Germany would have been forced to embark on a special path of isolationist policy in dealing with regional crises at the periphery of its borders. However, the Court ruling was based solely on the political reality of increased domestic and foreign pressure for the FRG to assume a greater role in international military operations affecting crises in the Post-Cold War era.²³⁹

²³⁷Chancellor Kohl maintained that the NATO AWACS flights did not cross into former Yugoslavian airspace and therefore was not violating the traditional Constitutional interpretation of defending Germany and the NATO alliance area.

²³⁸Ibid., 93-069, 13 April 1993, p. 13, "Kinkel Discusses Bosnia No Fly Zone Operation," in AU1304102093 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0517 GMT 13 Apr 93.

²³⁹Marc Fisher, "New Debate Erupts on German Military," The Washington Post, 16 April 1993, p. A21.

The FRG passed through another crossroads in the formulation of foreign policy and a greater German contribution toward the burdensharing responsibility of European security and stability.²⁴⁰ CSU national Chairman Theo Waigel remarked that the Court made a "decision of great political and legal importance that pointed the way into the future."²⁴¹ However, Guenter Verhuegen of the SPD Bundestag parliamentary group voiced the opposite opinion that the decision was temporary and only pertained to the Bosnia conflict. He warned the government coalition not to interpret the decision as "carte blanche for Armed Forces operations of all kinds."²⁴² The SPD attempted to pass legislation in the Bundestag calling for the withdrawal of the German aircrew from the AWACS missions on 21 April 1993. The attempt failed by a vote of 343 to 199 (with nine abstentions) at stopping the German involvement despite the Court decision to allow the mission.²⁴³ In another vote on

²⁴⁰FBIS-WEU, 93-069, 13 April 1993, p. 16, "Further Commentary," in AU1104191193 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 10 Apr 93, p. 6.

²⁴¹"Government Expresses Relief at Karlsruhe AWACS Decision; SPD Warns Against 'Carte Blanche'," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 16 April 1993), p. 1.

²⁴²Ibid.

²⁴³FBIS-WEU, 93-076, 22 April 1993, p. 13, "Bundestag to Keep Crews in NATO AWACS Over Bosnia," in LD2104174393 Berlin DDP in German 1654 GMT 21 Apr 93.

the same day, the Bundestag approved the government decision by a margin of 341 to 206 (with eight abstentions)²⁴⁴ to support German participation in the evolving UN humanitarian aid operation in "peaceful areas" of Somalia.²⁴⁵

The issue of German military involvement in out-of-area missions reached another qualitative level through the Kohl government's decision to actively participate in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. German involvement on a global scale, in consonance with the FRG's alliance partners, showed that the German contribution to increased security burdensharing did not stop at the limits of the NATO Alliance area or of the European region. Germany's ruling coalition felt that Germany must also be responsible for the stability of regions further in distance than the Balkans. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition maintained that Germany's responsibility for enforcing stability in areas not directly affecting Germany's security was necessary now that Germany was a fully sovereign state and on a level with the other democratic member states of the United Nations.

²⁴⁴"Bundestag Approves Somali Mission for German Armed Forces," The Week in Germany. (New York: German Information Center, 23 April 1993), p. 1.

²⁴⁵FBIS-WFU, 93-076, 22 April 1993, p. 13, "Bundestag Approves Decision to Provide Aid to Somalia," in LD2104173693 Berlin ADN in German 1642 GMT 21 Apr 93.

The Kohl government argued that it was in Germany's best interests to contribute military units to UN efforts if the FRG was to maintain a foreign and security policy that benefitted regional and global aims of safeguarding human rights and the promotion of democracy abroad.

B. SOMALIA MISSION

On 17 December 1992, Chancellor Kohl announced his intention to increase the number of Luftwaffe humanitarian flights to Somalia. In anticipation of UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali's visit to Germany, Chancellor Kohl also pledged a battalion of the Bundeswehr to the follow-on UN mission at the conclusion of the U.S.-led Operation Restore Hope. The objective of the battalion was to assist in the nation building process in passive areas of Somalia. The German unit was to consist of engineers, medical personnel, telecommunications specialists, military police and security forces strictly for self-defense of the unit.²⁴⁶ Defense Minister Volker Ruehe detailed the composition of the German "humanitarian intervention" contribution to the UN mission (UNOSOM II) as an equivalent Regiment of 1,500

²⁴⁶"Germany to Send Military Personnel to Somalia; Increase Number of Aid Flights Now," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 18 December 1992), p. 1

personnel of which 150 were infantry soldiers.²⁴⁷ Mr. Kohl, aware of the ambivalent SPD position on deploying troops outside of traditional limitations, expressly stated that the Bundeswehr unit was not to participate in military engagements.²⁴⁸

In January 1993 foreign policy spokesman for the SPD parliamentary group Karsten Voigt commented that his party was vehemently against the military deployment without a prior amendment to the Basic Law. However, he also reaffirmed that the SPD supported all that the UN and the Secretary General expected of Germany in conjunction with the Somalia mission, but that any German participation must be preceded by an amendment to allow peacekeeping troops to be deployed.²⁴⁹ After Defense Minister Ruehe announced on 15 April 1993 that German troops were to deploy to Somalia in June 1993, the SPD protested that the mission was too dangerous at that time and reiterated that the Bundeswehr

²⁴⁷FBIS-WEU, 93-006, 11 January 1993, p. 11, "Bundeswehr Completes Planning for Somalia Deployment," in AU1101102893 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 10 Jan 93, p. 6.

²⁴⁸"Germany to Send Military Personnel to Somalia; Increase Number of Aid Flights Now," p. 1.

²⁴⁹FBIS-WEU, 93-007, 12 January 1993, p. 6, "SPD Official Criticizes CDU/CSU," in LD1201112293 Berlin ADN in German 0812 GMT 12 Jan 93.

should take part in humanitarian operations only if the chance of becoming involved in combat is non-existent.²⁵⁰ In response, Foreign Minister Kinkel stated that the government's conditions for deploying the Bundeswehr consisted of assurance from the UN Secretary General that German units would be stationed in pacified regions of Somalia with a low probability of combat engagements, that the German contribution was purely humanitarian in nature, and that the use of weapons was only for self-defense.²⁵¹

After the Constitutional Court ruling on the use of German forces in the NATO AWACS planes for the Bosnia no fly zone missions, Chancellor Kohl commented that, "[The Somalia deployment of German troops] is an important decision for Germany's international solidarity...[because] our international partners expect us to participate in Somalia."²⁵² Foreign Minister Kinkel laid out the objectives of the German contingent in Somalia to help rebuild the nation by clearing mines off the roads, providing transportation assets for the UN force, distributing aid and

²⁵⁰Marc Fisher, "New Debate Erupts on German Military," The Washington Post, 16 April 1993, p. A21.

²⁵¹FBIS-WEU, 93-074, 20 April 1993, p. 19, "Kinkel Urges Mission Role," in AU1904201193 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1716 GMT 18 Apr 93.

²⁵²Ferdinand Protzman, "Germany's Troops to Go to Somalia," New York Times, 21 April 1993, p. A4

relief supplies, building shelters for the refugees and establishing the water system again.²⁵³ After the government clarified the humanitarian role that German troops were to play in the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia, the popular support for this type of operation increased. This trend was evident in the Allensbach Institute's poll which showed that 50% of the German respondents supported the FRG's ability to send troops to UN missions, while 31% were opposed and 19% had no opinion.²⁵⁴

On 21 April 1993, the Bundestag voted 341 to 206 to support the government decision to send the Bundeswehr to Somalia to fill a humanitarian role.²⁵⁵ Unlike the German military involvement in the Bosnia no fly zone issue, the FDP was in agreement with the CDU/CSU position on a humanitarian troop deployment to Somalia. Foreign Minister Kinkel released a policy statement prior to the vote in which he stated that the FRG, like the rest of the UN members, must assume three tasks of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and creating conditions of peace. Kinkel also said the FRG must "reach a new, expanded political and

²⁵³Ibid.

²⁵⁴Ibid.

²⁵⁵"German Humanitarian Aid Mission to Somalia Begins," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 14 May 1993), p. 2.

constitutional consensus about the mission of the Bundeswehr that enables [the FRG] to work under the umbrella of the UN and alongside [Germany's] partners toward fulfillment of the three tasks.²⁵⁶

The SPD Chairman Bjoern Engholm argued that the Somalia mission was a "classic blue helmet mission" and that a constitutional precondition was missing for the proper execution of German military involvement. He warned the Kohl government that if German troops were deployed to Somalia, then his party would be forced to appeal the decision to the Constitutional Court.²⁵⁷ Engholm denied that a split occurred within the SPD concerning the admissibility of German troop involvement in both peacekeeping and combat operations if the proper conditions first existed. Earlier, Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD parliamentary floor leader, said his party was not opposed to sending military units to certain parts of Somalia under the banner of the UN, but that an amendment was required and the SPD was prepared to achieve a change to the Basic Law.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶"Bundestag Approves Somalia Mission for German Armed Forces," p. 1.

²⁵⁷FBIS-WEU, 93-080, 28 April 1993, p. 17, "Engholm Denies Changing Course on Combat Missions," in AU2704142893 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Apr 93, p. 5.

²⁵⁸Protzman, p. A4.

However, internal division within the SPD was evident on the issue of troop deployments for other than UN peacekeeping missions without a Basic Law change if the proper political and security conditions were in place for establishing an operation. This attitude could be a reflection of the ZDF Political Barometer poll taken in April in which 50% of the west Germans responded that in the future the Bundeswehr should be able to participate in combat missions. However, only 38% of the east Germans polled answered favorably to a future combat role.²⁵⁹ The lower percentage of the east German respondents could be attributed to the general pacifist and apathetic attitude prevalent within former East Germany as a result of the oppressive militaristic government system that dominated all aspects of society during the Cold War.

An advance unit of 45 Bundeswehr troops deployed to Somalia in the second week of May 1993, followed shortly by an additional 100 soldiers to establish a base of operations in Belet Huen.²⁶⁰ Belet Huen is situated in a relatively calm area 186 miles from Mogadishu, the internal hot bed and

²⁵⁹ FBIS-WEU, 93-080, 28 April 1993, p. 27, "Poll Shows Increase in Government Popularity," in AU2604083393 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 24-25 Apr 93, p. 12.

²⁶⁰ "German Humanitarian Aid Mission to Somalia Begins," p. 2.

Capitol of Somalia.²⁶¹ The remainder of the 1,640 strong German military unit deployed in June and July 1993 and was composed of two infantry companies (for self-defense), two engineer companies, two logistics companies, a military police detachment, and signals, medical and maintenance companies.²⁶²

In June 1993, after several armed clashes between rival clans and UN peacekeepers in Mogadishu caused the deaths of 23 Pakistani UN peacekeepers, the SPD petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe to temporarily halt the deployment of German troops already in progress at that time and to clarify the constitutional basis for the military deployment.²⁶³ According to the SPD, the parameters of the mission changed from a humanitarian operation to a combat role with the stationing of 50 Bundeswehr personnel in Mogadishu acting as a German liaison to the UN Command headquartered in the Capitol. After the fighting erupted in Mogadishu, the 50 military technicians and specialists were

²⁶¹"SPD Seeks to Block Deployment to Somalia of Bundeswehr Soldiers," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 11 June 1993), p. 2.

²⁶²"Kohl Gets Backing for Somalia Troops Plan," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 19, no. 18, p. 11.

²⁶³"SPD Seeks to Block Deployment to Somalia of Bundeswehr Soldiers," p. 2.

flown out to Nairobi, Kenya.²⁶⁴ The SPD was concerned that German troops would be drawn into combat and therefore not covered under the constitution without a clarification to allow German soldiers to participate in such operations.²⁶⁵

On 23 June 1993, the Court handed down a decision allowing the German military deployment in Somalia to continue.²⁶⁶ The Somalia ruling signified a defeat for the SPD in clarifying the Basic Law toward the position favored by the Social Democrats. As in the case of the Bosnia no fly zone issue, the Court ruled specifically on the Somalia deployment and not on the broader issue of the constitutionality of out-of-area peacekeeping and combat missions. In their ruling, the judges emphasized the Bundestag's responsibility in deciding the issue of deploying troops to Somalia and elsewhere through the passage of formal resolutions. Both parliamentary Chairmen of the CDU/CSU and the FDP, Wolfgang Schaeuble and Werner Hoyer respectively, expressed relief at the Court's decision and stated the ruling greatly contributed to securing the FRG's ability to act in foreign and security policy issues

²⁶⁴Ibid.

²⁶⁵"Germany to Continue its Peacekeeping Role," Jane's Defense Weekly, vol. 20, no. 1, p. 9.

²⁶⁶"German Mission to Somalia Does Not Violate the Basic Law, Constitutional Court Says," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 25 June 1993), p. 1.

beyond the borders of Germany and NATO. The Court also hinted that a decision on the general issue concerning the Basic Law and the role of the Bundeswehr in foreign and security policy could be expected in 1994.²⁶⁷

The situation in Somalia worsened on 15 July 1993, when nine German soldiers were shot at by Somali fighters at the Mogadishu airport.²⁶⁸ However, none of the men were wounded and they did not return fire. In another incident in Mogadishu, German soldiers were unharmed at the UN Command headquarters after an exchange of fire by Somali clansmen and UN peacekeepers. The German base at Belet Huen was also fired on by rival clans with no casualties on either side.²⁶⁹ Amid the growing concern that German troops might become involved in the fighting, the SPD continued to call for the withdrawal of German forces from Somalia due to the resurgence of violence within the country. Foreign Minister Kinkel countered the SPD assertions by stating:

[although the situation] gave cause for concern...The use of German troops in Somalia is not without danger and everyone knew that, including the Federal Constitutional Court and the Bunsdestag...[the fighting] cannot cause us

²⁶⁷Ibid.

²⁶⁸"More German Soldiers Arrive in Somalia; Issue Remains Controversial at Home," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 23 July 1993), p. 1.

²⁶⁹Ibid.

to withdraw our soldiers, as the only country among thirty [participating in UNOSOM II].²⁷⁰

The deaths of 17 U.S. Rangers and the wounding of 75 more in heavy fighting during October 1993 caused a shift in U.S. foreign and security policy within Somalia that called for the pull out of U.S. military forces by 31 March 1994. As a result of the U.S. decision, the German government along with several other troop contributing European countries, announced the withdrawal of their military forces in conjunction with the planned U.S. pull out. Yet, from the beginning of discussion on a possible military involvement in Somalia, the German government maintained that the initial deployment of Bundeswehr personnel was to terminate after six month period anyway.

Germany's leadership argued that the military participation in Somalia was significant and important in promoting democracy and stability in Somalia. The German military involvement in the Bosnia no fly zone enforcement operation, aid and resupply airlifts to Bosnia, humanitarian airdrops and the Adriatic Sea mission also contributed to thwarting Serbian aggression and safeguarding Bosnian lives. The military medical unit deployed to Cambodia also highlighted Germany's burdensharing contribution toward

²⁷⁰Ibid.

establishing peace and security not only in regional crises, but global conflicts as well. The significance of Sgt. Alexander Arndt's death in the Cambodian deployment showed that humanitarian missions, just like peacekeeping operations, are inherently dangerous and can sometimes blur into combat situations. The political debate within Germany over a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr involved not only compromise and consensus, but also a re-interpretation of old views on the legality and extent of using the military as a tool of foreign policy in a changing security environment.

The decisions by the Kohl government to take military action, in the UN-mandated multi-lateral operations, indicated a trend in German foreign and security policy to assume a greater role in helping to influence world events. The goal of assuming military humanitarian missions led to the idea of future participation in peacekeeping missions. Inherently, armed peacekeeping missions can lead to the possibility that these types of operations could lead to combat. Yet, the objective of peacekeeping missions is not to become involved in combat for the purpose of defeating an opposing side, but is aimed toward the promotion of regional and global stability and peace. The issue of adopting a foreign and security policy that maintains the ability to use military force for peacekeeping missions also means that

the potential use of armed force in combat is an inherent part of this type of a military role.

German reticence on utilizing its military as a tool of foreign policy in the changing Post-Cold War security environment was based on past unilateral historical actions which resulted in far reaching repercussions to Germany's well being and the world. The SPD maintained that the German military should not be used for purposes other than peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN, yet the feeling within German society, as reflected through the actions of the Kohl government and the Federal Constitutional Court, was that military involvement in peacekeeping missions was in the best interests of Germany and the global community. The resolution of the peacekeeping debate is not complete. However, the impetus is present to assume a greater role in world affairs should Germany's leadership deem that German participation in military actions under the banner of collective defense and security organizations is necessary to safeguard stability and peace within the European region or on a global scale.

The decisions by the Kohl government concerning military participation in the Balkans, Cambodia, and Somalia are small steps toward assuming full fledged peacekeeping missions for the Bundeswehr which will unavoidably lead to the eventual role of participation in combat operations.

This action does not mean that Germany will repeat history by unilaterally marching off to the sound of distant thunder, but shows that the FRG is in the process of assuming the role that other mature, stable democratic states have already maintained in resolving acts of aggression against other members of the global community. The German debate over military peacekeeping missions for the Bundeswehr is the first step toward an eventual combat role with the intention to use military force as a means of stopping aggression by belligerent states and promoting the ideals of stability and security in the Post-Cold War era.

The use of German military force, not only for the defense of the Homeland, but for positive measures of ensuring the protection of human rights abroad and the promotion of democracy in areas under the threat of authoritarian rule is the act of a mature and responsible nation. The positive resolution of the German debate surrounding a peacekeeping mission will lead to an increase in the security burden-sharing responsibility and the enhancement of relations among the more developed democracies of the world.

However, the political parties still differ on their interpretation of the constitution and the issue of peacekeeping missions for the Bundeswehr. Until the parties can come to an agreement on the role of the Bundeswehr in a

changing security environment, the government will not be able to utilize the military in foreign policy decisions that could involve potential peacekeeping or combat missions. Therefore, the position of the military, the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government and the SPD opposition party on the divisive issue are important to understanding the political gridlock prevalent within the German polity.

VI. THE POLITICAL DILEMMA OF COMPROMISE

The debate over a peacekeeping mission for the Bundeswehr primarily involves the political parties that possess the ability to influence the government's foreign and security policy decisions. In addition, the military's viewpoint is important because the role of the Armed Forces is at the crux of the issue. However, unlike the pre-Cold War days, the military's position in the German state is not one of supremacy to the government's leadership or the political parties. The Bundeswehr was established under the precept of the soldier as a citizen first and the primacy of civilian control of the military. The founding father of the Bundeswehr, Wolfgang Graf Baudissin, best summed up the position of military in society and government as the "citizen in uniform."²⁷¹ Although the Bundeswehr's top leadership possessed a distinct view on the role the military should play in the Post-Cold War era, the Minister of Defense stated the official position of the military on the peacekeeping issue. The General Inspector, the head of

²⁷¹Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale," p. 88.

the joint Armed Forces staff, is subordinate to the Defense Minister as a department head.²⁷² Nevertheless, the recommendations of the Bundeswehr joint staff were important for understanding the attitude of the uniformed leadership in participating in potential peacekeeping and combat operations. The General Inspector is designated as the principal military advisor to the Defense Minister and to the federal government. The General Inspector is a non-voting member of the Cabinet's Federal Security Council and can be called on by the Security Council or the Chancellor to answer questions or provide expert or advisory opinion on matters pertaining to the military.²⁷³ The General Inspector maintains the role of primacy in overall Bundeswehr planning. He is responsible for the "harmonizing and coordinating of service views on how to meet the economic, demographic, and social constraints that will shape the Bundeswehr in the 1990's."²⁷⁴ Therefore, the General Inspector must prepare the Bundeswehr to assume peacekeeping and combat operations if the government leaders decide on such missions.

²⁷²Ibid., p. 92.

²⁷³Ibid., p. 96.

²⁷⁴Ibid., p. 97.

A. MILITARY VIEWPOINT

In February 1992, the Bundeswehr joint staff submitted a report entitled "Military Policy and Military Strategic Principles and Conceptual Basic Tendencies of the Restructuring of the Bundeswehr" which outlined a framework for the military structure to follow through the 1990's. This report was the first official report by the Bundeswehr on a new defense policy Germany's reunification. The report stated that the Bundeswehr must begin preparation for NATO "out of area" deployments based on an Alliance and European assessment of the risks from a worldwide perspective.²⁷⁵ The report fueled the debate within Parliament on whether the military should assume missions other than the defense of the homeland. Both the SPD and the FDP labeled the report as irresponsible planning on the part of the Bundeswehr and the Defense Ministry. FDP Deputy Juergen Koppelin remarked that the report "intended to create an international police force."²⁷⁶ Both Parties accused Defense Minister Stoltenberg, by allowing the report to be published, of

²⁷⁵FBIS-WEU, 92-027, 10 February 1992, p. 17, "Secret Doctrine Denied," in LD0702115792 Hamburg DPA in German 1643 GMT 6 Feb 92 and "TAZ Says Defense Ministry Plans New Doctrine," in LD0702114692 Berlin ADN in German 1557 GMT 6 Feb 92.

²⁷⁶Ibid., 92-030, 13 February 1992, p. 29, "SPD, FDP Reject Stoltenberg's Bundeswehr Plans," in AU1302121892 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 13 Feb 92, p. 2.

ignoring the military tenets of the Basic Law.²⁷⁷ He was reminded of the primacy of civilian political control to be maintained over the Bundeswehr.

In February 1992, German Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg remarked that the Bundeswehr must adapt to the changing geopolitical situation of international crisis management by abandoning the position of considering itself as just a "front line state."²⁷⁸ He proposed that the Bundeswehr assume three primary missions: as part of an all-European balance of military potential; in defense of German and Allied borders; for collective operations outside the NATO area, and through participation in international peacekeeping missions.²⁷⁹ He reiterated that the broadest political consensus would first be required to assume the function of "preserving peace and defending international law" yet, he felt that the Bundeswehr should "take part in the entire range of international missions within the framework of the UN Charter."²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷Ibid.

²⁷⁸Ibid., 92-022, 3 February 1992, p. 19-20, "Stoltenberg on New Bundeswehr Missions, Policy," in 92GE0202A Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German no. 1, Jan 92, p. 9-12.

²⁷⁹Ibid., 20.

²⁸⁰Ibid., 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 8, "Stoltenberg Remarks on Bundeswehr Missions," in AU1601134392 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1200 GMT 16 Jan 92.

In consonance with the new NATO strategy concept of establishing crisis reaction forces as the first line of defense and main defense forces as the second line, Mr. Stoltenberg planned to attain these goals for future Bundeswehr participation through the establishment of NATO-oriented German "crisis reaction forces" and also through the maintenance of German main defense forces.²⁸¹ His actions toward effective and rapid crisis management and, if necessary, the establishment of combat-ready units underscored the importance of the debate on future roles for the Bundeswehr.²⁸² Bundeswehr Generalinspekteur (Chief of Staff) Klaus Naumann's intentions were to organize the Armed Forces toward the role that German troops were playing in the peacekeeping operation in Cambodia (not from a humanitarian perspective, but from one of protection).²⁸³ He, like Stoltenberg, understood that a political clarification by the parties on the peacekeeping role would have to be enacted prior to complete preparation for such missions.

²⁸¹Ibid., 92-003, 6 January 1992, p. 14, "Bundeswehr To Get Crisis Deployment Capability," in LD0501102492 Berlin ADN in German 0637 GMT 5 Jan 92.

²⁸²Ibid., 92-009, 14 January 1992, p. 12, "Stoltenberg Lays Out New Plans for Bundeswehr," in AU1301144592 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 12 Jan 92, pp. 1, 2.

²⁸³Ibid., p. 15, 16, "Naumann Intends to Reorganize Bundeswehr," in AU0501191592 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1000 GMT 5 Jan 92.

Still, the military was beginning to plan for contingencies in anticipation of a government decision to allow for peacekeeping and possibly combat operations.

In March 1992, Gen. Naumann remarked that one of his tasks was to prepare German soldiers for participation in international peacekeeping missions once the appropriate constitutional requirements were in place. In reality, he perceived that the necessary political consensus for such missions would be a long term process. Nevertheless, he was progressing with plans to outfit a battalion of 1,000 to 2,000 men for a German contribution to an international peacekeeping mission.²⁸⁴

After he assumed the position of Minister of Defense, Volker Ruehe commented on 15 January 1993 to the Bundestag:

Germany is facing the task of assuming equal responsibility as its neighbors in a new, changed international system. War as a political instrument has returned to Europe. Why should a 19-year old Polish soldier in 1993 shoulder greater responsibility for peace and security in Europe than a 19-year old German soldier? The motto cannot be; All for one, but one only for himself. Germany cannot simply refuse to participate.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁴Ibid., 92-063, 1 April 1992, p. 13-15, "Inspector General Views Bundeswehr Goals," in AU3103200092 Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 27 Mar 92, pp 7-8.

²⁸⁵Ibid., 93-011, 19 January 1993, p. 12, "Ruehe Endorses Participation in UN Missions," in AU1501131993 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 0954 GMT 15 Jan 93.

Within the military itself, Gen. Naumann's aims for possible peacekeeping missions did not represent the majority viewpoint. In May 1992, an opinion poll conducted by the Bundeswehr psychological service showed that only 42 percent of the military polled would take part in UN Blue Helmet operations. In addition, the poll showed that only about 15 percent advocated UN mandated "armed missions."²⁸⁶ A study by the Institute of Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr in Munich carried out in the spring of 1992, showed that the officer corps held mixed opinions on the potential for the Bundeswehr's deployment outside of Germany for either peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions.²⁸⁷

General Naumann asserted that what he needed from members of the military was an awareness that the "overwhelming majority of [the] people supported participation in UN missions...all of which are dangerous."²⁸⁸ He further commented that Germany needed "Armed Forces that will have to carry out a great number of

²⁸⁶Ibid., 92-104, 29 May 1992, p. 20, "Soldiers Oppose Deployment Outside Germany," in AU2505175492 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 25 May 92, p. 16.

²⁸⁷Ibid., 92-106, 2 June 1992, p. 14-15, "Bundeswehr Officers Seek Clear Goals, Mission," in 92GE0358A Hamburg DEUTSCHE ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German No 17, 24 Apr 92, p. 11.

²⁸⁸Ibid., 93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 9, "Bundeswehr's Naumann on FRG Role in UN Missions," in AU0703210093 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1005 GMT 7 Mar 93.

tasks in the future...ranging from humanitarian missions to peacekeeping and peacemaking operations."²⁸⁹ General Naumann saw no strict demarcations between all these missions. He commented that a "chemically clear-cut distinction between humanitarian and armed operations under the auspices of the UN is as impossible as a clearly defined dividing line between UN peacekeeping and peacemaking missions."²⁹⁰ He reiterated that the Bundeswehr must be capable of mounting not only humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, but peacemaking operations as well.²⁹¹ General Naumann was planning for the availability of a complete division for peacekeeping missions by 2000.²⁹² General Naumann was concerned about what he termed growing doubts of trustworthiness and reliability by Germany's security partners in the FRG's willingness to share the risks. He asserted that Germany must not assume a special role of reticence and isolation which also affects the mood among the soldiers.²⁹³

²⁸⁹Ibid., p. 10.

²⁹⁰Ibid., 93-045, 10 March 1993, p. 28, "Naumann Warns Against Refusing Role in UN Peacekeeping," in LD0903185293 Hamburg DPA in German 1636 GMT 9 Mar 93.

²⁹¹Ibid.

²⁹²Ibid., 93-044, 9 March 1993, p. 9, "Bundeswehr's Naumann on FRG Role in UN Missions," p. 11.

²⁹³Ibid., p. 12.

However, General Naumann's comments were criticized by members of all the political parties. Walter Kolbow, SPD Bundestag Group defense policy spokesman, said that what matters is the "acceptance of the primacy of politics" and that Gen. Naumann's comments reached their "limit."²⁹⁴ Werner Hoyer, FDP security policy spokesman, said Gen. Naumann was walking a "hot tightrope."²⁹⁵ CDU deputy and defense expert Otto Hauser noted that even if Gen. Naumann was correct in his statements, that it was "none of his business to tell the politicians what he was thinking and to discredit them."²⁹⁶ Gen. Naumann later stated that he welcomed a political decision to the question of the future role of the Bundeswehr and he hoped that the broadest possible consensus could be reached.²⁹⁷

Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Helge Hansen, in June 1992, stated that, although German soldiers were still "nursing their wounds" over the government's decision not to get involved in a combat role during the Gulf War, the

²⁹⁴Ibid., 93-046, 11 March 1993, p. 22, "Political Parties Criticize Bundeswehr's Naumann," in AU0903230293 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 9 Mar 93, p. 2.

²⁹⁵Ibid.

²⁹⁶Ibid.

²⁹⁷Ibid., 93-062, 2 April 1993, p. 23, "Bundeswehr Chief Naumann on Collective Security Role," in 93EN0279A Berlin DER TAGESSPIEGEL in German 13 Mar 93, p. 5.

Bundeswehr would be ready to participate in UN peacekeeping missions starting in 1993. He also asserted that a constitutional clarification should first be enacted in order for the Bundeswehr to be able to fulfill this type of military mission.²⁹⁸ In the spring of 1992, LtGen. Hansen's staff began contingency planning for a "brigade-strength Army unit" to shift from a peacekeeping mission to a peacemaking (using force) role "following a deterioration of the situation in a crisis area."²⁹⁹ LtGen. Hansen remarked, "We cannot afford to sit out another round [in reference to the Bundeswehr's non-combat role in the Persian Gulf War]."³⁰⁰ In an advisory to the Army in August 1992, LtGen. Hansen spelled out preparations for German soldiers to take part in operations "inside and outside the NATC area...[with] special attention in training ...devoted to combat, as well as to registering and transporting the dead."³⁰¹ However, LtGen. Hansen was severely admonished by members of the political parties for overstepping the bounds

²⁹⁸Craig R. Whitney, "Cold War Past, Germans Ask Why Army Is Still Necessary," New York Times, 23 June 1992, p. A8.

²⁹⁹FBIS-WEU, 92-148, 31 July 92, p. 7, "Background to Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p 22-29.

³⁰⁰Ibid.

³⁰¹Marc Fisher, "U.N. Urges German Military Role," The Washington Post, 12 January 1993, p. A14.

of his position. He was accused of assuming the role of the government in deciding on missions for the Bundeswehr.

Even Gen. Naumann criticized the "wishy-washy" politicians' lack of assertiveness in reaching a political consensus on peacekeeping missions, "If you want world peace, you must get involved, not just express your concern."³⁰² However, Gen. Naumann proposed the deployment of Bundeswehr troops only if "the majority of the population is in favor of it."³⁰³ He reiterated that the future role of the military was to prevent conflicts and guard the peace. Yet, he could not effectively accomplish this peacekeeping goal unless such a mission was in consonance with the Basic Law.³⁰⁴

Defense Minister Ruehe concurred with the uniformed leadership that the FRG needed the broadest agreement of society for a new role of the Armed Forces in a changing world.³⁰⁵ However, the political reality of the situation was that the majority of the public did not necessarily agree

³⁰²Ibid.

³⁰³Ibid., 92-208, 27 October 1992, p. 23, "Klaus Naumann Views Future Bundeswehr Functions," in 93E0021C Bonn DAS PARLAMENT in German No 41, 2 Oct 92, p. 15.

³⁰⁴Ibid.

³⁰⁵Ibid., 93-079, 27 April 1993, p. 16, "Poll Shows 53% Against Bundeswehr Missions Abroad," in AU2304145093 Hamburg DIE WOCHE in German 23 Apr 93, p. 1.

with the military leadership's viewpoint. In a poll conducted by the Dortmund FORSA Institute for DIE WOCHE in April 1993, 53% of the respondents expressed that the military should stick to the exclusively defensive task.³⁰⁶ Only 21% approved of German peacekeeping missions under UN command and just 12% supported combat missions of German soldiers outside of the NATO guaranteed area.³⁰⁷

Nevertheless, upon receiving direction from Defense Minister Ruehe, Gen. Naumann began preparation of two battalions to be capable of taking part in UN peacekeeping operations by the end of 1993.³⁰⁸ The size of the force being readied for peacekeeping missions is minuscule in comparison to the total German Armed Forces, yet the idea of preparing any units at all for such a mission is a large step toward changing firmly entrenched linear defense attitudes not only in the military but also within the political parties and the German general population. However, the military preparations are not an indicator that political consensus is forthcoming in the near future. The coalition government still must obtain a two thirds majority vote to amend the constitution to permit the military to assume

³⁰⁶Ibid.

³⁰⁷Ibid.

³⁰⁸John G. Roos. "General Klaus Naumann," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1993, p. 45.

peacekeeping or peacemaking missions under the control of the UN or other regional security organizations. The view of the CDU/CSU party to reinterpret the existing articles of the constitution is not enough to formulate foreign and security policy. The FDP and the SPD require further clarification. The military viewpoint is important, but in the long run it is not a driving factor in the CDU/CSU's attempt to alter traditional military missions toward peacekeeping and peacemaking operations. The Coalition government must agree to a common policy and then attempt to persuade the opposition to adopt the same viewpoint on peacekeeping missions.

**B. CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION/CHRISTIAN SOCIAL UNION
(CDU/CSU) VIEWPOINT**

The moderate Christian party, the Christian Democratic Union, allied with the Bavarian Christian Social Union party, emerged after World War II and has played a major role in German politics throughout the Cold War and the present. Although both parties maintain independent structures, they form a common caucus in the Bundestag and do not run opposing party-platform campaigns (although they threaten to from time to time). Primarily composed of Catholics and Protestants, the allied CDU/CSU also

encompasses all economic classes. The CDU/CSU is generally conservative, especially on economic and social policies, and is closer identified with the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches than the other major parties.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl has served as the party chairman for the CDU since 1973. The CSU is chaired by Theo Waigel, who succeeded Franz Josef Strauss upon his death in 1988.³⁰⁹

The CDU/CSU is the senior coalition party in control of the government. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government, headed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU), took control in 1982 and replaced the SPD-FDP coalition chaired by the SPD's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Defense Minister Stoltenberg, a member of the CDU Party, in January 1992, advocated that the Bundeswehr should assume UN collective military missions outside the NATO area. He adamantly stated that the Bundeswehr must be able to participate "in the full spectrum of international missions," which includes peacekeeping operations.³¹⁰

CDU Deputy Bernd Wilz, CDU/CSU defense policy spokesman, was more specific in outlining the future tasks the Bundeswehr should assume. Speaking for the CDU/CSU Party, he stated

³⁰⁹U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, p. 5-6.

³¹⁰FBIS-WEU, 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 9, "Supports UN Mission Participation," in ID1601102492 Hamburg DPA in German 0832 GMT 16 Jan 92.

that the four missions should be: defense of the FRG; contributing to NATO with a new strategy of multi-national integration; contributing to collective security organizations (UN, WEU, etc.) after the Basic Law had been amended; and humanitarian missions. With regard to the proposed Bundeswehr third task, Wilz declared, "that would begin with [Bundeswehr participation in] the UN peacekeeping forces but would also include active military missions when and if hotbeds of tension have to be pacified."³¹¹

In March 1992, after the SPD threatened to propose a constitutional amendment restricting Bundeswehr operations strictly to UN peacekeeping missions, Karl Lamers, CDU/CSU foreign policy spokesman, remarked that assuming peacekeeping missions was a necessary move toward the FRG's normalization as a country which upholds international law. Yet, he further stated that a constitutional restriction on limiting the scope of military missions to only peacekeeping operations was not advocated by the CDU/CSU.³¹² Instead, the CDU/CSU supported the role of both peacekeeping and

³¹¹Ibid., 92-018, 28 January 1992, p. 7, "Parties Increasingly Attacking Stoltenberg," in AU2801104292 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG in German 26 Jan 92, p 2.

³¹²Ibid., 92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 15, "CDU/CSU Rejects Narrow Bundeswehr Role," in AU2403164792 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 92, p 6.

peacemaking operations for the Bundeswehr.³¹³ He further claimed that an amendment to the Basic Law was not necessary for the Bundeswehr to participate in UN Blue Helmet missions. According to Lamers, membership in the UN constituted tacit approval to abide by the UN Charter under which participation in peacekeeping missions was an obligation. Article 25 of the Basic Law spelled out that international law out-ranks German law and that an amendment to allow UN peacekeeping missions therefore was not needed.³¹⁴

When Volker Ruehe (CDU) took over as Defense Minister in March 1992, he also stated that peacekeeping operations would be the first step in fulfilling international obligations as spelled out in the UN Charter.³¹⁵ Mr. Ruehe recognized that a political consensus for establishing not only peacekeeping but peace-enforcing roles would be hard to achieve. The issue of out-of-area deployments and the use of the Bundeswehr for missions other than self-defense was

³¹³Ibid., 92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 7, "Politicians Discuss Future of Bundeswehr," in AU0604201392 Mainz 3SAT Television Network in German 1730 GMT 2 Apr 92.

³¹⁴Ibid., 92-071, 13 April 1992, p. 21, "CDU's Lamers Cited on Army's UN Action Role," in 92GE0231B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 92, p 6.

³¹⁵Ibid., 92-076, 20 April 1992, p. 6, "Ruehe Cited on Bundeswehr NATO Participation," in AU 2004085092 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 18 Apr 92, p 5.

still an uneasy concept for the general population to accept. In June 1992, Mr. Ruehe favored an aggressively manifested security policy of Bundeswehr peacekeeping deployments in which "everything else will come afterwards."³¹⁶ He intended to create the necessary prerequisites for UN peacekeeping missions by the end of 1992.³¹⁷ His attempts were not realized by his self-imposed deadline. A clear consensus was still not possible in light of the changes in the international security environment in the transition to the Post-Cold War era.

The CDU/CSU has consistently maintained that a Basic Law amendment is unnecessary for UN peacekeeping missions. Yet, in light of the SPD opposition to participation in international military combat operations and owing to the lack of social consensus on using the military for roles other than territorial defense, the CDU/CSU Party has offered proposals to the SPD on amending the Basic Law for immediate Blue Helmet operations and combat operations in

³¹⁶Ibid., 92-114, 12 June 1992, p. 12, "Parties View UN Missions, Eurocorps," in AU1106141192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jun 92, p. 1-2.

³¹⁷Ibid., p. 11, "Defense Minister Warns Against German Isolationism," in LD1106165792 Berlin ADN in German 1546 GMT 9 Jun 92.

principle.³¹⁸ A proposal submitted to the SPD leadership by Deputy Chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag Group Hornhues, in June 1992, called for a simple majority vote within the Bundestag for peacekeeping missions and a "qualified majority" to include approval by the Chancellor would be required in the Bundestag for combat operations.³¹⁹ The SPD outrightly refused to agree to such an amendment.

CSU Chairman Theo Waigel, in June 1992, commented that German Armed Forces should also participate in combat operations. He felt that the main foreign policy tasks should include preservation of German interests both "bilaterally, within the European framework, and at the international level."³²⁰ CDU/CSU Bundestag Caucus Chairman Schaeuble stated in July 1992 that combat missions were compatible with the Basic Law for reasons mentioned previously, yet the Party was prepared to clarify the

³¹⁸Ibid., 92-121, 23 June 1992, p. 21-22, "Ruehe Seeks Compromise With SPD on UN Missions," in LD2006093292 Berlin ADN in German 0848 GMT 20 Jun 92.

³¹⁹Ibid., 92-119, 19 June 1992, p. 11-12, "CDU, SPD Submit Plans for Bundeswehr Actions," in AU1806141592 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Jun 92, p. 5.

³²⁰Ibid., 92-128, 2 July 1992, p. 7, "Waigel Urges German Role in UN Combat Missions," in AU3006082592 Hamburg WELT AM SONNTAG in German 28 Jun 92, p. 1, 6.

issue with a Basic Law amendment to end the debate.³²¹ Finding a compromise amendment suitable in wording and content, which is agreeable to all the political party views, became the stumbling block toward passage of a constitutional change allowing either peacekeeping or combat missions. The consensus of the coalition swing-member FDP Party, in agreeing to the CDU/CSU version of an amendment, became increasingly more important for a required two thirds majority passage.

The CDU/CSU party cited Article 24 of the Basic Law in which the senior coalition partner justified Bundeswehr missions within the framework of the UN and other regional defense organization like NATO and the WEU. The need to clarify the constitution through an amendment was not necessary based on a re-interpretation of the traditional government stance as laid out in the previously mentioned 1982 German Federal Security Council Resolution. However, in the interests of establishing a solid political consensus the CDU/CSU party was willing to agree on amending the constitution toward peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.

The CSU was more assertive than the CDU in stating that the Basic Law need not be changed. Wolfgang Boetsch,

³²¹Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 9, "SPD Policy on Combat Missions," in AU2107072892 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Jul 92, p. 1-2.

Chairman of the CSU Land Group in Wildbad Kreuth, stated that "Germany's ability to act in foreign policy must be comparable to that of France and Great Britain."³²² He stressed that an amendment that restricted the FRG to peacekeeping measures only was "fatal" and "handcuffed" German foreign policy.³²³ Mr. Boetsch asserted that the government should not "go into the Babylonian captivity of the SPD in every case."³²⁴

Chancellor Kohl stated the government's position that without reservation the "complete participation in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-implementing measures" under the command of the UN was required by Germany.³²⁵ As a member of the UN, Mr. Kohl stressed that the FRG has a responsibility to fulfill the duties of a UN member and that "anything else would be incompatible with the dignity of Germany."³²⁶ He stated that Germany must fulfill its international responsibilities in individual cases by

³²²Ibid., 93-008, 13 January 1993, p. 15, "CSU Favors Participation in Combat Missions in FRY," in AU1201171593 Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11 Jan 93, p. 2.

³²³Ibid.

³²⁴Ibid.

³²⁵Ibid., 93-024, 8 February 1993, p. 18, "Kohl on Further Troop Cuts, UN Peacekeeping," in LD0602105493 Hamburg DPA in German 0853 GMT 6 Feb 93.

³²⁶Ibid.

developing certain criteria to facilitate the legal and moral basis for such actions. "A special road for Germany in the implementation of security interests would lead to political isolation," he commented that would lead Germany astray from the comfort and security of its alliances.³²⁷ If Chancellor Kohl expects to formulate a forward looking foreign policy incorporating military involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, then his party must agree on an amendment to the Basic Law that satisfies the requests of the FDP, junior partner in the coalition, as well as the Social Democrats. However, based on the inflexibility of the party positions the likelihood of passing an amendment in the near future which satisfies all of the parties' concerns seems remote. A common consensus between the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition members on an amendment was a slow process that required compromise within both parties.

C. FREE DEMOCRAT PARTY (FDP) VIEWPOINT

The FDP traditionally has been made up of middle and upper class Protestants who regard themselves as "independents" and who maintain the "European liberal

³²⁷Ibid.

tradition."³²⁸ The FDP has participated in all but three of the post World War II governments. In the 44 year history of the FRG, the FDP has been in coalition with the ruling majority party(ies) for 41 years. Elected in 1988, FDP Chairman Otto Graf Lambsdorff³²⁹ was succeeded by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel on 11 June 1993.³³⁰

In March 1992, the FDP advocated three distinct missions for the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO guaranteed area. The first possibility was UN peacekeeping measures. The next option consisted of the use of military force as mandated by the UN Security Council (such as the Gulf War scenario). The last mission concerned peacekeeping measures under the auspice of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) acting in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter as a "regional organization."³³¹ The possibility of passing an amendment to allow German soldiers to become international peacekeepers would only be supported by the

³²⁸U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, p. 6.

³²⁹Ibid.

³³⁰"Kinkel Elected as Chairperson of the Free Democrats," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 18 June 1993), p. 1.

³³¹FBIS-WEU, 92-058, 25 March 1992, p. 15, "Genscher Views Employing Blue, Green Helmets," in AU24031553392 Hamburg DIE WELT in German 24 Mar 92, p. 8.

FDP if such missions were first based on a UN resolution.³³² FDP Chairman Lambsdorff modified his Party's stance on a constitutional amendment that stipulated a mandate solely from the UN for military action by the Bundeswehr. He included the Western European Union (WEU), as a subordinate organization to the UN Security Council, which could also mandate the use of force in order for the Bundeswehr to respond.³³³

Unlike the CDU/CSU, the FDP linked the use of Bundeswehr forces for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions exclusively to a prerequisite UN Security Council resolution or a regional collective security organization (as spelled out in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter) mandate.³³⁴ Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel (FDP), in August 1992, commented that an agreement had been reached within the government coalition that military operations beyond the scope of only Blue Helmet missions should be carried out. He reiterated the FDP stance that any military action, whether

³³²Ibid., p. 14, "Genscher on FRG Soldiers in Non-UN Missions," in AU2403143492 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Mar 92, p. 6.

³³³Ibid., 92-102, 27 May 1992, p. 19, "Lambsdorff Favors UN, WEU Force Deployment," in 92GE0340B Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 24 Apr 92, p. 4.

³³⁴Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 10, "FDP Presidium Backs Adriatic Role," in AU2107083192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Jul 92, p. 1-2.

peacekeeping or combat, must first be under the aegis of the UN and also approved by the Bundestag.³³⁵

In August 1992, then FDP Chairman Lambsdorff commented that the FDP Presidium favored an amendment to the Basic Law covering peacekeeping operations by the German military which could "in an emergency" take part in combat oriented missions as well.³³⁶ The FDP maintained its position of favoring combat missions under a proposed Basic Law change, provided that the UN framework would be utilized for Bundeswehr troop participation.³³⁷ FDP Chairman and Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel reiterated the party position that an amendment was desirable that allowed Blue Helmet operations and ultimately combat missions also.³³⁸ He stressed that his party will only agree to military missions under the

³³⁵Ibid., 92-155, 11 August 1992, p. 11-12, "Kinkel Supports Protection for Bosnian Aid Efforts," in AU1008104492 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 0515 GMT 10 Aug 92.

³³⁶Ibid., 92-157, 13 August 1992, p. 4, "Lambsdorff Favors Amendment on UN Troop Missions," in LD1008185792 Berlin DDP in German 1205 GMT 10 Aug 92.

³³⁷Oliver Thranert, "Germans Battle Over Blue Helmets," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 48, no. 8, Oct. 1992, p. 35.

³³⁸FBIS-WEU, 93-006, 11 January 1993, p. 5, "Kinkel Interviewed Prior to Talks," in AU1101103593 Hamburg ARD Television Network in German 2100 GMT 10 Jan 93.

auspices of UN control or regional organizations mandated by a UN resolution.³³⁹ Mr. Kinkel commented:

...that no people can take leave of their past and their history. We [Germans] in particular must keep in mind that terrible things happened. But somehow we must also liberate ourselves and become normal to be able to assume additional responsibilities as a result of German unity.³⁴⁰

Mr. Kinkel advocated a more active German role in the world and said "checkbook diplomacy (in reference to German foreign policy in the Persian Gulf War) was a thing of the past."³⁴¹ Through compromise, the FDP and the CDU/CSU coalition agreed upon an amendment change which incorporated the FDP position of military action under the banner of the United Nations. Yet, even though the FDP gave its full support to an agreed upon amendment, the coalition government still did not have a two thirds majority necessary for passage. The Loyal Opposition SPD outrightly opposed to combat missions and peacekeeping operations not under the control of the UN.

³³⁹Ibid., p. 7, "Kinkel Supports FRG Role Only in UN Military Operations," in LD0801180293 Berlin DDP in German 1641 GMT 8 Jan 93.

³⁴⁰Ibid., 93-019, 1 February 1993, p. 14, "Kinkel Views AWACS Missions, Other Issues," in AU2801150493 Halle MITTELDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 25 Jan 93, p. 4 (Tentative).

³⁴¹Ibid., 93-042, 5 March 1993, p. 28, "Kinkel Urges Involvement in UN Peacekeeping Missions," in AU0403143993 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Mar 93, p. 2.

D. LOYAL OPPOSITION SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY (SPD) VIEWPOINT

The SPD, the other major party in Germany, is one of the oldest political organizations in the world. Founded in 1863, the SPD traditionally advocated Marxist principles.³⁴² However, in 1959, the party adopted the "Godesberg Program" and abandoned the concept of a class party.³⁴³ The SPD still continues to support social welfare programs.

Originally, the SPD opposed the FRG's entry into NATO. However, in September 1960, the party formally approved of Germany's membership in the NATO Alliance. The party currently continues to stress Germany's ties to the Alliance. However, in the past, the SPD fought against specific NATO programs in favor of SPD proposals under the auspices of "security partnership" with the East.³⁴⁴ The SPD's base of support originates from the larger cities and the industrialized states. Elected in May 1991, Bjoern Engholm stepped down as SPD chairman in May 1993 amid a scandal and was succeeded by Rudolf Scharping.³⁴⁵

³⁴²The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 4 June 1993), p. 8.

³⁴³U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Background Notes: Germany, p. 6.

³⁴⁴Ibid.

³⁴⁵"...The Nomination of Rudolf Scharping," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 18 June 1993), p. 3.

In January 1992, the SPD outlined its position on Blue Helmet operations by demanding that only unarmed Bundeswehr units should participate in UN peacekeeping missions.³⁴⁶ The SPD agreed in principle to use the Bundeswehr as a "guardian of peace" but, not through the use of force in safeguarding that peace.³⁴⁷ However, this pacifist position was not unanimously agreed upon by all SPD deputies. In April 1992, SPD Deputy Norbert Ganseel commented that the Bundeswehr should first be used in Blue Helmet operations under the UN framework. He went on to say that if legal prerequisites between the UN and its member states were established to allow UN forces to act as a "global policeman in reestablishing and safeguarding peace," then the German Armed Forces should also take part in this peace-enforcement.³⁴⁸

The SPD proposed to eliminate the "grey area of constitutional law" concerning the use of the Bundeswehr by recommending an amendment that would permit peacekeeping

³⁴⁶FBIS-WEU, 92-011, 16 January 1992, p. 9, "Supports UN Mission Participation," in LD1601102492 Hamburg DPA in German 0832 GMT 16 Jan 92.

³⁴⁷Ibid., 92-032, 18 February 1992, p. 15, "Commentary Criticizes New Bundeswehr Plans," in AU1602182492 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Feb 92, p. 3.

³⁴⁸Ibid., 92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 8, "Politicians Discuss Future of Bundeswehr," in AU0604201392 Mainz 3SAT Television Network in German 1730 GMT 2 Apr 92.

missions under the framework of the UN. In June 1992, SPD Bundestag Group Chairman Klose announced the SPD intention to amend the Basic Law in such a way that peacekeeping missions would be allowed but combat missions would be ruled out.³⁴⁹ Yet, following the government's actions in dispatching Bundeswehr units to "monitor" the UN embargo of Serbia and Montenegro in July 1992, the SPD position began to soften toward the possibility of a future UN-led Bundeswehr combat role.³⁵⁰ SPD Chairman Engholm remarked, "when the UN has a clear and worldwide monopoly to use force and then asks [the FRG] to participate in certain [combat] missions, but only under the auspices of the UN," then the SPD would have to rethink its current position on the use of military force.³⁵¹

In August 1992, Deputy Chairwoman Hera Daeubler-Gmelin reiterated the SPD position of proposing a clarifying amendment to permit Blue Helmet but, not combat operations. She further explained that the SPD would not agree to

³⁴⁹Ibid., 92-114, 12 June 1992, p. 12, "Parties View UN Missions, Eurocorps," in AU1106141192 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 11 Jun 92, p. 1-2.

³⁵⁰Ibid., 92-135, 14 July 1992, p. 19, "SPD Threatens Suit Over Bundeswehr Missions," in AU1107175592 Munich SUEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 11-12 Jul 92, p. 1.

³⁵¹Ibid., 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 9, "SPD Policy on Combat Missions," in AU2107072892 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Jul 92, p. 1-2.

missions similar to the Allied combat role in the Gulf War.³⁵² Yet, former Minister Egon Bahr (SPD) advocated participation by German soldiers in UN operations, which restore "peace by force" as "possible and useful."³⁵³ The war in the Balkans compelled Mr. Klose to change his peacekeeping-only view. Although he did not advocate a German combat role in the former Yugoslavia, he remarked that, "the Bremen resolution of no combat involvement makes the [SPD] look ridiculous."³⁵⁴

The SPD viewpoint on the viability of Blue Helmet missions versus combat missions gradually underwent a transformation in which participation of the Bundeswehr in a UN commanded combat role is conceivable for the Social Democrats also.³⁵⁵ In November 1992, at a special convention, the SPD agreed to back the government's bid to remove constitutional barriers to Bundeswehr deployment outside of

³⁵²Ibid., 92-158, 14 August 1992, p. 9-10, "SPD Official Opposes UN Combat Missions Role," in AU1308123792 Berlin BERLINER ZEITUNG in German 10 Aug 92, p. 5.

³⁵³Ibid., 92-162, 20 August 1992, p. 9, "Bahr Favors Combat Missions Under UN Command," in 92GE0469C Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 25 Jul 92, p. 6.

³⁵⁴Ibid., 92-187, 25 September 1992, p. 26, "SPD Rift Over Bundeswehr Deployment Analyzed," in 92GE0507A Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German no. 38, 11 Sep 92, p. 4.

³⁵⁵Ibid., 92-192, 2 October 1992, p. 13, "Article Analyzes Future Foreign Policy Goals," in 92GE0528A Hamburg DEUTSCHES ALLGEMEINES SONNTAGSBLATT in German no. 35, 28 Aug 92, p. 4.

the NATO guaranteed area.³⁵⁶ The debate over whether such deployments should solely be peacekeeping and not peace-enforcing was not settled at the SPD convention. The SPD majority still favored only UN Blue Helmet operations.

When the coalition proposed a Basic Law amendment in January 1993, the SPD position had not changed to allow for combat operations, even under the control of the UN or under the aegis of a UN resolution. SPD party leader Bjoern Engholm commented, after the amendment failed, that the SPD position of advocating UN Blue Helmet operations "covered 95% of all possible deployments within the framework of the United Nations."³⁵⁷ He explained the SPD's criticism and rejection of the Basic Law amendment as too restrictive from the opposite end of the spectrum since peacekeeping operations under UN command practically encompassed all possible types of involvement that the SPD advocated in a constitutional amendment.

Even after Rudolf Scharping assumed the SPD party leadership position, the SPD did not alter its position regarding participation by the Bundeswehr in only UN controlled peacekeeping missions. At the SPD party

³⁵⁶"Worldwide," Wall Street Journal, 18 Nov. 1992, p. A1.

³⁵⁷FBIS-WEU, 93-009, 14 January 1993, p. 23, "Engholm Rejects Proposed Amendment on Bundeswehr's Role," in LD1301185493 Hamburg DPA in German 1715 GMT 13 Jan 93.

convention on 16 November 1993, the Social Democrats outlined and approved the party platform of committing military soldiers strictly to peacekeeping missions under the aegis of the UN and only after parliamentary approval of such participation.³⁵⁸ The SPD reiterated its continued opposition to Bundeswehr participation in UN military actions that were not of a humanitarian or traditionally peacekeeping nature.³⁵⁹

With state and Federal elections taking place throughout 1994, the likelihood of the peacekeeping debate becoming a hot campaign issue is not probable. The domestic concerns of a flagging economy and rising unemployment brought on by the unification process will no doubt highlight the political election races. In addition, the major parties are predicted to lose part of their hold in national politics to the minor far right and left wing parties. The possibility of a grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and the SPD is a possibility if the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition fails to win a solid majority again. What this means to the issue of a changed security policy to permit peacekeeping missions,

³⁵⁸"Social Democrats Convene Party Convention: 'We Can and Will Govern'," The Week in Germany, (New York: German Information Center, 19 November 1993), p. 1.

³⁵⁹Ibid.

let alone combat operations, is that the debate will not be addressed in the election year. Unless a cataclysmic event occurs in the future which requires the German government to immediately resolve the divisive issue, the debate likely will not be settled in the foreseeable future. The political parties are presently more concerned with domestic political issues than changes affecting the role of the military in foreign affairs.

VII. CONCLUSION

In June 1992, the WEU members (Germany being one of the nine member states) agreed to form a military force that could be sent on peacekeeping missions. These missions, according to WEU ministers, were only to be carried out after requests from the UN Security Council or the CSCE. The German contribution to the military force consisted of dual-hatted NATO troops and the newly formed Franco-German Corps.³⁶⁰ Also in June 1992, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali recommended to the UN Security Council that Article 43 of the UN Charter be modified to make troops available on a permanent and ad hoc basis to deter world-wide aggression. He requested on-call "peace enforcement units" to serve in situations in which the mission capability of peacekeeping troops was surpassed.³⁶¹ Mr. Boutros-Ghali expressed that the

³⁶⁰Steve Vogel. "West European Force to Be Formed," Washington Post, 20 June 1992, p. A18.

³⁶¹Lucia Mouat. "UN Overhaul Is Seen as Key to Expanded Peacekeeping Role," Christian Science Monitor, 22 June 1992, p. 3.

time had come for "preventive deployments" of the peace-enforcement mission.³⁶²

The German public did not necessarily agree with Mr. Boutros-Ghali's sentiment on the need to establish peace-enforcement units. In an October 1992 poll, 65 percent of the German public supported German participation in UN peacekeeping operations. However, the poll also showed that 53 percent of the western Germans and 59 percent of the eastern Germans opposed a combat role for the Bundeswehr.³⁶³ The poll indicated that the public perhaps was ready to accept a peacekeeping role for the Bundeswehr but was not psychologically ready for a combat role.

Defense Minister Volker Ruehe concurred that the general populace was not mentally prepared for a potential Bundeswehr combat role. In addition, he explained that the military also was not yet logistically or psychologically ready to assume combat operations, even if an amendment were

³⁶²"Peacekeeping; Round Up a Posse." The Economist, vol. 323, no. 7765, 27 June 1992, p. 48.

³⁶³Thranert, p. 34 and FBIS-WEU, 92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 7, "Background to Bundeswehr's Adriatic Deployment," in 92GE0444A Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German no. 30, 20 Jul 92, p 22-29.

to be passed to allow such missions.³⁶⁴ He planned to change these shortcomings so the Bundeswehr would be able to fulfill the missions in the event the UN called upon Germany to participate in either peacekeeping or peace-enforcing operations and the political parties agreed to permit these types of roles.³⁶⁵ He aptly stated:

Where peace and law are violated, where conflicts are pursued by force, and important German interests are endangered, we must also be willing, at the request of the international community, to make a contribution to preserving peace. In the constitution we need an opening for peace-establishing measures on the basis of the stipulations of the UN Charter. Whoever pushes Germany into a special role in this connection will make it incapable of political action...in the long run. Our soldiers must fight for global peace if the United Nations calls upon us to do so.³⁶⁶

However, Mr. Ruehe recognized the political gridlock on permitting such missions and knew that the Bundeswehr's deployment in UN combat missions was still "very far away."³⁶⁷ The political reality of the present dictates that a change in the constitution is not likely. The parties are

³⁶⁴FBIS-WEU, 92-140, 21 July 1992, p. 6, "Ruehe Views Adriatic Blockade," in AU2107064392 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 20 Jul 92, p. 32-35.

³⁶⁵Ibid, p. 7-8.

³⁶⁶Ibid., 92-176, 10 September 1992, p. 16, "Ruehe Notes New Security Policy," in AU0909164092 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1241 GMT 9 Sep 92.

³⁶⁷Ibid., 92-219, 12 November 1992, p. 18, "Ruehe Views Future Role of Bundeswehr," in LD1011235692 Hamburg DPA in German 1152 GMT 10 Nov 92.

not willing to compromise on the issue of allowing peacekeeping missions, let alone peacemaking or peace-enforcing missions in which the probability of combat is present, under the banner of the United Nations. The issue has been relegated to the back burner of the daily political agenda in favor of the more pressing domestic issues of unification, economic revival and the upcoming state and Federal elections.

The shape of German defense policy at the close of 1993, more than three years after unification and two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, reveals a contradictory picture. The makers of German defense policy have moved away from the familiar world that they obtained from the establishment of the FRG and fostered through the Cold War until unification in 1990. Germany's leadership has moved toward a more active international role for security policy beyond the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the Cold War that was dominated by a policy of reticence. However, the path forward is not entirely clear. Strategic interactions of the elements that constitute the making of German defense policy at the time of this writing are not completely suggestive that the Federal Republic of Germany can easily assume the burdens of a world power that some analysts confidently hinted at three years ago, or even some were bold enough to suggest in different circumstances in the

1970s. While the Kohl cabinet and the military look forward to a more far reaching security policy and seek to secure the means to achieve this goal, the other political elements in the making of strategy, especially at home and the nature of the threats abroad confound the Kohl government's movement away from the old familiar German strategic world.

This well known set of strategic practices also brought success for the FRG in a way that preceding ideals of force and statecraft had never been able to do. In the last twenty years of the long Cold War struggle, this familiar strategic security outlook was visible for all the world to see in the pages of the Ministry of Defense White Papers, complete with the multi-colored pictures of the so-called layer cake defense on the inner-German border. The certainty that year after year during the Cold War, NATO forces would remain arrayed in place reflected the durability of the Federal Republic of Germany's success in alliance defense in the Atlantic coalition.

This German defense policy reflected the outgrowth of NATO's policy of dual containment in which the defense against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact by the alliance of the Western European states and the North Atlantic democracies was guaranteed. At the same time, the FRG joined the ranks of the Western powers by means of strategic mechanisms that assured the FRG's neighbors of a guarantee

against the revival of German outward expansion. The creation of this policy of dual containment also brought forth a corollary of what one might call dual integration. The Bundeswehr was integrated in turn into a multi-national defense alliance in which the makers of policy found a means to subordinate German power while assuring the defense of the FRG on a multi-national basis. Meanwhile, the instruments of democratic control in the nascent FRG (as interpreted through the Basic Law and later in the MOD White Papers) assured that the soldiers would remain loyal to the government and the Western alliance. All of this succeeded with results that no one could have easily predicted at the time that these instruments were first put in place.

The strategic revolution of unification, the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, and all that followed in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, Somalia and beyond, has cast all of the above into a cockeyed perspective. The familiar has long vanished. Repeated attempts in the Defense Ministry to offer the German public a new White Paper on the state of affairs in regard to an up-to-date, coherent defense policy have failed since the "roller coaster" of strategic events has not come to a rest.

A. DEBATE CONTINUES

While Germany has done anything other than leap out of the strategic confines of the past epoch, the makers of policy have found great difficulties in adjusting their labor to the present. This state of affairs should come as no surprise. The creation of these structures forty years ago took a long time to evolve into their current form even in the face of what today seems a clear Stalinist threat in the wake of the Second World war and the resultant bi-polar division of the world. Today, however, the perils of intellectual exhaustion, economic straits, rising chaos as a result of imperial decline and the contention between the industrialized powers forms the backdrop of German foreign and security policy on the world scene. It is a place where the Germans have seldom felt at home and a place where the policy of reticence of a state situated in the middle between the big powers was a familiar role in which all European countries might feel comfortable and safe.

This feeling of comfort and safety is now gone. The collective security and defense institutions that flourished in this Cold War world flounder in today's world of change. This state of affairs is liable to continue so long as the present parameters remain in effect. That is, so long as the major powers fail to agree on the shape of new security arrangements for dealing with future crises. While the

international system of responsible states fails or only very modestly succeeds in the face of present threats, they face further trials. The issues of who should have a monopoly on the use of force, individual sovereign states or supra-national organizations, remains unclear and thus adversely affects the outcome of the question over the use of military force. This generalization applies especially to the Germans with all of their laudable progress on developing a new security policy in a changed international environment notwithstanding.

The debate on peacekeeping missions continues within the German parliament. With the threat of the Balkan War spilling over into neighboring states and the residual effect of this regional instability directly affecting Germany's national interests, the debate will become more intense. The resolution of the peacekeeping debate will more than likely establish the means for a Bundeswehr deployment in a supra-national peacekeeping framework. Once this action occurs, the next step toward a combat oriented role would seem to be much easier to accomplish.

If German soldiers are fired upon in a peacekeeping mission, the obvious response would be to fire back in self-defense. The fine line between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing would be crossed and combat will have taken place. The responsible politicians are aware that this scenario can

and does happen quite frequently in peacekeeping operations. The next logical step in legitimately backing up the military when it is confronted with hostile fire would be to sanction a combat role.

Defense Minister Ruehe has said that Germans must get used to the idea that Bundeswehr troops will be deployed beyond the FRG's borders in the future. International law, in the form of UN, CSCE, WEU and NATO resolutions calling for military action, will dictate that Germany's response should be a contribution to peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions. Mr. Ruehe commented that a collective "change in mentality" is needed to meet the internationally changed situation.³⁶⁸ German leaders will eventually have to work out a political solution. This author firmly believes that a political resolution will eventually allow for Bundeswehr participation in offensive military actions. Yet, the political reality of the current situation does not warrant immediate action by the elements of the government. Nevertheless, the Bundeswehr will have two battalions earmarked in the spring of 1993³⁶⁹ and ready by the end of the

³⁶⁸FBIS-WEU, 92-197, 9 October 1992, p. 9, "Ruehe Calls For Consensus on Security Policy," in LD0810195792 Hamburg DPA in German 1849 GMT 8 Oct 92.

³⁶⁹Ibid., 92-189, 29 September 1992, p. 14, "Defense Minister Interviewed on Current Events," in AU2609150392 Hamburg BILD in German 25 Sep 92, p. 2.

year for future peacekeeping missions.³⁷⁰ Like any other professional military force, in the event of a political decision, the Bundeswehr is somewhat surreptitiously planning for combat contingency operations.

The debate on peacekeeping missions has come to its first vote with less than optimal results. In the potentially unstable post-Cold War era, another crisis may precipitate further military action on Germany's part. The general consensus has shifted toward taking a more decisive approach in deterring aggression through peacekeeping measures. The ongoing debate is proof of the call for such measures and the future implications signify a trend toward eventually greater involvement.

Yet, makers of U.S. policy should keep the following in mind. In only a few weeks, Germany faces a series of elections that will last until the Fall of 1994 that may result in a change of government. The upshot of this marathon of elections may be a grand coalition government or a minority government. In any case, these elections may curtail the reach of German foreign policy. The Kohl government already struggles with the faltering pace of European unification and consolidation that began to be felt

³⁷⁰Ibid., 92-183, 21 September 1992, p. 26, "Ruehe Outlines New Plans for Bundeswehr," in LD1709163592 Hamburg DFA in German 1401 GMT 17 Sep 92.

in 1991-1992. The demands of domestic consolidation continue without pause and have been more difficult than originally thought to be.

A forward strategic policy requires the support of the electorate. Yet, the domestic ills of a newly sovereign country does not bode well in the near term for resolving the issue of the use of military force in German statecraft. The German electorate is in no mood for German world policy on the model of 1897 or 1908. The Social Democratic Party, which in the past brought forth such experts in defense policy as Fritz Erler and Helmut Schmidt remains deeply divided about the present realities of force and statecraft, as it has since the collapse of the old defense consensus in Germany in the late 1970s. This electoral constellation is further darkened by the on-going social crisis of unification and the structural problems of the European economies in comparison with the American and Asian centers of industry. All of this poses an enormous dilemma for the Social Market economy and the makers of German foreign policy. The makers of German defense policy must adjust their efforts to these realities.

B. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR A COMBAT ROLE

History has shown that peacekeeping actions tend to turn into peace-enforcing measures which invariably involve combat. Most normal states understand this relationship. If the need arises to engage in combat, these countries enact the necessary legal and constitutional provisions to legitimately support this type of military action. Germany should not act differently in the long run provided a complete transformation in national security policy thinking happens within the country. The peacekeeping debate, if successfully concluded to allow the use of military force for other than defense purposes, will eventually lead to an expanded combat role for Germany's Armed Forces.

As previously noted, the Bundeswehr remains deeply integrated within the Atlantic security institutions. Germany does not possess the capability to operate military forces unilaterally for any extended length of time outside the immediate boundaries of the Republic. The requisite assets and are not present within the Bundeswehr's inventory and the money to finance such programs is not forthcoming. Germany's Armed Forces are suffering the same fate as the U.S. military due to the end of the Cold War and the draw down in size and budget. Furthermore, the psychological makeup of the typical German soldier in a conscript military does not currently allow for a far reaching defense policy.

As of this writing, one of the more noteworthy German strategic forays of late, the NATO opening to the east championed by Volker Ruehe at a meeting of the NATO Defense Ministers in October 1993 at Travemuende, Germany brought an angry response from a sinister quarter. The head of Russian foreign intelligence Primakow, protested against the expansion of NATO to include the former member of the Warsaw Pact. No doubt, the German assertiveness here on inclusion into the West security camp must burn in the old wounds of those who have silently watched the ignominious withdrawal of Soviet power from its western ramparts. The course of the Putsch against Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the Fall of 1993 has brought a revival of military power to the former Soviet state. All of this weighs upon a German military policy that attempts to reach out beyond the limits of the past.

At the same time, however, the makers of U.S. strategy should recognize the steps undertaken by their German counterparts. The preceding chapters have interpreted in detail the making of foreign and security policy in the past three years. The death of Sgt. Alexander Arndt in Cambodia this Fall is full evidence of this extraordinary change in behavior and attitude toward fulfilling Germany's burdensharing responsibility. Even though there is talk of establishing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for

Germany (as well as other Democratic states), the idea of a member residing without the ability to use its military force in a similar fashion as the other permanent Security Council members makes for an ill conceived policy. The crisis of governance in Germany dictates that the FRG is not ready to assume such a position until the debate is resolved over peacekeeping and combat missions.

A knowledge of the intricacies of the policy process in other countries is an essential requirement for the effectiveness of U.S. policy. The makers of defense policy in this country will often be disappointed if they expect Germans to act like Americans or French or British without a sense of the real limits of current German security policy. At the same time, Germany continues to need U.S. leadership in security affairs much because of the still conflicted nature of defense and security policy in the FRG. This thesis attests to this reality and its author looks forward hopefully to a time when a democratic Germany can assume its full role abroad on equal terms and in the ranks of the world's democratic powers. The global community would ultimately benefit from Germany's uninhibited military contribution to peacekeeping, peace-making and peace enforcing missions with the aim of ensuring peace and stability.

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