Our Reserve Component: We Can Do More With Less
Abstract
The United States has a history of entering conflicts ill prepared. The results of this lack of initial preparedness have been not only the senseless loss of lives but also making a foe more determined due to his initial battlefield success. Projected force drawdowns to a 1.6 or perhaps 1.4 million standing military will require the use of our Reserve Component to execute the crisis response or reconstitution missions of our national military strategy. Our Reserve Component must be capable of initial success in any type of conflict. Policies by the executive branch, congress, DoD and the services must be altered to ensure the Reserve Component is ready when called. Prioritizing mobilization by service and units within services is required. The executive branch must make timely decisions. Congress must allow the services to structure their respective Reserve Components for combat effectiveness vice political sensitivity. DoD should allow the services access to all potential warfighters by presenting a comprehensive plan to congress on exactly what is required for a generic scenario and when it might be required. The services must organize their remaining warfighting assets, both active and reserve, for maximum flexibility and combat effectiveness. All branches of the service can do a far better job of managing and training all personnel assets for rapid and sustained deployment/ employment. This paper provides several recommendations to increase Total Force effectiveness by insuring our Reserve Component can make a significant contribution to warfighting.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA276683
Entities
People
- Alphonso B. Diggs
Organizations
- Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy