Why Programs Die: The Stand-Off Target Acquisition System (SOTAS) Case Study

Abstract

This paper looks at a real DoD weapons system that was terminated by Congress in 1981. The paper reviews the origins of the program, and why it was killed. The author's research shows that a number of mistakes were made, both by the Government and Motorola, the prime contractor. The author cites specific mistakes made by the Army Program Office, including acceptance of requirements from OSD that were not necessary, mistakes made by the source selection board in failing to adequately consider the difficulty in jumping from a component supplier to a systems integrator, and a poor bidding strategy by the contractor which made substantial overruns inevitable. The paper concludes with lessons learned for program managers, acquisition personnel and contractors in how to avoid the pitfalls that doomed the SOTAS program.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Apr 01, 1993
Accession Number
ADA276887

Entities

People

  • Mark J. Lumer

Organizations

  • Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Human Systems
  • Sensors
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Congress
  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Department Of Defense
  • Electronics
  • Electronics Industry
  • Executives
  • Government Employees
  • Government Procurement
  • Governments
  • Lessons Learned
  • Management Personnel
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Procurement
  • United States
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Defense Technology Research and Development.
  • Educational Psychology
  • Systems Analysis and Design