Planning of the First Gallipoli Amphibious Landings: An Operational Analysis
Abstract
Focusing on the operational level of war, this research paper analyzes General Sir Ian Hamilton's planning of the first Gallipoli amphibious landings to derive lessons for future planners responding to a crisis with limited resources. The analysis is presented in four parts. First, the strategic background and preliminary events leading to the decision to land at Gallipoli are introduced. Second, Hamilton's plan, and rationale behind his decisions, are cited using an operational construct. Third, the plan is examined in execution to determine why the operation failed. And last, lessons are deduced. The chief finding of this study was that Hamilton had within his power the ability to accomplish his assigned mission, but it would have required near flawless application of operational art. Despite a well-conceived plan, Hamilton had shortcomings as an operational commander that kept his plan from being properly implemented. As a result, his operation failed. The paper concludes that Hamilton's shortcomings provide valuable lessons for future operational commanders and planners seeking to optimize limited resources, to include amphibious assets, in a crisis response.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 17, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA279563
Entities
People
- C. R. Spofford
Organizations
- Naval War College