Barbarossa: Planning for Operational Failure

Abstract

The German planning process for the 1941 invasion of Soviet Russia is analyzed through the presentation of the major plans developed from July 1940 until June 1941, The final plan is then critiqued within the context of the applicable Principles of War, The planning process was characterized by significant disagreements between Hitler, the German High Command and the Army High Command. The major points of contention relate to the selection of primary objectives and force deployment patterns. A set of conclusions is presented which argues that the planning process was faulty due to a number of assumptions which were generally held by the officers who were involved in the process.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 08, 1994
Accession Number
ADA279709

Entities

People

  • John D. Snively

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Attrition
  • California
  • Civil War
  • Classification
  • Governments
  • Lessons Learned
  • Maneuvers
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • New York
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • United States
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Theoretical Analysis.