U.S. Conventional Arms Control for Korea: A Proposed Approach
Abstract
Conventional arms control negotiations should (1) help achieve U.S./ Republic of Korea (ROK) military objectives on the peninsula, and (2) produce a verifiable agreement. These are important objectives and we will return to them. However, there is a more important objective not always associated with arms control-how arms control could help the United States achieve its regional security objectives. In Northeast Asia, the United States has four main security objectives: (1) maintain ability, (2) maintain access and influence, (3) prevent a power vacuum or the rise of any regional hegemon, and (4) prevent nuclear proliferation. Conventional arms control can indirectly help the United States achieve these regional security objectives. Except for the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), these regional objectives are being achieved by maintaining ROK and Japanese security through bilateral security agreements between the United States and each ally. Because it has no territorial designs, the United States has served as a regional balancer and an honest broker in the region. To the extent that the United States can continue in that role, we will probably continue to accomplish American regional objectives.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA282319
Entities
People
- James C. Wendt
Organizations
- RAND Corporation