Barriers to Managing Risk in Large Scale Weapons Systems Development Programs
Abstract
Managing the development of a major weapon system is, to a great extent, the management of risk. Top managers in the Air Force and its contractors will aim at managing development in such a way that the risks of shortfalls in performance or unacceptable development times and costs are monitored and controlled. This report integrates the findings of seven case studies of major weapon system development efforts. It attempts to understand how the actions of major actors, including the System Program Office (SPO), supervising command, Air Force Headquarters, Department of Defense (DoD), the contractors, and Congress, interact to shape the character and levels of risk inherent in a development and to manage that risk throughout the development. The systems that are subjects of the case studies were chosen to represent a wide spectrum of development tasks and levels of risk and include the following: (1) B-1B Bomber; (2) Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM); (3) Low- Altitude Navigation Targeting Infrared for Night System (LANTIRN); (4) F100-PW- 220 and F110-GE-100, Alternate Fighter Engines (AFE); (5) Space Elements of the Global Positioning System (GPS); (6) F-16/Multinational Staged Improvement Program (MSIP); and (7) Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS). The studies, written largely from the perspective of the SPO, examine the management of risk during full-scale development but often reach back to the important planning and development activities in earlier stages of the acquisition process.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA282427
Entities
People
- Frank A. Camm
- Kenneth R. Mayer
- Susan J. Bodilly
- Thomas K.
- Timothy J. Webb
Organizations
- RAND Corporation