Clausewitz Misperceived: On War, Not Strategy,
Abstract
Clausewitz' contribution to the study of war is certainly invaluable. However, the military, politicians and scholars alike need to move away from Clausewitz except as a source of discussion to generate alternatives to strategy. Clausewitz essentially deals with the operational and tactical levels of war as he observed it in the Napoleonic era. While Clausewitz is better known and frequently quoted for espousing the primary of politics in war, he does not adequately discuss the relationship between politics and war, the problems of higher direction of war or the nature of civil-military relations. Starting with his definition of strategy as the use of engagements for the purposes of the war, he repeatedly emphasizes the direct strategy of destruction of enemy's armies as the main objective and even calls the political purpose a modification of this objective. Unfortunately, due to his contradictory style of writing, his adherents have been able to link his theories to all subsequent wars to suit their particular needs. The controversy is fueled by the fact the Clausewitz could not complete his book 'On War' before his death. This paper examines Clausewitz' validity in the modern era with a new approach of evaluating his emphasis on theories at the strategic level to derive his intent
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA283129
Entities
People
- Harish Masand
Organizations
- Air War College