PROJECT MATTERHORN: A Lesson in Strategy and Politics
Abstract
MATTERHORN is the codename for B-29 operations out of China against strategic targets in Japan and Manchuria from June 1944 to January 1945. To date, most historians have condemned MATTERHORN as a total failure that diverted critical assets for little or no immediate military gain. However, this paper shows that MATTERHORN was conducted almost exclusively for strategic and political purposes; not for operational military gains. The strategic situation in the Pacific in early 1943 was characterized by a lack of unity of command that severely impacted strategic planning and resulted in a strategy of opportunism'. Army Air Force planners were intent on using the B-29 strictly as a strategic bomber and hoped it would prove air power prophet's predictions that air power can be a decisive element of war. President Roosevelt was determined to make China one of his four policemen that would make his post war vision of a new international order a reality. These three factors interacted to make a military poor course of action appear viable -- despite the costs. MATTERHORN serves as a valuable learning tool for today military statesmen to remind them of the absolute necessity for unity of command, the political nature of war, and the critical importance of logistics
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 19, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA283234
Entities
People
- Michael P. Fennessy
Organizations
- Air War College