C4I: Weapon or Achilles' Heel
Abstract
Today Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) is considered by some to be a force multiplier and by others to be a weapons system unto itself. C4I is no longer simply a supporting system for the commander - especially for the theater commander. This paper explores the increasing level of importance of C4I to the combatant commander using lessons learned from operations URGENT FURY (1983) and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (1990- 1991). These operations vividly demonstrate past difficulties and recent improvements in joint operations, improvements any would argue are largely attributable to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Unfortunately, these same operations reveal that many problems continue to exist. The explanation for these continuing problems is explored through an examination of the varying roles and views of the key players involved in both developing and using C4I systems
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 17, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA283374
Entities
People
- James E. Hull
Organizations
- Naval War College