Gallipoli 1915-Opportunity Lost?
Abstract
The 1915 Allied campaign to the Dardanelles was intended to reopen the straits and force Turkey out of the war. Although the campaign cost some 250,000 Allied casualties and ultimately failed to achieve its military objectives, many consider it to have been a golden opportunity to have defeated Germany through a peripheral front. The initial portion of this paper discusses the strategic soundness of the campaign while the major portion discusses its two phases and evaluates its causes for failure at the operational level. Special emphasis was placed on the Suvla Bay landing which occurred during the joint phase of the operation. Similar to the Dardanelles Campaign, it too considered only a secondary mission whose potential was never truly recognized. This evaluation concluded that the strategic vision of the Dardanelles Campaign was extremely sound, but operational weaknesses and inept leadership were the principle causes for its failure. Remedies are suggested that would have greatly improved its operational soundness, but there are no claims that such changes would have guaranteed success. It is strongly felt, however, that had the initial assault in mid-February been conducted as a true joint navy and substantial ground force operation, the effort to force the straits would have succeeded. Whether this action would have caused the fall of Constantinople and shortened the war is uncertain. Gallipoli, Turkey, World War I, Dardanelles, Operational evaluation.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 16, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA283403
Entities
People
- Craig H. Murray
Organizations
- Naval War College