


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FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS - A CINC'S TRUMP CARD

by

Stephen P. Kinder
COL USA

A paper submitted to the Facility of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature Stephen P. Kinder

10 May 1994

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ABSTRACT of

FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS - A CINC'S TRUMP CARD

A lesson from the Gulf War that will in all likelihood be learned by our future adversaries is that they must prevent the U.S. from establishing lodgements for follow-on forces. The CINCs ace in the hole or trump card will be their ability to rapidly project power and forces into semi-permissive or non-permissive area of operations. Forces required to execute forcible entry operations are assigned or forced listed to each CINC. However, these capabilities amphibious assault, airborne and air assault have primarily been developed along separate service lines. Despite the fact these separate capabilities have been recognized as the "elite" forces, they have not been a CINC top priority in joint integration, technology and equipment modernization.

What is the "right" force/force mix for forcible entry operations? Is it Marine Corps - amphibious assault or Army - airborne and air assault? The answer is all of the above - as the risk is just too high without the complete package. Each of these forces bring to-the-table special warfighting skills, however, when you analyze operational imperatives with a forced entry scenario certain constraints surface which could become show stoppers. An effective mix of these elite warfighting skills would maximize collective strengths and minimize individual limitations.

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FORCIBLE ENTRY OPERATIONS - A CINC'S TRUMP CARD

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

Peering into the future is not easy. The Cold War era has ended, but in its wake we are now confronted with a new world of uncertainty. In an attempt to bridge this uncertainty, four fundamental elements of our national defense strategy have been articulated in our current National Security Strategy : "... to ensure strategic deterrence and defense, to exercise forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crises and to retain the national capacity to reconstitute forces should the need arise."¹

However, the realities of budget cuts and domestic priorities had significantly impacted on the Department of Defense in the implementation of these strategic fundamentals. Consequently a "bottom-up" review was conducted by the Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Joint Chief's of Staff (JCS) and the Service Component Commanders to focus on smart down sizing and other cost enhancements to reduce the defense budget, while maintaining sufficient military power to be able to win two major regional conflicts that occur nearly simultaneously. The envisioned results were: a more measured forward presence; forces predominantly based in the United States; and an increased reliance on strategic mobility.

Remarks by President Bush at Aspen : "Our task is to shape our defense capabilities to the changing strategic circumstances. We would be ill served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunk down version of the one we possess at present..... What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring."²

The key imperative to this downsizing and realignment was a stronger-than-ever commitment to joint operations.³ "The Armed Forces of the United States will never again poke as individual fingers; rather they will always strike as a closed fist. We will gang up with every joint resource at our disposal whenever summoned to battle."⁴ Therefore, it is critical that the capabilities which the individual services (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marines) can bring to the fight are fully integrated and synchronized. The key joint operational level commanders who are responsible for this synergism are the regional combatant commanders in chief (CINCs).

The CINCs ace in the hole or trump card will be their ability to rapidly project power and forces into semi-permissive or non-permissive situations. The Joint Staff Officer Guide identifies Forcible Entry as a mission option.⁵ Forcible entry operations provide a swift and decisive means for seizing the strategic initiative, however, forcible entry generally requires rapid follow-up and exploitation by significant forces from the national strategic reserve for success in major efforts.⁶ It may perhaps be best described as a capability available for gaining access (lodgement) to an area of operations (AOs) where that access is being denied by an opposing force. Forcible entry applications include: seizure of key locations (ports, airfields, sites for advanced bases, lines of communication and chokepoints); initial lodgements for major expeditions; envelopments (vertical or horizontal) in a developing campaign; evacuation of forces or noncombatants; and a diversion or dispersion of enemy efforts. A lesson from the Gulf War that will in all likelihood be learned by our future adversaries is that they must prevent the U.S. from establishing lodgements that would allow for a buildup of forces.

The forces required to execute forcible entry are available now to the CINCs, however, these capabilities amphibious, airborne and air assault, have primarily been developed along separate service lines. While these separate capabilities have been recognized as the "elite" forces, they have not been a CINC top priority in joint integration, technology and equipment modernization.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze forcible entry operations and to recommend what the "right" force/force mix should be in support of the regional CINCs. The perspective will be from an army officer assigned to the crises action planning cell J5 Atlantic Command (ACOM). The methodology will be to investigate the following issues: (1) What are our current forcible entry capabilities? (2) What are the key operational imperatives for forcible entry operations? (3) What is the "right" force/force mix for forcible entry operations? Is it Marine Corps - amphibious assault or Army - airborne and air assault? (4) How can these forcible entry forces be effectively employed (possible scenarios)?

CHAPTER II

CURRENT FORCIBLE ENTRY FORCES

Amphibious Operations (Marine Corps and Navy Team) Naval Expeditionary Forces are routinely deployed to meet the day-to-day requirements of the CINCs for forward presence in regions vital to our national interests.

There are various lift options for deploying Marines. Amphibious ships provide the only employment option with forcible entry capability. The ability to conduct vertical and surface assault either sequentially or simultaneously is an essential element of maneuver warfare initiated from the sea.⁷

A Marine Expeditionary Force (MEU), a key component of this naval expeditionary force, is tasked organized into a 2,000 man air-ground force embarked in an amphibious ready group of three to four ships. An MEU can be rapidly dispatched (transit time = 500 miles per day) to conduct amphibious forcible entry operations. As a seabased force they are unrestricted by basing or overflight requirements, self-sustained and extremely mobile.⁸

Amphibious forces are our "storm troopers" from the sea who seek the advantages of surprise and shock by landing decisive forces at the site and time of their choice. The Marine Corps is charged with developing, in coordination with the other services, the joint doctrines, procedures and equipment for amphibious operations. The joint doctrine for amphibious operations is found in JCS PUB 3-02.

Amphibious assault echelons come ashore by three basic means: amphibious assault vehicles, helicopters and naval landing crafts. The most preferred method of forcible entry is deploying from over-the-horizon (OTH).

The intent of OTH assaults is to avoid detection and the enemy's long range defenses by increasing his indecision. OTH operations are currently limited to assaults by helicopter and Landing Craft Air-Cushion (LCAC) based on the slow speed of the present amphibious assault vehicles and other naval landing crafts. This constraint limits the amount of forces and equipment which can rapidly be deployed in OTH insertions. To further enhance surprise and survivability, amphibious forces are night operations capable.

Key Force Modernization issues :

- replacement of the current amphibious assault vehicle (AAV) (early 1970 vintage) with an advanced amphibious assault vehicle (AAAV).
- replacement of the CH-46E helicopter (1960 vintage) with the V-22 Osprey (tilt rotor aircraft).
- replacement of the old gator fleet (LST, LPH and LKA) with next generation amphibious ships LX class (2002).
- fielding of the new class mine-countermeasures ships (MCM) (9 of 14 commissioned) and costal minehunters (MHC) (8 of 12) under construction.

Planning considerations :

- deception concept
- suitable beaches and weather (sea state)
- mine sweeping
- naval gunfire support/close air support
- air superiority

Airborne Operations (Army and Air Force Team) - To provide the CINCs with an immediate force entry capability, Battalion Task Forces from the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, NC and Army Rangers at Fort Benning, GA/Fort Campbell, KY/Fort Lewis, WA are maintained on a 18 hour wheels up deployment status. Additionally, the Army can rapidly deploy (24 to 96 hours) the following forcible entry airborne units : 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC (10,000 man) ; 3-325 Airborne Battalion Combat Task Force, Vicenza, Italy (1,200 man) ; and 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, GA - Fort Campbell, KY - Fort Lewis, WA (1,600 man).⁹

Airborne forces are our "devils" from the sky, who, in darkness of the night, can cause surprise and terror. The Army is charged with developing, in coordination with the other services, the joint doctrine, procedures and equipment for airborne operations.

Airborne assault forces (parachute drop) and equipment (heavy drop (HD) and/or Low Altitude Parachute Extraction Systems (LAPES)) can be deployed by Air Force aircraft (C-130s, C-141s and C-17s) anywhere in the world. The preferred method of forced entry is night operations (blackout conditions) using a low-level approach (nap-of-the- earth) to enhance surprise and survivability.

While airborne forces deploy with 72-hours worth of provisions and can be resupplied/sustained by additional airborne operations (Combat Delivery System (CDS) and HD operations), the ideal situation is to immediately secure a tactical airfield for follow on airland operations. Utility transports and attack/anti-tank (critical organic combat multiplier) helicopters must be airlanded in Air Force aircraft or operated from a forward operating base (FOB) (secure airfield/naval platforms). Also, with the

introduction of airland operations, a rapid build-up of firepower, forces, mobility and logistics can be achieved.

The airborne forces could be supported by a tactical Air Force Wing or Carrier Battle Group (CBG) or both. A composite wing is stationed at Pope Air Force Base, NC, in support of XVIII Airborne Corps. This wing consists of three squadrons : C-130s (tactical airlift); A-10s (tank-killer aircraft); and F-16s (close air support and local air cover).

Key Force Modernization issues :

- replacement for the (HD) Sheridan tank (1960 vintage) with the Assault Gun System.
- replacement of the AH-64, Apache with the RAH-66, Comanche helicopter.
- fielding of Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs).

Planning considerations :

- availability of airlift (C-130s, C-141s, C5s and C- 17s)
- air superiority
- tactical air strip/FOB
- basing/overflight rights/air refueling
- weather (high winds)

Air Assault Operations (Army and Marine) - Another forcible entry tool available to the CINCs is the rapid insertion of troops and equipment by helicopters during air assault operations. Utility transport helicopters (UH-1 Huey, UH-60 Blackhawk, CH-47D Chinook, CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53D/E Sea Stallion) deployed along with attack/anti-tank helicopters (AH-1 Cobra, AH-64 Apache and OH-58D Kiowa) provide a highly mobile and

lethal combination. The Marine Corps provides as part of its MEU (amphibious operation) a limited air assault capability (12 ea. CH-46E, 4 ea. CH 53D/E and 4 ea. UH-1N for 360 troops per lift; and 4 ea. AH-1W and 6 ea. AV-8B Harrier attack/anti-tank).¹⁰ The Army Airborne and Rangers upon securing a landing strip or support from an FOB, can enhance its firepower and mobility with organic/tailored package utility and attack helicopters (82nd organic assets = 46 utility, 31 scout (recon) and 45 attack).

The XVIII Airborne Corps (Contingency Corps) has numerous units on 24 to 96 hour deployment sequences which have air assault/attack helicopter assets. The lead unit being the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) which has forcible entry as one of its primary mission essential tasks (101st organic assets = 222 utility and 96 attack/anti-tank).¹¹

Key Force Modernization issues :

- replacement of the AH-64 with RAH-66 Comanche.
- replacement of the CH-46 with V-22 Osprey.

Planning considerations :

- availability of airlift (C130s, C-141s, C-17s and C-5s)
- load planning
- air superiority
- secure airfield/FOB
- self deployment
- operational range/fuel capacity
- basing/overflight rights/air refueling

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES

The operations of the armed forces generally adhere to and are guided by a common set of principles of war. They are established in joint doctrine, specifically Joint Publication 3-0, "Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations." In order to level the playing field and to better understand the key imperatives of forcible entry operations this chapter will apply the principles of war to forcible entry operations as follows :

a. **Objective.** Forcible entry operations objective is simply the use of shock, surprise, and decisive force to achieve a foothold in enemy territory. Sample objectives include : seizure of key locations (ports, airfields, sites for advanced bases, lines of communications, and chokepoints); initial lodgements for major expeditions; envelopments (vertical or horizontal) in a developing campaign; evacuation of forces or noncombatants; and diversion or dispersion of enemy efforts.

Forcible entry objectives predominantly focus on enemy vulnerabilities, the most significant being night operations. Selected forces must be able to conduct deployment and employment operations under blackout conditions. These forces must also be proficient in night vision and global position system (GPS) equipment. Additionally, forcible entry forces must be able to attack and seize multiple objectives simultaneously. Objectives must be clearly understood at all command levels as forced entry missions can not be sorted out on the ground, but must be conducted with precision, synergy and speed.

b. **Offensive.** Attack, seize and exploit the initiative, " nothing short of victory is acceptable."¹² Forcible entry operations are tempo focused offensive actions. Forces must be bold and relentless as seizing a lodgement area might call for a sequel of setting up defensive positions to protect follow-on forces but it does not allow for ease of withdrawal/disengagement actions.

c. **Mass.** Forcible entry operations seek shock and surprise but when engaging actual enemy strong points the culminating detail, is the concentration of combat power. This mass of combat strength is achieved by direct and indirect fire by troops on the ground and also with synchronization of close air support (attack helicopters/combat aircraft). The proper combination of all elements of combat power will enable the forcible entry forces to maintain the initiative. Care must be taken not to fragment the forcible entry force but to achieve superiority of force.

d. **Economy of Force.** Forcible entry operations are decisive objectives, therefore, risks may have to be accepted in concurrent combat scenarios. CINCs planners must insure/demand the full range (amphibious, airborne and air assault) of capabilities to achieve superiority for mission execution.

e. **Maneuver.** Application of maneuver in forcible entry operations has three principles agility, mobility and maneuverability.¹³ The forcible entry forces commander must have the agility to exploit successes and enemy vulnerabilities. This flexibility will insure sustained momentum, enhance the ability to react rapidly to unforeseen circumstances and to concentrate and project power at the decisive point. Forcible entry forces must be able to deploy on short notice and rapidly move to an AO for immediate combat

operations. This requisite requires a special culture/mind set of the leaders and troops (airborne mentality and Marine Corps grit) as well as highly trained/rehearsed units. To deploy these forces requires the rest of the joint team, the Air Force and the Navy. CINC planners must request sufficient lift assets to move and synchronize forcible entry forces. The final principle involves maneuverability within the AO so as to : project combat power; sustain the initiative; preserve freedom of action; reduce vulnerability; and execute objectives (branches and sequels).

f. **Unity of Command.** The degree of risk inherent with forcible entry missions are of such magnitude that exact control, precision and synchronization must be established in preparation for and in execution of the operation. This translates to one responsible commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces. The CINC must designate a Joint Task Force Commander to direct the unity of effort of the joint forces required to conduct forcible entry operations. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), to ensure unity of effort, must be maintained while the forces are enroute to the objective (intelligence updates and execution orders) and the assault operations. This can most effectively be accomplished by using Airborne C3I platforms which enhance on scene coordination, communication and synchronization.

Additionally, to enhance unity of effort, it is imperative that these joint forces be frequently trained together. This is the challenge that ACOM must embrace, not from just training the CONUS contingency forces together but by exercises in the area of responsibility (AOR) of each of the regional CINCs with their forward deployed forces. This has been most successfully

accomplished in the past in CINCSOUTH AOR during the forcible entry phase of exercises SOLID SHIELD and OCEAN VENTURE.¹⁴

g. Security. Security is paramount to forcible entry operations. Operations security (OPSEC), intelligence, counterintelligence, cover and deception, and electronic warfare (EW) are required/integrated to insure both security and surprise. OPSEC and deception are mutually supporting activities for both the commander's real objective and the deception objective.¹⁵ Deception is a tool of the commander, not the intelligence system. It must be integrated into the scheme of maneuver and be planned concurrently.¹⁶

h. Surprise. As previously stated, the risks associated with forcible entry operations are so high that security and surprise are the keys to success. Forcible entry forces achieve surprise by speed, night operations, effective intelligence, various tactics and method of operation (amphibious, airborne and air assault), and doing the unexpected.

i. Simplicity. Although forcible entry forces execute complex and risky operations, their plans and procedures must be clear, simple and direct to facilitate understanding and synchronization. Simplicity is facilitated by common terminology and doctrine, standard equipment (especially communications equipment), and joint training.

CHAPTER IV

OPTIMUM FORCE / FORCE MIX

In Chapter II, the current forcible entry forces (amphibious, airborne and air assault) were identified and discussed. Then in Chapter III, using the principles of war, the key imperatives of forcible entry operations were presented. The purpose of this chapter is to propose the "right" force/force mix to conduct forcible entry operations in support of the regional CINCs.

The CINCs have assigned or forced listed to their AOR, the forces required to execute forcible entry operations. The document which lists these assets for the CINCs is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). However, the mission planning and execution of forcible entry operations are most complex. The synchronization of the many moving parts and the impact of numerous operational challenges translates into one of the most risky of all missions confronting the CINCs.

The first and the most critical of these operational challenges is timing and tempo - can the required forces be deployed in the AO (maneuver) to meet the window of opportunity? How long will it take for the Naval Expeditionary Force to be within striking distance (planning factor is 500 miles per day)? While an airborne force could be on the scene within 24-36 hours, are they of sufficient force (mass) to maintain the tempo until other forces are deployed?

The second key challenge is locations and number of lodgements to be seized. Is the objective/objectives within the footprint of amphibious OTH

operations? Are there any available airfields/lodgements in the AO which could support an FOB or could be used to support air assault operations? What are the impacts of basing and overflight restrictions? Does the mission require seizing multiple objectives? If the answer is yes, is the concentration of available combat strength (mass) sufficient?

The final key challenges are mobility, maneuverability, and sustainment. The forcible entry forces commander must have the agility to exploit successes and enemy vulnerabilities. Once the initial forced entry is successful, can the assault force expand the lodgement area to defend and facilitate employment of follow on forces? A viable forcible entry force must have ground and air mobility.¹⁷ The forces must be organized with sustainability in mind. Sustainable forces will need integrated combat support and combat service support organizations.

Okay, there seems to be more questions than answers, what is the "right" force/force mix? The answer is all of the above (amphibious, airborne, and air assault). While some scenarios could restrict the initial use of one of these capabilities, the key to the CINCs ability to rapidly project power and forces into a semi-permissive or non-permissive area of operations today lies in joint action. The synergistic combination of these capabilities will enhance the forcible entry operations in reaction time, tempo, lethality and sustainment.

The capability of the Armed Forces for forcible entry is an important weapon in the arsenal of the joint force commander. The primary modes for such entry are amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations which provide joint force commanders with great potential to achieve strategic and operational leverage. As shown in the Gulf War, even the threat of a powerful and flexible forcible entry capability can exert a compelling influence upon the plans and operations of an opponent.¹⁸

The combination of these capabilities has historical trace. During World War II numerous amphibious landings were accompanied by airborne operations, the most noteworthy being Operation Overlord where airborne troops were deployed to protect the flanks of the amphibious landings. Additionally, in support of the Dominican Republic Operation, airborne and Marine amphibious forces were deployed to restore democracy. This combination, however, was not executed again until 1983, during Operation Urgent Fury, the U.S. invasion of Grenada. While both forces were deployed simultaneously, neither operation supported the other except in an indirect fashion with the subsequent linkup nearly ending in disaster when communications could not be established between the converging forces.¹⁹ However, since Operation Urgent Fury numerous CINCLANT exercises (SOLID SHIELD/OCEAN VENTURE) have effectively executed joint amphibious, airborne and air assault operations. Just Cause, Panama 1989, was a great success in the synchronization of air assault forces from bases within Panama and airborne forces deployed from CONUS in a multiple objective scenario. The Navy and Marines exercise air assault maneuvers as an integral part of amphibious operations; and the Army routinely trains air assault operations as enabling/follow-on forces to airborne missions.

In 1983, the French saw the need to organize forces for out of area operations. As a result, they created a corps of highly mobile, light, rapidly deployable forces. The corps is comprised of a marine infantry division, a parachute division, a mountain division, an assault division and a light armored division.²⁰ The Force d' Action Rapide (FAR) was designed around light vehicles and helicopters. Despite France's limited strategic lift

capability, the FAR provides a tremendous capability to deploy light to mid-weight forcible entry forces.

The recent Russia military reorganization has focused its interest towards a Mobile Force Command which would deploy airborne, light infantry and limited amphibious forces.²¹ These forces would provide a deployable integrated quick reaction capability with missions to include forcible entry operations (primarily focused on the "Near Abroad").

The most compelling argument for the CINCs to option for a force mix which includes amphibious, airborne and air assault capabilities is that the risk associated with going without the complete package is too high. In chapter II, these three forcible entry capabilities were reviewed : present forces; key force modernization issues; and planning considerations. The most important aspect of this review was the listed planning considerations (or better stated planning limitations). Each force has its elite warfighting skills, however, when you apply operational imperatives (principles of war and Mission Enemy Troops Terrain and Time (METT-T)) to a forced entry scenario certain limitations could become show stoppers. For example : an amphibious assault could be too risky because of shallow water mines, unsuitable beaches, weather (sea state), multiple objectives or excessive inland distances; an airborne operation could be chancy based on weather (winds), sustainment, airlift limitations, and on-the-ground mobility; and air assault insertions depend on FOBs (airfields/naval platforms) and sustainment (refueling/rearming). The effective mix of these forces would minimize the individual planning limitations of each capability.

CHAPTER V

DEPLOYMENT SCENARIOS

Forcible entry missions are one of the most complex military operations to plan. It is difficult for planners to visualize/understand the enormity of the essential information required and the number of moving parts that must be synchronized. The mission workup starts with situation updates, identification of constraints, METT-T analysis, and concludes with the development and approval of a concept of operation.

To further illustrate the full potential of the integration and synchronization of amphibious, airborne and air assault capabilities in the execution of forcible entry missions, this chapter will analyze three possible scenarios.

CINCSOUTH - Terror prevails in Haiti

SITUATION - Last night (May 5, 1994) the Haitian army and their agents executed 243 Haitians in Port-au-Prince. The CIA has confirmed that 56 RPGs and 460 AK-47s were smuggled through the Dominican Republic to the Front for Advancement and Progress in Haiti (FRAPH) in the past month. Fearing a military action by the United States, FRAPH and the Haitian military have prepared a plan to seize all Americans and other foreign nationals as hostages against such an attack. President Clinton has directed the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) to take immediate action to safeguard Americans and restore democracy in Haiti.

CONSTRAINTS

- Time
- CBG not available
- minimize collateral damage
- safety of U.S. and foreign nationals

MISSION - CINCSOUTH conducts offensive operations in Haiti at 0200R, 7 May in order to: safeguard Americans and other foreign nationals, and restore democracy in Haiti.

ENEMY - Army - 7,000 man (automatic weapons, RPGs, 15 APCs and 40 vehicles with mounted 60 cal); Navy - 12 patrol crafts; Air Force - 12 aircraft and 3 helos; Paramilitary - 6,000 man.²²

TROOPS - Task Organization

1 MEU (MAGTF) (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

1 ABN BDE TF (FT Bragg, NC)

1 AVN TF (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

Joint Special Operation Command (JSOC)

TF Red (SEAL TMs and DELTA TMs)

TF Black (Ranger BN)

PSYOP TMs

TF 160 (AVN)

LOG TF

TERRAIN - Main objective area is Port-au-Prince (urban)

- Key terrain is hills overlooking Port-au-Prince
- Poor road networks
- Coastal beach area north of Port-au-Prince

TIME - Operation must be executed within the next 24-48 hours

CONCEPT of OPERATIONS

- FOB established at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (H-18)
- Insertion of RECON TMs (H-12)
- MEU (MAGTF) close on FOB (H-8)
- AVN TF close on FOB (H-6)
- TF Red conducts pre-assault operations (H-1)
- TF Black airborne assault Port-au-Prince airport (H-Hour)
- Airborne assaults multiple objectives to fix and defeat Haitian military (H-Hour)
- MEU air assaults into Port-au-Prince to link-up with TF Red and TF Black; conduct combat operations/security of noncombatants (H-Hour)
- AVN TF provides lift and attack helo support to Airborne and MEU forces (H-Hour)
- MAGTF provides Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support (CAS) (H-Hour)
- Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) will be used as an airborne C3I platform
- PSYOP TMs deploy with MEU and Airborne forces
- LOG TF close on Port-au-Prince D+3

CINCEUR - Libya threatens Tunisia

SITUATION - Libya continues to support terrorist activities in Tunisia; the latest incident a car bombing which killed two Americans and 12 Tunisians outside a Coca Cola factory. A Libyan naval patrol boat had fired

on a Tunisian oil tanker in Tunisian territorial waters and numerous border incidents have occurred in the past month. Libya has threatened to attack Tunisia over a disputed strip of land which borders these two countries. US and UN sanctions against Libya have failed to convince Libya to back off this aggressive behavior. Intelligence reports show a continued build up of troops by Libya on the border. CIA states that Libya will attack as soon as their armored forces are in position (approximately 72 hours)

The Tunisian government has asked the US for assistance. All non-essential Americans have been advised to leave Tunisia. A CBG is presently in position off the coast of Tunisia. A second CBG is enroute (5 days steaming time). An Air Force Wing and the 3-325 Airborne Combat Task Force, both stationed in Italy, have been placed on alert status. Italy has indicated it would support military actions against Libya. Libya has stated it will oppose by force any foreign forces that attempt to deploy into Tunisia. President Clinton has drawn the line and has directed JCS to deploy military forces to Tunisia to insure its territorial sovereignty and, if attacked, to take whatever means required to defeat that aggression.

CONSTRAINTS

- Time (initial MEU and Airborne deployments)
- Limited airfields in Tunisia
- No preemptive strikes - must wait until Libya initiates hostilities

MISSION - CINCEUR deploys ground forces into Tunisia at H-Hour, D-Day in order to : demonstrate US resolve for the territorial sovereignty of Tunisia and if attacked to defeat that aggression.

ENEMY - Army 55,000 (11 AR BDEs, 11 MECH BDEs, 5 INF BDEs, 42 IND TK BNs, 48 IND MECH BNs, 19 ABN BNs and 70 ATTK Helo
- NAVY 8,000 (6 SS, 6 Mini-Subs, 3 FF, 7 Corvettes, 25 MSI Craft, 14 Patrol, and 8 Mine)
- Air Force 10,000 (10 Bombers, 120 GRND ATK, 240 Fighter, 45 ATTK Helo
- ADA 12,000 (24 SAM BDEs and 3 IND SAM BNs)²³

TROOPS - Task Organization

2 CBGs	(Mediterranean)
2 MEU (MAGTF)	(Mediterranean)
1 Airborne BN TF	(Italy)
2 AF Wings	(Italy, Spain)
1 Army Corps	(Germany)
1 AR DIV	
1 MECH DIV	
1 AVN BDE	

TERRAIN - Northern area (Mediterranean forest and hard leaf scrub)

- Central and Southern areas (semi-desert)
- Limited road network

TIME - Initial operations (MEU deployment) must be executed within the next 24-48 hours

CONCEPT of OPERATIONS

- JTF Forward deploys to US Embassy in Tunis (H-18)

- CBG conducts Show-of-Force/AI (H-6)
- MEU amphibious deployment to Oabis Beach (H-Hour)
- Airborne TF deployment to Oafsah Airfield (H+2)
- If hostilities are initiated by Libya, air campaign
"Nightmare" will be executed
- Military Preposition Ships (MPS) Squadrons close in AO
(C+7)
- Heavy Army Forces close in AO (C+30)

CINCPAC - Insurgents attack U.S. Preposition Stock Facility
(PSF) in Thailand and hold 107 US hostages.

SITUATION - Thailand government troops guarding the U.S. PSF in Sattahip were overrun by insurgent forces. With the Thai government troops engaged in numerous battles with insurgent forces throughout the country and the possibility that the military hardware stored at Sattahip could be used to tip the balance for the insurgents, the President of Thailand has asked for U.S. assistance. The insurgents are holding 107 U.S. hostages (36 military and 71 contractor personnel) and threaten to execute them if the U.S. takes a military action. President Clinton has directed the JCS to take immediate action to rescue American hostages and to secure the PSF. He has also authorized the authority to pursue insurgents to gain control/destroy U.S. military hardware.

CONSTRAINTS

- Time (safety of hostages)
- Pursuit operations limited to the Cambodian border

- Until an airhead is secure, LOG and medical support will be provided by CBG

MISSION - CINCPAC conducts operations in Thailand at H-Hour, D-Day in order to: rescue American hostages; secure the U.S. PSF; and to gain control/destroy U.S. military hardware.

ENEMY - Insurgent forces consist of approximately 1,200 men (paramilitary/ex-military). Armed with RPGs, AK-47s, 60 cals, and possible U.S. military hardware (Dragons, AT4s, mortars, Stingers and explosives).

TROOPS - Task Organization

1 CBG

1 MEU

1 ABN BN TF

Special Operations (JSOC)

TF Red (SEAL TMs and DELTA TMs)

TF Black (Ranger BN)

TF 160 (AVN)

PSYOP TMs

TERRAIN - Main objective is the PSF in Sattahip (port/urban)

- Key terrain is mountain ridge overlooking Sattahip

- Area just north of the objective is open rice paddies and small hootches

- Coastline south and west of the objective

- 20kms north and east of Sattahip is sloping terrain and heavy vegetation

TIME - Operation must be executed within the next 24-48 hours

CONCEPT of OPERATIONS

- FOB established at Diego Garcia (H-18)
- Insertion of RECON TMs (H-12)
- TF Red inserts Hostage Rescue TMs; and conducts pre-assault operations (H-1)
- TF Black airborne assault on PSF (H-Hour)
- Airborne assaults multiple objectives to fix and defeat insurgent forces (H-Hour)
- TF 160 conducts fire support and extraction lift (H-Hour)
- CBG provides CAS (H- Hour)
- MEU conducts OTH air assault to close insurgent forces escape routes, north and east of Sattahip; prepares for pursuit operations (H-Hour)
- MEU conducts amphibious landing at port of Sattahip; establish link-up with TF Black; establishes LOG, medical, and security support (H+2)
- ABCCC will be used as an airborne C3I platform

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Future adversaries may conclude (based on lessons of the Gulf War) that their best course of action when confronting the United States would be to prevent the establishment of a lodgement that would allow for a buildup of forces. Should an opponent choose this option, U.S. forces will be required to fight their way in. Far fetched? Perhaps not! Could this not have been the situation if Iraq had overrun Saudi Arabia before U.S. forces deployed? Without access through Saudi Arabia ports and airfields, we would have had to rely only on an air campaign or had to conduct forcible entries. Even more likely scenarios - opposed NEO, peace-enforcement, and Urgent Fury/Just Cause type operations are confronting the regional CINCs today. These type operations require surprise, speed and precise power projection in a semi-permissive or non-permissive area of operations. In either extreme, our capability today to effect a forcible entry may be insufficient.

The CINCs have assigned or forced listed to their AOR, the forces required to execute forcible entry operations. However, these capabilities amphibious assault, airborne, and air assault have primarily been developed along separate service lines. Despite the fact these separate capabilities have been recognized as the "elite" forces, they have not been a top priority in joint integration, technology, and equipment modernization.

Historically, the combination of these capabilities has demonstrated exceptional utility, however, except for recent CINCLANT exercises (SOLID SHIELD and OCEAN VENTURE) these warfighting skills have not been

planned for or exercised as an integrated force. It is recognized that some scenarios could restrict the initial use of one of these capabilities, however, today the key to the CINCs ability to rapidly project power and forces into opposed areas of operations lies in joint action.

The most compelling argument for the CINCs to option for integrated capabilities is that the risk associated with going without the complete package is just too high. Each of these forces bring to-the-table special warfighting skills, however, when you analyze operational imperatives (principles of war and METT-T) with a forced entry scenario certain constraints surface which could become show stoppers. For example : an amphibious assault could be too risky because of shallow water mines, unsuitable beaches, weather (sea state), multiple objectives or excessive in land distances; an airborne operations could be chancy based on weather (winds), sustainment, airlift limitations, and on the ground mobility; and air assault insertions depend on FOBs (airfields/naval platforms) and sustainment (refueling/rearming). An effective mix of these elite warfighting skills would maximize collective strengths and minimize individual limitations.

The synergistic combination of amphibious assault, airborne and air assault will enhance forcible entry operations in reaction time, tempo, lethality and sustainment. The CINCs must embrace the fully potential of joint synergism and be prepared to play all their joint cards especially their ace or trump card - "Forcible Entry Forces, the tip of the spear, first into action and followed as required by heavier forces and longer sustainment."

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