The Siberian Expedition 1918-1920: An Early Operation other than War
Abstract
When the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia during November, 1917 they immediately ceased hostilities with the Germans. The potential impact on the Allies was catastrophic, German Eastern Front forces combined with 1.6 million repatriated POW's could be returned to fight on the Western Front. The European Allies quickly demanded that American and Japanese troops be sent to reopen the Eastern Front, launching what would evolve into an early operation other than war for American forces. Against the strong opposition of the War Department, President Wilson committed 9000 American troops with a set of strategic goals rendered quickly obsolete by the armistice. Major General William S. Graves, commander of the expedition, underwent 20 months of turmoil translating Wilson's policy into attainable military objectives for the operation, against strong opposition from the other Allies and even the U.S. State Department. At the end of this unpopular operation, Graves thought he had failed. Yet when the positive outcomes are weighed and the expedition is measured by modern standards for this type of operation, Graves achieved remarkable success and deserves a better reputation than what was his fate. Graves struck a balance between operational imperatives and political requirements not often achieved in the circumstances of conflicting strategic goals.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 13, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA283474
Entities
People
- Robert L. Smalser
Organizations
- Naval War College