

AD-A283 537



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, R.I.

LET'S PUT 'JOINT' BACK INTO JFACC

by

Lynn M. Champagne

Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: *Lynn M. Champagne*

16 May 1994

Paper directed by
Capt. D. Watson USN
Chairman, Department of Military Operations

DTIC
ELECTE
AUG 17 1994
S G D

2698 94-25876



DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

94 8 16 068

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification		Authority: NA	
3. Declassification/Downgrading		Schedule: NA	
4. Distribution/Availability		of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.	
5. Name of Performing Organization: Joint Military Operations Department			
6. Office Symbol: 1C		7. Address: Naval War College, 686 Cushing Rd., Newport, RI 02841-5010	
8. Title (Include Security Classification):		LET'S PUT 'JOINT' BACK INTO JFACC (U)	
9. Personal Authors: LTCOL L. M. CHAMPAGNE/USMC			
10. Type of Report: Final		11. Date of Report: 16 MAY 1994	
12. Page Count: 23			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: THE JFACC SHOULD BE MANNED BY ALL SERVICES.			
15. Abstract: The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept remains a very controversial subject. A survey of the doctrinal differences among Services highlights the origins of some very contentious issues. U. S. Air Force doctrine places heavy emphasis on the strategic use of airpower. Existing or evolving doctrine in the U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, and U. S. Marine Corps lean more to the tactical use of aviation assets. The JFACC process must be responsive to the needs of all Services in the joint arena. The interdependence of joint forces demands a JFACC staff that is sensitive to the needs of all participants. In essence, it must act in a more 'purple' fashion. A standing all Services JFACC staff is a realistic and feasible means to achieve this end. The Joint Warfighting Center, USACOM, and initiatives at USCINCLANT/USCINCPAC are offered as possible avenues for achieving this goal. In this manner, the Joint Task Force Commander will increase the likelihood that the aerospace needs of future forces are met most effectively and efficiently.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
18. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASS			
19. Name of Responsible Individual: Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department			
20. Telephone: (401) 841-3414/4120		21. Office Symbol: 1C	

**Abstract of
LET'S PUT 'JOINT' BACK INTO JFACC**

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept remains a very controversial subject. A survey of the doctrinal differences among Services highlights the origins of some very contentious issues. U. S. Air Force doctrine places heavy emphasis on the strategic use of airpower. Existing or evolving doctrine in the U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, and U. S. Marine Corps lean more to the tactical use of aviation assets. The JFACC process must be responsive to the needs of all Services in the joint arena. The interdependence of joint forces demands a JFACC staff that is sensitive to the needs of all participants. In essence, it must act in a more 'purple' fashion. A standing all Service JFACC staff is a realistic and feasible means to achieve this end. The Joint Warfighting Center, USACOM, and initiatives at USCINCLANT/USCINCPAC are offered as possible avenues for achieving this goal. In this manner, the Joint Task Force Commander will increase the likelihood that the aerospace needs of future joint forces are met most effectively and efficiently.

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I ☒
DTIC	TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
ABSTRACT	.	ii
I	INTRODUCTION	1
II	BACKGROUND	4
	Army Doctrine	4
	Navy Doctrine	4
	Marine Corps Doctrine	5
	Air Force Doctrine	6
III	PROBLEM AREAS	9
IV	THE BIGGER PICTURE	13
	Joint Warfighting Center	13
	US Atlantic Command	14
	DJTFAC	15
	USCINCLANT/USCINCPAC Initiatives	16
V	CONCLUSIONS	18
APPENDIX I--JFACC NUCLEUS MANNING REQUIREMENTS	.	20
BIBLIOGRAPHY	.	22

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

No matter where we fight in the future, no matter what the circumstances, we will fight as a joint team. We will have the fingers on that team that are individual services, but when it comes to the fight we want the closed, clenched fist of American military power. The days of single service warfare are gone forever.

Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USN
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) holds a very special place in joint warfare. As the focal point of the "unity of effort" of aviation assets, the influence of the JFACC and his staff crosses all Service boundaries. The result of the JFACC concept should be the most effective and efficient use of aviation assets in any potential conflict.

Currently, military leaders point to the results of the Gulf War as proof that the JFACC concept works. The JFACC PRIMER states:

Operation Desert Storm² validated the JFACC concept in its first combat test.

Did it? Was the experience of Desert Storm a real test of the JFACC concept? Could we be learning the wrong lessons from that very successful chapter in military history?

The results of the air war in Operation Desert Storm were

¹ Quoted in "Committed, Focused, and Needed." C4I for the Warrior (Washington, D.C.: Director, Command, Control, Communication, and Computer Systems, J-6, The Joint Staff, 12 June 1993), from a speech at the Naval War College, Newport, RI, 25 March 1993.

² JFACC Primer Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations Headquarters, United States Air Force. August 1992

noteworthy. It would be unwise, however, to assume that many advantageous aspects of that war that favored the use of airpower will be duplicated in future conflicts. Iraqi leadership chose to fight a war of limited objectives. This resulted in abundant lead time for the build-up of equipment and forces. The large influx of men, warfighting equipment, and supplies was uncontested. The host nation support given to aviation forces placed coalition forces in an extremely advantageous position. This series of events allowed coalition air assets to organize and train for almost six months prior to the commencement of the air war. The combination of these circumstances gave the entire campaign a unique character. Military leaders should focus on how the JFACC functioned rather than the results.

Despite the advantage of extensive lead time and overwhelming assets, many problems were experienced in integrating United States and coalition forces under the control of a single JFACC. Many questioned the priority given to strategic targets instead of targets with more tactical significance. Difficulties ranging from the printing and distribution of the Air Tasking Order (ATO) to the exchange of vital intelligence concerning targets in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) highlight the necessity for a reassessment of JFACC procedures.

Perhaps military leaders should look at difficulties in the JFACC process to serve as a foundation for the rethinking of how we organize, train and equip our JFACC assets of the future. I

will argue that there should be sweeping changes. These changes are necessary and are vital to the success of our joint military structure.

This paper will attempt to highlight why change is needed in the manner in which we organize the JFACC. As all Services downsize forces, the responsibilities of planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking aviation assets will become more critical to the success of any future conflict. All Services will be competing for an ever decreasing "pot" of aviation assets. As a result, the JFACC must act in a more 'purple' fashion. It must be responsive to the needs of all Services participating in the theater of operations. It must be manned in a manner that allows for a quick transition from peace to war.

As the warfighting assets of the nation decrease, the debate about whether the JFACC is a "commander or coordinator" will become more heated. It is only a matter of time before the JFACC will be forced to make some very difficult choices. Who will receive priority in the allocation process? A tug-of-war is looming between those who would emphasize strategic bombing and those who would husband aviation assets for tactical targets. A JFACC staff with a broad perspective, drawing from all Service backgrounds, would be best suited for the task of making those decisions. The correct answer to those questions would give the JTF Commander the best chance for tactical, operational, and strategic success.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

Philosophies concerning the optimum use of aviation assets varies from Service to Service. This is understandable. Given the different roles and missions for each Service, it is logical that opinions concerning the best use of air assets will vary. Each Service emphasizes different means of projecting aerospace combat power in Service doctrine. In this case, it is useful to establish some of those differences by summarizing doctrinal differences.

Army Doctrine. The aviation brigade provides the division commander with the organic capability to shape the battlefield. The aviation brigade's mission is to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. Army doctrine emphasizes the tactical employment of the aviation brigade in the same manner as a ground maneuver force or in a combined arms effort acting as a team with ground forces.³ In short, Army doctrine emphasizes the use of its aviation combat power in the Close Air Support (CAS) role and as a maneuver element at the tactical level of war.

Navy Doctrine. Naval doctrine is in transition. In the White Paper "...from the Sea", the Navy lays out a new strategic vision for Naval forces. Naval Expeditionary Forces operating in the littoral will be expected to act as an "enabling" capability for joint operations. Naval aviation assets will be asked to

³ U.S. Army. Department of the Army FM1-111 Aviation Brigades Headquarters, U. S. Army, Washington, D.C. 1990

make vital contributions in the areas of Battlespace Dominance and Power Projection. In essence, these assets will be split in some percentage between fleet defense and strike missions. What percentage of forces will support the two roles will depend upon the type of threat to the Naval Expeditionary Force and the distance from hostile shores. If the Carrier Battle Group is to be the primary source of air support for the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), then the emphasis of the use of Carrier Air Wing assets should swing away from the role of Strategic Attack. Although there will be a place for Strategic Attack for strike assets, it may be necessary for the majority of aviation assets to concentrate on CAS, Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI), and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) in support of an amphibious operation. Additionally, as fleet assets lose the mobility offered by the open ocean, the criticality of the contribution of aviation assets to fleet defense dramatically increases. Given this new vision for the use of Naval Forces, the result should be an increased emphasis on the employment of aviation assets at the tactical level.

Marine Corps Doctrine. Marine Corps doctrine centers around the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). All MAGTFs have the same basic structure: a command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE).

The size and composition of the ACE will depend on the size and mission of the MAGTF. The basis of the concept is to provide

"a single-Service, air-ground, combined arms team."⁴

The ACE provides the MAGTF Commander the air support necessary to perform his tactical mission. There are those who contend that fixed-wing aircraft such as the F/A-18 and the AV-8 should come under the control of the JFACC. Recent statements by the Commandant of the Marine Corps acknowledge that there are some instances when the JTF Commander will justifiably place Marine assets under the direct control of the JFACC.⁵ Without the organic artillery assets common to some Army units, such a move takes away a vital warfighting capability from the Marine GCE Commander. Therefore, the removal of organic aviation assets can only decrease the warfighting capability of the MAGTF to perform its mission.

The Marine Corps aviation units take great pride in being a direct contributor to the success of the GCE at the tactical level of war through the prudent use of CAS.

Air Force Doctrine. The tenets of Aerospace doctrine differ greatly from that of the other services. The USAF emphasizes Airspace Control through missions labeled Counterair and Counterspace. In the role of Force Application, the priorities are Strategic Attack, Interdiction, and Close Air Support.

AFM 1-1 is revealing in the manner that aerospace roles are

⁴U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability, FMFRP 2-12 Washington, D.C. p.2

⁵U. S. Marine Corps. Commandant of the Marine Corps. 1986 Omnibus Agreement for the Command and Control of Marine TACAIR. Washington, D.C. 18 March 1986

presented. The emphasis on strategic attack is clear while Close Air Support is termed "... the least efficient application of aerospace power".⁶

To summarize the doctrinal differences which divide the services it is instructional to quote USAF doctrine:

...Army and Marine aerospace forces are organized and designed to give first priority to immediate and close support of ground forces. Likewise, naval aerospace forces, as a priority, support fleet operations. In contrast, only the Air Force is charged with preparing aerospace forces that are organized, trained, and equipped to exploit fully aerospace power's flexibility and potential decisiveness.

The philosophical differences and mindsets of individual Services about the use of airpower are influenced by Service culture. Therefore, it not surprising that well intentioned individuals of each Service will have very different views about the proper use of aviation assets given the same strategic, operational, and tactical situation.

The danger lies when only one of those services is allowed to dominate the decision making process. An appreciation of the needs of all Services is needed. Too much emphasis on strategic targets in the planning and conduct of a campaign may place those who depend on aviation assets for tactical success at risk. On the other hand, those who would overemphasize tactical targets, run the risk of losing the obvious benefits that strategic bombing can bring to a military campaign. An appreciation of the

⁶U. S. Air Force. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters USAF, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume 1 Washington, D.C. March 1992 p. 13

⁷Ibid.

philosophies of both means of warfighting is vital to tactical and strategic success.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEM AREAS

The JFACC concept, developed following the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, was designed to provide a much needed command and control structure for the integration of joint air operations. The official DOD definition of the term JFACC is in JCS Pub 1-02:

The joint forces component commander derives his authority from the joint commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among his subordinate commanders, redirect and organize his forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of his overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint forces commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint forces commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other services component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas.

The major points which are pertinent to this discussion are:

- (1) The JFACC derives his authority from the Joint Forces Commander (JFC).
- (2) The JFC should provide guidance for the force apportionment to the JFACC.
- (3) The JFACC will normally conduct planning, coordination, allocation and tasking.

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub 1-02 (Washington: 1989). p. 197

(4) The JFACC is required to coordinate with other component, service and supporting commanders.⁹

Given the previous discussions about service doctrine, it is logical to conclude that if any one service is allowed to dominate the JFACC process, particularly in the areas of campaign planning and the allocation of assets by the Joint Targeting Control Board (JTCB), that process may be skewed due to lack of understanding or emphasis.

Overemphasis of strategic targets by members of the JTCB may lead to vital tactical targets being overlooked. This result is both natural and dangerous. An example of such a target is mines. While not considered a strategic target, sea mines that are stored on land pose no threat. Once deployed, the consequences of that deployment has operational and tactical implications which directly affect the employment of Naval forces. Likewise, artillery sites or enemy observation points on key terrain features may hamper the ability of the JTF Commander to achieve operational and tactical goals in the land campaign. While not ordinarily considered strategically significant, these are two examples of potential targets which are at risk of being overlooked by those in the allocation process.

In Operation Desert Storm aviation assets played an instrumental part in the defeat of the Iraqi war machine. Unquestionably, the strategic bombing campaign which preceded the

⁹Lobdell, John D., THE U.S. NAVY AND THE JFACC CONCEPT U. S. Naval War College (Condensed) Undated

ground offensive laid the foundation for the decisive victory.

Through a series of events, the JFACC staff in Riyadh was dominated by USAF personnel. This preponderance of USAF personnel included six Air Force flag officers (none from the Navy).¹⁰ There is no doubt that such participation was a great contributor to the success of the strategic air campaign. It could be argued, however, that the JFACC staff placed too much emphasis on the strategic bombing campaign at the expense of ground forces.

A postwar message from I MEF to CENTAF contended:

...differences between services' philosophy and doctrine were the crux of operational misunderstandings and friction in Desert Shield/Storm among the services. These misunderstandings could have been avoided with a true "purple suit" organization. ...the problem of not having a truly joint structure for targeting and apportionment is that the strategic views become the order of the day at the expense of the tactical.¹¹

Major disagreements centered around the shaping of the battlefield. MARCENT and ARCENT forces were extremely concerned about obstacles and artillery sites which were impediments to the ground commander's mission.¹² The process which led to a lack of needed emphasis on tactical targets should be a concern.

Given the air supremacy that the coalition forces enjoyed at the beginning of the ground war, the allocation process for air

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Commanding General Fleet Marine Force Pacific message to USCINCENT SUBJ: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF JOINT AIR OPERATIONS DTG CG FMFPAC 130120Z December 1991

¹²Ibid

assets should have placed greater emphasis on the requirements of the ground forces as that phase of the war approached.

Will the allocation process be more responsive to those who depend on aerospace assets for tactical success in the next war? This should be the focus for military leaders.

CHAPTER IV

THE BIGGER PICTURE

Currently, there are four initiatives which can form a basis for an improvement to the process in which we organize, train and equip the JFACC. By doing so, it is possible that a standing group of JFACC staff personnel can be organized and exercised as a permanent group which includes members of all services.

These initiatives include:

- (1) The stand up of the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC)
- (2) USACOM Joint Force Packaging and Training
- (3) USCINCPAC Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation (DJTFAC)
- (4) USCINCPAC/USCINCLANT (JFACC) concept letter 15 JAN 93

By blending these initiatives, it is possible to lay the foundation for a workable and effective joint services JFACC.

Joint Warfighting Center. The Joint Warfighting Center is in a unique position to be part of the solution to attain an all service JFACC. Three of the stated goals for the JWFC place it at the forefront of the process. They are:

- (1) Facilitate joint and multinational training and operability by assisting in the development, preparation, and conduct of joint training and exercises using operational C4I to enhance readiness across the full range of military operations.
- (2) Consider potential modernization and material

requirements for joint and/or multinational forces.

(3) Provide insights into potential joint force organization and command arrangements.¹³

Properly manned, the JWFC could be the proper site to permanently position personnel earmarked for the purpose of forming a standing JFACC with a cross section of members of all services. These personnel could be used to perform the function of the JFACC in appropriate joint exercises. Consistent with the JWFC charter, they could be at the forefront of new developments in the field in both joint doctrine and capabilities.

USACOM. The expanding role of USACOM in the joint arena places it in an ideal position to be instrumental in the solution of this problem. Among the responsibilities of USCINCCOM are:

(1) Conducting joint training of assigned CONUS-based forces and JTF staffs.

(2) In accordance with other combatant commanders, identifying and preparing for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint force packages for world wide employment.¹⁴

Therefore, USACOM is responsible for the advanced-level, joint training of forces. The goal being to ensure that, "if the United States must fight in the future, it will fight as a joint,

¹³The Joint Staff, Joint Warfighting Center Activation Plan, 4 March 1994

¹⁴Secretary of Defense. Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Unified Command Plan Washington, D.C. 1 October 1993

unified team, with seamless command and control".¹⁵

The concept of a seamless command and control is critical to the joint manning of a JFACC. The question which arises is, "Can the JFACC be integrated into a joint force package?" It has to be. If it can't, we're in trouble. USACOM is in an ideal position to exercise the concept on regular intervals and make it work.

JFACC procedures should be uniform from one geographic location to another. EUCOM procedures and PACOM procedures should be identical. CONUS units which may be allocated to either CINC, as contingencies arise, should not have to worry about procedures that are peculiar to regions. USACOM should be in a position to make recommendations to standardize procedures and equipment.

Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell. (DJTFAC) This initiative is important. It is a model for the augmentation of certain staff functions necessary in USCINCPAC. The concept centers around the augmentation provided to the CJTF to provide a joint staff planning capability in a command not available to a uni-service command. In addition, the concept also calls for USCINCPAC to provide a flag officer, from a service component other than that of the CJTF, to serve as the Deputy CJTF.¹⁶

This team is nominally a team of 20-24 personnel,

¹⁵ Miller, David Paul. "The Military After Next", Proceedings, February 1994

¹⁶ Excerpts from USCINCPAC INSTRUCTION 3120.26E dtd 20 Jan 93

representing all services and all functional areas. The cell is tailored from existing staff people and CINCPAC. Special staff personnel can be added, if necessary. Very importantly, they bring deployable communications gear to ensure that proper communications links are established. Consider the communications problems which were experienced in the Gulf War with the transmission of the ATO and the inability to pass pertinent intelligence.

In concept, a JFACC staff could be organized and utilized in the same manner as the DJTFAC. This staff could be "plugged in" where necessary with the proper number of personnel and communications equipment to act as the JFACC for a range of contingencies. It could be task organized to the needs of the JTF Commander. The DJTFAC model shows that such a concept is feasible and, in some cases, desirable.

USCINCLANT/USCINCPAC (JFACC) CONCEPT LETTER 15 JAN 93. This recent policy statement is important for a number of reasons. Enclosed in Annex I is a table of organization for a truly joint (JFACC). The table is important in that the organization thoroughly represents all services. It emphasizes the need for the involvement of all services in the planning phase of the operation. Additionally, it includes a cross section of all services in the JTCB which is a critical factor in the allocation process as the war progresses.

There are two areas, however, where this initiative must be expanded. The first is in the level of manning. The rank

structure sufficient to support a MRC should be a requirement. Another area which requires improvement is readiness. Simply calling personnel from separate commands to meet requirements for annual exercises does not ensure readiness. The concept letter states that the table of organization was validated in OCEAN VENTURE 92. A review of the after action report for OCEAN VENTURE 93 indicates that it took five weeks for the JFACC cell to print the first Air Tasking Order (ATO).¹⁷ That is unacceptable. The JFACC structure must be able to step in within days, not weeks, and begin to function. Only a standing JFACC team which trains together regularly will be able to accomplish this requirement.

¹⁷ Commander JTF 140 (CJTF 140) Lessons Learned ID. LLEAO-03636 29 OCT 93

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Given our nation's latest experience in Operation Desert Storm and the ongoing downsizing of forces, it is apparent that available assets and requirements needed to fight future conflicts are on a collision course. The future role of the JFACC and his staff will take on ultimate importance. For many reasons, it is imperative that there be a standing JFACC which crosses all Service boundaries.

The Joint Warfighting Center is the ideal command to place personnel to meet the requirements of manning the JFACC needs of the future. From this position they can be organized and equipped to deploy to those commands which are in need of a staff to control all aviation assets. Most importantly, this staff must have the opportunity to regularly train together.

USACOM is in an ideal position, in the same manner that they will identify joint force packages, to utilize these personnel. As the joint force provider, USACOM is strategically placed to utilize this staff to control aviation assets in any situation from joint operations to MRCs.

Using the same concept as the DJTFAC, these personnel would be a standing asset which could be "plugged in" immediately to be the 'purple' suited managers of aviation assets for the JTF Commander. They would bring with them the communications gear necessary to direct the members of the joint force team, wherever

they may be.

In this manner, these personnel will bring a broad perspective to the use of aviation assets at all levels of warfare. This will give the JTF Commander the greatest chance of achieving strategic, operational, and tactical success.

By doing so, we will put 'Joint' back into JFACC.

JFACC Nucleus Manning Requirements

1. The billet structure listed below identifies the JFACC personnel providing the nucleus of required expertise. Based on specific mission requirements for sustained 24 hour operations, additional personnel will be required. The JFACC will submit requirements for additional support via the chain of command to USCINCPAC/USCINCLANT J1. Components and supporting commands should be prepared to supply additional personnel when requested by USCINCPAC/USCINCLANT J1.

2. SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS: Each component commander must review service Special Access Programs (SAPs) to ensure JFACC staff augmentees provide the required expertise to coordinate Special Access Program use.

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFC1-01	JFACC	1115	07/08	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC1-02	DEPUTY COMMANDER	13XX	06/07	N	PAC/LANTFLT	CURRENT/POST CVW CDR
JFC2-01	ACOS INTELLIGENCE	8085	05/06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC2-02	D-ACOS INTELLIGENCE	1630	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-03	TARGETEER	8085	03/04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFC2-04	TARGETEER	1630	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	GOODFELLOW SCHOOL GRAD+1YR EXPERIENCE DESIRED
JFC2-05	CURRENT INTEL	35A	02/03	AR	ARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-06	CURRENT INTEL	0202	02/03	MC	MARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-07	MC&G	8065	03	AF	AFLANT/PAC	MC&G
JFC2-08	MC&G	8065	03	AF	AFLANT/PAC	MC&G
JFC2-09	ANALYST SUPERVISOR	3905/07	E7/E8	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFC2-10	ANALYST SUPERVISOR	20150	E7/E8	AF	AFLANT/PAC	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-11	ANALYST	0231	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-12	ANALYST	96B	E5/E6	AR	ARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-13	ANALYST	20150	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-14	ANALYST	IS	E5/E6	N	PAC/LANTFLT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-15	ANALYST	96B	E5/E6	AR	ARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC2-16	ANALYST	0231	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	I&W/THREAT EXPERIENCE
JFC3-01	ACOS OPERATIONS	1115Q	06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	AIR/GND INTERDICTION EXPERIENCE
JFC3-02	STRIKE OPERATIONS	13XX	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	A-6 CVW STK LDR (POST COMMAND DESIRED)
JFC3-03	AIR OPERATIONS	1115B/Q	05/06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	AIR TO AIR (F-15/F-16)
JFC3-04	STRIKE OPS AIR/GND	13XX	05	N	PAC/LANTFLT	POST-DEPT HEAD FA-18 CVW STRIKE LEADER
JFC3-05	CLOSE AIR SUPPORT	7509	04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	AV-8 (WTI GRAD)
JFC3-06	ELINT/AEW OPS	13XX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	E-2 MISSION COMMANDER
JFC3-07	AIR DEFENSE/ESCORT	13XX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	F-14 TARPS/NFWS GRAD
JFC3-08	STRATEGIC OPS	1235Z	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	F-117/FWIC GRAD
JFC3-09	INTERDICTION OPS	1235E	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	F-111/FWIC GRAD
JFC5-01	ACOS PLANS	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	FA-18
JFC5-02	INTERDICTION PLANS	1115B	05	AF	AFLANT/PAC	F-15E/FWIC GRAD
JFC5-03	AWACS	1475T	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	AWACS
JFC5-04	TLAM STRIKE PLANS	1110/20	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	TLAM EMPLOYMENT
JFC5-05	FIRE SUPPORT	14A	04	AR	ARPAC/LANT	MLRS/ATACMS
JFC5-05A	TLAM OPS	1120	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	TLAM EMPLOYMENT
JFC5-06	AIR/GND PLANS	1115N	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	A-10/F-16/FWIC GRAD
JFC5-07	STRIKE PLANS	7541	04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	EA-6B
JFC5-08	STRATEGIC PLANS	1235C	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	TANKERS/B52
JFC6-01	ACOS COMMUNICATIONS	4945A	04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	CAFMS/CTAPS/JDISS
JFC6-02	COMM WATCH OFFICER	13XX	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	FLEET COMMS EXPERIENCE

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFC6-03	AIR C ² SYSTEM OFF	7208	03/04	MC	MARPAC/LANT	MACCS COORDINATOR
JFC6-04	COMMS OFFICER	25C	03/04	AR	ARPAC/LANT	GMF/SHF ARMY COMMS
JFC6-05	COMM WATCH NCO	RM23XX	E7	N	PAC/LANTFLT	SI COMMS
JFC6-06	ADP INSTALLER/OPR	2531	E5/E6	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFC6-07	WWMCCS	49251	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	WWMCCS OPERATOR
JFC6-08	RADIO OPERATOR	49251	E5/E6	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFCL-01	SOF LIAISON	TBD	06	AF	SOCAPAC/LANT	
JFCL-02	ARMY LIAISON	15A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-03	USN LIAISON	13XX	06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFCL-04	USAF LIAISON		06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFCL-05	USMC LIAISON	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-06	BCE TEAM CHIEF	13A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFCL-07	ALLIED AVIATOR	ANY AIR	06 EQ		VARIOUS	
JFCL-08	CNA	ANY	06 EQ	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFCL-09	SPACE LIAISON	TBD	06		VARIOUS	

JFACC AFLOAT MANNING REQUIREMENTS

LINE	BILLET	CODE	GRADE	SVC	SOURCE	REMARKS
JFA1-01	JFACC	13XX	07/08	N	PAC/LANTFLT	
JFA1-02	DEPUTY COMMANDER	1115X	06/07	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFA2-01	ACOS INTELLIGENCE	1630	05/06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	POST SEA DUTY INTEL STAFF
JFA2-02	TARGETEER	8085	03/04	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFA2-03	TARGETEER	1630	03/04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	GOODFELLOW SCHOOL GRAD. +1 YR EXPERIENCE
JFA3-01	ACOS OPERATIONS	13XX	06	N	PAC/LANTFLT	A-6 CVW STK LDR (POST COMMAND DESIRED)
JFA5-01	ACOS PLANS	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFA6-01	ACOS COMMUNICATIONS	1XXX	04	N	PAC/LANTFLT	FLEET COMMS EXPERIENCE
JFAL-01	SOF LIAISON	TBD	06	AP	SOCAPAC/LANT	
JFAL-02	ARMY LIAISON	15A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-03	USAF LIAISON	13XX	06	AF	AFLANT/PAC	
JFAL-04	USMC LIAISON	9907	06	MC	MARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-05	BCE LIAISON	13A	06	AR	ARPAC/LANT	
JFAL-06	ALLIED AVIATOR	ANY AIR	06 EQ		VARIOUS	
JFAL-07	CNA	ANY	06 EQ	N	PAC/LANTFLT	

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- CG FMFPAC MSG: "Command and Control of Joint Air Operations"
Message: CG FMFPAC 130120Z December 1991
- Craft, Douglas W. An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War, Strategic Studies Institute, U. S. Army War College, 31 August 1992
- Houle, Edward H. Col., "JFACC--The Sequel", Marine Corps Gazette, May 1993 p.83-89
- Jeremiah, David E., "Committed, Focused, and Needed," C4I for the Warrior Lecture. U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI 25 March 1993
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. JCS Pub 3-56.1. (Second Draft)
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman. Unified Command Plan Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Washington D. C.
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. DOD, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Pub 1-02. Washington; 1986
- The Joint Staff. Memorandum for the Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Warfighting Center Activation Plan, Washington, D.C. 4 March 1994
- Kennedy, Floyd, D. "Ocean Venture 93, Commanding a Joint Air Campaign-From a Ship", Proceedings, August 1993 p. 34-35
- Lobdell, John D. U.S. Navy and the JFACC Concept, (Condensed Version) U. S. Naval War College, (Undated)
- Mc Peak, Merril Gen., "No Clear Mission Statement, Until Now", Lecture, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 19 June 1992
- Miller, Paul David. "A New Mission For Atlantic Command" Joint Force Quarterly Summer 1993 p. 81-90
- Miller, David Paul. "The Military After Next", Proceedings February 1994
- Motz, Dwight W. "JFACC: The Joint Air Control 'Cold War' Continues...", Marine Corps Gazette, January 1993
- Polzhill, Dennis. "Making Interoperability Work", Military

Review September 1993, pp. 42-51

- U. S. Air Force. Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations Headquarters, United States Air Force. JFACC Primer Washington D.C. September 1992
- U. S. Air Force. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters USAF, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States, Air Force Manual 1-1, Volume 1 Washington, D.C. March 1992
- U. S. Air Force. Department of the Air Force, Headquarters USAF, AFP 200-17, An Introduction to Air Force Targeting, 23 June 1989 p. 3
- U. S. Army. Department of the Army, FM1-111 Aviation Brigades Headquarters, U. S. Army, Washington, D.C. 1990
- U. S. Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT), U. S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC). Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Concept of Operations. J311/3000, 7 January 1993
- U. S. Marine Corps. Commandant of the Marine Corps. 1986 Omnibus Agreement for the Command and Control of Marine TACAIR. Washington D.C. 18 March 1986
- U. S. Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force: A Global Capability FMFRP 2-12 Washington, D.C. 1991
- U. S. Marine Corps. Campaigning Department of the Navy, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. 25 January 1990