


REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DTIC SELECTE AUG 17 1994 B		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING AUTHORITY		4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	
7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION		AD-A283 709 	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207			
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	
9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER			
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NUMBER	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) (U) ESCALATION: A Definition for the 90's			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) M. C. Fralen, CDR, USN			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 940617	15. PAGE COUNT 29
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by ESCALATION, LIMITED WAR, PLANNING,	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The term "escalation" is widely used but little understood. Past theorists have provided little on the general nature of the process of escalation. The purpose of this paper is to review the theory of the Cold War era. From this theoretical base an analysis and a model of escalation will be developed with relevance to today's international climate. The model is based on axes of planning and control. The analysis is focused on the planning axis in conflict of intensity up to "limited war". Today's planning documents deal with escalation not as a process but as an effect. This is due to the separation of the control of the elements of national power below the National Security Council. There is a need to further coordinate the Departments of State and Defense for many reasons. A secondary benefit of further coordination will be improved escalation control. However, the decision process of selecting applications of national power is not something that can be delegated down the national organizational structure.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT X UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED SAME AS RPT. DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLAS	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL Chairman, JMO Department		22b. TELEPHONE (include area code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

ESCALATION: A Theory for the 90's

by

M. C. Fralen

Commander, United States Navy

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: MC Fralen

17 June 1994

Paper directed by
D. Watson, Capt, USN
Chairman, Department of Joint Military Operations

94-25896



94 8 16 092
DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

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ESCALATION: A Theory for the 90's

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Escalate- To increase in intensity or scope.-escalation n."¹

The term escalation seems simple enough, but it can have as many connotations as persons utilizing it. Critical discussions of the concept of escalation yield widely varied and supportable opinions on the term with regard to military operations. Although the term is not in the daily jargon of military staffers its concepts permeate their efforts, especially with regard to planning and the execution of command and control.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a history of escalation theory as well as develop a useful model of the historical theory of escalation as it applies to today's national security arena. As this model will be based on axes of planning and the execution of control, a critical analysis of present methods of these axes is warranted. The scope of this paper's analysis will be limited to exploring the planning axis of the suggested model. The focus will highlight the military commander's increasing role in planning the application of all national elements of power. Although command and control are also elements of planning, the execution of control requires its own extensive examination in Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Information (C4I) development. The paper's conclusion will support present trends that may affect

operational planning in the future.

The framework of this model and analysis will be based on the execution of levels of crises up to limited war. Limited war is defined for these purposes as a war where the United States' objectives are not immediately concerned with national survival. Additionally, our military objective is not the overthrow of our opponent's recognized political leadership. The opponent's objective with regard to the nature of limited war has been omitted purposely. It is the misunderstanding of an opponent's objective that foreshadows the first mechanism for escalation.

To threaten the national survival of the United States, in the present balance of power, a state would have to have a strategic nuclear capability. Initial escalation theory is overspecialized in strategic nuclear confrontation. This study will focus on more universal applications of the theory. This is not to imply the negation of the use of nuclear weapons but to relegate them to a limited level only. This framework is consistent with the present threat planning for Major and Lesser Regional Contingencies (MRC and LRC).

Chapter II

Escalation Theory

History of the term

The introductory definition was quoted from a Webster's Dictionary dated 1984. However, in 1961 the term escalation was not included in the Oxford English Dictionary, and in 1973 the American Heritage Dictionary indicated the term related to military events of increasing scope and intensity.² This expansion of the term has left theorists struggling to define its process in an ever expanding application.

Twentieth century academics were intrigued to develop the theory of escalation only in regard to nuclear holocaust. Essentially this is where the term gained its intermediate definition as a military effort. The range of analysis ran from psychological studies of human interaction in crisis to simplistic model formation. Regardless of the technique used, the volume of study concerning the process of escalation is very limited.

The Theorists

"Since in war too small an effort can result not just in failure but in positive harm, each side is driven to outdo the other, which sets up an interaction.

Such an interaction could lead to a maximum effort if a maximum could be defined. But in that case all proportion between action and political demands would be lost: means would cease to be commensurate with ends, and in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise."³

Clausewitz's insightful view of the difficult balance of

ends versus means succinctly describes the dilemma of escalation. Despite lacking the term, early commanders were not lacking the mechanics of escalation. The desire to study and define these mechanics gained prominence when it appeared that the practical maximum effort could produce the end of civilization as we now know it.

Herman Kahn

Herman Kahn set the stage with his escalation ladder theory in 1965. Kahn introduced the dimensions for escalation in a limited conflict as well. His analysis included the three categories; "compound escalation, increase intensity, and widen area".⁴ His dimension of "increased intensity" included attacks on logistics, use of nuclear weapons and attacking cities. The current vernacular would include these escalations in the vertical dimension of escalation theory. "Compound" and "widen area" escalation included exporting the conflict outside the area of operations and expanding the local area of operations respectively. These are the forerunners of the current horizontal dimension of escalation theory. The purpose of expanding these dimensions is either a realization that the present limits will not allow attainment of the objective or a response to an escalation by the opponent.

Kahn, however, used the term "agreed battle" to describe limited war.⁵ As alluded to in the introduction, the lack of understanding between the belligerents of the "limits" of the war is a strong catalyst for escalation. The term "agreed" denies

this mechanism.

Kahn's ladder was significant in that it was the earliest escalation model or theory. However, as the term escalation was in its infancy, the model was simplistic and focused on the interactions of two strategic nuclear capable states. There are 44 rungs to Kahn's escalation ladder.' As the model is linear it insinuates that implementing a lower rung effort after a higher rung effort is achieved is not escalation. Additionally, only 20 of the 44 rungs deal totally with conventional war. This is indicative of an early preoccupation with a war between the United States and the Soviet Union that would escalate to global nuclear war.

Ole Holsti

Ole Holsti pursued the study of war, and with it the study of escalation, from a psychological view. His discussions focused on the stresses generated in conflict. Elements of communication, alternative selection and time stresses were all dissected.

Two of Holsti's hypotheses on crisis communication are valid for today's model. First, as stress increases, the volume of communication tends to increase between belligerents. As stress increases, the reliance on extraordinary or improvised channels of communication is increased.' With today's ability for world and regional leaders to communicate through the international media on a real time basis, this volume and methodology of exchange can be very challenging. Control of the messages to be sent is also problematic as any voice that can get the attention

of the international media can be immediately heard.

As alternatives are offered by planners, Holsti places their selection in three categories: choice, closed, and necessity.⁹ Choice indicates that the chosen alternative was selected on merit above other viable alternatives. Closed indicates that a specific alternative is not viable. Necessity is the escalation operative. In this category a decision is made due to the perception that no other course of action is available. This is not to imply that there is no other course of action or that the decision chosen is the best one. Necessity is a product of the stresses of crisis, most notably the stress of time. An alternative that is descriptive of the necessity category has great probability of being formulated in an ad hoc planning committee in a condition of group think. Holsti's study showed a majority of alternatives chosen in times of crisis fit this description.

Time is Holsti's underlying factor to processes and policies in crisis management. As with communication and alternative selection, Holsti offers some theoretical examples of time pressures. As time pressure is increasing: the more vigorous the search for alternatives, the less fruitful the search, the fewer number of alternatives will be considered, the greater the likelihood that a false alarm will be converted to war.⁹ This analysis of time is extremely relevant to the psychological mechanisms of escalation. Holsti notes, "Experimental research has shown that under severe time pressure normal subjects produce

errors similar to those committed by schizophrenics."¹⁰ This thought may be even more discomfoting when discussing crisis action planning. In addition to time being a stessor, subsequent theorists explored time as a dimension of limited war.

Fred Ikle'

A war's generic objective is termination on terms favorable to one's own concern. It is theoretically feasible for both sides to achieve this in a negotiated settlement. Once fighting begins, this possibility seems to fade as subsequent cost analysis or lack of such analysis seems to obscure those terms. Fred Ikle's study of war termination required discussion of escalation to be complete. Unique to his analysis was the consideration of time as a dimension of escalation.

By compressing the time needed to implement a course of action a belligerent may hope to overwhelm an enemy and bring him to defeat or proffered peace terms.¹¹ Conversely, a belligerent finding his operation going badly may find it far too difficult to accept the immediate choice of surrender, destruction, or occupation.¹² In this case, time escalation can be used to prolong the war and may allow force regeneration, wear down the enemy, or provide time for a final initiative to avert defeat. This form of escalation can also be rationalized desperation to defer the inevitable.

Richard Smoke

Richard Smoke expanded many of these concepts in his book, War: Controlling Escalation. His first revelation was the dynamic

nature of the ends-means relationship.¹³ As the means are increased to achieve the original objective (end), so does the perceived value of that objective also rise. Therefore, the objective may change to justify its value. This is another mechanism for escalation.

The theme of the "agreed battle" in limited war is again broached by Smoke. He too contends that the limits (salients) of a conflict are roughly defined during the posturing done before and during a crisis. Therefore, an escalatory action is defined as the crossing or expanding of these salients. Salients can be expanded for two reasons. First, the objective cannot be met by the means encompassed within the salients. Secondly, there may be an obligation to make good on a threat of crossing the salients. The threat may have been a bluff to entice an opponent to back down but the opponent's response was unfaltering.

Herman Kahn's metaphor for this evolution is the game of "chicken".¹⁴ This game has two opponents in vehicles racing toward each other. The object is to be the last to turn from the impending collision. The impetus to turn away is the certain demise upon collision. This analogy expresses the heightened reliance on risk-taking to win. It also identifies the only involuntary process of escalation control, fear.

Smoke also provides images of escalation that will be useful cornerstones for the development of this study's model. The first image is the actor image.¹⁵ This is a unilateral act of escalation. This escalation includes a decision and execution cycle that

control the limits of the conflict. The action taken by the opposing side will not further escalate the conflict. Proponents of an aggressive strategy to ensure victory rely implicitly on the actor model.¹⁶

The *phenomenal image* is the natural phenomena of wars to expand.¹⁷ This is the more popular image of escalation. Opponents to courses of action in crises often evoke this image as a likely consequence of the execution of such action.

Subsets of the phenomenal image are the two extremes of *reciprocal escalation* and *cyclical-sequence escalation*.¹⁸ Reciprocal escalation is the planning and execution of an escalatory action or response where the action-response cycle is only completed once. Cyclical-sequence, as the name implies, has multiple action-response cycles. Theoretically this sequence is infinite. Practically, the finite end would be a strategic nuclear exchange.

A key concept for the definition of escalation as crossing saliencies is that such a crossing needs to be of consequence. Smoke noted that adding a squadron of helicopters to the Vietnam War in 1967 would not change the nature of the war.¹⁹ Kahn would imply that to be of consequence an escalation would have to be of such magnitude that the perpetrator would feel the action would win the war.²⁰ In developing a model the concept of consequence will be further explored.

CHAPTER III

THEORY ANALYSIS

An assimilation of the concepts offered by the theorists is needed to provide a stepping off point for model development. This analysis will tie together the following themes:

- The objective
- The means
- The limits of war
- Stresses

The objective, for our purposes, is the termination of a conflict with the desired object or relationship in possession. The attainment of this objective must be perceived to provide benefit. On this journey to the objective, escalation is a side effect. Depending on the skill of its manipulation, escalation can be a positive or negative factor in attaining an objective.

The means available to attain an objective coincide with the four elements of national power: diplomatic, economic, informational, and military.²¹ Diplomacy applies pressure on a political front. This pressure is applied through negotiation, coalition leverage and assistance programs. Economic pressure affects financial, trade, and property elements of another nation's power base. The informational element affords the means to present a national policy in order to gain the support of the Congress, international governments, and most importantly the people. The military element is the use of weaponry to disable an

opponent's elements of power through force.

The definition of escalation can now be expanded to include the heightening of intensity of any or all of these elements of power. A unique aspect of the military element is that in heightened levels of conflict it is dominant to the point of excluding or usurping the others. This is another aspect of the element of military power that focused early definitions of escalation on it.

This expanded definition allows an analogy of power projection to the equalizer of a stereo system. Each element of power is regulated for a synergistic effect toward attaining an objective. This synergistic output is the "ways" in which national policy is applied. When the output of diplomatic, economic, and informational power has peaked, military power can continue to escalate as the sole element of power. As such, many national leaders view military power as a panacea. With this view the outputs of the other elements of power may not be optimally applied and military escalation is sure to result.

The increase in output of these elements of power is not free. It comes at some cost that needs to be analyzed. As this can only be done subjectively, the following relationships are offered.

cost = the value of the benefit of attaining the objective

cost = the means expended + the investment of national prestige

In a zero-sum evolution it is sensible that the cost of an object not exceed its value. In the second relationship the cost is based on two variables that are dynamic in any conflict. Therefore, the cost to attain an objective can be ever increasing. Returning to the first relationship, this implies that as the cost increases so does the value of the objective. This is the common failure in the use of cost / benefit analysis to control escalation. Decision makers find it difficult to fix the value of the objectives they seek.

The framework of limited war for this study was selected due to this cost benefit relationship. Unlimited war implies that the value of the object is such that cost is no object. Early theorists also focused on this object value inflation. This focus again led them to theories of escalation terminating in unlimited war.

The combined output of the four elements of power provide limits to a conflict at a particular point in time. These limits can be easily visualized in the following dimensions: horizontal, vertical, and time.²² As conceived earlier, horizontal escalation is the widening of conflict geographically. This concept includes international intervention as well as the geographical widening of combat operations. Vertical escalation is the increase in output of one or more of the elements of power. Escalation in time is the manipulation of time to gain advantage. As discussed earlier, this manipulation can either be the contraction or expansion of the time that a certain measure of national power is

applied.

National leaders attempt to define their limits of national power in relation to their opponent's. The difficulty is to determine the settings of the opponent's limits and relate those settings to the value of his objective. These difficulties lead to the next topic of stresses.

Stress is a necessary impetus to motivate action." Stress is also a catalyst of escalation. The basic stressors of communication, alternative selection and time are continually motivating decision makers to find a definitive solution to the application of power. The stressors also cloud the perception of what the optimal solution is.

The volume of communication, whether word or deed, is constantly analyzed by decision makers in an attempt to define an opponent's dimensional limits. Stress is encountered because of too much information, not enough information, or lack of clarity in the information. Secondly, alternative selection can cloud the mind as a multitude of options can be presented. Lastly, time as the stressor involves the requirement to act now before the initiative is lost. This is the environment in which national decision makers operate. It is small wonder that the natural processes of escalation can take hold.

CHAPTER IV

THE MODEL

With an understanding of the themes of escalation it is useful to visualize a scheme to indicate the status of escalation in a particular conflict. As mentioned earlier, Kahn developed a linear visualization with his escalation ladder. Although this concept gets high marks for simplicity, its concept is too limited for use in this study. However, in the spirit of simplicity, a four square grid model is offered. This model is based on the axes of planning and control. These were chosen from the perception that the control of escalation is desirable and that planning is the optimal covariant. To fill in the squares with useful concepts, Smoke's images of escalation are used. The constructed model follows in figure 1.

Escalation Image Model

	PLANNED ESCALATION	UNPLANNED ESCALATION
CONTROLLED ESCALATION	ACTOR IMAGE	RECIPROCAL ACTION RESPONSE
UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION	RECIPROCAL ACTION INITIATED	PHENOMENAL IMAGE CYCLICAL SEQUENCE

FIGURE 1.

The first quadrant implies that through complete planning and control escalation can be a unilateral act toward objective attainment. This is theoretic perfection. Due to its unilateral nature, the existence of an event that displays pure actor image escalation would not present an image of a crisis. The recent Gulf War contains the best historical illustration of actor image escalation that can be perceived in a crisis setting.

Iraq's launching of Scud missiles into Israel was devised to get Israel to enter the war. The Iraqis surmised that there would be high probability of the disintegration of the coalition against them if Israel joined the war. The United States also feared this eventuality. With respect to Israel, levels of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military power were applied horizontally by the United States to ensure that Israel would remain neutral. Due to Israel's perception of the dimensions of U.S. power presented and therefore the value of their neutrality, they "capitulated" without escalatory response.

Reciprocal escalation is a single cycle of phenomenal image escalation. If objective attainment requires an application of power not originally planned in the cost / benefit analysis, a subsequent plan to apply additional power may be executed. However, the response to this escalation may be totally unexpected. Regardless of the response, through a further decision process, the escalation continues no further. This is the "action initiated" quadrant.

In the "action response" quadrant the escalation is

initiated by the opponent. In this case a response is chosen to ensure the cycle of escalation will end at one. Again the Scud missile crisis provides a useful illustration. The execution of Scud missile attacks against Israel was a horizontal escalation of the military element of power by Iraq. Many options were available to Israel and the coalition. Many can recall the stress as the best option was contemplated. Concurrently, the coalition increased the military, political, and informational elements of power. Specifically the United States deployed Patriot missile batteries to Israel. In addition the United States pressured Israel to remain out of the conflict, while touting a positive perception of effectiveness of the Patriot missile. The use of actor image escalation in concert with Israel was the reciprocal escalation in response to Iraq. The effect was that this cycle of escalation ended at one.

This evolution also lends itself to the analysis of consequence in defining escalation. Scud missiles had been used by Iraq throughout the war against targets in Saudi Arabia. This new endeavor with this tactically ineffective weapon would not have accomplished the defeat of the coalition in itself. Its design was to change the nature of the war. If Israel had entered the war the coalition might have fallen apart. A new U.S.-Israeli conflict against an Arab state would have taken on a whole new context. Therefore, the requirement to qualify as an escalation of consequence is; an action or series of actions, exceeding the planned limits, designed to change the nature of the war.

The fourth quadrant is the cyclical sequence mode of escalation. The implication of the model is that, with a loss in critical planning and loss of control, escalation will continue unabated infinitely. This will end when one or both sides have consumed all their national power elements. History has many examples of wars that have escalated from crisis to unlimited war. A critical question for decision makers, however, is how to keep a limited conflict limited. The first key is in response planning. Do the decision makers in the United States contemplate the mechanisms of escalation in their planning? An overview of organizational matrices and planning guidance, in particular military planning, will provide some insights.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING

Organization

In the United States the four elements of national power are integrated at the level of the National Security Council (NSC). The statutory members are: the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense." The Secretaries of State and Defense are easily identifiable with the diplomatic and military elements of power. The recommendations for the application of the other two elements of power come through these two secretaries and through other Secretaries and Agency heads who attend NSC meetings with special invitation of the council." It is this body, or ad hoc offshoots of it, on which the stressors that motivate the forces of escalation act upon.

Decision making in times of stress can elicit a response termed "group think." Here various members of council will suppress their desires in order to conform with the standards of the group. If the group leader (President) has set a powerful standard, positive dissent may not be forthcoming. The advisors then may appear to wholeheartedly agree with a course of action when in fact they do not. Additionally, recall Holsti's remark on the schizophrenic level of decision making in a condition of time stress.

Recognizing the essence of these phenomena, the lower echelon national organization has evolved, to some extent, to

allow for coordinated application of the elements of national power.

In general, the State Department is the lead agency for the execution of U.S. foreign policy. This includes:

"-To implement U.S. foreign policy

-To serve as the principal U.S. activity in dealing with foreign national organizations, and

-To oversee and coordinate the activities of the U.S. Government departments that are involved with another nation or have foreign policy implications.

this excludes,

-The activities of U.S. fighting forces operating in the field where such forces are under the control of a U.S. area military commander.

-Such other military activities as the President chooses to conduct through military channels; and

-Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and that are not of such a nature as to affect significantly the overall U.S. overseas program in a country or region."²⁶

These exclusions are, in large part, the responsibility of the Department of Defense. The U.S. fighting forces operating in the field are under the command of the area Unified Commander in Chief (CinC). There is not some well defined line as to where the State Department relinquishes the lead in the application of national power to the Defense Department. That transfer of oversight evolves over the duration of a conflict at the direction of the President. In order to maintain liaison between Departments at the field level, U.S. embassy country teams include military members in varying degrees. In addition, the CinCs maintain a State Department political advisor on their

staffs. Regardless of the interaction and cooperation between the two Departments the approval of coordinated efforts can only be accomplished at the NSC level. It is only at this level that the separate plans of the members of the NSC are melded into a national policy. At present there is no real fusion at the lower levels, but that may be changing.

Planning

The interaction of planning between the Departments of Defense and State have, in reality, remained relegated to the military element of power. The Chief of Mission is responsible for maintaining emergency plans for evacuation. This information he is to supply to the two Secretaries, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the area CinC.²⁷ Beyond this, the realm of ends-ways-means planning belongs to the Department of Defense and as such many of the mechanisms of escalation reside here.

It is not the intent of this study to regurgitate the present planning methodologies but to relate them to the process of escalation control through planning. The current methodology described as Adaptive Planning is designed to provide a range of options to the national leadership that can "deter further escalation."²⁸ The three options include Flexible Deterrent Operations (FDOs), Deploying Decisive Force and Counterattack. Each of these three consider escalation in a different light.

Flexible Deterrent Operations are recommended by the CinC when it is his opinion that the forces in theater are sufficient to attain the mission objective. The CinC may feel that

additional assistance is required in the diplomatic, economic and informational elements of power. As such, current planning documents include a list of options in each of those three categories that can be "requested" by the CinC. Here the four elements of power merge to provide planning for escalation control but approval of their application must still pass many wickets on the way to the NSC.

Deploying Decisive Force is a cost benefit approach to escalation control. It is also vulnerable to the inflation factor involved in such an approach. Through a "deliberate planning" process a series of plans are constructed with force levels (means) increased throughout. These force levels are identified in cases one through four, to coincide with the level of effort required for attaining the objective." The purpose of these plans is not to provide a rigid off-the-shelf response. This planning provides the logistical planning backbone for situational dependant responses formulated during Crisis Action Planning. This Crisis Action Planning process provides the first link of control for the National Command Authority.

Counterattack assumes extremis of the forces already positioned in the theater. This planning approaches unlimited war as means are applied liberally enough to ensure a successful counterattack. At this point the value of the object is sure to increase out of proportion.

It is interesting to examine the elements of escalation using the JSCP Options Relationships graph. Although it is a

Deliberate Planning graphic, it helps make a point on means selection and escalation.

JSCP OPTIONS RELATIONSHIPS




FIGURE. 2

Source: Armed Forces Staff College Pub. 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off.), p 6-13

Figure 2. is a modified version of the JSCP Options Relationship graph. The ascending line has been labeled cost. This upward slope indicates planning requirements of increasing means to attain the objective. An arbitrary benefit line suggests the selection of an option by the NSC during Crisis Action Planning. In this instance a phased approach would be implemented from Flexible Deterrent Operations through deterrence to defense in order to attain the objective. The hope would be to attain the objective at the lowest cost possible. This phasing represents the manipulation of escalation toward a positive goal. Under current doctrine the amount of force applied toward the benefit

line would be calculated to maintain this escalation in the "actor image" mode. As for the coordination of the different elements of power, the CinC recommends applications for all four in FDOs. Beyond there, the application of the other elements are listed as assumptions in his estimates.

If the objective has not been reached within the planned cost limits the effects of the natural escalation mechanisms can be very real. First, there is not a juncture in a conflict where it is glaringly obvious that the value of the objective has been exceeded. Such a realization usually occurs well beyond that point. Upon this realization the NSC has three basic options:

- Withdraw, which is difficult in any culture. Yet, as could be seen in Somalia, it is an option we can take.

- Change the objective to something achievable with present expenditures. Bargain or unilaterally declare victory.

- Reevaluate the value of the objective with the added value of national prestige.

When adding means to obtain an objective of increasing value, an attempt may be made to maintain "actor image" escalation. To do this an action of consequence may be decided upon. Inconsequential "cyclical-sequence" actions may also the cumulative consequential effect of changing the nature of the conflict. At each juncture that the cost has not acquired the benefits of the objective, this decision process must be repeated again. Our planning structure is designed so that the initial cost / benefit analysis will provide the optimum mix of national power to attain our national objectives in the initial decision cycle. Our leadership must ensure that it works.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The study of escalation is very difficult due to its varied mechanisms. Therefore, the application of any lessons learned, either theoretical or practical, is difficult. Although our planning doctrine does not dwell on escalation effects for its foundation, its consideration is very evident in the planning process structure.

Our major weakness, if there is one, is that all four elements of U.S. national power are not coordinated in full below the National Security Council. Our form of civilian controlled government makes a solution to this problem difficult. The oversight of all elements of national power by a military leader is counter to our national charter. The execution of military power by a civilian has had dire consequences in the past. Hence, the maintenance of two parallel Departments, State and Defense, fits our culture well. However continued close cooperation, assistance and development of programs where the two Departments more fully interact will ensure that the output of our national elements of power are more than a mere cacophony.

In the final analysis, success is found in our leadership's understanding of the objective, the means, the limits and the stresses as they relate to escalation. It is their ability to make the right choices under stress that will ensure our expenditures of means do not outweigh the ends. Even without the term "escalation, Clausewitz understood its only solution nearly

two hundred years ago when he wrote:

"At the outset, then, we must admit that an imminent war, its possible aims, and the resources it will require, are matters that can only be assessed when every circumstance has been examined in the context of the whole, which of course includes the most ephemeral factors as well. We must also recognize that the conclusion reached can be no more wholly objective than any other in war, but will be shaped by the quality of mind and character of men making the decision-of the rulers, statesmen, and commanders, whether these roles are united in a single individual or not."³⁰

NOTES

1. Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1984), p. 442.
2. Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, publishers, 1965), p. 3; American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), p. 446
3. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 585
4. Kahn, p. 5
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 39
7. Ole R. Holsti, Crisis Escalation War. (Montreal: McGill Queen's University Press, 1972), p. 83
8. Ibid., p. 145
9. Ibid., p. 121
10. Ibid., p. 15
11. Fred Ikle', Every War Must End. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 41
12. Ibid., p. 56
13. Richard Smoke, War; Controlling Escalation. (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 14
14. Kahn, p. 9
15. Smoke, p. 21
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., p. 27
19. Ibid., p. 32
20. Kahn, p. 3

21. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, "Doctrine for Joint Operations". (Washington: 1993), p. I-2
22. The terms "horizontal and "vertical" escalation were borrowed from the syllabus for Joint Military Operations. p. 18
23. Holsti, p. 121
24. Armed Forces Staff College Pub. 1, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1993. (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993), p. 5-3
25. Ibid.
26. Patricia Insley Hutzler and James H. Drennen, A Guide to Interagency Support for DOD: Military Force Deployment, Civilian Noncombatant repatriation, and Military Patient Regulation. (Bethesda, Md: Logistics Management Institute, 1986), pp. 4-19, 4-20
27. Ibid., p. 5-5
28. Armed Forces Staff College Pub. 1, p. 6-12
29. Case 1 relates to forces in theater to be used for FDOs. Cases 2 and 3 relate to deploying decisive force and case 4 relates to counterattack. Armed Forces Staff College Pub. 1, pp. 6-16, 6-17
30. Clausewitz, p. 586

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