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# STRATEGIC FORUM

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## Central European Security, 1994: Partnership For Peace (PFP)

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### Conference Conclusions

- Most Central and East European states (the Czech Republic excepted) feel more insecure in 1994 than they did in 1989.

- All Central and East European states agree that formal integration into Western institutions generally and NATO specifically is the key to stability and security.

- All see PFP as the necessary step to NATO membership and security guarantees—although they are confused about the relationship of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to PFP and how the Western European Union (WEU) will interact with NATO. They are also concerned about whether Russia will establish a “special” relationship under PFP.

- The states fear that PFP has inadvertently undermined sub-regional cooperation and

contributed to competition, but they agree that this problem can be ameliorated by advancing sub-regional programs and multilateral military activities.

- Resource scarcity is a universal problem; it has heightened insecurity and exaggerated competition among Central and East Europeans. PFP's success or failure may rest on resource availability.

- All Central and East European states regard peacekeeping operations as the instrument for NATO integration. Because of that, it's possible NATO might receive more offers of peacekeeping training sites, centers, and facilities than it could possibly accommodate.

### Background

Despite a wide variety of problems, risks, threats, and opportunities, all presentations

### About the Conference:

On May 16-17, 1994, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) and the Hungarian Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies co-sponsored a conference in Budapest that brought together defense and security planners from the Central and Eastern states of Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. From the perspective of five years after the 1989 revolutions, the participants discussed the general status of Central and Eastern

European security—their national security doctrines, the status of the region's armed forces, and each country's attitude toward and plans for participating in NATO's Partnership For Peace (PFP) program.

This report summarizes the discussions, outlines the principal issues discussed, and summarizes the recommendations made by the participants. INSS will publish the papers in a volume outlining each state's national security concept, with further commentary comparing and contrasting each. The Hungarian Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies intends to publish simultaneously a volume in Hungarian.

portrayed the real basis of national security as depending on the following:

- Internal stability and development
- Good-neighbor relations
- Regional cooperation—e.g., Visegrad Group, Carpatho-European Region, and Central European Initiative.

As a result, they portrayed their military restructuring more as an instrument for achieving the goal of Western integration than as one for meeting immediate defense needs and requirements.

In the same vein, since all Central Europeans want to integrate into Western institutions such as EU and NATO, they are frustrated because of confusion with their multiplicity, their shortage of resources, and their lack of clear time-lines to demonstrate results to their constituencies.

- They express confusion about the relationship between NATO's North Atlantic Cooperation Council and Partnership For Peace (PFP). Specifically, the Central and East Europeans want to know the advantages or disadvantages of the WEU's Consultative Council and Associate Membership.

- Since manpower and resources are so scarce, Central Europeans are uncertain as to the most rational way to allocate those resources. They worry that the NATO-WEU institutions are really competitive, not compatible.

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*"scarcity of resources to implement PFP remains a real problem"*

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- An important concern of the Central European states, one that they feel is little understood and under-appreciated in the West, is that their social-psychological imperative requires short-time-frame goals—three to five years. Ultimate Central European assessments of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of WEU or NATO (NACC/PFP) may be driven by this social-psychological need to fulfill goals quickly.

Despite NATO's efforts to the contrary, all Central European participants expressed concern about any "special" relationship that Russia might develop with NATO under PFP. Any special relationship under PFP raises Central European concerns about Russian influence over their security and potential condominium. It also drives

them toward the WEU, which excludes Russia.

Likewise—NATO's efforts to the contrary—Central European participants expressed unanimity in one judgment of NATO's PFP program. To wit, they perceive PFP as a necessary condition to future NATO membership. As a result, PFP has turned them into competitors: As each state races to join NATO first, it sees little reason to cooperate with the others. Competition may also be heightened by the fact that NATO treats each bilateral PFP Presentation Plan as "confidential," which discourages and undermines efforts to discuss and compare PFP plans and enhance transparency in the region.

### Central and East European PFP Plans

**POLAND:** On April 25, 1994 Poland submitted its PFP presentation document to NATO. Poland sees PFP participation as leading to full NATO membership. Poland's PFP priorities include:

- Political consultations
- Military exercises with stress on peacekeeping operations (PKOs)
- Broad exchange in defense and security information—including plans to bolster their staffs at Mons and Evere.

Though the scarcity of resources to implement PFP remains a real problem, Polish political will and determination exists. The Poles will seek to expand their NATO bilateral contacts under the PFP umbrella because they want to establish a broad network of defense contacts. They are planning common exercises with the Netherlands, Germany, and the U.S. They think that PFP should include other countries in military exercises to enhance sub-regional cooperation. The Poles feel that the 16+1 PFP formula does create competition, but expanding multilateral military exercises to enhance sub-regional cooperation can reverse this situation. Poland has found its informal cooperation with France and Germany to be useful.

**CZECH REPUBLIC:** The Czech Republic's strategic goal is to join NATO. They do not see PFP as a substitute for NATO membership, but as a step toward membership. Prime Minister Klaus signed PFP in March 1994; the Government signed the presentation document in early May and will present it to Brussels shortly.

The PFP document commits Czech forces to support UN peacekeeping operations and outlines

the means to achieve operational compatibility with NATO. The short-term goal is to support PKOs; the mid-term goal is to achieve compatibility in combat operations; the long-term goal is to achieve full compatibility.

The Czechs will offer their training ranges to NATO armies and intend to augment their staffs at Evere and Mons. Though they need outside assistance, the Czechs have increased their defense budget, in part to help achieve their PFP goals.

The Czechs made particular note of the fact that PFP has introduced an element of competition into the region because NATO is evaluating each country. In addition, since PFP documents are "classified," PFP tends to further "divide" the countries in the region. The Czechs, though, made note of their "special" ties to Slovakia (specifically the Czech and Slovak military cooperation agreement of early March 1994).

**HUNGARY:** The Hungarian PFP Presentation Document is now ready to be delivered. Hungary took its time because it wanted a well-elaborated and well-developed document. The document was developed within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) with the General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and was coordinated with some NATO partners as well as Austria, which has assisted by exchanging military planners and providing small-unit (company-battalion) training.

The Hungarians do not intend to publish the document, although they do not consider it confidential. Hungary's PFP effort will seek:

- To develop a training and educational program with NATO and NATO members.
- To cooperate closely in peacekeeping monitoring and operations. They have already begun cooperation with Nordic countries in PKO and monitoring activities. (The Hungarian Armed Forces are not capable of meeting large requests.)
- To establish in Budapest a regional peacekeeping center for education and training—for this center, they will seek NATO's help.
- To begin joint exercises. (Germany and UK will carry out a joint exercise with Hungarian forces in Hungary; the Dutch have requested that Hungarian forces participate in an exercise on Dutch soil.)
- To bolster their staff in Belgium. (They have promoted their military representative to general officer rank and expanded his staff by two at Evere;

they will expand the staff at Mons as well).

**SLOVAKIA:** PFP clearly has an influence on Slovakia's transition. Slovakia's main objective is to gradually achieve "full-fledged" NATO membership. Slovakia's PFP document describes the concrete steps they will take to achieve military cooperation. The Slovaks plan to implement a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in two to three years and to develop a small but well trained army to be interoperable with NATO. They have allocated a specific portion (one percent) of their defense budget to PFP.

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Slovakia feels that NATO's enlargement does not threaten anyone, but in fact expands the zone of stability. They intend to send a liaison officer to NATO shortly. In addition, they will offer to make training areas available to NATO for exercises up to battalion level, as well as an educational center in Bratislava for PFP members. The Slovaks regard their 600-man UNPROFOR commitment as the basis for future interoperability.

**ROMANIA:** The Romanians are discussing and developing their PFP presentation document. Though specifics of Romania's PFP plan remain vague, the Romanians claim that PFP can lead to the expansion of security to Central and even Eastern Europe. They see NATO and PFP as the main power source to fill what they see as a security vacuum in the region. They also seem to believe that PFP can assist Romania convert its defense industry to produce military items to NATO standards and for NATO markets.

Romania's enthusiasm seems to be related more to the fact that PFP prevented NATO's early admission of the Visegrad States; PFP represents a challenge for Romania, but also the "best chance" for the region. The Romanians stress that they see PFP as the instrument for NATO's expansion, but argue any NATO expansion must include Romania.

**BULGARIA:** Bulgarians feel insecure as a result of the loss of international security guarantees. Bulgaria stresses the primacy of the UN Charter and their past contributions to UN

PKOs. They have made the political comm... at to join NATO, but they question whether... will really open its doors to Bulgaria. The Bulgarians also seem resigned to the fact that they have little influence over the NATO process.

Though PFP creates an "equal" start to partners who are beginning the step-by-step process to NATO guarantees, Bulgaria seems particularly sensitive to its financial constraints. Bulgarians stress the need for new markets for their defense

industry and for financial support. In this vein, the Bulgarian budget meets only 30 percent of the needs of the Defense Ministry. So Bulgaria faces cutting its military forces—the question is by how much. If Bulgaria's forces are cut, Bulgaria will be at risk.

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Policy Recommendations


Based on this conference, policymakers might consider the following steps:

- Expand multilateral programs to circumvent competition among PFP partners and to enhance sub-regional cooperation.

- Craft PFP programs with three-to-five year time horizons to legitimize democratic political leaders and programs in the region.
- Emphasize PFP political programs to offset military predominance in the region.
- Provide the resources to jump start PFP and avoid seeing the program stillborn.

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