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# Campaign Planning for Peace Enforcement Operations

A Monograph  
by  
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
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
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
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## ABSTRACT

CAMPAIGN PLANNING FOR PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS by Maj Bruce J. Gebhard, USAF. 4 pages.

This monograph examines various campaign planning considerations for peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement, which is the use of military force to either restore or compel peace, is becoming more prevalent, particularly as the United Nations continues to expand its influence in world crisis situations. Additionally, many peacekeeping scenarios find themselves drifting into a hostile environment. However, whether working under the auspices of the United Nations or not, there is not a significant amount of material to draw on when designing a campaign scenario. This monograph builds on existing doctrine to fill that void.

The monograph first looks at some of the key definitions involved in peace operations. It then examines the peace enforcement environment, building the case that it is distinctly different from either peacekeeping or war. Four key components of peace enforcement are consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality. Each has ties to peacekeeping and combat operations, yet each is distinctive for peace enforcement. The monograph then looks at various classical and revolutionary theories of war, showing that peace enforcement combines elements of both. Since the role of force is critical in peace enforcement operations, this area is studied, with emphasis on the role of airpower. The monograph then examines the current doctrine available for assisting the campaign planner. Building on this base, various key considerations are discussed. An appendix contains a list of items pertinent to planning peace enforcement operations to provide a starting point for the campaign planner.

The monograph concludes that while doctrine on peace enforcement operations is emerging, more needs to be done. In particular, a solid definitional and doctrinal base, especially from the United Nations, is needed. Additionally, training in some of the unique complexities of these operations needs continued emphasis.

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## Introduction

In today's world, the line between peace and war is less clearly drawn than at anytime in our history.<sup>1</sup>

When Caspar Weinberger spoke these words in 1984, the Cold War dominated America's political and military focus. Yet, nearly ten years later, and with the end of the Cold War, that "line" appears less distinct than ever. The past few years have witnessed a multitude of ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and other forms of strife. In the face of these conflicts, there has been an increasing willingness by nations and organizations to contain the violence and alleviate human suffering. In particular, the United Nations (UN) has shown a desire to focus world attention and generate the will to not only promote peace, but to impose peace when conflicts persist and even to prevent hostilities from starting.<sup>2</sup> Missions to Somalia, Bosnia, and Macedonia are just a few examples of this.

This expansion into peace enforcement (PE) operations to restore or impose peace presents new challenges to the military forces involved. Traditionally, most peacekeeping (PK) forces deployed into a relatively tranquil environment, though peace was certainly not guaranteed. Many PK procedures and considerations have been formulated and established. However, soldiers are increasingly entering situations where peace is tenuous or non-existent, or where a calm environment becomes hostile. How to restore or compel peace is a challenge distinctly different than either peacekeeping or conventional combat operations and involves elements of both missions.

While there is a substantial body of knowledge on planning both PK and combat missions, there is not a significant amount of guidance

on conducting PE operations. This monograph will focus on some important PE planning considerations. The first requirement is for clear definitions of the terms used in the various peace operations. This may seem trivial, but is actually quite critical. "Peacekeeping" and other terms imply different things to different organizations. Additionally, an understanding of the PE environment is important for comprehending the nature of the mission. In other words, what distinguishes PE from PK or combat operations? Given this background, one needs a theoretical framework for peace enforcement. This framework establishes a method for examining situations, plus provides a foundation for formulating doctrine. A critical part of this is the role of force to compel peace. Additionally, with the increasing proclivity to use airpower independently of ground forces, this role will be reviewed. The monograph will then examine the current doctrine for PE, noting strengths and areas for improvement. With this analysis, it will discuss some key considerations for the campaign planner. These will reflect the theoretical and doctrinal base established, plus factors culled from historical examples. These considerations imply a need for increased doctrinal and training emphasis for PE operations.

Military planners need to seriously study the many factors involved with these missions as operations such as Somalia and Bosnia are becoming more prevalent. By examining these operations, from the basics of definitions and the environment, through theoretical and doctrinal factors, one can be better prepared to orchestrate an effective plan. Additionally, one will be better able to both advise strategic planners and provide the soldier a clear mission that best balances his protection with mission achievement.

### Definitions and the Peace Enforcement Environment

An understanding of the terms and the environment of peace enforcement is essential for orchestrating an effective plan. This understanding begins with common terminology. Unfortunately, there are no standard definitions for peace operations. Even the UN definitions must be gleaned from various sources. An example is the term "peacekeeping." The UN definition, taken from the current Secretary General's writings, is:

The deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.<sup>3</sup>

This definition seems straightforward enough; however, even though it states that there is consent, it also implies that a peaceful environment is not secured. A "technique" to "expand the possibility for preventing conflict and making peace" leaves significant room for interpretation.

Contrast this definition with the one in Joint Pub (JP) 3-07.3, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. It defines peacekeeping as:

Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute.<sup>4</sup>

Note that this definition clearly states that a formal agreement to establish a peaceful environment has already been reached , and the military is clearly "in support of" a political solution.

As a final contrast, an organization recognized by many in the peacekeeping arena is the International Peace Academy. Their definition of peacekeeping is:

The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party, intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.<sup>5</sup>

Note how this definition contains elements of the UN and JP 3-07.3 definitions of peacekeeping, but also implies the use of forceful means to compel peace.

The same potential confusion exists in defining "peace enforcement." In fact, the only clear definition is found in JP 3-07.3:

A form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolution—the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international community.<sup>6</sup>

This definition emphasizes that force is used only in conjunction with, and to achieve objectives determined by, an international organization. In other words, it gains legitimacy from a body of world opinion. PE missions include "the restoration of order and stability, the protection of humanitarian assistance, the guarantee and denial of movement, the enforcement of sanctions, establishment and supervision of protected zones and the forcible separation of belligerents."<sup>7</sup>

There is no official UN definition for PE, though the topic is discussed by the Secretary General.<sup>8</sup> His writings imply that there is a desire for peace among the belligerents, but the existing agreement has

broken down. PE operations will restore this peace. JP 3-07.3 implies that this desire for peace may not exist.<sup>9</sup>

Combined with these contradictory definitions, one must also comprehend the different operations the UN may sanction. These are normally referred to as either "Chapter VI" or "Chapter VII," after the part of the UN charter on which the operation bases its authority. Chapter VI, entitled "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes," gives the Security Council broad measures in which to encourage a peaceful settlement.<sup>10</sup> This chapter is the basis for UN PK operations. Chapter VII, entitled "Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression," grants the UN the authority to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."<sup>11</sup> This is the basis of UN PE operations.

These differences in definitions and terms highlight the potential confusion of a particular operation's objectives. This can be especially important when working with non-US military forces or agencies who may have their own definitions and concepts, and cannot be expected to have familiarity with US military definitions. This highlights the need for the UN to provide standardized terms for international reference. This monograph will use the JP definitions and point out potential problems with others when required.

Armed with these definitions, one must also comprehend what factors differentiate peace enforcement from other peace or combat operations. The distinctions are often not as clear as one might think. Four key components of peace enforcement are consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality. Each has a tie to both peacekeeping and

combat operations, and each has a distinct role in peace enforcement. Other distinctions closely linked to these four components include the traditional employment of UN forces, the objective or end state, and the role of force. An understanding of these factors is essential to the operational planner.

Consent conveys the willingness of the belligerents to accept a force's presence. For peacekeeping, the consent of all parties implies a genuine interest in preventing the escalation of tense situations to violence. The continuing UN observer presence in the Sinai between Israeli and Egyptian forces is an excellent example. In combat operations, consent is not sought, as all parties seek to achieve their objectives through violence. For peace enforcement, there is a lack of consent by at least one party. This consent may have never existed, or perhaps it once did, but has been withdrawn for some reason. The actions of the Multi-national Force (MNF) in Lebanon from 1982-1984 illustrate this. The MNF deployed as a PK force, but never ensured the consent of all parties, leading to escalating violence and ultimately the tragic bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in October, 1983.

Consent is linked to sovereignty. Traditionally, a nation's sovereignty was sacrosanct. In PK operations, the consent granted by the belligerents implies the peacekeepers will respect their host's sovereignty. In PE operations, there is normally a conscious decision to violate a country's sovereignty for a "higher good." In the past, people might protest about what a nation was doing to its inhabitants, but except for various economic and political actions, little else was usually done. War has normally been reserved to either achieve a political aim or to respond to a nation's external actions, but not its internal ones.

However, now there is an increased willingness to place a people's welfare above a nation's right to govern as it desires. In Operation Provide Comfort, relieving Kurdish suffering transcended Iraq's right to rule. Though this intervention enjoyed widespread support, violating a nation's sovereignty involves many delicate issues.<sup>12</sup>

This concern with sovereignty leads to the concept of legitimacy. There are two types of legitimacy in this environment. One concerns that of the government—its right and ability to govern. The other type of legitimacy concerns that of the peace enforcers. As noted earlier, the Joint definition of PE stressed this second type of legitimacy; but the first type is just as important.<sup>13</sup> During PK operations, legitimacy is assumed due to the consent granted by the belligerents. During war, legitimacy is sought to help gain or maintain public support. Since the end state of a PE operation is a return to a secure, stable government, actions that undermine its legitimacy are harmful. Likewise, any action taken without widespread support, most noticeably without the sanctioning of the UN, may be seen as interference, thus harming the credibility of both the intervenor and the "host" government.

The final key component of PE is neutrality. Peacekeepers gain their strength from the perception of neutrality. If they lose it, they become ineffective. How to maintain a perception of neutrality among diverse cultures is a challenging problem. In many environments, the feeling that "if one is not for me, then he is against me," leaves little room for a PK force to act and remain neutral. Likewise, humanitarian aid or other functions performed by the peacekeepers will be scrutinized for equality among the factions. Additionally, the government, if one exists, that consented to the peacekeepers' presence

may not be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the disputants. In fact, this is often one of the root causes of the conflict.

The PE force will violate this neutrality. This leads to two concerns. Assuming that the PE force is separate from the PK force, how will any actions affect the neutrality of the peacekeepers already deployed? This conflict arose during the recent airstrikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia as the Serbs detained some UN observers in retaliation for the bombing by NATO airplanes. A second concern is the transition from peace enforcement back to peacekeeping. One must assure the perceived neutrality of the new peacekeepers.

These questions of consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality must be continually evaluated for any changes. More importantly, they must be evaluated from the eyes of the factions. What may seem logical to the peacekeeper or other outside observer may not seem so to others. Whether one is involved in a PK operation or already performing a PE mission, changes in these key components will normally necessitate a change in the mission and/or force structure. By keeping sight on the political objective and the environment, one can hopefully recognize these changes early.

Besides these four components, there are several other important distinctions among PE operations. One is the traditional role of the UN as a peacekeeper. Though its efficiency is frequently challenged, it is still seen as providing the legitimacy for international actions—recognizing sovereignty and acting with consent, legitimacy and neutrality. As a peacekeeper acting under the auspices of Chapter VI, the UN functions adequately; however, when invoking Chapter VII operations, it is clearly inadequate.<sup>14</sup> A lack of a military planning

staff, separate operations and support chains, and no "on call" forces are just a few of the problems which hinder a forceful UN response. This implies that at least one major state must take the lead for effective PE. The UN's increasing penchant to embark on more forceful missions may taint people's view of its traditional role. This is especially true if the UN is going to sanction the PE mission and also provide the peacekeepers upon its completion.

The "objective" or "end state" is another distinctive factor. In peacekeeping, the goal is usually to maintain or promote the peace until either the conflicting parties can settle their differences or local authorities have established a stable situation and can govern and maintain security on their own. While this seems relatively straightforward, the continuing missions in Cyprus and the Sinai attest to the extended nature these operations can assume. The political solution in PK is therefore dominant, and in fact is desired by all parties. War, on the other hand, normally implies victory through military actions, with the political solution normally flowing from the victor's position of superiority. Peace enforcement falls somewhere between these two concepts. In PE, one does not normally want the total destruction of any particular party, only to motivate them to pursue a solution through non-violent means. What constitutes "victory" is not always clear.

By realizing that force may provide short term solutions but probably not achieve the desired long-term results, one can see that PE operations require extremely close coordination of military and political actions. It can be argued that this desire to use force to compel a political solution is no different than normal combat operations—that

it is nothing more than "... a continuation of politics by other means." However, in most PE situations the conflict is predominantly political and force will rarely bring about the desired end state by itself. Indeed, if misapplied, force may only serve to exacerbate the conflict. This is especially so with many of the PE missions that imply minimal use of force such as enforcing sanctions, protecting humanitarian assistance efforts, and establishing protection zones.<sup>15</sup>

An understanding of peace operations definitions and the environment illustrate that PE is distinctive from other peace operations or war, requiring different considerations. Differences in terms and definitions present potential problems from the outset. Analysis of the nature of PE operations show several distinguishing factors. Four key concepts are consent, sovereignty, neutrality and legitimacy. The UN's traditional role as peacekeepers and the objective or end-state are also factors normally different for PE. These concepts require careful analysis and continual appraisal to ensure the success of a peace enforcement mission.

### Theory of Peace Enforcement

Given the convoluted nature of the peacekeeping environment, one might deduce that finding an applicable general theory of peace enforcement would also be difficult. In fact, one might question the need to establish any type of theory. However, theory serves several purposes. The most important is that theory helps guide one's thoughts and provides a framework for analyzing different situations. This is not to say that every situation should be forced into this framework, but hopefully most will fit with relative ease. Additionally, theory should

provide the basis for sound doctrine. By understanding the nature of what one is doing, a positive approach for working in that environment should emerge. Though writing about war, Clausewitz' thoughts on the use of theory are applicable to peace operations. He noted that "theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls."<sup>16</sup> If PE is different than war, then a theory of war will probably not completely apply. However, parts of different theories should be helpful in defining a framework for PE.

Clausewitz' main contribution applicable to PE deals with the delicate political-military balance; when it comes to the role of force, one encounters difficulties. This should be expected based on the nature of the peace enforcement environment discussed earlier. Clausewitz discussed war, not peacekeeping. While he does discuss war for "limited aims," this is not the major thrust of his writings.

Besides his often-quoted phrase of war being the continuation of policy by other means, Clausewitz offers more key thoughts pertinent to PE. In particular, he emphasizes that one must clearly understand the ends, ways and means of a war before entering into it.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, the leadership must predicate ". . . the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."<sup>18</sup> Likewise, while war is a continuation of policy, it does not suspend politics—both are inextricably linked.<sup>19</sup> This conforms to the nature of peace enforcement described earlier.

As one moves from the political aspects to the role of force, Clausewitz's ideas begin to break down. One reason for this is the

environment that existed in his time. Clausewitz dealt primarily with sovereign countries composed of a trinity of the people, the army and the government.<sup>20</sup> In many of today's PE environments, this trinity does not exist. For example, factions may not have an established government, or the people may not recognize the government as being legitimate. Additionally, Clausewitz' nations were similar in composition and capabilities.<sup>21</sup> He did not have the asymmetries that exist today between larger and smaller powers. Given these disparities, the role of force should be different than what he experienced.

Clausewitz' writings on force are probably more often quoted than understood, but it seems clear that he saw the destruction of the enemy army, whether actual or threatened, as the most efficient means to achieve victory.<sup>22</sup> In dealing with limited warfare, territorial gains are still his central focus.<sup>23</sup> Noting that there are different ways to achieve the ends, his model works for normal interstate warfare. However, in briefly discussing insurrections and guerrilla operations, he approaches them more from the aspect of organizing these missions for one's defense rather than in how to defeat them. He also freely admits to the difficulties in analyzing this new type of warfare just emerging in his time.<sup>24</sup>

These weaknesses in applying Clausewitz to PE operations are important to note, but not as important as comprehending the political-military relationship that must exist. To better understand the role of force, a theory reflecting the asymmetries that exist today is probably more pertinent. In fact, since many peace operations will occur as a result of either civil disturbances or insurgencies, the theories of Mao or other revolutionaries are equally, if not more, applicable.

In fact, Mao's theory emphasizes the dominance of politics over military actions. Not only this, but his concepts of space, time and the protracted nature of revolutionary war are all counter to traditional western military thought.<sup>25</sup> Mao's theory has three stages: establish secure operating bases, guerrilla warfare, and large unit conventional tactics. Each stage has different characteristics regarding organization, force structure (guerrilla versus regular forces) and military operations.<sup>26</sup> The most important stage is the first one. Here, the political base is established, which Mao emphasizes as a lengthy process of building popular support and leadership. Force is employed very selectively.<sup>27</sup> Mao's second stage involves more fighting and, in fact, he says it "will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation."<sup>28</sup> The third stage resembles conventional operations. Mao's close integration of politics and military operations, and the use of force to supplement politics, are relevant to peace operations.

Many of Mao's ideas pervade other forms of revolutionary war. Common features include a protracted nature, political dominance over military, and the use of guerrilla tactics.<sup>29</sup> Though knowledge of these theories is important, how to counter them has more bearing on the campaign planner. In many situations, a PE operation will resemble a counterrevolutionary action and will share many of the same traits.

Successful counterinsurgency strategy obviously seeks to reverse or prevent the actions of the revolutionaries. In most cases it is a battle for legitimacy—the government trying to maintain it and the insurgents trying to undermine it or establish their own. Thus, political dominance continues to be key. Likewise, consent, sovereignty and neutrality are also involved. Several authors note that three

requirements for a successful counterrevolutionary strategy include removal of the origins of public discontent, removal of the revolutionary infrastructure and defeat of the armed units.<sup>30</sup> Peace enforcement operations have similar objectives, though defeat and removal of insurgents is usually not required—only that they agree to abandon the violent pursuit of their objectives.

But how does one successfully implement these requirements? The French applied rather severe methods to quell the insurgency in Algeria and arguably won; however, the costs included deep divisions both within the French society and between the society and the military. The British fared much better in Malaya by basically adhering to the three requirements listed above. Their actions displayed an efficient organization of military and civilian operations, minimum force and patient negotiation. However, the operation took 12 years (1948-1960) and a force of over 300,000 people versus a peak insurgent population of approximately 10,000.<sup>31</sup> In both cases, as well as most others, the focus is on the population.

One common method for focusing campaign planning efforts is to identify a "center of gravity (CG)." This is what Clausewitz called the "hub of all power," and others have called "vulnerable points."<sup>32</sup> In revolutionary war, one could argue that the CG is the same for both sides—the population.<sup>33</sup> The problem becomes how to attack it. Applying "overwhelming" combat force will often serve to alienate the populace one is trying to "save." A more indirect, patient approach that recognizes the desires of the people, while identifying and neutralizing the appeal of the insurgents, is key.

The indirect approach is echoed by other modern military theorists, such as Richard Simpkin. He argues that forces need to be organized and equipped to engage revolutionists on their own terms, emphasizing stealth and surprise.<sup>34</sup> However, Simpkin focuses on the discrete application of force at the expense of gaining the support of the population. Defeating insurgent forces will only provide a short term solution if there is nothing to fill the void. A long term solution requires patience and perseverance.

With the divergence of various classical and modern theories applied to peace operations, one may question the relevance of trying to establish a theory. In fact, some argue that each situation is so unique that trying to formulate a framework to encompass them will only stifle the required flexibility.<sup>35</sup> However, if one returns to the purpose of theory—to provide a framework for analysis and guidance upon which to build sound doctrine—then hopefully the search will be fruitful. It seems clear that because of the nature of the peace operations environment, applying any theory in its pure form will be inadequate. Drawing upon the political purposes of war espoused by Clausewitz, the politicization of war espoused by Mao, and combining counterrevolutionary theory as demonstrated by the British, one can begin to assemble a framework applicable to peace enforcement. This review, while brief, helps establish a foundation that can be expanded upon, especially as recent experiences are incorporated.

### Force Employment Considerations

A key consideration is discussing the theory of peace enforcement is the role of force. How much? Where? With what

means? These are just a few of the many critical questions one must answer. As a subset of force, airpower, whether manned or unmanned, has been used independently (Libya, in 1986), and as a means to avoid the commitment of ground troops (Bosnia). This has its advantages, but one must also recognize its limitations. To achieve strategic aims, one must link ends, ways and means. A careful analysis of the means (force or other instrument) versus the ends (objectives) is required. In the peace enforcement environment one misuse of force can have devastating strategic results. Sometimes force has been successful, and at other times not. Too little force or force misapplied and one will not achieve the aims. Too much force and one risks galvanizing public will and opinion against the PE operation, thus undermining legitimacy.

As with many aspects of peace enforcement operations, traditional concepts of force application must be modified due to the nature of the mission. Overwhelming force might work sometimes, and many times will achieve short term results; however, if the desire is to establish the conditions for PK operations, then the focus must remain on force being a supporting component of a long term political solution. Therefore, the force applied must be seen as proportional, appropriate, and discriminatory.

The issue of proportionality concerns the question of "how much force?" Enough to guarantee that one will "overwhelm" the enemy implies that more force is applied than is sufficiently needed. Sometimes this might be "appropriate," but can lead to a backlash from both internal and external parties for excessiveness. Too little force can be even worse. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, succinctly noted:

Decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if they are not always possible. We should always be skeptical when so-called experts suggest that all a particular crisis calls for is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack. When the "surgery" is over and the desired result is not obtained, a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of just a little escalation—more bombs, more men and women, more force. History has not been kind to this approach to war-making.<sup>36</sup>

Decisive means, then, should be the guide to applying force. An insufficient amount, and the next question will undoubtedly be, "Now what?" However, as Powell states, this may not be always possible. Proportionality requires careful study.

The appropriate use of force refers to both the targets selected and the means applied. Target selection has been a subject of intense debate in both conventional and unconventional operations. This debate has only increased as technology has increased the range, lethality, precision and types of weapons.<sup>37</sup>

A good example from an unconventional war is Operation Peace For Galilee, in 1982. To force the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) out of artillery range, the Israelis applied overwhelming military force against an adversary that was predominantly a political organization. Abandoning many of their weapons, the PLO mixed in with the population and moved into Beirut. In a desire to target the PLO, the Israelis established a siege and tried various methods to extract them. Shutting off the water and electricity, and employing cluster bombs did not achieve their aims.<sup>38</sup> In fact, it inflamed resistance against the Israelis, generating a significant loss of prestige at home and abroad. There are at least two lessons here. One is the difficulty in applying military force against an opponent who is primarily political. The other deals with the appropriate balance of targets and weapons.

While the Israelis achieved their goal of forcing the PLO from artillery range, their ways and means did not meet the tests of proportionality, appropriateness or discrimination. This caused a loss of legitimacy and damage at the strategic level.

In deciding where to apply force, it is imperative to examine the situation from the perspective of the opponent. One must consider many factors, such as culture, religion, ethnicity, and technology. In addition, one must consider the perspective of the remainder of the population. To maintain legitimacy, the population must generally agree with the methods applied.<sup>39</sup> For example, using excessive or inappropriate force against the Bosnian Serbs might generate a measure of sympathy from the Croats, Muslims, or outside observers.

In deciding what to target, many return to the center of gravity. In the politicized world of peace operations, the CG will often be nebulous and include items such as "will" and "public support." Non-military terms such as these should warn the planner that the most appropriate means should probably also be non-combat. Force should normally be used in support. The selection of the enemy CG may still not allow one to attack it. As noted earlier, in most insurgencies, the population is the CG for both sides. How then, can one attack the enemy's CG while protecting one's own when they are the same? Obviously, direct means will not accomplish the objective, and will most likely reduce the legitimacy of the action. One must decide how to isolate the insurgents and target them, if possible. If this is not directly possible, then one must focus on indirect means and choose targets that affect their power. Again, the means must be seen as appropriate,

proportional and discriminatory. There are no easy answers. Each situation is unique and requires careful analysis.

A brief discussion of the role of airpower is important since it seems to be the "weapon of choice" in many current situations. Bosnia is certainly the most obvious example. However, the use of airpower alone to force a political settlement has a somewhat clouded past. For example, in an attempt to break the stalemate in the Korean war, the leadership began a number of airstrikes to induce the North Koreans to sign an armistice. Being a predominantly agrarian society, a well-developed industrial infrastructure did not exist. Additionally, the North Korean and Chinese forces did not require a vast amount of supplies to fight, particularly once the war had reached a stalemate. Targets shifted from industry to electrical facilities and then to dams in an attempt to flood the food-producing areas.<sup>40</sup> Though the bombing did affect the general population, it did not independently compel an armistice; however, many believed it did.<sup>41</sup> This belief in airpower's ability to achieve a political objective would carry forward into Vietnam. Additionally, the Korean War marked the beginning of political leadership having a heavy influence on target selection.<sup>42</sup>

The use of airpower in Vietnam displayed several important trends. One is that "gradualism" is not an effective method of applying force. Another is that force is better at persuasion than dissuasion. A final one is a repeat from the Korean war—an agrarian society fighting a guerrilla war presents few well-defined centers of gravity. These trends are displayed through the bombing campaigns known as Rolling Thunder and Linebacker. In Rolling Thunder, it was hoped that bombing North Vietnamese targets would dissuade them from either

fighting in the south or supplying Viet Cong forces. However, the forces in the south were receiving minimal supplies from the north. With few large-scale forces or supporting equipment, one historian notes that the only viable targets that would materially affect the North Vietnamese were people and food.<sup>43</sup> Yet even attacking these would probably not have affected the Viet Cong, especially pre-Tet. Even so, targets remained predominantly industrial-related, with heavy political influence on the process.<sup>44</sup> Additionally, the campaign was marked by a gradual use and disuse of bombing to compel a peaceful resolution. As an example of employing force to independently achieve political objectives, Rolling Thunder was flawed.

In the Linebacker campaigns, particularly Linebacker II, many of the restrictions on targeting were lifted. Bombers struck in and around Hanoi, as well as other targets previously off-limits. Many claim that if Linebacker had been executed earlier, the war could have ended sooner. However, this is debatable. In Linebacker II, the objective was a positive, limited one: to bring the North Vietnamese to the bargaining table. Additionally, the war had become more conventional, allowing airpower to strike targets that would make a difference. Combined with intense diplomatic efforts and military successes in the South, Linebacker was a success.<sup>45</sup>

The lessons of applying airpower in Vietnam show that there must be clear linkage between the military objective and the political goals. Additionally, it shows that force is better applied for a positive objective rather than for dissuasion. This is especially true when trying to attack "the will to fight." Other lessons include the lack of results when applying a gradual response and the difficulty in finding

key targets in a guerrilla environment. Overwhelming force in these situations usually unites the population in opposition and the intervenors are seen as the enemy by all parties. Though these lessons come from an air campaign, they apply equally to others.

These lessons can be updated from recent events in Bosnia. The debate over the use of airstrikes to eliminate artillery positions has been the subject of deep debate and conflicting opinions over their potential for success.<sup>46</sup> The threat following the Sarajevo mortar attack in February, 1994, and the subsequent movement of the artillery would seem to vindicate those that offer airpower as the best solution for Bosnia. However, one can compare the objectives with the lessons from Vietnam and see the parallels. In Sarajevo, the threat of military force was clearly linked to a political objective—the security of Sarajevo from artillery attacks. Additionally, this was a positive aim—to compel the movement of the artillery out of range. Finally, the potential targets, at least in the Sarajevo area, were known. In trying to extrapolate the results here with a solution to Bosnia itself, one must use caution. If the goal is to stop the fighting—a negative aim—then the chances for success appear to be less.

Airpower can be an extremely effective force for peace operations. With its rapid projection capability, command and control structure, and other unique abilities, it can be a crucial part of any peace mission. As a peace enforcer, it can serve the role of being a force independent of the peacekeepers already deployed, perhaps maintaining their neutrality. Its ability to establish "exclusions zones" allows one to avoid risking ground units. However, when applying force, the precise military objectives must be clearly expressed and

achievable. One must ensure that it is not serving as a substitute when other instruments are actually needed. Finally, as in all campaign plans, one must plan for what happens if it does not achieve the established goal.<sup>47</sup>

The use or threatened use of force, no matter the means, in a peace enforcement mission is certainly among the most important considerations for the campaign planner. The link between strategy and tactics is often a tenuous one, but it cannot be so in this environment. Overwhelming force and destruction of the enemy army are key considerations in a conventional war. While it may work in a peace enforcement operation, the potential for failure and damage to any hopes for peace must encourage a closer examination of the ways and means to achieve strategic ends. Analyzing options against the four key components of consent, legitimacy, sovereignty and neutrality, is one method. Additionally, the force applied should be seen as appropriate, proportional and discriminatory. There are no easy, "cook book" solutions; each situation is unique. Yet several guidelines do exist. One is that force must be applied decisively. Gradualism is not a sound technique. Secondly, the use of force must be closely tied to, and must be able to achieve, the political goal. For peace enforcement, this does not mean total defeat, but rather the implementation or restoration of peace. Finally, the application of force is better employed to induce a positive aim than a negative one.

### Doctrine

Given the unclear nature of the peace enforcement environment, the need to piece together parts of different theories, and the complexities of force employment, one would expect to find a dearth

of doctrinal support. This is indeed so, though the volume of literature is increasing. Joint publications on peace operations are being published and revised. The US Army in particular is emphasizing the subject. The other services are lagging somewhat, but the lack of coherent doctrine is noticeably absent from the UN. A brief review of the current doctrinal concepts will lay the foundation for further analysis of campaign planning considerations.

Before progressing, one needs to comprehend what doctrine is and its purpose. Though definitions vary, most agree that doctrine is a consensus on the best way to accomplish the mission. It reflects an analysis of experience, tempered with current realities, including technology, resources and the strategic environment.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, most sources agree that doctrine is "authoritative but requires judgment in application."<sup>49</sup>

Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Campaign Planning, establishes the concepts, development, format, and implementation of joint campaign plans. It lays out a general methodology for developing a plan, but is short on detail.<sup>50</sup> In fact, in discussing Operations Other than War (OOTW), which includes peace operations, it takes the position that a campaign plan becomes less useful as the level of hostilities diminishes.<sup>51</sup>

Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTPP for Peacekeeping Operations, is a relatively new publication establishing a doctrinal base for peacekeeping. While it does not specifically address peace enforcement operations, it does define them and discusses the potential use of force in peacekeeping. This is particularly important since in specifying the types of operations and tasks associated with peacekeeping, several of them can

quickly embroil a PK force into an environment more volatile than originally planned.<sup>52</sup> Though emphasizing that peacekeepers are deployed with the consent of all parties, this consent does not guarantee a peaceful environment. Additionally, JP 3-07.3 provides a foundation of various military and political considerations and procedures for peacekeeping operations.

In discussing the role of force in peacekeeping, JP 3-07.3 emphasizes the need for careful planning. Additionally, it states that the potential use of force should be clearly stated to all parties, with adequate warnings and, above all, reflect a clear willingness and resolve to employ it.<sup>53</sup> The declaration of intent to use force against artillery positions around Sarajevo is a good example of this. An important point here is that most "traditional" PK forces do not deploy with the amount of force required to implement such an ultimatum. Lightly armed peacekeepers or unarmed observers normally lack the credibility to apply significant force without some form of augmentation or the insertion of a separate PE force.

One final critique is JP 3-07.3 states that the use of force in PK operations should only be as a last resort, a thought often repeated in other writings.<sup>54</sup> One needs to be careful with this statement. If force is being contemplated, this implies that one of the essential preconditions for a PK operation—consent—is either waning or is no longer present among at least one of the parties. If the peacekeeper waits until this point, it may already be too late to stop the drift towards violence. Earlier firm actions, carefully planned, may stop this drift before it gets to a point where it is "all or nothing."

The US Army has done much to foster a firm doctrinal approach to peace operations. From its keystone manual, FM 100-5 Operations, to specific peace operations manuals, to articles in professional journals, a wealth of literature is emerging. Since the Army provides the bulk of the ground forces for these operations, its interest is natural. As such, the potential campaign planner, regardless of service, can gain much from these writings.

However, even here one sees conflicts in translating the nature and theory of PE through the doctrine. For example, FM 100-5 lists principles to guide actions for various missions, including war and OOTW. Additionally, it lists considerations for combined operations, which most PE operations will be. These are outlined below:

Principles of War<sup>55</sup>

Objective  
Offensive  
Mass  
Economy of Force  
Maneuver  
Unity of Command  
Security  
Surprise  
Simplicity

Principles of OOTW<sup>56</sup>

Objective  
Unity of Effort  
Legitimacy  
Perseverance  
Restraint  
Security

Considerations for Combined Operations<sup>57</sup>

Goals & Objectives  
Equipment  
Cultural Differences  
Language  
Teamwork & Trust  
Doctrine & Training

FM 100-5 lists peace enforcement as an OOTW mission, though its definition does not emphasize the international legitimacy as JP 3-07.3 does.<sup>58</sup> Yet, when describing the principles of OOTW, it notes that for combat operations, one should apply the principles of war. In describing the principle of war "objective," it states that "the ultimate military purpose of war is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces and will to fight."<sup>59</sup> According to FM 100-5, it would seem that peace enforcement would fall under the principles of war, since in many

cases it involves armed combat; however, the "objective" conflicts with the joint definition of peace enforcement. This is not to imply that the Army does not know what PE is, but simply to point out the difficulty in tying the nature and theory of peace enforcement to the doctrine.

A new publication, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, deals specifically with the continuum of possible peace missions, from benign military support through peace enforcement. As such, it consolidates many of the thoughts contained in other references. It recognizes that the environment is not a constant, and is affected by three variables: the level of consent, the level of violence and the degree of impartiality.<sup>60</sup> The values of these variables determine the nature of the mission. These three variables match up well with the four key components—consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality—used in this monograph to describe the PE environment. Additionally, FM 100-23 lists ten specific peace operations and the type of military actions required to perform them.<sup>61</sup> These actions are further described and some general tasks and planning factors noted. Combined with a review of the UN organization and a listing of many non-governmental organizations (NGOs), FM 100-23 is an excellent reference for planning or participating in a peace operation.

Other Army publications are also beginning to include references to peace operations. For example, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, includes specific considerations for providing intelligence support for peace enforcement missions.<sup>62</sup> Additionally, articles in various professional journals display the Army's efforts in comprehending peace enforcement and other peace operations.<sup>63</sup>

While the US is pushing for sound peace operations doctrine, the UN is unfortunately lagging behind. Most UN missions have standard operating procedures (SOPs) for each particular situation, which in effect, substitute for doctrine. Given the various missions, combined with many participants and their ad hoc assemblage, this may be the best solution.<sup>64</sup> Many of the countries that regularly provide peacekeepers have a firm doctrinal approach to the mission. Since the UN does not even have standard definitions for peace operations, trying to formulate a common doctrine would be difficult. However, any attempt to consolidate definitions and some doctrinal principles is key if the UN is going to continue along its path of increasing intervention.<sup>65</sup>

#### Campaign Planning Considerations

Though FM 100-23 outlines many considerations for PE operations, one can expand this list based on other factors. By focusing on the four key components of consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality, one can see how these considerations affect the overall campaign plan. To be effective, doctrine must continually evolve as more experiences, strategic considerations, technology and analysis shed new light on the best way to achieve the objective. These considerations are a start in devising an effective PE plan.

Before formulating a plan, it is imperative to know the strategic goals one is attempting to achieve. There are several sets of criteria the national leadership may rely on when deciding to employ military force to attain strategic aims.<sup>66</sup> These goals are normally reflected in either the "mandate," for a UN operation or some form of a mission statement. This is the most important guidance the campaign planner can receive

because it establishes legitimacy and is the primary source for formulating military objectives.

Unfortunately, a clear, concise mandate or mission statement is often difficult to obtain, particularly in a peace operation.<sup>67</sup> It is primarily the field commander's responsibility to establish the military objectives, but the trend is that the UN or other political leadership provide minimal input. This allows room for interpretation, but also requires the commander to understand the political complexities of the situation.<sup>68</sup> The other trend is that the mandate is normally deficient.<sup>69</sup> Additionally, it may change or expand as time goes on, leading to "mission creep." It is normally mission creep that drags peacekeeping forces into a potential peace enforcement situation.

Mission creep is a subject deserving close scrutiny. No one purposely allows themselves to be drawn into a dangerous situation, but this can easily happen in peacekeeping operations. Indeed, mission creep is not always bad, for it allows commanders flexibility to adapt to the local situation.<sup>70</sup> However, this needs to be a conscious decision. Normally, mission creep evolves from internal factors, such as a mandate or force structure change, or a failure to adequately analyze all implied tasks. This results in a change in the environment. The case of the MNF in Lebanon provides a good example. Originally deployed as a PK force, their various assigned missions included peacekeeping, being an interposition force, "presence," and training the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).<sup>71</sup> The Marines, whose security was supposed to be provided by the LAF, never had the force structure to handle the increased missions, nor the neutrality or legitimacy to fulfill a PK mission. This resulted in an increasing level of violence; however, no

changes were made to the rules of engagement (ROE) or force levels to reflect the new environment.

This expansion of the original mission also occurred in the former Yugoslavia. For example, the original mandate, which encompassed four missions, changed five times to expand to eleven different missions.<sup>72</sup> In fact, the original ceasefire upon which the UN mandate was based collapsed before the first soldiers deployed, thereby technically negating their ability to perform a peacekeeping mission.<sup>73</sup>

In each case, mission creep resulted from an expanding mandate, which caused changes in the peacekeeping environment. The environment was characterized by a slowly increasing level of violence, followed by a "catastrophic" incident—the Marine barracks in Beirut and the mortar attack on the Sarajevo market—and a subsequent change in policy, force structure, or deployment status.<sup>74</sup>

The challenge is to recognize the drift in the environment and take positive action. While seemingly easy at the macro level, the recognition can be difficult when immersed in the situation. Commanders and planners must assess new mandates or missions versus the four components of consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality. When mission creep is noted, one has several options. First, one should seek clarification from the originator. If the new mandate stands, then one must assess the impact on the peace operation, focusing on the resources available to accomplish it. If a disparity exists, then one needs to act early. The penchant for "doing more with less" has clearly shown to be a dangerous one in peace operations.

Given that one understands the mandate or mission, there are other considerations that affect building a peace enforcement plan. As

a starting point, FM 100-23, provides a description of 4 "key" considerations and 14 "major" considerations that apply to all peace operations.<sup>75</sup> Additionally, Richard Connaughton, former British Army Head of Defense Studies, has outlined nine "principles of intervention," which are adaptable to peace enforcement.<sup>76</sup> These ideas are repeated in Appendix V. While there are a number of other considerations, tenets, and lists, these two provide a base that can be expanded upon.<sup>77</sup> The results are presented in Appendix VI. Several of the more important ones will be discussed.

#### End State/Exit Strategy

Ideally, the end state should be established concurrently with the mission statement. This accomplishes two things. First it ensures that the military objectives achieved by the campaign plan will support the desired political objective. Secondly, it provides a framework for the planner, helping to ensure that such things as force structure are properly positioned for the follow-on mission, which normally will be some form of peacekeeping. It must be remembered that attainment of military objectives will rarely, if ever, achieve the long term political solution in a peace operation. Ideally, military actions must be in concert with the other instruments of power. If the mandate is clear, and the military component of the peace enforcement operation is achievable, then the end state should also be clear. If not, the planner must actively seek to highlight and resolve the conflicts—preferably before forces are introduced.

## Rules of Engagement (ROE)

In today's peace operations, where an error in tactical judgment can have far reaching strategic consequences, clear, simple ROE are imperative. ROE help remove some of the ambiguities common to peace operations. Additionally, they reinforce legitimacy. Clear ROE must balance force protection with mission accomplishment. The soldier manning the checkpoint or protecting a convoy must have a clear understanding of when he may use force to fulfill the mission.

ROE must also be flexible. This is particularly important as peacekeeping drifts towards peace enforcement. For example, when the Marines were deployed to Beirut as part of the MNF, they had different ROE depending on their proximity to the US embassy. As the environment changed from pure peacekeeping towards peace enforcement, the ROE did not change.<sup>78</sup> In the emotionally charged world of ethnic and intrastate conflicts, ROE must be flexible, with more decentralization delegated to the local commander<sup>79</sup>

Additionally, ROE must be clearly communicated to all parties and soldiers. ROE should be unclassified and freely distributed. Some might argue that by allowing factions to know what they can get away with, they will operate to those limits. This is probably true, but leads back to the statement that ROE must balance force protection with mission accomplishment. ROE violating this balance should not be implemented. The factions should not know what will precipitate a change in the ROE, but by allowing them to know what the limits are, they will know when PE is a viable option. Ideally, this will have a deterrent effect.<sup>80</sup>

For ROE to be effective, there must be a strong chain of command and unity of effort. In multi-national efforts, other countries may be

unwilling to live with US ROE.<sup>81</sup> Additionally, within the chain of command, unit commanders must ensure changing ROE are communicated and complied with. This is especially important when returning from peace enforcement to peacekeeping, particularly if the same forces are being used.

### Environmental Concerns

In these days of increased environmental awareness, one must be concerned with the short and long term results of military actions on the surroundings. As mentioned previously, in the Korean war aircraft attacked dams to cause flooding and destroy crops. In Vietnam, defoliants were used to destroy enemy hiding areas. It is difficult to imagine repeating these kinds of actions in the future. On the surface, this concern seems rather preposterous—can one really be concerned with the environment when planning for decisive military action? In peace enforcement, there are two primary reasons for this concern. One is that various factions might "hold the environment hostage," by threatening damage if one intervenes. The other is that where one is trying to establish conditions for a lasting peace, blatant and undue harm to the environment can significantly effect the mission's legitimacy.

Many people were appalled in Desert Storm when Saddam Hussein threatened, and then released, oil into the Persian Gulf. They were equally appalled when Iraqi troops ignited hundreds of oil wells as they retreated, causing thick, black smoke to spread for hundreds of miles. Though not on this scale, similar actions have occurred in the former Yugoslavia.<sup>82</sup> The problem, therefore has not significantly abated, and

it is conceivable that the military could be called upon to intervene against a potential or actual environmental threat.

Additionally, commanders must consider the possible effects of their military actions upon the environment. The legal restrictions against using the environment as a weapon are contained in both the 1949 Geneva Convention and a 1977 treaty.<sup>83</sup> Increasing environmental awareness may override some "military necessity" justifications.<sup>84</sup> This is particularly valid for peace enforcement operations, where force should be applied decisively, yet selectively.

Commanders and planners must be concerned with the environment. When planning peace enforcement operations, this concern is reflected in the plan and the ROE.<sup>85</sup> When confronted with a belligerent threatening or actually causing damage, prompt response is important. The media is an excellent tool for exposing the problem and generating pressure on the perpetrators. Again, this is not to say that the environment must be the first concern; however, blatant disregard is detrimental to the peace enforcer's legitimacy and the consent granted to them and the peacekeepers who follow.

#### Interagency Coordination

Every peacekeeping effort will involve many non-military agencies, non-governmental organizations.(NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). This is especially true with a humanitarian relief effort. Governmental agencies include well known ones such as the Departments of State and Defense, and others less known and probably less understood. If the peace operation is under the auspices of the United Nations, then there will also be a number of UN agencies involved. The potential number of organizations is in the

hundreds. For example, 125 were involved in UN operations in Cambodia and 225 in Bosnia.<sup>86</sup> All of these organizations have different charters and goals. In designing a PE operation, one must know which agencies are already involved, and which might be required or desired in the transition to peacekeeping. Three important questions to ask are "What can they do for me?," "What can I do for them?" and "What must we do for each other?" One also needs to know if there is a "lead" agency coordinating their efforts. These various agencies provide unique capabilities greatly enhancing an operation's legitimacy and overall success. Harnessing these capabilities requires effort.

### Transition

Interagency concerns are a key part as the PE operation transitions to whatever follows, whether it be a PK mission or the "host" nation's authorities. This transition is a critical piece of the campaign plan. It must assure the government's legitimacy and also establish the legitimacy and neutrality of any peacekeeping forces. Additionally, this is a time when factions may try to spoil the peace. This may be because they were not totally compelled by the PE actions, or perhaps they want to seize more territory for political bargaining. A smooth transition assures legitimacy and neutrality, setting the conditions for a lasting peace.

Unfortunately, the U.S. military does not have an excellent track record when it comes to planning post-conflict activities. They are often relegated to the "back burner" to be handled by someone else or at another time. However, given the political climate of peace enforcement operations, and the criticality of the transition to peacekeeping, this part of the plan must be well integrated.

Several recent operations show the breakdown between conflict and post-conflict planning. One occurred in Operation Just Cause. Originally, the intervention and post-conflict plans were linked. However, when the intervention plan was expanded, the follow-on plan was neglected.<sup>87</sup> As a result, there was no clear end-state, resulting in dispersed efforts among a variety of civil and military agencies.<sup>88</sup> This disconnect also occurred in Operation Desert Storm.<sup>89</sup>

The key to a smooth transition is to integrate it into the plan from the beginning and continually reassess it. There are many parts to this. Besides the numbers and goals of the various agencies, other questions include: How much can they know about the peace enforcement plan without compromising security? Will the agencies initiate activities in parts of the country where it is safe or wait until the entire PE operation is over? What is the role of the "host" government? Is there an ambassador to coordinate diplomatic efforts? Which elements, if any, of the PE force will be used for any peacekeeping or peace building effort? These are just a sample of the many key questions of the transition plan. As can be seen, most involve political and interagency efforts. Unity of effort and a consideration for consent, legitimacy and neutrality are critical and must be closely linked with the PE plan.

### Media

Few will doubt the importance of the media in today's environment. In fact, many claim that the media, particularly television, can shape foreign policy based on the images displayed. Somalia is often claimed as an intervention that would not have happened if not for the pictures broadcast on various news programs.

Likewise, the former commander of the UNPROFOR alluded to the use or misuse of the media by various factions as part of a disinformation campaign.<sup>90</sup> Whatever one's opinion, the media are a powerful influence and can be a powerful ally in promoting a well-run peace operation. By documenting the various reasons for the peace enforcement operation, plus displaying the peace enforcer's actions, the media can help promote legitimacy. However, it will not happen without integrating them into the plan. This includes projecting potential numbers of media personnel, their logistical needs, and how to balance their desires with the commander's security needs.<sup>91</sup>

### The Mechanics of Campaign Planning

A final factor affecting the peace enforcement campaign plan is the process itself. In developing a campaign plan, one follows certain "mechanical" steps. For example, one normally assesses the "correlation of forces" to represent the combat capability of one's foes. This assists in "war gaming," where the flow of the campaign—actions and probable reactions—are played out to test the plan's validity. While this works well with conventional operations, it can prove difficult in peace enforcement. How does one assess the fighting ability of a Somali warlord's clan members? How does one measure the key components of consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality? These components do not lend themselves to quantitative measurements, yet they are critical in measuring success. Many traditional concepts of campaign planning need to be examined for their applicability to peace enforcement.

### Other Considerations

There are obviously many other considerations for PE operations. Some are included in Appendix VI. Their exclusion from discussion in

the body of this monograph is not meant to slight their importance. Logistics, displaced civilians, signal support and command and control are just a few additional topics that can spell the difference between success and failure. Each merits a detailed analysis. This monograph has attempted to focus on some of those that are particularly key, such as the role of force, the mandate and the ROE, and others not often considered, such as the environment and interagency coordination. Hopefully, this discussion will encourage future expansion and refinement of PE considerations.

### Implications of Peace Enforcement Operations

The increasing numbers of ethnic conflicts and other forms of confrontations, combined with the increasing propensity of regional and global organizations to become involved with them, spell many opportunities for the U.S. and its military to become involved as well. Whether for strictly humanitarian relief operations or to compel peace, the mission is not always clear, and the initial purpose of the deployment may change for a number of reasons. If the U.S. is going to engage in peace operations, then it needs to embrace them fully. If one accepts the premise that peace enforcement is fundamentally different than either peacekeeping or standard combat operations, then several requirements exist. Two key ones are doctrine and training.

As discussed earlier, there is no standard theory of how to approach peace enforcement operations. It combines many of the political considerations espoused by Clausewitz with some of the considerations of revolutionary and counterrevolutionary theorists. The doctrine that flows from this combination of theories is likewise a

mixture. This area should continue to receive emphasis. FM 100-23 is a good start, but could include some of the considerations discussed in this monograph. Joint Pub 3-07.3 should incorporate peace enforcement activities instead of categorizing them as being covered by other doctrinal manuals. Likewise, the other services also need to address peace enforcement. For example, the Air Force's basic doctrinal manual includes a small section on "Military activities short of war," but does not adequately address the Air Force's role in it.<sup>92</sup> Instead, it sends the reader to Joint and Army publications. Though some of the campaign planning tools discuss strategic and operational considerations, peace operations should receive more emphasis.

Training is another requirement for peace enforcement; however, this is a contentious issue. With limited training time and dollars, how does one strike the balance between training for war and training for peace operations? Many people believe that as long as one trains for the most demanding mission then others can easily be handled. This may be true, but there are unique parts of PE operations that pure combat training may not prepare one for. As discussed earlier, a response with overwhelming firepower may lead to a short term victory, but a failure with respect to legitimacy or another key component of PE. Other examples of tasks which are unique to PE operations and entail distinct training requirements include negotiating, and working with the UN or other NGOs/PVOs.

There are a number of other requirements if the U.S. is going to emphasize peace operations.<sup>93</sup> Again, many might question the need to expand the role of peace operations and the subsequent need for more doctrine and training. The military can normally forge its way

through, but at what cost in either political objectives or, more importantly, the lives of the soldiers sent out to do the mission?

### Conclusion

Developing a campaign plan for peace enforcement operations presents significant challenges. Literature is just emerging to help the planner respond to these challenges; however, differences in definitions present problems from the beginning. Likewise, the peace enforcement environment involves distinct values of consent, sovereignty, legitimacy and neutrality—values that make peace enforcement different from peacekeeping or combat operations. One must also have a firm understanding of the role of force—its purpose and the probable consequences of its employment. Doctrine, while at times unclear, is beginning to incorporate many of these ideas.

With this in mind, one can begin to formulate a plan. The first requirement is to understand the strategic context and political objectives one is trying to achieve. This is usually reflected by the mandate—a mandate with a history of being unclear, frequently changed, and not in concert with either the nature of the peace operation or the force structure required. Armed with this mandate, this monograph has highlighted some important considerations for campaign planners as they link strategy to tactics. Many of these considerations are fundamentally different than if one was planning either a peacekeeping or a conventional combat mission. How one does this requires careful analysis and sound judgment. Additionally, these considerations imply a need for further emphasis on doctrine and training.

One must remember that placing PE forces in harm's way "... may be effective in making the continuation of violence impossible; it cannot, in and of itself, create the conditions for lasting peace, which involve the political embrace of peace as more attractive than war."<sup>94</sup> With ethnic cleansing, thousands of refugees, and the need for humanitarian assistance around the globe, then sound doctrine, well-trained personnel, and a comprehensive plan can be more effective in "setting the conditions for lasting peace."

## APPENDIX I

### ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS

This appendix contains various abbreviations and acronyms common to peace operations.

|              |                                                                                     |
|--------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| ASD (ISA)    | Assistant Secretary of Defense for<br>International Security Affairs                |
| ASD (S)-LIC) | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special<br>Operations and Low Intensity Conflict |
| C3           | Command, Control and Communications                                                 |
| CA           | Civil Affairs                                                                       |
| CMD          | Civil-Military Operations                                                           |
| DC           | Displaced Civilians                                                                 |
| DOS          | Department of State                                                                 |
| FID          | Foreign Internal Defense                                                            |
| HA           | Humanitarian Assistance                                                             |
| HNS          | Host Nation Support                                                                 |
| INGO         | International Non-governmental<br>Organizations                                     |
| IPB          | Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield                                         |
| J3           | Operations Directorate                                                              |
| J5           | Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate                                              |
| JP           | Joint Publication                                                                   |
| JTTP         | Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures                                           |
| LIC          | Low Intensity Conflict                                                              |
| LNO          | Liaison Officer                                                                     |
| LOCs         | Lines of Communication                                                              |
| MFO          | Multinational Force and Observers                                                   |
| MNF          | Multinational Force                                                                 |
| MP           | Military Police                                                                     |
| NGO          | Non-governmental organization                                                       |
| OPSEC        | Operations Security                                                                 |
| PA           | Public Affairs                                                                      |
| PE           | Peace enforcement                                                                   |
| PK           | Peacekeeping                                                                        |
| PO           | Peace Operation                                                                     |
| POLAD        | Political Advisor                                                                   |
| PSYOP        | Psychological Operation                                                             |
| PVO          | Private voluntary organizations                                                     |

**ROE**

**Rules of Engagement**

**SF**

**Special Forces**

**SOF**

**Special Operations Forces**

**SOFA**

**Status of Forces Agreement**

**SOP**

**Standard Operating Procedures**

**UN**

**United Nations**

**UNIFIL**

**UN Interim Force in Lebanon**

## APPENDIX II

### GLOSSARY

The following terms are applicable to peace operations. The source for each definition is given in parentheses.

Center of Gravity. That characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. (JP 3-0)

Center of Gravity. The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. (Clausewitz, Book VIII, Chapter IV)

Center of Gravity. The hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends; that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or the will to fight. (FM 100-5)

Doctrine. Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives. Doctrine is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (FM 100-5)

End State. Military end state includes the required conditions that, when achieved, attain the strategic objectives or pass the main effort to other instruments of national power to achieve the final strategic end state. That end state describes what the NCA wants the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power. In the PO context, end state is the political and military conditions described by the authorizing power as the objective of the PO. (FM 100-23)

Humanitarian Assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life, or result in a great loss of property. (JP 3-07.3)

Humanitarian Assistance. Assistance provided by DOD forces, as directed by appropriate authority, in the aftermath of natural or man-made disasters to help reduce conditions that present a serious threat to life and property; assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration and is designed to supplement efforts of civilian authorities who have primary responsibility for providing such assistance. (FM 100-5)

Peace-building. Post conflict diplomatic and military action to identify and support structures that will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peace-enforcement.** A form of combat, armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, that is pursuant to international license authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolution--the primary purpose of which is the maintenance or restoration of peace under conditions broadly accepted by the international community. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peace enforcement.** Military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat. (FM 100-5)

**Peacekeeping.** Non-combat military operations (exclusive of self-defense), that are undertaken by outside forces with the consent of all major belligerent parties, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement in support of diplomatic efforts to reach a political settlement to the dispute. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peacekeeping.** Operations using military forces and/or civilian personnel, at the request of the parties to a dispute, to help supervise a cease-fire agreement and/or separate the parties. (FM 100-5)

**Peacekeeping.** The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party, intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace. (International Peace Academy)

**Peacekeeping.** An operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, established by the United Nations to help maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. (Unofficial UN definition)

**Peacemaking.** Process of arranging an end to disputes, and resolving issues that led to conflict, primarily through diplomacy, mediation, negotiating, or other forms of peaceful settlement, that may include military peace support operations. (JP 3-07.3)

**Peacemaking.** The diplomatic process or military actions to gain an end to disputes. (FM 100-5)

**Peace support operations.** The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary or non-military action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. (JP 3-07.3)

**Preventive diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. (JP 3-07.3)

**Rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other encountered forces. (FM 100-23)

### **APPENDIX III**

#### **Selected United Nations Charter Articles**

**The following selected articles relate to peace enforcement operations:**

#### **CHAPTER I: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES**

##### **Article 2**

- 1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.**
- 3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.**
- 4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.**
- 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.**

#### **CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES**

##### **Article 33**

- 1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.**
- 2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.**

##### **Article 34**

**The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.**

##### **Article 36**

- 1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or method of adjustment.**

##### **Article 37**

- 1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.**

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

#### Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

### CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

#### Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

#### Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

#### Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

#### Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

#### Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

#### Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

#### Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined internal enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

#### Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

#### Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament.

#### Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

#### Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## **APPENDIX IV**

### **Weinberger Tests for the use of US combat troops abroad<sup>95</sup>**

- 1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.**
- 2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly.**
- 3. Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital national interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peacekeeping.**
- 4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed—their size, composition and disposition—must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements.**
- 5. Fifth, before the US commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation.**
- 6. Finally, the commitment of US forces to combat should be a last resort.**

## Appendix V

### FM 100-23 and Connaughton's Principles

#### FM 100-23 Key Aspects of Peace Operations<sup>96</sup>

1. Use of force
2. ROE
3. Force Protection
4. Training

#### FM 100-23 Major Considerations<sup>97</sup>

1. Force Composition
2. Intelligence
3. Maneuver
4. Fire Support
5. Air Defense
6. Mobility and Survivability
7. Logistics
8. Augmentation and Liaison
9. Displaced Persons
10. Technology
11. Public Affairs
12. The Environment
13. Transition and Termination
14. Signal Support

#### Connaughton's Principles of Intervention<sup>98</sup>

1. The selection and maintenance of the aim.
2. Operate under the auspices and co-ordination of a valid and supportive international organization.
3. Establish a simple and agreed unified C3I organization.
4. Plan the force extraction concurrently with the planning of the force insertion.
5. Establish an effective *cordon sanitaire* around the target area.
6. Maintenance of consensus (Home, Target country, and of the interventionist forces).
7. Agree and adhere to national contributions.
8. Operate within the law.
9. Military intervention is the last resort of a collective security machine.

## **Appendix VI**

### **Campaign Planning Considerations for Peace Enforcement Operations**

The following is a series of questions to provide a starting point for planning peace enforcement operations. While not all-inclusive, they provide a core around which one can plan a campaign.

#### **Strategic Political Context**

Why has peacekeeping/diplomacy failed?

What do the warring factions want? Why do they contest the status quo?  
What is their desired end state?

How is the current government seen from all sides? Is there legitimacy?

What is the role/agenda of any external actors? What have they contributed so far?

What is the role of the UN/Regional alliance?

#### **Strategic Military Context**

Can military force achieve the political objective?

What kind of conflict already exists? (Civil war, guerrilla, revolutionary?)

How will the imposition of military force be seen by all parties? What will they likely do about it?

What other instruments of power (economic, informational, political) are involved and how is the military supported by, or supporting, them?

#### **Operational Considerations**

Consent, Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Neutrality—What is the current status?

What is the mandate? Is it conducive to a military objective? If not, make it so.

What is the end state? What defines success?

What is the role of force in this situation. What political/legal constraints exist? Can it achieve the objective? How will its use be seen by the belligerents, the supporting population, and how will it be judged by world opinion? Is it proportionate, appropriate, and discriminatory?

### **Intelligence**

Faction's force structure, political structure, equipment, external support?

NGOs/PVOs numbers and location?

Refugees/DCs? How many already exist, how many new ones will intervention generate?

What force structure is there to work with?

Peacekeepers already in place

Who else has signed up?

What technology, training, doctrine, etc. do friendly forces have?

What is the C3I arrangement?

Special Operations Forces (PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, others)

### **Interagency Coordination**

What can they do for the mission?

What support do they need?

Is there a lead agency coordinating their efforts?

### **Logistics**

Host Nation Support

UN Support

Combined/Coalition Support

### **Signal Support**

### **Other Operating Systems**

Maneuver

Fire Support

Air Defense

Engineers

### **ROE/SOPs**

Do they balance force protection with mission accomplishment?

How are they published?

Who can change them?

What triggers a change in the ROE?

### **Environmental Considerations**

What are the potential risks? Are there unique areas that may require a special response (oil wells, etc.)

Do the ROE cover potential hazards?

### **Media**

How much media interest will there be?

How many media personnel will cover the operation?

What support do they need?

What is the balance between OPSEC and being open?

### **Transition to Peacekeeping operations**

Who's in charge, what forces, when, all at once or piecemeal?

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup>Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 435. This quote is from Mr. Weinberger's address to the National Press Club, where he also laid out his six criteria for employing force.

<sup>2</sup>See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace (New York: The United Nations, 1992), 7. Mr. Boutros-Ghali is the current Secretary General of the United Nations.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., 11.

<sup>4</sup>US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub (JP) 3-07.3. JTPP for Peacekeeping Operations. Revised Initial Draft (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1993), GL-11.

<sup>5</sup>International Peace Academy, Peacekeepers Handbook (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 7.

<sup>6</sup>JP 3-07.3, GL-11.

<sup>7</sup>US Army. FM 100-23 Peace Operations. (Version 6. Draft) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994), 1-3.

<sup>8</sup>Boutros-Ghali, 26-27. Boutros-Ghali goes on to call for the formation of peace enforcement units to respond to these situations.

<sup>9</sup>Donald M. Snow, Peacekeeping. Peacemaking and Peace-enforcement: The U.S. Role in the New International Order (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 4-5. For a further discussion of the differences among the definitions, see Appendix A of Joint Pub 3-07.3, and John O. B. Sewall, "Implications for U.N. Peacekeeping," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter, 1993-94, 31-32.

<sup>10</sup>Appendix III contains parts of the UN charter pertinent to peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

<sup>11</sup>United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 42.

<sup>12</sup>For example, there are a number of people in many nations, including democratic ones, who can argue that they are oppressed. In the states of the former Soviet Union there are a number of Russian populations which constitute a minority. In a crisis situation, would Russian intervention be justified? What if the UN authorized an operation into a former Soviet state without Russia's explicit approval?

An additional consideration is that a PE operation may not necessarily involve a violation of sovereignty, depending on one's viewpoint. For example, the threatened use of force against Bosnian Serbs would not violate the sovereignty of Bosnia as seen by the Bosnian

government. Any operation would have its consent and would be seen as preserving its sovereignty. Obviously, the Bosnian Serbs would not be granting consent, and contest the Bosnian government's sovereignty over the resident Serbs.

For a further discussion, see Snow, 13-14; Richard Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s (London: Routledge, 1992), 177-178, and Boutros-Ghali, 98-99.

<sup>13</sup>In fact, the Army's keystone doctrine Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), stresses the first type of legitimacy. On page 13-4, it defines legitimacy as to "sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.

<sup>14</sup>For an excellent review of UN operations, see William J. Durch, ed., The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

<sup>15</sup>FM 100-23, 1-3.

<sup>16</sup>Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 141.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*, 579.

<sup>18</sup>*Ibid.*, 88.

<sup>19</sup>*Ibid.*, 605.

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid.*, 89.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 282.

<sup>22</sup>For example, see 75, 227, and 94-97.

<sup>23</sup>*Ibid.*, 611-612.

<sup>24</sup>*Ibid.*, 479-483.

<sup>25</sup>John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 839.

<sup>26</sup>Mao Tse-Tung, The Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972), 210-217.

<sup>27</sup>Shy and Collier, 850.

<sup>28</sup>Mao, 212.

<sup>29</sup>Dennis M Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy-An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988), 111-112. The Vietnamese version is called "dau tranh," which focuses on making virtually all the people a weapon and the goal becomes to "out organize" the opponent. For an excellent description of this theory, see Douglas Pike, PAVN: People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 213-253.

<sup>30</sup>*Ibid.*, 118. Drew expands on this discussion in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. American Military Dilemmas and Doctrinal Proposals (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1988).

<sup>31</sup>Shy, 854. For an account of Malaya, see Edgar O'Ballance, Malaya: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966).

<sup>32</sup>For example, in The Air Campaign. Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 9, air theorist John Warden describes the center of gravity as "... that point where the enemy is most vulnerable and the point where an attack will have the best chance of being decisive."

<sup>33</sup>Drew and Snow, Making Strategy, 116-117. For another view, see John R. Schmacher, "Center of Gravity: The Critical Link in Strategic Planning for Low Intensity Conflict," Study Project, US Army War College, 1993.

<sup>34</sup>Richard E. Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1985), 318-320.

<sup>35</sup>See Johan Jorgen Holst, "Enhancing peace-keeping operations," Survival, May/June 1990, 264. While arguing against a theory, Holst says that some general rules and principles probably do apply.

<sup>36</sup>Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, 40.

<sup>37</sup>World War II presents an excellent example of the target debate for conventional operations. From submarine pens, to the Luftwaffe, to the oil fields, planners and commanders debated over the proper targets. Each service, and in many cases different parts within each service, had their perspective on what was critical to both enhance their operations and to defeat the enemy.

<sup>38</sup>Mark Phillip Hertling, "Insights Garnered and Gained: Military Theory and Operation Peace for Galilee." Monograph, School Of

Advanced Military Studies, 1988, 27. For the cluster bombs, see Weinberger, 144.

<sup>39</sup>John MacKinlay, "Powerful Peacekeepers," Survival, May/June 1990, 247.

<sup>40</sup>Mark Clodfelter, The Limits of Air Power (New York: The Free Press, 1989) 16-18.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 36, 25.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., 140.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 126-128.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., 172-174.

<sup>46</sup>See W. Bruce Rember, "Wings For Peace: Air Power in Peacemaking Operations," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992. for a view against the use of airpower in Bosnia, and Kurtis D. Lohide "Air Power: A Solution for Bosnia," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993, for a pro-airpower stance.

<sup>47</sup>For an excellent review of airpower support for peace operations, see Steven Metz, "The Air Force Role in UN Peacekeeping Missions," Airpower Journal, Winter 1993, 68-81. In particular, pages 72-75 outline specific Air Force Missions applicable to all peace operations.

<sup>48</sup>US Army, FM 100-5 Operations, (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 1-1 through 1-2. For a more detailed discussion of doctrine, see Drew & Snow, Making Strategy, 163-173.

<sup>49</sup>FM 100-5, Glossary-3.

<sup>50</sup>US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 5-00.1, Doctrine for Joint Campaign Planning (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1992), III-5-8.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid., I-9.

<sup>52</sup>JP 3-07.3, I-8. Some of these missions are "supervising demilitarization, demobilization, and maintaining law and order."

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., II-19-21.

<sup>54</sup>Probably the one most often quoted is the Weinberger criteria for employing force. The text of this criteria is contained in Appendix IV.

<sup>55</sup>FM 100-5, 2-4 through 2-6.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 13-0.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., 5-1.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid., Glossary-7. The definition of peace enforcement is "military intervention to forcefully restore peace between belligerents who may be engaged in combat."

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., 2-4.

<sup>60</sup>FM 100-23, 1-10, 1-11.

<sup>61</sup>Ibid., 2-1.

<sup>62</sup>US Army, FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (Initial Draft), (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1993), 7-12, 7-13.

<sup>63</sup>For example, see William W. Allen, Antione D. Johnson, and John T. Nelsen, II, "Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Operations," Military Review, October 1993, 53-61, and Horace L. Hunter, Jr., "Ethnic Conflict and Operations Other Than War," Military Review, November 1993, 18-24.

<sup>64</sup>David Wurmser and Nancy Bearg Dyke, The Professionalization of Peacekeeping, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1993), 50.

<sup>65</sup>For further discussion of UN doctrine, see William H. Lewis and John O. B. Sewall, "Implications for UN Peacekeeping," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, 32-33. See also Timothy L. Thomas, "The UN's Vietnam?" Military Review, February 1994, 47-55.

<sup>66</sup>Probably the most quoted criteria is former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's six criteria. These are contained in Appendix IV. Another set was developed by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, and espoused in "U. S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, 32-45. His criteria consists of the following set of questions: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined and understood?" "Have all other nonviolent policy means failed?" "Will military forces achieve the objective?" "At what cost?" "Have the gains and risks been analyzed?" "How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?" See also Charles

A. Kupchan, "Getting In: The Initial Stage of Military Intervention," in Foreign Military Intervention, ed. by Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 241-60. Kupchan's article presents a good discussion of the reasons why nations become involved, the assessments they make, and some of the miscalculations often made. Some of the important miscalculations include intelligence, the value of firepower and the impact of domestic policy.

<sup>67</sup>Eliot A. Cohen, "Dynamics of Military Intervention," in Foreign Military Intervention, ed. by Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 261-84. Cohen notes that in military interventions, most objectives are "open-ended," such as "the creation of a stable government."

<sup>68</sup>Wurmser and Dyke, 24-25.

<sup>69</sup>US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change. 103d Congress, 1st sess., 1993. 10.

<sup>70</sup>See S. L. Arnold, "Somalia, An Operation Other Than War," Military Review, December 1993, 35, Footnote 6. During Hurricane Andrew relief operations in Florida, 10th Mountain Division initiated some extra missions on their own, such as construction projects, to give the soldiers an opportunity to do something visible.

<sup>71</sup>Jeffrey R. Willis, "The Employment of US Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984," Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992, 88-91.

<sup>72</sup>David A. Mozinski, "U. N. Peacekeeping in "Yugoslavia:" Background, Analysis, and Lessons Learned," Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1993, 62-64.

<sup>73</sup>*Ibid.*, 40-41.

<sup>74</sup>This same chain of events also occurred in Somalia. Expanding missions brought forces into an increasingly hostile environment, culminating in the clash with the U. S. Rangers on 3 October 1993. This was followed by a change in policy—more people and equipment brought in, but a stated exit date for U. S. forces of 31 March 1994.

<sup>75</sup>FM 100-23, 4-8 through 4-22.

<sup>76</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s, 45-55.

<sup>77</sup>For example, see Richard M. Connaughton, Peacekeeping and Military Intervention (Camberley, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1992), 30-31 for "Relevant factors" or "Prerequisites

for Chapter VII Operations;" James P. McCarthy, "The Use of Military Force in Bosnia," in The Challenge of Change, ed. Jeffrey Simon (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 1993), 165-166, for "Tenets of Peacemaking;" and Mozinski "U. N. Peacekeeping," 91, for "Lessons for future PK operations in a regional/ethnic conflict."

<sup>78</sup>Michael D. Barbero, "Peacemaking: The Brother of Peacekeeping or a Combat Operation?" Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1989, 20. In Weinberger, 164, he notes that the Long Commission which later investigated the Marine presence in Lebanon cited as one of its findings that "inadequate ROE led to a sense of laxity within the USMNF."

<sup>79</sup>See William H. Lewis and John O. B. Sewall, "UN Peacekeeping Ends vs. Means," Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 93, 55.

<sup>80</sup>William D. Smith, "Peacemaking From the Sea," Proceedings, August 1993, 25-28.

<sup>81</sup>This problem arose with Operation Provide Comfort. See John P. Cavanaugh, "Operation Provide Comfort: A Model For Future NATO Operations," Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992, 17.

<sup>82</sup>In Croatia, Serbian troops took control of a dam in 1991 and placed explosives throughout it. UN soldiers later regained control of the dam but were unable to remove the explosives, potentially radio controlled. In January, 1993, the Serbs attacked the UN force, and then Croatian soldiers retook the dam. The battle caused some structural damage, threatening 20000 people in its direct path and 30000 people indirectly. See John Darnton, "Croats Are Easing the Danger of Damaged Dam's Collapse," The New York Times, 31 January 1993, 10, and John Darnton, "Battle for Dam in Croatia Grows, Ousting U.N. Force," The New York Times, 29 January 1993, A3.

<sup>83</sup>Thomas F. Bersonn, "The Environment as an Operational Center of Gravity," Paper, Naval War College, 1993, 4. The 1977 treaty is the "Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention).

<sup>84</sup>Michael Donnelly and James Van Ness, "The Warrior and the Druid—The DOD and Environmental Laws," Federal Bar News and Journal, January 1986, 42, in Bersonn, 19.

<sup>85</sup>Bersonn, 5-6.

<sup>86</sup>Steve Metz, The Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 19. Additionally, FM 100-23 Appendix B contains a description of many of the more prominent agencies, NGOs and PVOs.

<sup>87</sup>John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 27.

<sup>88</sup>*Ibid.*, viii.

<sup>89</sup>John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), viii. Fishel notes that differences in planning considerations and lack of knowledge of the responsibilities of an occupying force could have led to unintentional human rights violations.

<sup>90</sup>Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper. The Road to Sarajevo (Vancouver, British Columbia: Douglas & McIntyre, 1993), 308. MacKenzie was asked about the reasons for the difficulty in orchestrating a cease-fire for Sarajevo and responded with "Because I can't keep the two sides from firing on their own positions for the benefit of CNN."

<sup>91</sup>Charles W. Ricks, The Military-News Media Relationship: Thinking Forward (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 1993), 36.

<sup>92</sup>Air Force Manual 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, Vol. II (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1992), 51-62.

<sup>93</sup>For example, see Snow, Peacekeeping. Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The U. S. Role in the New International Order, 31-34. Also, see Wurmser and Dyke, 49.

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 21.

<sup>95</sup>Weinberger, 443-444.

<sup>96</sup>FM 100-23, 4-2.

<sup>97</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-8.

<sup>98</sup>Connaughton, Military Intervention in the 1990s, 45-55.

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