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
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The Impact of Command Likelihood on
Commitment

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This study focuses on how commitment among Army officers, having between five and fifteen years of commissioned service, may be impacted as a consequence of the Army's current drawdown. It was hypothesized that officer commitment would decline as a result of a reduced likelihood of commanding a battalion. Additionally, an officer's branch specialty and number of alternatives defining a successful career were expected to have varying impact on commitment. Motivational and cognitive theories were found to be parsimonious in accounting for the hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested using a quasi-experimental technique in a 3X4X2 design which examined the manipulated effects of "likelihood of command" according to branch and sample type. Using a published inventory, each subject's commitment was assessed before and after the manipulation. The analyses revealed robust support for the principal hypothesis: likelihood of command does impact commitment. Branch specialty exhibited a differential effect on commitment, but not as a consequence of command likelihood nor the number of alternatives officers have for defining success as was hypothesized. Implications for expanding the Army's vision of career success and for the psychological research community were offered, and issues requiring further research were set forth.


Command Likelihood, Commitment, Drawdown, Battalion
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THE IMPACT OF
COMMAND LIKELIHOOD ON COMMITMENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

STEVEN M. JONES, MAJOR, USA
B.S., U. S. Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1981
M.A., Univ. of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
1990

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF COMMAND LIKELIHOOD ON COMMITMENT by MAJ Steven M. Jones, USA, 125 pages.

This study focuses on how commitment among army officers, having between five and fifteen years of commissioned service, may be impacted as a consequence of the army's current drawdown. It was hypothesized that officer commitment would decline as a result of a reduced likelihood of commanding a battalion. Additionally, an officer's branch specialty and number of alternatives defining a successful career were expected to have varying impact on commitment. Despite the absence of a psychological theory of commitment, motivational and cognitive theories were found to be parsimonious in accounting for the hypotheses.

The hypotheses were tested using a quasi-experimental technique in a 3 X 4 X 2 design which examined the manipulated effects of "likelihood of command" according to branch and sample type. Using a published inventory, each subject's commitment was assessed before and after the manipulation. The analyses revealed robust support for the principal hypothesis: likelihood of command does impact commitment. Branch specialty exhibited a differential effect on commitment, but not as a consequence of command likelihood nor the number of alternatives officers have for defining success as was hypothesized. Implications for expanding the army's vision of career success and for the psychological research community were offered, and issues requiring further research were set forth.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Considerable changes in the force structure and mission of the United States Army are currently taking place. Following the dramatic shift in world affairs reflected by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1986, the army is becoming smaller and more contingency-oriented. Since 1989 the army has "downsized," in much the same manner as the other service branches of the Department of Defense. The current drawdown in the armed forces is largely a result of both the end to the cold war and a necessity for the nation to seriously attend to its massive economic deficit. This reduction in the military, however, is not without precedent. In fact, in the United States during the past seventy-five years every major war has been immediately followed by a considerable reduction-in-force (RIF) of approximately 25%: Post-WWI and WWII, Post-Korean War, and Post-Vietnam.¹ While historically the drawdown periods, themselves, have been of relatively short duration (one to two years), their effects on the combat readiness of the force have been significantly more far-reaching.

The essence of this study pertains to the attitudes held by the survivors of the army drawdown, as well as the impact that the drawdown has on them psychologically. Such a focus is contrary to the considerable attention paid these days to those who have lost, or will lose their jobs as a consequence of downsizing. Of specific interest are the junior officers in the grades of captain and major who survive the massive reduction, remain on active duty, and continue accomplishing the missions essential for the nation's defense.

It certainly seems plausible that a general neglect of the attitudes of "survivors" in past downsizings may have contributed to debacles such as the Kasserine Pass after World War I, Task Force Smith after World War II, and Desert One after Vietnam. The fact that each of these tragedies occurred reveals the army's failure to adequately manage combat readiness during the post-war downsizing that proceeded it; today's army leadership has admitted as much.² There can be no doubt that combat readiness results from the interaction of many, many variables including the extent of dedication and discipline among soldiers, quality equipment, realistic and demanding training, and unit cohesion. Central to the formula accounting for combat readiness, however, is solid and dedicated leadership. Quality leadership that actively demonstrates a "commitment to holding it [the Army] together"³ is the key to

maintaining the morale and combat focus of the force. Managing a reduction-in-force (RIF) of personnel to retain and foster this quality leadership is just one of many issues requiring attention during a drawdown. In fact, because the issue of managing personnel in these terms is rather subjective, perhaps it is ignored relative to other, more objective details such as resource allocations, fiscal management, or numbers of tanks and artillery pieces being retained. It seems quite possible that the military of yesterday focused so much upon personnel being laid off and equipment being retained that it lost an adequate focus on sustaining the leadership necessary for rebuilding an effective fighting force.

The psychological impact of the current drawdown on survivors is expected to be of considerably greater consequence than ever before. In contrast to downsizings in the past, for instance, the current downsizing will span a significantly longer period of time. The eight year long drawdown, as currently projected, will prolong the uncertainty and psychological stress; the impact of which can be expected to reverberate throughout the military culture well beyond the official end of the drawdown. Additionally, because the force is made up entirely of volunteers, the drawdown of the 1990s will, for many, carry with it the burden of "Uncle Sam's" violation of an implicit agreement to offer a career in return for honorable service to

country. There can be no doubt during this drawdown, in contrast to what has occurred during those of the past, that a better understanding of the attitudes of "survivors" is needed.

The military has not been the only organization to struggle through a painful transition in the 1980s and '90s. An unprecedented number of U.S. corporations and industries, large and small, are carrying out similar reductions of white collar workers in order to survive the current economic slump. Since 1982, for instance, Mobile Corporation has laid off 17% of its mid- and lower-level managers; DuPont, 15%, and General Electric, 35%.⁴ Among a host of other companies which previously seemed robust, the Phillips Light Company and the Bank of America have had to make similar cuts in the white collar work force.⁵

According to several corporate executives "getting rid of people is the easy part"⁶ relative to getting the survivors focused once again on making needed contributions to the organization. Evidence of the enormous psychological strain created by the reductions is illustrated by the stress that human resource experts refer to as the "survivor's syndrome."⁷ Survivors perceive an increase in stress, and studies have indicated that the stress is related to dissatisfaction and an intent to leave. Of 2500 managers surveyed, 88% said morale was down since downsizing, and 40% said productivity was down.⁸ Surprisingly,

however, a survey of large corporations in the process of downsizing reveals not a single one as having any kind of comprehensive program for managing the return to normalcy for survivors, or a mechanism to monitor attitude changes over time.⁹ Based on what is well established about the role of job satisfaction, commitment, and morale in an organization such an oversight regarding the needs of surviving managers will likely offset the potential gains sought by the reductions in the first place.

During the past four years, the army has shrunk from sixteen to twelve active duty divisions, deactivating in the process more than forty brigades, and nearly 140 battalions. Former Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Les Aspin, announced his recommendations following the "Bottom-Up Review" to reduce the active force to ten divisions and just less than 500,000 active duty troops by 1996.¹⁰ General Sullivan converted the Secretary's concept into action by recently announcing plans to deactivate what he implied will be two additional heavy divisions. The reduction, in real terms, is expected to amount to only one heavy brigade because the other three brigades involved will be reassigned to round-out the other heavy divisions throughout the ten division army.¹¹ These unit and personnel cuts reflect the legislative reductions that have been mandated as of this date. Ever increasing budgetary pressures in government are making defense reductions seem more and more

appealing, especially at a time when the nation's security is not being threatened directly. Proposals suggesting a reduction in the force by even two more active duty divisions, to eight divisions, are receiving considerable attention, and are now more plausible than ever before.

As in the corporate world, the drawdown process in the military has represented a demanding and stressful transition. Much has been said and done by senior army leaders to avert the seemingly inevitable slump in readiness that has befallen our army in every past drawdown. The army's shift to a significantly wider scope of mission requirements, including contingency operations and operations other than war, is at odds with increasingly restrictive fiscal constraints. At the tactical level, among company- and field-grade officers especially, more is being demanded to adequately train active duty units while simultaneously micro-managing shrinking resources.

The army's emphasis in establishing the Voluntary Separation Incentive/Selective Separation Bonus (VSI/SSB) and early retirement options to benefit those officers who have been forced-out has come, in some respects, at the expense of a focus on the needs of officers still on active duty. This problem has also been the source of much concern in the corporate world. The early-out incentive programs are admittedly necessary: they help organizations reach drawdown end-strength objectives that are deemed critical.

These incentive programs, however, do little to personally and directly advantage the drawdown survivors. In fact, a study examining the direct impact of the VSI/SSB on army officers who remained on active duty demonstrated a significant decline in the psychological commitment of survivors.¹² Those officers who separate from active duty with a benefits package enjoy some degree of satisfaction from financial compensation. Survivors of the drawdown, however, derive their satisfaction from (but remain concerned about) job security and occupational advancement opportunities. In spite of the greater demand for officers to perform more diverse missions with less resources, the smaller force structure offers fewer opportunities for field-grade officers to command battalion-sized organizations; a well-defined and uniformly desirable achievement for most army officers.

Senior army leaders suggest that opportunities to command are actually greater because the percentage of units drawn-down (25%) by the end of FY94 has been less than the simultaneous personnel drawdown (32%).¹³ As a consequence, they contend, the percentage of officers selected to command at the battalion-level is improved by the drawdown process. According to Department of the Army data, however, the selection rates to Battalion Command of about 9% per year have remained essentially unchanged.¹⁴ Selection rates are not projected to increase as the ten-division

force takes shape with only 740 battalion-command positions remaining, and may in fact decline a bit. Further, the percentages alone are deceiving since the pool of officers now competing for key command positions is substantially more competitive. This is because the drawdown in officer personnel substantially involved reductions among only the bottom half of all officers. According to Brigadier General Frederick Wong, Director of the army's Officer Professional Management Division, "a lot of what would be appropriately termed D and D- officers are no longer with us in the Army."¹⁵ General Wong's comments reflect the success attained by the army's drawdown in retaining the solid performers, while eliminating others under very favorable conditions--both monetarily, and with self-esteem intact. The non-symmetrical distribution of talent among those who have departed the army, however, has caused competition for key assignments to rise sharply among those officers who have elected to remain on active duty. For example, the pool of field-grade officers which represented twenty seven percent of the pre-drawdown population, now accounts for the top forty percent of the field-grade officer population in today's smaller army. There is little doubt that the likelihood of commanding a battalion, even if only a perception, is quickly declining as a consequence of the army drawdown and significantly greater competition.

There is cause for concern that fewer command billets at the battalion-level, whether real or perceived, and a much greater competition to command may result in a reduced career commitment among army captains and majors. A survey was conducted of 650 human resource professionals regarding downsizing effects among civilian managers roughly equivalent to captains and majors. Of those surveyed, 71% said surviving managers are more insecure about their jobs, and 68% indicated that surviving managers are less secure about their careers.¹⁶ They report a general feeling that the corporations are being perceived as tearing down implicit contracts of advancement and opportunity, not unlike a potentially similar perception among junior officers in the military.

A clear advancement scheme in an organization has important meaning for employees. Such a scheme, either formally or informally discussed with subordinates, illustrates general promotion trends and provides employees a clear indication about paths of advancement to higher levels of authority and responsibility. This serves the employees who are ambitious, as well as the organization which can demand more from its employees in exchange for promotion to opportunities of greater responsibility and perks. Ambitious employees, working within organizations that lack sufficient advancement potential, will likely have neither sufficient intrinsic motivation to be committed to

their job, nor be able to be motivated extrinsically. The impact that the perceived likelihood of advancement has on the psychological commitment of drawdown "survivors" represents the primary focus of this research.

For the army, the drawdown has led to significantly more challenging competition for battalion command positions. In the following chapter evidence will be cited suggesting that performance and retainability are related to commitment.¹⁷ To the extent that commitment is linked to perceived likelihood of commanding a battalion, performance and retainability are expected to be negatively impacted.

The primary question being addressed by this research is whether the commitment of officers, of between five and fifteen years active federal service (captains and majors), is affected by a reduced likelihood of commanding a battalion? There are several components of this primary question. Does a significant relationship exist between command likelihood and commitment? What demographics mediate the relationship? Are there other factors that can be shown to significantly mediate the basic relationship between commitment and command likelihood? My research attempts to answer all these questions.

There is a considerable amount and wide scope of literature that addresses these issues indirectly, both theoretically and empirically. There is no known research, however, that specifically examines the impact of command

likelihood on commitment among army officers. I will, therefore, establish a theoretical and empirical foundation for my hypotheses in Chapter Two, the Literature Review, and then develop a method for testing the hypotheses in Chapter Three.

Endnotes

¹Leonard Wong and R. Bullis, "Downsizing the Army: Two Types of Commitment in the Survivors," Unpublished Paper presented at the Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, October 1993, 3.

²Lee Ewing, "The Shrinking Army: How Small Can It Get," The Army Times, 7 February 1994, 12.

³Address by LTG John Miller to the students of the Command and General Staff Officer Course, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 12 January 1994.

⁴Jay R. Tombaugh and Louis P. White, "Downsizing: An Empirical Assessment of Survivors' Perceptions in a Postlayoff Environment," Organizational Development Journal (Summer 1990): 32.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Harold P. Weinstein and Michael S. Liebman, "Corporate Scale Down, What Comes Next?" HR Magazine (August 1991): 34.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Warren Bronson and Linda Burgess, "Survivors' Syndrome," Across The Board (November 1992): 43.

⁹Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁰Les Aspin, "The Bottom-Up Review," Press conference presented at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 5 October 1993.

¹¹Sean Naylor, "Army Hints at Shape of 10-Division Plan," Army Times, 28 February 1994.

¹²Wong, 15.

¹³The Chain Teaching Program Slides, Update 3, DCSPERS, 30 June 1993.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵BG Frederick Wong, interview by author, Phone conversation, Washington, D.C., 2 February 1994.

¹⁶Jennifer Skopp, "HR Paints a Bleak Portrait of Downsizing Survivors," The Economist (April 1993): 24.

¹⁷John P. Meyer and S. Paunonen and I. Gellatly
and R. Goffin and D. Jackson, "Organizational Commitment and
Job Performance: It's the Nature of the Commitment That
Counts," Journal of Applied Psychology 74 (1989): 152.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The drawdown currently being undertaken by the U.S. military is not without historical precedent as was discussed in the Introduction, Chapter 1. Four other major reductions-in-force have been carried out during this century alone: after WWI, WWII, the Korean War, and Vietnam. In many respects, one might expect that with such extensive experience, the U.S. military should be able to restructure itself with relative ease; the goal being to manage established reductions in personnel and equipment without significantly impacting combat readiness. However, in terms of remaining combat ready the army's record of success appears bleak as evidenced by the post-reduction disasters: at Kasserine Pass during the outset of WWII, the annihilation of Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean Conflict, and the disaster of Operation Desert One after Vietnam.¹ Cause-effect relationships are always difficult to establish. Consequently, while it would be inappropriate to suggest that the drawdowns during the previous post-war periods were entirely responsible for these tragedies, they must certainly have had some adverse

impact on the effectiveness of units and individuals, and perhaps even throughout the military culture, itself.

The focus for this study is on the individuals who will "survive" the personnel reduction initiatives associated with the current drawdown, and remain on active duty. The goal of this research is to better understand some of the factors that mediate "survivor" commitment among officers of between five and fifteen years active commissioned service. Specifically, I am interested in determining the impact that reduced advancement opportunities (defined by a declining likelihood of commanding a battalion) have on these officers.

There is no known research from previous drawdowns in the military that illuminates the attitudes of drawdown "survivors," in spite of the number of extensive reductions that have occurred in the military throughout the past seventy years. How, one wonders, is the commitment of officers affected by fewer command opportunities? This issue is no small matter since commitment has been identified in the senior officer leadership field manual as an essential leader and soldier value of the military profession.² Until recently, little had been discovered about the psychological aspects of commitment. In contrast to the drawdowns of the past, the means are now available to better understand psychological aspects of the drawdown process.

It was not until the late 1970s that a surge of interest emerged in the sociological, psychological, and organizational behavior communities regarding organizational commitment. Initially, the focus of research on commitment related to a theoretical explanation of the construct, and an empirical elaboration of the antecedents and outcomes. Commitment was repeatedly identified as "an important variable in the understanding of the work behaviors of employees in organizations."³ As such, its predominate application in research has been as an independent variable. Identifying the behavioral component of commitment has occurred with relative recency in contrast to the attitudinal component which had been accepted previously.⁴ As recently as 1993, commitment has been recognized as a multifaceted construct, measurable with reliable and valid survey instruments.⁵ Little is directly inferable, however, about the role that career advancement opportunities play in mediating commitment among salaried professionals.

Broad Conceptualizations of Commitment

"Commitment" is a term and concept common to everyday discourse but one not completely understood by psychologists. Certainly, the term has meaning for us in reference to an obligation owed. However, the concept relates more richly to loyalty: consistency in dealing with others, ideas

and values, and perceived obligations. While there is no refined theory that accounts for organizational commitment, there are two broad conceptualizations: a sociological and a psychological perspective.⁶ A brief accounting of each has utility in the development of variables relevant to this study.

Sociologically, the commitment process is accounted for theoretically as a consequence of social control and social sanction; norms about what is perceived to be acceptable. Consistency of behavior results from doing what is right and acceptable within a social group because deviating from it would cause punishment, or ostracism. According to this conceptualization, people act consistently because "it is morally wrong, practically inexpedient, or both, to do otherwise."⁷ An example of this might be a person's commitment to an occupation. Few individuals in our society would view a worker's bouncing from one job to another as acceptable. Certainly there is nothing explicit that disallows the practice, but the norm is nonetheless clear that workers should remain relatively stable in their jobs. It seems clear that this social pressure is one of the things that compels consistency, and consequently commitment.

Psychologically, the theoretical accounting for the commitment process as an attitude is no less compelling. In this case, commitment is understood as a function of

fulfilling stable needs. "People have stable needs and consistently act so as to maximize the possibility of satisfying them."⁸ To apply the previous example, a worker remains in a single occupation because she values the benefits and stands to lose more than she would gain by changing jobs. While the notion of "stable traits," so central to this perspective, seems at the surface less certain than the sociological approach, a deeper examination of other behavioral science theories reveals a full accounting of when choices are made by people, and why. These theories explore how people weigh costs and rewards, the role of investments that compel people to remain committed in spite of considerable costs, and the comparison level that is considered before adopting an alternative. These concepts are central to the hypotheses put forth in this research and will be developed in more detail later in this chapter. Definitionally, commitment may be understood as "the tendency, based on cognitive, affective, and normative forces on the individual...to place primacy on organizational rather than personal interests."⁹

Whether explained sociologically or psychologically, the processes that underlie these "consistent lines of activity" are necessarily motivational; otherwise, consistency would certainly dissipate. More specifically, commitment may be understood as a consequence of motivational forces, cognitions, satisfaction and investments. In

terms of the study of commitment among junior army officers in the grades of captain and major and its potential relationship to command likelihood, it is essential that relevant motivational and cognitive factors be examined.

A review of the literature, however, reveals no expansive theory of commitment. The construct is widely used, especially empirically, and components of it are theorized and empirically supported. While there are many theories that contribute to our better understanding of organizational commitment, to date there is no theory that outlines "why commitment," or "how commitment?" Nor is it the goal of this study to ferret out such a theory.

An examination of the relevant inferences associated with other theories appears prudent in the absence of being able to apply a fully developed theory of commitment. Such an approach is perhaps less parsimonious than applying a developed theory, but nonetheless sufficiently insightful to provide the basis for developing hypotheses. Relevant motivational theories that relate to commitment include Expectancy Theory (Mitchell, 1974), the Theory of Job Design (Hackman and Lawler, 1972), and concepts about adult development (Levinson, 1980). Aspects of this study also relate to cognitive issues, and so theoretical foundations for the proposed research must necessarily include a brief discussion of Balance Theory (Heider, 1950), Dissonance

Theory (Festinger, 1956), Self-Perception Theory (Bem, 1972), and Interdependence Theory (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959).

Following a discussion of the motivational and cognitive inferences gained from behavioral science theories, a direct examination of the empirical insights about commitment will be made. Additionally, directly relevant insights derived from army officer samples as well as corporate manager samples will be explored and assimilated prior to developing the hypotheses and necessary assumptions for the study.

Commitment as a Motivational Construct

To establish, theoretically, how a junior army officer's commitment may be affected by a reduced likelihood of commanding a battalion one must consider an individual's motivational needs and predispositions toward his or her career. With this focus, three prominent motivational theories appear especially relevant: (1) The Expectancy Theory (Mitchell, 1974) and the role of "instrumentality" in accounting for individual motivation, (2) The Theory of Job Design (Hackman, 1975) and the impact of autonomy and task significance on motivation related to one's job, and (3) The Theory of Adult Development which addresses the psychological needs common to officers as a function of their stage of development. These theories address and integrate both of the broader sociological and psychological perspectives relating to commitment.

Expectancy Theory posits three principal components in a multiplicative relationship to define motivation: expectancy, instrumentality, and valence.¹⁰ The Expectancy Theory of Motivation is well established and experimental findings boasting its validity are numerous. In defining the variables, "expectancy" relates to one's belief that he can do (an individual behavior) a given task to a given standard (the performance outcome). "Instrumentality" addresses the likelihood of receiving something (a reward outcome) contingent upon accomplishing the performance outcome. "Valence" is the perceived value of the reward outcome. A cup of coffee, for instance, would have great valence for a bum, but little valence for most people who have coffee often. High motivation is defined only by the combination of high expectancy, high instrumentality and high valence.

Put in the context of the research being undertaken, a junior officer has high motivation to serve on active military duty to the extent that she has high expectancy, high instrumentality, and high valence. Given the army's significant drawdown in force structure, the reduced likelihood (or the perception of a lesser chance) of being selected to command a battalion is certain. For the individual officer, the perception of a lessened opportunity to command translates to having reduced instrumentality,

and consequently may be expected to cause a drop in motivation for military duty, and commitment to it.

The nature of the job, itself, can also be expected to play a role in individual commitment. Hackman and Lawler have proposed a Theory of Job Design that identifies five core job dimensions deemed essential for a defining a satisfying job: skill variety, task identity, task significance, autonomy, and feedback.¹¹ According to the theory, all core job dimensions are required to provide satisfaction. Absent any one of the variables, and the job will lead to dissatisfaction, turnover, and absenteeism. The U.S. automotive industry's long standing assembly line approach to production was efficient, but led to serious motivational problems for many of the employees. In the short-term, more cars were produced; in the long-term, the quality of those cars was negatively affected. The motivational problems associated with assembly line jobs can be understood in terms of the absence of all of the core job dimensions. Relative to problems associated with jobs in the automotive industry, the military seems to have had few problems. Military assignments, especially for commissioned officers, typically have substantial responsibility and variety, and provide satisfaction according to this theory. But officers seem to typically "tolerate" the demands and less glamour of being a staff officer in anticipation of the ultimate payoff: being selected to command a battalion. The

desire to eventually attain the goal of becoming a battalion commander is commonly expressed by commissioned army officers. Herein may lay the problem in terms of the army's drawdown. With the potential of so many fewer battalions available to command, or at least the perception of competition being so great as making it so, inevitably fewer officers will be able to be battalion commanders. The only career alternative will be to accept other staff assignments which generally may be perceived to lack adequate autonomy and task significance. As a consequence, especially as junior officers pessimistically weigh their probabilities of commanding, job dissatisfaction and a drop in motivation are likely. Job commitment may also be expected to decline.

The final theoretical element regarding motivation that relates commitment to the army's drawdown of the force does not regard motivation theory at all, at least not directly. Rather, it relates to the predictable stages of psychological development that adults pass through as junior officers and the impact that the developmental stages have on shaping their needs and commitment. In the theory of adult development, Levinson proposes that adults pass through stages of development throughout their entire adult lives in much the same manner that children have been shown to do throughout childhood. Central to Levinson's theory is the concept of a life structure; the individual manner in which we establish and alter our personal priorities for

life.¹² A life structure typically includes an established priority to one's spouse, children, and hobbies. It may also include a role for career, religion and close friends. Levinson's research, and robust empirical evidence supporting it demonstrate that adults alternate between periods of stability when they are building and fortifying their life structure, and periods of turbulence when they are evaluating and changing their life structure. The "mid-life" crisis is a well-known structure-changing stage of adult development, but in fact, there are six other stages as well. Typically, adults pass through these alternating stages of development every five to seven years beginning with the ascension into the adult world as maturing adolescents.¹³ Career military officers have been shown to make similar transitions through adulthood.¹⁴

The theory of adult development has important implications for the hypotheses about commitment being developed. One notes a conspicuous effort throughout the thesis to isolate "junior" officers from the larger population of army officers. This is due, in part, to the different psychological state that 25-29 (Captains) and 33-38 year old (Majors) officers are likely to be in as opposed to more senior field-grade officers between the ages of 39-44 years (Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels). Captains, between the ages of 25-29 years, with about five to eight years of active commissioned service, are

predominately in a relatively stable stage of adult development known as the "Entry Life Structure for Early Adulthood." In this stage a "young man works to expand his horizons and generate alternative options for adult living. He seeks to delay making strong commitments until all his options are explored and seem more clear to him."¹⁵ In contrast, Majors, as relatively junior field-grade officers between the ages of 33-38 years, are in the stage of adult development known as the "Culminating Life Structure for Early Adulthood." In this stage of development a "young man seeks to anchor his life more securely and make more permanent investments in those components of his life that have emerged as central in his own life structure."¹⁶ Considering this theoretical perspective alone, one would expect to find a somewhat lower commitment among captains than majors. Once an officer, as a major, establishes a plan to make a career in the military and completes more than half of the retirement requirement, he looks carefully toward anchoring his life more securely. Career, especially the desire for most military officers at this stage of development to command a battalion, is a central component of the life structure. To the extent that one's career goal cannot be attained is certain to upset established priorities in the life structure. For more senior field-grade officers, however, this is not expected to be the case. By that point in their lives, at about 39 years old, senior

officers are likely to be in the next stage of adult development known as the "Mid-life Transition," a particularly turbulent period when a whole host of different, non-occupationally related issues are being considered and weighed.

Taken together, the theoretical evidence suggested by expectancy theory, the theory of job design, and the theory of adult development combine to suggest that motivation among junior field-grade officers will be adversely impacted by the drawdown in the army's force structure. As a consequence of considering these factors in conjunction with one another, it appears likely that commitment, a behavioral and psychological antecedent of motivation, will be similarly affected.

Commitment as a Cognitive Construct

In addition to the motivational theories informing commitment as a psychological construct, there are distinctive cognitive insights as well. Commitment is a cognitive construct to the extent that it influences and is influenced by attitudes. The Theory of Self Perception (Bem, 1972) regards the shaping of attitudes via observing one's own behaviors. Balance Theory (Heider, 1950), a cognitive consistency theory, informs the principle research question by relating a junior officer's commitment to his attitudes about being a battalion commander. Interdependence

Theory (Thibaut and Kelly, 1959) is a prominent "needs-based" theory that describes the role of psychological investment and accounts for one's satisfaction, commitment and choosing between alternatives. This cognitive theory is central to the notion that commitment will be mediated by the number of alternatives one has for defining success in a drawdown situation where battalion commands are less likely.

According to Bem in his Theory of Self Perception, people ascertain their attitudes from observing their own behaviors. To the extent that commitment is a type of an attitude, it is plausible that a junior officer infers her commitment from observing her own behavior while on duty. In the context of this research, a drastic decline in satisfaction resulting from a poor probability of being selected to command may result in various dysfunctional behaviors that imply, for her, an absence of commitment. Conversely, merely staying on active duty as opposed to taking the VSI/SSB (a drawdown financial incentive), for instance, would likely be inferred by the officer as representing a "committed" attitude.

Cognitive consistency theories establish that people develop and maintain only beliefs that are internally consistent. Inconsistent cognitions create a drive state leading to the shifting in evaluations of one or more of the attitudes. Balance Theory provides insights about beliefs that exist in a cognitive triad. In the context of the

research question, consider the following three cognitions that a junior officer may likely have: (1) I want to succeed, (2) Success is being a battalion commander, and (3) There is little chance that I will be a battalion commander. These three cognitions are not in balance and are therefore inconsistent. According to the Balance Theory, a psychological drive state will bring about change in one or more of the cognitions until the triad becomes balanced. Considering the present situation, it is unlikely that the first cognition will undergo any shift since it is firmly grounded in the officer's self esteem. Likewise, it is unlikely that the final cognition will change because the physical reality is relatively absolute. Only the second cognition is susceptible to change in order to bring about cognitive consistency, but to do so evokes considerable psychological strain. This is a belief that is likely to have the deepest of roots, both psychologically and sociologically. Strong norms defining success as being selected to battalion command exert strong social pressure. Long held beliefs and goals, without a clear set of alternatives, create considerable psychological pressure. The outcome in reconciling the cognitions is that success is "not necessarily command." The impact that this realization is expected to have on an individual's commitment contributes to the effects hypothesized.

While it is expected that the drive state caused by these inconsistent cognitions will activate a reconciling of cognitions among junior officers for the reasons stated above, the cognitions related to commanding would not be expected to be salient for more senior field-grade officers, even relatively senior Majors beyond the seventeenth year of commissioned service. For these more senior officers, any inconsistent cognitions about career success in the military and the likelihood of command are most likely secondary to the more salient concerns related to readying oneself for retirement, or getting started in a second career. Commitment is expected in all these populations, it is a core value in the military profession, but for a host of different reasons relative to many diverse life priorities. Commitment among senior field-grade officers motivated to stay until retirement (most of whom are beyond the point of being eligible for command) would be different from the commitment among more junior officers motivated by career interests and priorities. Hence, in addition to the theory of adult development, there is a cognitive basis for isolating junior officers in this research.

There is, however, a theoretical suggestion about what may mediate the loss of commitment resulting from the forced alignment of cognitions: Interdependence Theory by Thibaut and Kelly, 1959, and augmenting that, Investment Theory by Rusbult in 1980. These theories are the only

psychological theories that address the mechanisms of commitment directly, and they do so by combining satisfaction, investment, and the availability of feasible alternatives. Consistent with the needs-based psychological notion of commitment, interdependence theory suggests that people weigh the potential or realized rewards and costs of every social (or in some cases, non-social) interaction. There are rewards and costs associated with virtually every relationship and the sum of the two represents what is called a comparison level (CL). To the extent that the CL is greater than one's average or expected outcomes she'll be satisfied. When the CL falls below the average outcome dissatisfaction results. If a better alternative is available it will be adopted instead. Empirical evidence and everyday experience, however, demonstrate that people do not always remove themselves from dissatisfactory relationships, be they social or non-social. For examples, one need only look as far as abusive relationships, or horrific jobs in which people remain. The answer for why people remain in these less than acceptable situations relates to the investments that they have made. According to Investment Theory, and there is robust evidence to support it by Rusbult and Farrell in 1983, in spite of a more attractive alternative(s), less attractive choices are often made as a consequence of the high investments made to the relationship. Combining these concepts, commitment (COM) according

to Rusbult is calculable by the following formula:¹⁷

$$\text{COM} = (\text{REWARD} - \text{COST}) + \text{INVESTMENT} - \text{ALTERNATIVE}$$

Job commitment, in our case, is directly proportional to job turnover.¹⁸ In the context of the present research, the formula suggests that as the army drawdown of the active force reduces battalion command opportunities, the single most important goal for most junior officers, "costs" will escalate resulting in low satisfaction. "Investment" for these officers is expected to be considerable. Well beyond ten to twelve years of merely being in a job, the military profession has provided them a way of life; one that will be difficult to walk away from. "Alternative" is the last component of the formula, and in fact, the pivotal piece in understanding commitment psychologically. To the extent that a junior field-grade officer has no alternatives to commanding a battalion for defining success, or better alternatives outside the active duty military, his commitment will decline markedly. In this instance, only the perceived quality (costs and rewards) of the alternative in contrast to current investments and costs associated with non-command opportunities will determine whether the officer will exit the active duty military.

Potentially more interesting, and a component to the primary research question, is the nature of commitment among junior officers who do possess multiple alternatives for defining success within the active military, i.e., if not a

battalion commander, maybe a district engineer, or a recruiting region manager, or a project manager for new equipment being brought on line. According to the formula introduced earlier, it is likely that a junior officer who has multiple alternatives for defining success will psychologically adopt another desirable alternative(s) within the military profession when faced with the inevitability of not being able to command. In such an instance, one would expect only slight impact upon commitment to active military service.

Both theoretical and empirical evidence have been established providing motivational and cognitive insights related to the commitment construct. It is now possible to develop a number of hypotheses regarding commitment among junior officers and the role that may be played by the declining likelihood of commanding a battalion. Before discussing these hypotheses, however, a discussion of what is specifically known about commitment is of benefit. In spite of a lack of common theoretical foundation, the empirical findings associated with the commitment construct, as both an independent and dependant variable, are insightful.

Commitment As A Construct Unto Itself

As has already been described in some detail, the understanding of commitment as a construct unto itself has

only recently come into being. As recently as 1985, understanding of the commitment construct was essentially limited to establishing the major forms of work commitment,¹⁹ development and validation of an organizational commitment questionnaire,²⁰ and establishment of research evidence that links commitment to job satisfaction (correlation=.40) and performance (correlation=.31).²¹

Since the mid-1980s, research interest in organizational commitment has blossomed. Much of this research has been enabled by more sophisticated statistical analyses, and inspired as a means for getting more out of the work force. A research problem is that there is ambiguity in the conceptualization and measurement of organizational and professional commitment. "Organizational commitment has been conceptualized either as attitudinal alignment with the organization, or as investments in the organization."²² The interest in organizational commitment developed from the notion that "committed employees would differ from uncommitted employees in systematic ways in terms of attitudes, performance, satisfaction and withdrawal behaviors."²³ Commitment, in this sense, has a broader meaning than leaving or staying in the organization.

Professional commitment entails more global implications than organizational commitment. Professional commitment is not by definition concerned with the differences between occupations. Instead, the focus of professional

commitment is on "individual identification and alignment of goals with a profession or occupation and how this commitment affects organizationally relevant behaviors."²⁴ As noted by one researcher as recently as 1991, "There is continued disagreement over the conceptualization and measurement of the commitments [organizational and professional]. Few studies have taken a systematic or comprehensive approach to the topic."²⁵

Mowday, Porter, and Steers recently provided an extensive review of the theoretical and empirical work completed on the concept of commitment. Commitment has consistently been shown to be related to: (1) employee behaviors such as job search activities, turnover, absenteeism, and performance, (2) attitudinal, affective and cognitive constructs such as job satisfaction, job involvement and job tension, (3) characteristics of the employee's job such as autonomy, responsibility, role conflict, and ambiguity, and (4) personal characteristics such as age, need for achievement and job tenure.²⁶

While the empirical research findings have yet to be integrated into an expansive model of commitment, many of the findings themselves are interesting and encouraging. A robust finding using meta-analysis demonstrated that commitment causes job satisfaction, not vice-versa as has been otherwise generally accepted.²⁷ Commitment has been found to have multiple foci as illustrated by both one's

attachment to individuals/groups and one's underlying motives of job commitment.²⁸ Research findings also demonstrate that commitment serves as an effective buffer to stress associated with organizational turmoil by providing increased job meaning and purpose.²⁹

In support of the previous discussion of the role of adult development in shaping commitment, recent research evidence suggests that age is a more important determinant of organizational commitment than previously believed. Up to the age of 30 years old, the contradictory task of making commitments and keeping options open was recognized as a significant correlate of commitment (correlation = .24). Tenure later in the career raises investments, reduces options and was most highly correlated with organizational commitment between the ages of 31 and 35 (correlation = .14).³⁰

In addition to age, Mathieu and Zajac in 1990 conducted a meta-analysis of all the relevant literature and provide a summary of other antecedents that have been reaffirmed or discarded. Gender illustrates no consistent relationship in spite of a 1970 expectation that women would be more committed to jobs in order to overcome barriers. Education illustrates a generally small, but negative correlation with commitment, presumably because of available alternatives. Marital status demonstrates no correlation. Tenure, or what is referred to as "time in service" in

military terms, demonstrates a moderately positive correlation of .17 presumably because of investments. Job satisfaction is highly correlated ($r=.688$), though its status as an antecedent has been recanted, making it instead a consequence of organizational commitment. Stress is negatively correlated ($r=-.33$). Organizational commitment is correlated with occupational commitment ($r=.451$). Intent to look for another job/leave was negatively correlated ($r=-.599$).³¹

The least encouraging finding in the literature regards the commitment-performance correlation which in one case was only $r=.135$, and has never been stronger than $r=.31$.³² The research on the relationship between performance and commitment has received limited attention. This may in part be due to the difficulty in identifying and measuring performance. Zahra used both self-report and supervisory ratings of performance and found that both were positively correlated with commitment. Other results using either a self-report or supervisory rating indicate a modest positive relationship between commitment and performance.³³

Perhaps the most comprehensive measure and conceptualization of organizational commitment is offered by Meyer, Allen and Smith in mid-1993.³⁴ According to the authors, they were motivated to develop their scales because of the confusion surrounding the conceptual and measurement

properties of commitment. Their approach was to make a distinction between different components of commitment, develop measures of each, and demonstrate how these measures were different and linked to organizational and professional commitment. Building on previous research evidence suggesting that career commitment can be reliably measured, distinct from job involvement and organizational commitment, Meyer et al., proposed a multifaceted career commitment construct.

Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) conceptualized and developed scales for what they termed "affective, continuance, and normative commitment." Blau and others urged such a model.³⁵ Discriminate validity supports the notion of distinction by such factors differentially accounting for 58.8%, 25.8%, and 15.4% of the variance.³⁶

Meyer et al., propose that not all commitment is alike. They suggest that occupational commitment, career commitment, is composed of three distinct components: affective commitment, continuance commitment, and normative commitment. Affective commitment is value laden; the extent to which one is committed to a profession or career as a function of sharing organizational values, beliefs, and goals. Affective commitment has been shown to be positively correlated with desirable work behaviors and intentions. Continuance commitment is behaviorally-based; the extent to which one is committed as a consequence of viable

alternatives available. Continuance commitment was found to be highly correlated with dysfunctional work behaviors, and negatively correlated with both affective and normative commitment. Lastly, normative commitment is that commitment which is rooted in a feeling of obligation, a repayment of something owed. Affective commitment and normative commitment have been shown to be correlated with positive performance; unlike continuance commitment which has been shown to be negatively correlated.

Measuring Commitment

Beyond the conceptualizations of commitment that Meyer et al., (1993) proposes, is an inventory with demonstrated reliability. According to the inventory's authors, the average alpha coefficient of affective commitment scales was .71; others have reported their findings of .7.³⁷ According to Meyer et al., the average alpha coefficient for continuance and normative commitment were .71 and .79, respectively; others have reported an alpha coefficient of .68 for continuance commitment but no other test of normative commitment has been reported.³⁸

The validity of the instrument also appears robust. In a factor analysis conducted by McGee and Ford in 1987, a significant three-factor solution was confirmed as Meyer, Allen and Smith propose, with a caveat that continuance commitment, itself, may actually be represented by two

components: one associated with alternatives, and the other with personal sacrifice.³⁹ Based on these data, I will use the Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) instrument to test my hypotheses.

Army officers have been surveyed, and their affective and continuance commitment measured. Findings revealed a significant drop in affective and continuance commitment as a consequence of the army drawdown.⁴⁰ How this may relate to a more specific link to reduced advancement opportunities is the focus of my hypotheses.

Conscious now of the many psychological and sociological factors involved, and the empirical evidence that is available, it is my hypothesis that there is a significant correlation between commitment, as a motivational construct, and the perceptions held by junior field-grade and senior company-grade officers about their likelihood of commanding a battalion. Beyond the psychological factors, I believe that this relationship is largely shaped by sociological norms. Further, I believe an important aspect of the relationship between commitment and perceived likelihood of command emerges from a prevailing norm. This norm defines success as being selected to "command," especially at the battalion-level, and exists especially among army officers assigned to combat branches. It is also hypothesized that in spite of the drawdown, commitment will be less adversely impacted among officers who have established more

alternatives for defining success in their military careers. Beyond this, I hypothesize that time in service will interact with branch and likelihood of command in shaping occupational commitment.

If the results of this research match the hypotheses, the dysfunctional relationship between commitment and perceived command opportunity has significant ramifications for our army. In many respects, commitment among junior officers is more important today and in the near future than perhaps any other time in our Army's recent history. Real solutions, however, may be found in better understanding the psychological role of success alternatives. As our army continues to downsize and opportunities to command decline, the senior army leadership may be well advised to inspire a shift in the manner that "success" is defined. If the hypotheses are correct, the results of this research will provide the evidence for, and solutions to the inevitable decline in junior officer commitment and performance.

In order to carry out this research, I have identified several necessary assumptions. They are that: (1) The 1993-1994 Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) population is representative, in all respects, of a larger army population of junior field-grade officers who remain competitive for battalion command selection; (2) The Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS³) population

is representative, in all respects, of a larger army population of typical company-level officers; (3) Branch representatives (Infantry, Armor, Military Police, Service Corps, etc.) in the 1993-1994 CGSC and CAS³ populations are representative, in all respects, of larger branch populations of junior officers between five and fifteen years of commissioned service who remain competitive for battalion command selection; (4) The instrument published by Meyer et al., (1993) is a valid and reliable survey instrument; (5) Survey respondents are able to articulate alternatives other than command that constitute success in their minds; and (6) Survey respondents can be enticed to temporarily accept and personally consider the implications of less than desirable command opportunities.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

General

The hypotheses were tested in a 3 X 4 X 2 factorial design. The effect of manipulating the "likelihood of commanding" (3 levels), was analyzed according to "branch type" (4 levels) and "sample" (2 levels). The instrument used to test the hypotheses was a six-page survey. The survey measured subject commitment before and after the manipulation of the "likelihood of commanding a battalion."

One of the independent variables was manipulated; two were categorical. "Likelihood of Battalion Command," the manipulated variable, was imbedded within the survey instrument. The three levels ("Highly Unlikely," "A Toss-up/50%-50% Chance," and "Highly Likely") were established based on a reasonable degree of discernability in meaning, and consistency with the general approach taken in professional counseling by army career managers. Each survey issued contained one of the three levels of the experimental manipulation.

Two of the independent variables, "Sample" and "Branch," were categorical. The two levels of "Sample"

applied to the analysis identified officers according to their current assignment in the army's Command And Staff Service School (CAS³) and the Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC). This distinction represents a significant difference in the overall population of army officers. CAS³ officers represent a population of army officers with approximately five to eight years of service, all of whom are in the grade of Captain. It is perhaps the single most convenient source for sampling this subset of the officer population because all army captains are required to attend it in residence at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. This sample of captains is random, and an entirely representative distribution of captains in the army. Resident CGSOC attendees, in contrast, are army officers with approximately eight to fifteen years of service, all of whom are majors, or captains already selected to be majors. This sample of officers is admittedly not representative of all majors in the army. Each CGSOC class represents a larger population of emerging majors in the upper half of all majors in the army. It is from within this population that future battalion, brigade and higher-level commanders will be selected. Fully aware of the eligibility for competitive selection to CGSOC, it is appropriate to consider the CGSOC sample as representative of other majors in the top half of the army.

The final independent variable used in the analysis was "branch." The four levels of "Branch" distinguished between officers' primary career specialities. In accordance with the current U.S. Army Officer's Guide, "Combat" branches include officers assigned to the infantry, armor, field artillery, special forces, aviation, engineer, and air defense artillery branches.¹ However, for the purposes of the analysis, "Traditional Combat" branches were analyzed separately from the remainder of the "Combat" branches. "Traditional Combat" branches were identified as only infantry, armor, field artillery, and special forces (IN, AR, FA, and SF). For analysis purposes, "Other Combat" branches included aviation, engineer, and air defense artillery only (AV, EN, AD). The distinction, although somewhat artificial, takes into account several possible differences: the manner in which the wider scope of "combat" officers are conditioned as military professionals, the general combat supporting role that these branches actually perform, and the additional specialty skills engineers and aviators, for instance, are believed to possess. "Combat Support" branches included officers assigned to the military police, military intelligence, ordnance, signal, and chemical branches (MP, MI, OD, SC, CM). "Combat Service Support" branches include officers assigned in the adjutant general's corps, quartermaster, transportation corps, finance, and medical service corps (AG, QM, TC, FI, MS).

These four branch classifications conform with the general description and missions assigned to them.²

For analysis purposes, other possible demographic relationships were examined. These typical demographic variables included gender (male\female), race (Caucasian, black, Hispanic, Asian, other), education (bachelor's degree, master's degree, PhD), time in grade (in months), time in service (in years), promotion status (below/above the zone promotion to Major), and family data associated with having dependents, or not.

Commitment, as the overall dependant variable of interest, was measured in terms of its components (Affective, Continuance, and Normative Commitment) using the instrument designed by Meyer and Allen (1993). Recalling from the Literature Review in Chapter 2, affective commitment relates to the extent an individual shares the organizational beliefs. Continuance commitment pertains to the individual's perceptions about suitable career alternatives. Normative commitment regards one's sense of obligation to the organization. The survey used in the experiment contained a pre-manipulation measurement of these three dependant variables as well as a post-manipulation measurement. The post-manipulation measurement of commitment provided the basis for testing the hypotheses. The primary reason for including a pre-test measurement of commitment relates to the difficulties involved with

effectively provoking respondents to project their attitudes. The manipulation hinged on the subjects' ability to project themselves into a psychological mind-set consistent with the randomly assigned "likelihood of command" manipulation (Unlikely to Command, A Toss-Up/50-50% Chance to Command, or Likely to Command). In the event that subjects might be unable to accurately project themselves into a given condition, or if in doing so too little variability resulted after the manipulation, a pre-test/post-test difference score attributable to the manipulation could be calculated and tested in terms of the null hypotheses.

Subjects

The subjects in this experiment were 211 male and 22 female army officers (Captains) enrolled in the Combined Arms Staff and Service School (CAS³), Class #94-2, and 188 male and 17 female army officers (Majors, or Captains in a promotable status) in the Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC), Class #1-250-C2 (1994). Participants were required to be United States active duty army officers, in basic branches other than Judge Advocate General, Chaplain, and Acquisition Corps. Officers in these three branches were excluded from the study since they possess no chance in those branches of being selected as a battalion commander. Anonymity was assured. Participation was voluntary and solicited by randomly selecting 7 of

20 CGSOC sections (approximately 35 eligible officers each) and 24 of forty-seven CAS³ sections (approximately 10 eligible officers each). The randomization process will be described in more detail in the procedure section. No non-treatment control group was utilized in the between-group design since a pre-manipulation measure of commitment was already obtained from each subject.

Instrument

The basis for the instrument used in the experiment was designed and published by Meyer and Allen (1993). Only slight modifications in the wording of the statements was needed to adapt it to the military population being surveyed. Meyer and Allen developed a series of six statements for each of the three principle components of commitment. The response to each statement in the Meyer and Allen survey was measured using a seven-point Likert-type scale which asked subjects to indicate the extent of their agreement. In the survey designed for this experiment, a pre-manipulation measurement of the three types of commitment was obtained by asking respondents to respond to three of the six statements in each category. All responses were formatted as in the Meyer and Allen survey, using a seven-point Likert-type scale with "1" being "Strongly Disagree," and "7" being "Strongly Agree." The three pre-manipulation statements relating to affective commitment

were: (1) "I am proud to be in the military profession."; "I dislike being an army officer." and (2) "As of now, I really want to make the military a career." The three pre-manipulation statements relating to continuance commitment were: (1) "Too much of my life would be disrupted if I were to change my profession now." and (2) "Changing professions now would be difficult for me to do." and (3) "One reason I'm staying in the military right now is that the poor economy throughout the nation offers me few other good options." The three pre-manipulation statements relating to normative commitment were: (1) "I feel a responsibility to the military profession to continue it." and (2) "Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave the military now." and (3) "I expect that I'll remain in the military because that is what I feel I ought to do."

Demographic information was obtained following the pre-manipulation measurement of commitment. Categorical information included gender, primary military specialty (branch), civilian education level, race, rank, time in grade at the current rank, years of active commissioned service, extent of branch qualification, and whether the subject had dependents. The survey also asked what "single goal" would define a successful army career, and "what other goals will represent successes of about the same value."

The post-manipulation measurement of commitment followed the manipulation of the independent variable, "likelihood of battalion command." This manipulation occurred deep within the survey (on page 4 of the 6 page survey); everything else on the three versions of the survey were identical.

Following a manipulation check of the "likelihood of battalion command" manipulation to assess the degree a subject had understood the instructions, all eighteen of the statements developed by Meyer and Allen (1993) were offered to measure commitment. It was expected that if the manipulation were sufficiently internalized, a respondent's commitment could be measured in that projected state as it had in the present state during the pre-manipulation measurement. In addition to repeating the statements used to measure the three types of commitment in the pre-manipulation portion of the survey, three additional questions for each commitment type were asked. For affective commitment the following three statements were included: (1) "I would be enthusiastic about being an army officer." and (2) "Being an army officer would be important to my self-image." and (3) "I would regret having entered the military profession." For continuance commitment the following three statements were included: (1) "Changing professions now would require considerable personal sacrifice." and (2) "I have put too much into the military

profession to consider changing now." and (3) "Too much of my life would be disrupted if I were to change my profession." For normative commitment the following three statements were added: (1) "I believe people who have been trained in a profession have a responsibility to stay in that profession for a reasonable period of time." and (2) "I would remain in the military because of a sense of loyalty to it." and (3) "I would feel guilty if I left the military." As in the case of the pre-manipulation measures, all responses were formatted in a 7-point Likert-type scale with "1" being "Strongly Disagree" and "7" being "Strong Agree."

A final question in the survey assessed the degree a subject believed he was able to accurately project himself into the manipulated condition. The response to the question was measured according to a 7-point Likert-type scale in which "1" was "Not at all accurately" and "7" was "Very accurately." See Appendix B to view the survey.

Procedure

Following the development of the survey, a pilot test of the instrument was conducted. The instrument was tested using a student sample of convenience which included thirty-two CGSOC and ten CAS³ students. The purpose of the pilot was to ensure the effectiveness of the "likelihood of battalion command" manipulation and the overall clarity of the instrument.

Results of the pilot test revealed a number of significant findings consistent with the hypotheses; however, only 71.4% of the respondents accurately acknowledged the manipulation. No other aspect of the instrument required modification.

To strengthen the effectiveness of the manipulation, a number of modifications were made. The manipulation with the cautionary note, "***FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE SURVEY**", was encased graphically in a 3-dimensional rectangle, and underlined. Additionally, the manipulation check was modified to include, "To check your understanding of the instructions," prior to asking respondents to indicate which condition they had been given. Each survey was prepared containing one of the three levels of the "likelihood of battalion command" manipulation. All other aspects of the three versions were identical with the exception of branch qualification data being solicited, which was modified appropriate to the CAS³ or CGSOC population being sampled.

Random assignment of surveys was done at the section level. In both CAS³ and CGSOC, officers are distributed equally according to their basic military specialty (branch), but are otherwise randomly assigned. As a consequence of the stratified random assignment process, staff sections represent a sufficiently random sample of the officers assigned to the courses. One hundred percent of the eligible officers in each selected section were

surveyed. Based upon the desire to have more than sixteen subjects in each of the twenty-four experimental cells, about 240 surveys were prepared for each of the CAS³ and CGSOC sub-samples. This allowed for sufficiency as long as a minimum of 80% of the completed surveys were returned. The pilot testing revealed an approximate number of ten CAS³ and thirty-five CGSOC eligible officers in each section. This became the basis for survey distribution requirements.

Only the two sections used in the pilot testing were eliminated from consideration in the random assignment process. Using a random table of numbers published in a current statistical manual, seven CGSOC and twenty-four CAS³ sections were randomly identified to participate in the study.³ The allocation of surveys, each one containing one of the three experimental conditions, were equally counterbalanced for every section. Subjects then randomly received one of the three experimental conditions.

Section survey packets were distributed to section points of contact who distributed, collected, and returned survey responses. Each survey included a general description of the purpose of the survey, assured subjects anonymity, and offered a summary of the results if so desired.

Limitations

There are two limitations of this study: the usefulness that projected commitment-related attitudes have in predicting commitment-related behaviors, and the generalizability of findings to officers outside the five to fifteen year window of active commissioned service. Obviously, the former issue is more fundamental to the study's usefulness than the latter one.

The reliability of projected attitudes regarding commitment and the attitude-behavior link related to them remains an empirical question. Attitude measurements have not always been found to be consistent with behavioral intentions.⁴ In this study, commitment is being measured as an attitude; after the manipulation, as a projected attitude in a hypothetical situation. As was demonstrated in Chapter II, the Literature Review, there is ample evidence about behavioral consequences of low commitment: poor performance, high turnover, and among others, low satisfaction. No empirical evidence has been presented that demonstrates behavioral consequences of commitment as a projected attitudinal state, or even the reliability of commitment measures that are projected. The debate about the attitude-behavior link represents a huge body of social psychological literature and entire careers have been dedicated to its study (i.e., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975).⁵ Suffice it to say that correlations between attitudes and

corresponding behaviors are best when the measured attitudes and behaviors correspond in their levels of generality, the behaviors are reasoned as opposed to being without thought, and little time elapses between the measurement of the attitude and the corresponding behavior.⁶ The reasonably consistent level of generality between behavioral intentions and measured attitudes associated with commitment has been established by numerous empirical studies cited in the Literature Review. Additionally, turnover and absenteeism as behavioral manifestations of low commitment are reasoned, not without thought.

The time that elapses between attitude measurement and behavioral consequence, however, degrade the correlation of the attitude-behavior link. It is perhaps in this regard that the results of this study may, in the long-term, be inconclusive. The following series of questions illustrate this point. How accurately and reliably do people project commitment as an attitude when faced with a hypothetical situation? How reliably does that attitude correspond to behavioral intentions? How time sensitive, or perishable are the correlations that do exist? In part, these questions will be mitigated by a host of other factors that may also be involved, some of which this study will investigate. Nonetheless, these questions represent limitations to this study; ones that require additional

empirical testing before the full impact of any conclusions from this study can be considered.

The samples randomly selected from CAS³ and CGSOC are sufficiently representative of captains and like-majors in the active duty army. Consequently, the results of this study are generalizable to those populations. The results do not, however, necessarily generalize to other officer populations in the active duty army, nor even to officers of the same grades in different branches of the service. Officers with less than five years, and those with more than fifteen years may be expected to have considerably different values in terms of their commitment to an army career. In some respects, very junior officers might be expected to be especially committed as a consequence of enthusiasm related to beginning a new career. Equally possible, however, junior officers may be less committed as a consequence of being less invested, less indoctrinated, and less technically competent. Officers having beyond fifteen years of commissioned service may be expected to be motivated by diverse interests which may, or may not be career-related: higher level commands, promotions, or retirement, second career, financing the transition out of the military, financing college costs, etc. These diverse issues make the findings of this study hardly generalizable without additional empirical evidence.

Endnotes

¹Lawrence P. Crocker, Army Officer's Guide, 45th Edition (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1990), 286.

²Ibid., 286-287.

³Charles T. Clark and Lawrence L. Schkade, Statistical Analysis For Administrative Decisions, 3rd Edition (Cincinnati, OH: South-Western, 1979), Appendix Table N.

⁴Richard A. Lippa, Introduction to Social Psychology, (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1990), 243.

⁵Marvin E. Shaw and Philip R. Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology, 2nd Edition, (NY: McGraw-Hill, 1982), 286-287.

⁶Lippa, 248.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS

A total of 479 surveys were prepared and randomly distributed to officers (subjects) within the CAS³ and CGSOC courses. Four hundred and forty subjects completed and returned the surveys resulting in a very satisfactory 91.9% return rate. No administrative problems emerged from the conduct of the survey, or with the survey itself. Many subjects indicated a desire for, and were provided a summary of the results.

Manipulation Check

Between-group factorial analyses were completed to assure that the manipulation of "Likelihood of Command" was successful. For this independent variable, a univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was done to assess the effectiveness of the manipulation. To avoid making a type-two error, a probability value of less than or equal to .05 was adhered to as the criterion for assessments of significance. This is the accepted and typical standard for behavioral research. Additionally, univariate two-factor analyses of variance were performed using gender of subject, sample (CGSOC or CAS³), race, education, rank (captain or

major), and military specialty (branch) to identify any unexpected, but possible, interference with the manipulation. The remaining independent variables applied in the overall design, "Sample" and "Branch," are categorical, and as such, require no manipulation check. The data from the pilot and study proper were not merged.

The analyses demonstrated an overwhelmingly strong effect for the manipulation of the "likelihood of command," $F(2,432) = 273.5, p < .0001$ (see Table 1 and Figure 1). Subjects in each of the three experimental conditions reported their projected mind-set as significantly different than that of the other conditions at the $p < .05$ level (Unlikely $M = 1.12$, Toss-Up $M = 2.01$, and Likely $M = 2.54$). There were no significant main or interaction effects associated with subject gender, sample, race, education, rank, or military specialty.

The subjects' perceived accuracy of their responses provides additional evidence that the manipulation was effective. The mean response among subjects in the study regarding perceived accuracy of their responses was 5.49 on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all accurately; 7 = Very Accurately). No significant differences emerged regarding perceived accuracy according to the three manipulated levels of command likelihood (Command Unlikely $M = 5.51$; Command a Toss-up $M = 5.35$; and Command Likely

M = 5.61), or any other factors. The manipulation appears to have been very successful.

TABLE 1
MEANS FOR LIKELIHOOD OF COMMAND MANIPULATION CHECK

Condition	n	Mean
Command "Unlikely"	165	1.12 ^a
Command "A Toss-up"	156	2.01 ^b
Command "Likely"	112	2.54 ^c

Note: The higher the mean on the 3-point scale the more the subject perceives he is "likely to command." Seven subjects did not respond to this item. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.

Demographics

The demographics of the random sample, in all cases, revealed a picture that is consistent with the larger CAS³ and CGSOC populations. The subjects in the study included 46.8% from CGSOC, and 53.2% from CAS³. In terms of gender, 91.1% of the subjects were male compared with 8.9% who were female. Branch specialties were represented by 34.8% of the subjects who were assigned to the traditional




Figure 1

combat branches (infantry, armor, and field artillery), 20.3% to the other combat branches (aviation, air defense artillery, and engineers), 22.8% to the combat support branches (military police, military intelligence, ordnance, signal, and chemical), and the remaining 22.1% to the combat service support branches (adjutant general, quartermaster, transportation, finance, medical, and medical service corps). The sample was also representative according to race with 82.2% Caucasian, 12.5% African-American, .5% Hispanic-American, 2.8% Asian-American, and 1.6% other. Data regarding the highest level of civilian education achieved indicated that 63.8% had earned at least a bachelor's degree, 33.5% a master's degree, and 2.8% a Ph.D. Tenure was measured in terms of the total number of years of commissioned service. The data revealed an average of 13.2 years of service for majors, while that of captains was 8.2 years in the CAS³ population and 10.9 in the CGSOC population. Time in grade data illustrated a broad scope of experience at each rank with majors having an average of 2.1 years in grade, CAS³ captains having an average of 3.8 years in grade, and CGSOC captains having an average of 5.6 years in grade.

Other interesting demographic data emerged regarding: (1) dependents, (2) the primary indicants that subjects have for defining career success, and (3) the manner in which subjects tend to define their own

commitment. Subjects indicating that they had dependents included 84.9% of the total sample. Most interesting was the main effect differences which emerged according to sample and gender (Sample: $F(1,433) = 18.7, p < .001$; Gender: $F(1,433) = 23.6, p < .001$). The fact that CAS³ subjects (78.1% with dependents and 21.9% without dependents) were significantly different than CGSOC subjects (92.6% with dependents and 7.4% without dependents) does not seem surprising because the CAS³ population is considerably younger. The significant difference according to gender, however, is surprising. The sample of male officers (87.5% with dependents and 12.5% without dependents) differed significantly from the female officer sample (58.9% with dependents, 41.1% without dependents). Female officers were more than three times more likely not to have dependents. Perhaps these dramatic gender differences illustrate the unequal burden felt by females within the military to be both spouse/parent and army officer (see Table 2 and Figure 2). Informal post hoc questioning, however, revealed a potential confound in the manner male and female officers interpreted the survey question about having dependents. Males tend to include spouses as being dependents, females do not. This difference of interpretation, though interesting in its own right, may mitigate some or all of the gender effect found.

Another interesting contrast that emerged from the data relates to the "single goal" that subjects identified

TABLE 2
 PERCENTAGES OF SUBJECTS HAVING DEPENDENTS BY GENDER

Condition	n	Gender	
		Male	Female
With Dependents:	360	87.5 ^a	58.9 ^b
Without Dependents:	64	12.5 ^a	41.1 ^b

Note: Since the group percentages are not independent within genders, superscripts indicate only a significant difference between genders, $p < .001$. Sixteen subjects did not respond to this item.

as defining a successful army career. "Battalion Command" was cited as the single goal that defines a successful career by 51.7% of the officers in the traditional combat branches, 48.3% of the officers in the other combat branches, 37.9% of the officers in the combat support branches, and 27.9% of the officers in the combat service support branches. These attitudes represented a significant difference according to branch type, $F(3,418) = 5.55$, $p < .001$, suggesting perhaps a different trend in the career development or socialization of junior officers in the various branches (see Table 3 and Figure 3).

Lastly, the data revealed a prominent bias among subjects for choosing affective commitment as the basis for

DEPENDENT STATUS By Subject Gender




Figure 2

TABLE 3

MEAN PERCENTAGES OF SUBJECTS IDENTIFYING BATTALIC
COMMAND AS THE SINGLE GOAL DEFINING CAREER SUCCESS

Branch Type	n	Mean Percentage
Traditional Combat:	151	51.7 ^a
Other Combat:	87	48.3 ^a
Combat Support:	95	37.9 ^{a, b}
Combat Service Support:	93	27.9 ^b

Note: Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$. Fourteen subjects did not respond to this item.

describing their own commitment. When queried about the basis of their commitment, 88.9% of the subjects identified themselves with the description of affective commitment, 3.7% with continuance commitment, and 7.4% with normative commitment. Without questioning the validity of their perceptions, the result may nonetheless be skewed by the less favorable alternatives. An admission of not having any alternatives (continuance commitment) or of an obligation owed (normative commitment) will likely exacerbate psychological strain. If that was the case, those choices would be expected to have been avoided.




Figure 3

Factor and Reliability Analyses

Both factor analysis and reliability analyses were conducted to develop more reliable summed measures rather than individual indicants of each of the three types of commitment. A correlation of .4 was established as the criterion for inclusion in both types of analyses. As described in Chapter 2, the theoretical and empirical work of Meyer and Allen (1993) suggests that commitment is a multifaceted construct with three components. A factor analysis was conducted to confirm the three emergent and discriminate factors in this sample. Both the factor analysis and the reliability analysis for each construct provided the basis for developing summed measures. Table 4 provides a matrix of the size (n) of each cell in the design.

Three distinct factors emerged in the data using a varimax rotated factor analysis. The most dominant factor that emerged in the analysis related to the measures of normative commitment. This factor, with a factor strength (eigenvalue) of 6.86, accounted for 38.1% of the variance. The second emerging factor related to the measures of continuance commitment. It accounted for an additional 14.4% of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 2.59. The last factor to emerge significant was affective commitment with an eigenvalue of 1.41 accounting for an additional 7.9% of the variance. All three constructs demonstrated factor

strengths above a desirable threshold value for eigenvalues equal to 1.0.

TABLE 4
CELL SIZES OF THE BASIC EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
(Likelihood of Command X Branch X Sample)

Condition\ Sample	Branch Type				Total
	Trad'l CBT	Other CBT	CS	CSS	
Command "Highly Unlikely":					
CAS ³	26	19	19	21	85
CGSOC	35	15	17	10	77
Command "A Toss-Up \ 50-50% Chance":					
CAS ³	27	15	20	22	84
CGSOC	21	17	18	15	71
Command "Highly Likely":					
CAS ³	20	12	9	15	56
CGSOC	21	10	13	10	54
Total:	150	88	96	93	427

Note: Thirteen subjects did not respond to one or more of the principal design factors.

In all, these three factors accounted for 60.4% of the variance. In addition to confirming Meyer and Allen's

conclusions, the degree to which the three factors discriminate was perhaps most encouraging (see Table 5). Overall, there was virtually no redundancy in the components of the emergent factors at the .4 level suggesting the distinct and valid measurement of all three commitment constructs.

TABLE 5
 ROTATED FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Variables	Emerging Factors		
	Factor 1 (Normative)	Factor 2 (Continuance)	Factor 3 (Affective)
V23 (Affective 1)	.46		.56
V26 (Affective 2)	.40		.60
V29 (Affective 3)			.11
V32 (Affective 4)			.70
V35 (Affective 5)			.92
V38 (Affective 6)			.92
V24 (Continuance 1)		.76	
V27 (Continuance 2)		.09	
V30 (Continuance 3)		.84	
V33 (Continuance 4)		.86	
V37 (Continuance 5)		.84	
V40 (Continuance 6)		.61	
V25 (Normative 1)	.72		
V28 (Normative 2)	.61		
V31 (Normative 3)	.77		
V34 (Normative 4)	.79		
V36 (Normative 5)	.59	.41	
V39 (Normative 6)	.56		

Note: The criterion for inclusion is a correlation of greater than or equal to .4. All within factor correlations are displayed for reference purposes only.

Internal reliability is also important, and analyses for each of the three constructs reflected significant results as has been the case with several replications of Meyer and Allen's (1993) empirical study. The alpha coefficient for affective commitment, adjusted to include only the five correlated variables, was .84. It is interesting that in the military population surveyed, the question pertaining to "self image (V29)" did not load well with the other affective-oriented items. Perhaps army officers do not readily admit that "being an army officer" is important to their self image because it implies an inability to do other things, or make career shifts. As professional leaders, army officers may perceive many career options outside of the military. In this regard, the military population seems to contrast with the nursing sample studied by Meyer and Allen (1993). Nurses might be inclined to retain a more central "nursing" self-image by virtue of their specialized skills.

The alpha coefficient for continuance commitment, adjusted to include only the five correlated variables, was .87. For the military population sampled in this study, the question relating to "pressures to keep me from changing professions (V27)" did not load well with the other continuance commitment items. The cause may be somewhat related to reactance. Army officers may be less than willing to admit that they have no options other than serving in the

military, or that pressures of any sort compel them to remain on active duty.

The alpha coefficient for normative commitment, including all six of the correlated variables, was .86. In all, factor and reliability analyses satisfactorily confirmed the valid and reliable measures of affective, continuance, and normative commitment.

Factors Impacting on Affective Commitment

Two variables resulted in significant differences in affective commitment. They were command likelihood, and having dependents or not. Three other variables were found to be significant as covariates resulting in a more precise measurement of affective commitment. They were the degree of disappointment of not achieving one's primary goal, the current measurement of affective commitment, and number of years of commissioned service.

Three-factor analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to determine significant differences and trends among the various cell means of the design (Command Likelihood X Branch X Sample). A significant main effect was found for command likelihood, $F(2,396) = 15.69$, $p < .001$, with subjects in the "Unlikely to Command" condition having the lowest affective commitment ($M = 29.26$), "A Toss-Up" having the mid-range affective commitment ($M = 30.06$), and "Likely to Command" having highest affective commitment

(M = 32.7). The effect of command likelihood on affective commitment is almost linear (see Table 6 and Figure 4). No other effects were found to be significant in the basic design.


A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if any other factors might impose significant effects on affective commitment. The only factor found to have a significant effect was if subjects had dependents, $F(1,413) = 3.72, p < .05$ (see Table 6 and Fig. 4).

TABLE 6
MEANS FOR AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT ACCORDING TO LIKELIHOOD OF
COMMAND AND DEPENDENT STATUS

Condition	n	Dependent Status	
		w/ Dependents	w/o Dependents
Command "Unlikely":			
	161	29.28 ^a	28.81 ^a
Command "A Toss-Up / 50-50% Chance":			
	155	30.46 ^b	28.32 ^a
Command "Likely":			
	108	32.68 ^c	31.93 ^c

Note: The higher the means the greater the affective commitment. Sixteen subjects did not respond to all the component items and consequently were not included in the analysis. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.

AFFECTIVE COMMITMENT Likelihood X Dependents Status



Likelihood: $p < .001$; Dependents $p < .05$

Figure 4

The analysis revealed that subjects with dependents have significantly higher affective commitment ($M = 30.58$) than subjects without dependents ($M = 29.29$). In this regard, perhaps subjects with dependents share more of the beliefs and values of the military profession as a consequence of the responsibilities they have come to recognize in their own families.

Using the basic design factors, three-factor analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed three other variables that were significant as covariates. The current state of affective commitment, a measure taken prior to the manipulation, was found to be a most powerful covariate with $F(1,395) = 65.99$, $p < .001$. The "degree of disappointment" one would feel if his primary goal was not achieved also contributed significantly to the precision of measuring affective commitment with $F(1,395) = 8.5$, $p < .004$. Lastly, the years of commissioned service also enhanced precision as a significant covariate with $F(1,394) = 4.18$, $p < .042$.

Factors Impacting On Continuance Commitment

Three variables led to significant differences in continuance commitment. They were command likelihood, military specialty (branch), and having dependents or not. Four other variables were found to be significant as covariates resulting in more precise measurements of continuance commitment. They were the degree of

disappointment of not achieving one's primary goal, the current measurement of continuance commitment, the number of years of commissioned service, and the subject's time in grade at the present rank.

Three-factor analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to determine significant differences and trends among the various cells of the design (Command Likelihood X Branch X Sample). A significant main effect was found for command likelihood, $F(2,396) = 8.87, p < .001$, with subjects in the "Unlikely to Command" condition having the lowest continuance commitment ($M = 20.36$), "A Toss-Up" having the mid-range continuance commitment ($M = 21.32$), and "Likely to Command" having highest continuance commitment ($M = 24.04$). Similar to the case of affective commitment, the effect of command likelihood on continuance commitment is almost linear (see Table 7 and Figure 5).

Branch type was also found to demonstrate a significant main effect in terms of continuance commitment with traditional combat branches ($M = 22.47$) and combat support branches ($M = 22.44$) being significantly higher than other combat branches ($M = 20.86$) and combat service support branches ($M = 20.17$), $F(3,396) = 2.6, p < .05$. It is possible that the skills unique to the engineers, aviators, and combat service support branches make them more marketable outside of the military. Consequently, one would expect that these officers have a greater feasible set of

TABLE 7

MEANS FOR CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT ACCORDING TO LIKELIHOOD
OF COMMAND AND DEPENDENT STATUS


Condition	n	Dependent Status	
		w/ Dependents	w/o Dependents
Command "Unlikely":			
	161	20.86 ^c	17.14 ^a
Command "A Toss-Up / 50-50% Chance:			
	155	21.72 ^c	19.28 ^a
Command "Likely":			
	108	23.89 ^b	24.36 ^b

Note: The higher the means the greater the continuance commitment. Sixteen subjects did not respond to these items and were consequently not included in the analysis. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.

career alternatives and that they would have less continuance commitment (see Table 8 and Figure 6). No other main or interactive effects were found to be significant in the basic design.

A two-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if any other factors might impose significant effects on continuance commitment. The only

CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT Likelihood X Dependents Status



Likelihood: $p < .001$; Dependents $p < .05$

Figure 5

factor found to have a significant effect was whether, or not, subjects had dependents, $F(1,386) = 4.07, p < .04$. The analysis revealed that subjects with dependents have significantly higher continuance commitment ($M = 21.96$) than subjects without dependents ($M = 19.69$). Perhaps subjects with dependents feel a greater burden to ensure financial security for their families and as a consequence are less likely to leave the relative stability in the military (as seen previously in Table 7 and Figure 5).

TABLE 8
MEANS FOR CONTINUANCE COMMITMENT ACCORDING TO BRANCH TYPE

Branch	n	Continuance Commitment
Traditional Combat:	147	22.47 ^a
Other Combat:	87	20.86 ^b
Combat Support:	95	22.44 ^a
Combat Service Support:	90	20.17 ^b

Note: The higher the mean the greater the continuance commitment. Twenty-one subjects did not respond to all component items and consequently were not included in the analysis. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.




Figure 6

Using the factors inherent in the basic experimental design, three-factor analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed four other variables that were significant as covariates. The current state of continuance commitment, a measure taken prior to the manipulation, was found to be a most powerful covariate with $F(1,395) = 270.82, p < .001$. The "degree of disappointment" one would feel if her primary goal was not achieved also contributed significantly to the precision of measuring continuance commitment with $F(1,395) = 27.9, p < .001$. The years of commissioned service also enhanced precision as a significant covariate with $F(1,394) = 7.02, p < .008$. Lastly, time in one's current grade enhanced precision as a significant covariate with $F(1,394) = 7.20, p < .008$.

Factors Impacting On Normative Commitment

Three variables resulted in significant differences in normative commitment. They were command likelihood, military specialty (branch), and sample type (CGSOC or CAS³). Only two variables were found to be significant as covariates resulting in a more precise measurement of normative commitment. They were the "degree of disappointment" of not achieving one's primary goal, and the current (or in this case, the pre-manipulation) measurement of normative commitment.

Three-factor analyses of variance (ANOVA) were conducted to determine significant differences and trends among the various cell means of the design (Command Likelihood X Branch X Sample). A significant main effect was found for command likelihood, $F(2,394) = 15.32$, $p < .001$, with subjects in the "Unlikely to Command" condition having the lowest normative commitment ($M = 24.31$), "A Toss-Up" having the mid-range normative commitment ($M = 26.30$), and "Likely to Command" having highest normative commitment ($M = 29.94$). Similar to the effects found regarding affective and continuance commitment, the effect of command likelihood on normative commitment was virtually linear (see Table 9 and Figure 7).

Branch type was also found to demonstrate a significant main effect in terms of normative commitment with traditional combat branches having the highest normative commitment ($M = 27.93$), followed by the other combat branches ($M = 26.01$) and combat support branches ($M = 26.26$), and lastly the combat service support branches ($M = 24.66$), $F(3,394) = 2.99$, $p < .031$. The data suggest that combat service support officers feel significantly less obligation to the military profession than their peers in the traditional combat branches (see Table 10 and Figure 8).

TABLE 9

MEANS FOR NORMATIVE COMMITMENT ACCORDING TO LIKELIHOOD OF
COMMAND AND SAMPLE

Condition	n	CAS ³	Sample CGSOC
Command "Unlikely":			
	160	23.41 ^c	25.33 ^a
Command "A Toss-Up / 50-50% Chance":			
	152	25.30 ^c	27.46 ^a
Command "Likely":			
	106	29.39 ^b	30.52 ^b

Note: The higher the means the greater the normative commitment. Twenty-two subjects did not respond to all the component items and were consequently not included in the analysis. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.

Another main effect emerged from the analysis of the basic design. For normative commitment, in contrast to the other two types of commitment, significant differences were also revealed according to the sample surveyed, $F(1,394) = 3.92$, $p < .048$. CGSOC subjects ($M = 27.46$) demonstrated significantly more normative commitment than CAS³ subjects ($M = 25.57$) across the three manipulated conditions of command likelihood (as seen in Table 9 and Figure 7).




Figure 7

TABLE 10


MEANS FOR NORMATIVE COMMITMENT ACCORDING TO BRANCH TYPE

Branch Type	n	Normative Commitment
Traditional Combat:	148	27.93 ^a
Other Combat:	87	26.01 ^{a,b}
Combat Support:	95	26.26 ^{a,b}
Combat Service Support:	88	24.66 ^b

Note: The higher the mean the greater the normative commitment. Twenty-two subjects did not respond to all the component items and were consequently not included in the analysis. Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$.

There are a number of possible reasons; however, perhaps it reduces to being simply a function of the different populations themselves. CAS³ subjects represent the full spectrum of talent among their population of Captains while CGSOC subjects are representative of only the top-half of all Majors. Normative commitment, or the sense of obligation one feels toward the military may simply be a consequence of this fundamental difference between populations. No other significant main or interactive effects were found in the basic design, or among other possible factors.

NORMATIVE COMMITMENT According to Branch Type



$p < .05$

Figure 8

Using the basic design factors, three-factor analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) revealed only two variables that were significant as covariates. The current state of normative commitment, a measure taken prior to the manipulation, was found to be a most powerful covariate with $F(1,394) = 195.95, p < .001$. The "degree of disappointment" one would feel if his primary goal was not achieved also contributed significantly to the precision of measuring normative commitment with $F(1,394) = 14.13, p < .001$.

Other Effects and Non-effects

Significant effects were found relating to the variable measuring the subjects' perceived chance to command. A significant main effect was found for below-zone (BZ) versus primary-zone (PZ) promoted officers, $F(1,346) = 6.85, p < .009$. The data suggest, quite predictably, that below-the-zone (BZ) officers who have been promoted ahead of their peers believe themselves to have a better chance of commanding. Most interesting, however, was the significant triple-order interaction that emerged regarding the "perceived chance of command" according to gender, branch, and sample, $F(2,411) = 3.82, p < .02$. While a general trend seems difficult to identify, it appears that CAS³ and CGSOC subjects have virtually opposite perceptions according to branch type (see Table 11 and Figure 9).

Contrary to the hypothesis, no significant differences were found (according to branch type) in the number of alternatives subjects identified for defining a successful career, $F(3,418) = .059, p > .981$. The mean number of alternatives cited according to branch were: .95 for traditional and other combat branches, .99 for combat support, and .98 for combat service support. There simply was not enough variability in the responses to assess any significant impact of this variable on the three types of commitment. Qualitatively, however, there did appear to be a difference between the types of alternatives listed by CAS³ and CGSOC officers. CAS³ officers seemed to indicate more personally-oriented goals defining success (i.e., graduate education, family, doing one's best), whereas CGSOC officers' preferences were more professionally-oriented (i.e., job and career options). This difference may well be the result of differential maturity, personal or professional; or perhaps, even a population bias that exists between a course representing the full spectrum of captains and a course representing only the top half of the majors.

The Usefulness of Predictive Models

In answer to the research question and hypotheses, the study appears to have successfully identified some of the factors that play a significant role in affecting commitment. Beyond this, however, one wonders the extent

these factors may be useful in predicting the various commitment constructs.

TABLE 11
 MEAN PERCENT FOR THE PERCEIVED CHANCE
 OF BEING SELECTED TO BATTALION COMMAND ACCORDING
 TO SUBJECT GENDER, BRANCH, AND SAMPLE

Branch\ Subject Gender	n	CAS ³	Sample CGSOC
Traditional Combat:			
Males	149	44.58 ^a	51.21 ^{a,b}
Females	0	-	-
Other Combat:			
Males	83	55.81 ^b	46.60 ^a
Females	4	2.50 ^d	57.50 ^b
Combat Support:			
Males	83	45.00 ^a	53.32 ^b
Females	16	54.38 ^b	35.75 ^c
Combat Service Support:			
Males	75	46.70 ^a	53.61 ^b
Females	15	31.78 ^c	38.33 ^c

Note: Means not sharing the same superscript differ significantly, $p < .05$. Sixteen subjects did not respond to all factors and were consequently not included in the analysis.




Figure 9

Stepwise regression analysis was conducted to determine the predictive value of various models. These models were derived from the variables found to be significant for affective, continuance, and normative commitment. For affective commitment, a predictive model including the likelihood of command, dependent status, and the significant covariates (pre-manipulation measure of affective commitment, years commissioned service, and the degree of disappointment if primary goal is not reached) was tested. The results revealed that the current measure of affective commitment is most important in the prediction of future affective commitment accounting for 12 percent of the variance. This factor was followed by the "likelihood of command" that accounted only for an additional 8 percent of the variance bringing the predictive model's total to a mere 20 percent of the variance. The other factors did not emerge as contributing to the prediction of affective commitment. The regression model which emerged significant is as follows:

$$B = 13.25 + .33x_1 + .28x_2 + e_0$$

For continuance commitment, a predictive model including the likelihood of command, branch, dependent status, and the significant covariates (pre-manipulation measure of continuance commitment, time in grade at the present rank, years of commissioned service, the "degree of disappointment" if primary goal is not reached) was tested.

The results revealed that the current measure of continuance commitment is most important in the prediction of future continuance commitment accounting for 39.6 percent of the variance. This factor was followed by the "likelihood of command" that accounted only for an additional 2.9 percent of the variance. The "degree of disappointment if primary goal is not reached" accounted for an additional 1.6 percent of the variance bringing the predictive model's total to 44.7 percent of the variance. The other factors combined to contribute less than 1 percent of the variance to the prediction of continuance commitment. The regression model which emerged significant is as follows:

$$B = 3.8 + .58x_1 + .17x_2 + .13x_3 + e_0$$

For normative commitment, a predictive model including the likelihood of command, branch, sample, and the significant covariates (pre-manipulation measure of normative commitment, and the degree of disappointment if primary goal is not reached) was tested. The results revealed that the current measure of normative commitment is most important in the prediction of future normative commitment accounting for 29.2 percent of the variance. This factor was followed by the "likelihood of command" that accounted for an additional 5.5 percent of the variance. The "degree of disappointment if primary goal is not reached" accounted only for an additional 1.0 percent of the variance bringing the predictive model's total to 36.6 percent of the

variance. The other factors were not found to contribute significantly to the prediction of normative commitment. The regression model which emerged significant is as follows:

$$B = 5.8 + .50x_1 + .23x_2 + .10x_3 + e_0$$

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact that a declining likelihood of battalion command would have on the commitment of officers with between five and fifteen years of commissioned service. Absent any clear precedent, a review of related theoretical and empirical evidence suggested that commitment would be expected to decline for these officers as the likelihood of commanding a battalion diminishes. A quasi-experimental design was developed and employed to examine these questions directly. A discussion of the results, their ramifications, and suggestions for additional research follow.

Summary and Discussion of Results

The results of this study confirm the main hypothesis that the likelihood of command is a significant factor affecting commitment. This effect is robust among all three commitment constructs (affective, continuance, and normative), and in each case is virtually linear. Subjects with the highest likelihood of being selected to command a battalion also show the greatest amount of commitment.

Subjects with the lowest likelihood of being selected demonstrate the lowest commitment.

Branch type also plays a significant role in affecting commitment, but not entirely in the manner that was hypothesized. In the analysis, branch type emerged significant only as a main effect, and only in the cases of the continuance and normative commitment constructs. Officers in "other combat" branches including engineers and aviation, as well as the combat service support branches, were found to have significantly lower commitment than their colleagues in the "traditional combat" and "combat support" branches. Neither of the hypothesized interactions emerged as being significant: branch type in terms of the "likelihood of command" condition, nor branch type according to "the number of alternatives" an officer has for defining a successful career. It was, in fact, surprising to find out that little variability exists between the branch types and the number of alternatives officers have for defining a successful career. The average number of alternatives listed by the officers surveyed was just one.

There are at least two explanations for the significant effect that branch specialty has on commitment. One explanation relates to unique or easily transferrable skills, and the other relates to diverse socialization programs. Perhaps commitment related to branch specialty is associated with the divergence among the branches in the

number of easily convertible skills useful for civilian employment. Some branch specialties provide officers skills which are directly applicable, or easily convertible to civilian sector careers--engineers, aviators, quartermasters, transportation, medical, or maintenance managers, etc. Consequently, it would be expected that officers with marketable skills would be less committed and difficult to retain than officers without such skills. It is also quite possible that different trends exist among the various branches in terms of officer socialization. Combat Service Support officers, for instance, may be socialized for success in their branches differently than combat officers. The various means of socializing officers may well include, overtly or subtly, a difference between branches in how junior officers are encouraged to establish their own primary goals for defining success. This idea appears to have merit as evidenced by the significant differences between the branches identifying "battalion command" as the primary goal defining success.

As expected, several other demographic factors were found to impact commitment. Contrary to what many may assume of military professionals, their commitment is apparently not entirely governed by intrinsic motivations. Extrinsic motivators, both in terms of investments and sacrifices, clearly reveal a profound effect on commitment. Sacrifice, as illustrated by the effects of having

dependents, demonstrated an impact on affective and continuance commitment. The amount of investment, too, was highly correlated with commitment as seen by the effects associated with time in grade, and total number of years of commissioned service. Whether these indications of extrinsic motivation represent anything new is questionable, but it seems prudent for leaders to acknowledge their role as they attempt to positively shape and foster commitment.

Though not the established goal of this research, actually predicting an officer's commitment would be potentially valuable as a means to focus counseling efforts. According to the analysis, the measure of an officer's current state of commitment is the best predictor of his (or her) future state of commitment. Notwithstanding, this variable accounted for very little of the variance suggesting that there are many other variables that combine to account for commitment. Further, this effect may be a confound associated with the manner in which future commitment was operationalized in this study. Relative to the current state measure of commitment, other factors such as the likelihood of command, having dependents or not, and overall time in service emerged as only nominal predictors of affective, continuance, and normative commitment. Simply put, commitment is a far more complex psychological construct than can be understood and predicted even by the

few seemingly relevant variables as were addressed in this study.

Ramifications of These Findings

The results of this study provide numerous implications for the United States Army, especially in terms of expanding the vision of success during officer professional development. Additionally, the results suggest several theoretical and empirical implications for the psychological research community.

For the army, the findings of this study provide interesting insights about a number of contemporary issues important to the officer corps. There is empirical evidence, now, that the drawdown is likely to have a negative impact on commitment among officers having between five and fifteen years of service. This effect has been shown to be robust and as well as a direct result of the reduced opportunity to command.

These data also suggest that there are significant differences among branches in the proportion of officers who want to command. The differences may lead to considerable disappointment if other alternatives are not found to define successful careers.

These data forewarn us of at least some of the psychological strains that drawdown survivors will likely suffer. These career strains should be anticipated and

pro-actively dealt with. Beyond job and career security, army officers indicate a need for advancement opportunities that define a successful career. To the extent that a smaller force constrains advancement opportunities for battalion command, commitment can be expected to decline. The cost of lower commitment to the performance and morale of the army's officer corps, alone, may be potentially harmful to army readiness. The issue of command likelihood, and perhaps even more broadly career success, must be addressed directly by the army's senior leadership.

For the psychological research community, as well, the results of this study provide several implications for empirical and theoretical considerations of commitment. Foremost among these implications is the successful replication and application of Meyer and Allen's (1993) theoretical model and instrument. Their model and instrument are once again validated: this time in the context of another profession, the military. All three commitment constructs were identified and found to be discriminate. The inventory, with only two exceptions, was found to be valid and sufficient.

This study advances our understanding of the variables that affect commitment. Several factors have been known to affect commitment. The results of this study provide evidence that other constructs, such as the likelihood of advancement, marketable job skills, and having

dependents, also significantly affect commitment. The measures of the current state of commitment have been found to be significant indicants of the future state of commitment, in all three commitment domains (affective, continuance, and normative). I have not found any indication of the predictive value of the commitment variable, itself, evidenced in the literature. Consequently, this finding also provides a novel insight about an additional factor for predicting commitment.

The fact that future states of commitment have now been operationalized is perhaps the greatest contribution of this research for the psychological research community. Certainly, the question remains as to the validity and true success of the quasi-experimental approach that was employed. The survey technique used did not ensure the ultimate in control over other variables; however, it is unlikely that this had any adverse impact on the effects. Additionally, and despite the fact that subjects reported their responses to be very accurate, the nature of projecting oneself into a hypothetical situation is rather difficult, and potentially not entirely valid. Notwithstanding, the fact that the design is workable suggests the potential for new inroads: to a better understanding of commitment, as well as investigations of the future states of other relatively abstract psychological constructs.

Recommendations for Addressing the Implications

There is now very good evidence that the likelihood of commanding a battalion does significantly affect commitment. As was discussed in the previous section, the implications of this finding are also dramatic. There is, however, no evidence about the size of this effect in real, observable terms. Just how large a difference this effect will actually have in the workplace remains an empirical question. Perhaps the observable difference that the effect makes in the workplace will be hardly noticeable. Or perhaps, the behavioral implications of the effect will be huge. Consequently, more investigation is required before any major investments are made to address problems associated with the effect of command likelihood on officer commitment. Only then can the cost-effectiveness of the investment be assessed. Notwithstanding, there may be several inexpensive and relatively straightforward actions that can be taken to address the effect; to perhaps curb the negative ramifications that the effect may have throughout the military. To the extent that relatively inexpensive remedies can be implemented to address the expected negative impact of the drawdown on commitment, the remedies should be made.

It will be a considerable challenge for the army to alter the effect that the declining likelihood of command has on officer commitment. Perhaps the best way will first

be to establish a broader vision defining "career success" in the draft DA Pamphlet 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Utilization. Diverse and multiple career paths to success in ways other than via command need to be substantiated for officers. Lieutenant Colonel-level assignments, other than command, that define a successful military career may be, for example: ROTC Professor of Military Science, Senior Advisor to Recruiting or ARNG Organizations, Project Managers, District Engineers, etc. The point is that as long as officers most commonly identify success as being defined by battalion command, fewer commands are going to inevitably lead to a decline in commitment. A vision that inspires officers to redefine success along any number of other career paths would effectively curb the negative impact on commitment.

Really, what is being suggested here is a change in the prevailing norms and culture of the military among its officers. The norms and culture throughout the military where "command" dominates junior officer perceptions as the basis of achieving success are counter-productive during a drawdown. This norm, in essence, amounts to focusing on command as defining success when the rate of being selected to battalion command is declining. The results of this study confirm that perceptions of a declining likelihood of command undermine the commitment of the officer corps. Changing the norm could be accomplished by attacking some of

the underlying beliefs and values associated with the definition of career success in the military. This could be accomplished, in part, by promoting success stories of senior officers who have not been battalion-level commanders, posting public lists of selections to other, non-command assignments, and making such discussions a part of battalion-level officer professional development (OPD) sessions.

On somewhat of an optimistic note, in the course of this investigation I have detected what I believe to be a shift in attitude relating to this issue among my CGSOC colleagues. In the short period of thirty days between the pilot testing and study proper, I noticed a qualitative shift in the types of survey responses being submitted by CGSOC officers. The predominant response to open-ended questions among those surveyed seemed to shift from defining success as being "command only" during the pilot testing to a willingness to suggest other "non-command" alternatives during the study proper. Qualitatively, many of the interactions that emerged as significant in the pilot study disappeared in the study proper. The pilot results may, in fact, have been spurious; however, my sense is that within the ranks of the CGSOC class, officers begin to come to grips with the realities of their potential for being selected to command a battalion. It is possible that this shift came about as a consequence of talking with peers, or

of hearing the views and visions of future careers by several of the army's key leaders who visited as guest speakers, or both. Perhaps equally important during this period were the visits made by members of the army's personnel headquarters in Washington, D.C., the Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN). These personnel managers directly addressed many relevant career issues, in a personal way, with each individual officer. In any case, the exposure to senior-level officers who can provide a more diverse vision of what a successful army career is may well be of a measurable benefit in coping with the potential drain on commitment.

Another recommendation for the army regards the manner in which officers are socialized into the military profession. During the drawdown a renewed focus on survivors rather than those who depart the army must be a first priority. Thereafter, the chain of command would be well served to actively pursue socialization programs that motivate young officers to orient merely on doing their best rather than achieving selection to command; instead of commanding, to strive to accomplish success along any number of different paths.

For the psychological research community my hope would be that the results of this research will excite a closer examination of commitment, as a future psychological state. Longitudinal data regarding commitment attitudes and

performance would be insightful. Such data would provide the basis for assessments of the degree of correlation in the attitude-behavior link associated with commitment. Further, the usefulness and even the validity of applying a projected state in order to measure commitment in that state requires assessment. Lastly, a more comprehensive theory of commitment is needed to organize our understanding of the antecedents and processes that combine to effectively account for, and predict commitment.

Emerging Research Issues

Several interesting and provocative issues emerge from this research. These issues hold potential for worthwhile research related to the military as well as the greater psychological research community. The issues range in scope from general to specific; some of immediate interest during the drawdown process while others are more enduring.

How can we reliably predict commitment in this era of the drawdown? How will the effect of this drawdown that extends over the course of eight to ten years differ from previous drawdowns of much shorter duration? What unique impact on commitment is associated with the all-voluntary makeup of the army. Given that only forty percent of the variance, at best, is accounted for by present state measures of commitment and command likelihood, what are the

other significant factors which affect and help predict commitment?

Should army personnel managers directly address the stark realities associated with command likelihood immediately following an officer's promotion to major? Since statistically, below-zone (BZ) selections for promotion to major account for about eighty to ninety percent of the future battalion commanders, how would it behoove the army to manage this information in terms of counseling officers?

What are the behavioral ramifications associated with the fact that the likelihood of command affects commitment? This remains an empirical question. How will these attitudes actually manifest behaviorally, and when? Or does dissonance (Festinger, 1958) occurring at the second pass-over for battalion command offset any or all of the potentially negative behaviors?

What other behavioral consequences can be anticipated for the sixty percent of majors surveyed who reported that they will be disappointed if (when) they do not achieve their primary goal of being a battalion commander?

How should we socialize our junior officers given the inevitable downward trend in the number of battalion command positions available? Is the image that "command is the only great job" desirable as a prevailing norm, especially among combat officers, or does it behoove the army

leadership to promote a vision for officers that illustrates other equally successful career paths?

What about the dramatic gender difference associated with the disproportionate percentage of female officers who report not having dependents? What does it say about our military as a society? Is the trend subsiding as women become more integrated into the military? Is this a trend typical of mid-level managers in the civilian sector? Should we, in the military, consider the disparity an acceptable consequence of being a volunteer in the military profession? Although this issue is not at all tied to the central focus of this thesis, I find it an especially intriguing issue worthy of study.

In all, this study very much served its purpose. By rigidly adhering to the scientific method, a research problem was identified; hypotheses were developed and supported by the available literature; and a procedure to test the hypotheses was designed. The results of statistical analyses provided evidence supporting most of the hypotheses, denying support for others. Explanations and implications for the findings were put forth, and suggestions for additional research were provided.

GLOSSARY

Affective Commitment. The extent to which one is committed to a profession or career as a function of sharing organizational values, beliefs, and goals.

Alpha Coefficient. A measure of correlation used to determine internal reliability.

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). A statistical procedure that is used to determine whether two or more group distributions are significantly different.

Between-Group Factorial Analysis. Any analytic procedure that statistically compares the cell distributions created by the various factors, and the levels of each, to assess differences between them.

Cognition. A mental piece of information; a thought, a belief.

Combat Service Support. Branch specialties including, for this research, Adjutant Generals, Quartermaster, Transportation, Finance, and Medical Service Corps

Combat Support. Branch specialties including, for this research, Military Police, Military Intelligence, Ordnance, Signal, and Chemical Corps.

Construct. A theoretical concept or variable.

Continuance Commitment. The extent to which one is committed to a profession or career as a consequence of viable alternatives available.

Covariates. Variables that are highly correlated with a dependent variable and are used in analysis to increase the precision of the measurement.

Criterion for Inclusion. A threshold standard of correlation used to include variables for consideration.

Dependent Variable. The variable influenced by the independent variable in an experiment. The variable being measured.

Discriminate factor. A factor that is distinct from others.

Eigenvalue. A measure of strength for each significant factor identified in a factor analysis.

Factor Analysis. A statistical procedure, based on commonness of correlation, used to determine the number of different entities actually being measured.

Factorial Design. An experimental, or quasi-experimental structure used to combine two or more factors (variables), each one having discrete levels.

Independent Variable. The variable that is controlled and manipulated in the experiment.

Internal Reliability. The repeatability and consistency of multiple measures of a variable.

Manipulation. The purposeful changing of an independent variable to allow measurement of its effect on the dependent variable.

Normative Commitment. The extent to which one is committed to a profession or career as a consequence of a feeling of obligation to the organization, a repayment of something owed.

Null Hypothesis. The premise for all statistical analyses that there is no significant difference between cell distributions.

Other Combat. Branch specialties including, for this research, Engineers, Aviation, and Air Defense Artillery.

Percent of Variance. The proportion of dispersion accounted for in a measurement.

Pilot test. An initial test of the procedure used to ensure instrument clarity and manipulation effectiveness. Generally, a minimal number of subjects are used for this test.

Quasi-experimental. Almost experimental. Entails the manipulation of a single independent variable at a time to measure its effect on a dependent variable. An issued survey, however, is less than fully controlled.

Regression. An analytic procedure used to determine predictability associated with designated variables upon a measured variable.

Reliability Analysis. Any of a variety of procedures used to determine the extent of repeatability among measures.

Stratified Random Assignment. Just shy of total random assignment, stratification ensures a reasonably balanced distribution among sub-populations.

Study Proper. The actual test of the hypotheses after a preliminary pilot test has been conducted.

Summed Measures. As a means of enhancing the reliability of measurement, summed measures entail the combination of like measurements.

Time in Grade. A measure of tenure, time in grade constitutes the time an officer has served at a given rank (grade).

Time in Service. A measure of tenure, time in service constitutes the time an officer has served on active duty.

Traditional Branches. Branch specialties including, for this research, Infantry, Armor, and Field Artillery.

Type-two error. An incorrect conclusion supporting the hypothesis with significant findings.

Voluntary Separation Incentive/Selective Separation Bonus. Various financial packages instituted by the military and offered to special categories of officers to entice voluntary separations.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Survey Participant,

HOW IS YOUR COMMITMENT BEING IMPACTED BY THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING SELECTED TO COMMAND A BATTALION? It is a particularly relevant and contemporary question with big ramifications for Majors and Captains, especially as the drawdown in our army continues and the chances of commanding decline. This survey provides the basis for research examining how fewer battalion commands may impact upon commitment.

In contrast to many of the surveys you're asked to complete here at the school, we believe you'll find the focus of this research professionally intriguing. You were selected to participate in the study by virtue of being in a randomly selected section. As such, we ask that you provide input to this important research effort by completing and returning the attached survey.

You'll notice that the survey is entirely anonymous, and that no attempt is made to identify you personally. Our conclusions will reflect only the attitudes of officers by categories, not individually. Your feedback will provide information essential to this research. The overall results of this study will be compiled for a CGSC (MMAS) thesis and a summary may potentially be forwarded to the Office of the DCSPER and other army agencies.


We need and very much appreciate your help in completing this project. Other phases of this research cannot be completed until collection and analysis of the surveys are complete. The attached survey has already been tested with a sampling of other students and been revised to make it possible for us to obtain all the necessary data while requiring a minimum of your time. The average time required for students to complete the survey is 13 minutes.

NO MARKSENSE FORM IS NECESSARY. Merely indicate with a pen or pencil your answers on the survey itself and return it to the section survey officer NOT LATER THAN 3 DECEMBER.

We welcome all comments you may have concerning any aspect of the survey or this research project and will gladly provide a summary of research findings to each section participating in the study. If you will not be at Ft. Leavenworth after 1 Feb '94 and desire a personal copy be forwarded to you, merely indicate your address (no name necessary) on the back of your survey and we'll ensure you also receive a summary by mail.

AGAIN, PLEASE RETURN YOUR COMPLETED SURVEY TO YOUR SECTION SURVEY POC BY COB, 3 DECEMBER.

Thanks in advance for your participation.


Steve Jones
MAJ, IN CGSC - Sec 18C
Principal Researcher

Please indicate your feelings about each statement below by circling the number which best reflects your opinion:

1. I am proud to be in the military profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

2. Too much of my life would be disrupted if I were to change my profession now.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

3. I feel a responsibility to the military profession to continue it.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

4. I dislike being an army officer.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

5. Changing professions now would be difficult from me to do.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

6. Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave the military now.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

7. As of now, I really want to make the military a career.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

8. One reason I'm staying in the military right now is that the poor economy throughout the nation offers me few other good options.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

9. I expect that I'll remain in the military because that is what I feel I ought to do.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

In items #10 - 17, please indicate the categories that apply to you:

10. a. Gender (circle one): Male / Female

b. Branch (Please indicate): _____

11. Civilian Education Level (Circle one): BA/BS MA/MS/MBA PhD

12. Race (Please indicate): _____

13. Rank (Circle one): CPT / MAJ

14. Time in Grade (in months): _____

15. Years of Active Commissioned Service: _____

16. Have you been a Company Commander yet (circle one)? Yes / No

17. Do you have dependents (circle one)? Yes / No

18. What DO YOU THINK your chances are of being selected to command a battalion some day? _____ % (a percent chance, please)

19. Which one of the following statements BEST reflects the basis of your commitment to the army (Check only one)?

_____ I'm committed because I really want to do it.

_____ I'm committed because I have few other options.

_____ I'm committed because I feel that I ought to be.

20. a. What SINGLE GOAL do you have in mind for yourself that once achieved will define a "successful" army career?

b. "I will be disappointed if I do not achieve this goal" (Circle one):

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

21. What other goals in your military career will represent career "successes" OF ABOUT THE SAME VALUE as the one indicated by your answer to number 20a, above?

Considerable changes in the force structure and mission are taking place in the army as it becomes smaller and more contingency-oriented. The army's chain-teaching program has emphasized the need to retain unit readiness for a wider scope of missions despite

extreme resource constraints and budgetary restrictions. It's a tough time for the army.

Perhaps equally disturbing, professionally, is the reduced opportunity to command at the battalion-level. According to the most recent data from PERSCOM (dtd 18 Oct 93), the annual selection rate to battalion command is 8.6% (less than one in ten), data that reflects the impact that the drawdown is having as the army transitions from sixteen to ten active duty divisions.

As successful army officers, it's all too common to assume that the discouraging statistics "apply only to the other guy," and that our own chances of commanding a battalion are exceedingly higher. The fact is, however, that in the wave of the current downsizing, most successful officers will not have an opportunity to command a battalion. While resident attendance at the Command and General Staff School for about half of the army's Majors is considered a key "quality-cut," less than 50% of those will be selected to BN CMD.

****FOR THE PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY****

REGARDLESS OF WHAT YOU ACTUALLY BELIEVE YOUR CHANCES ARE OF COMMANDING A BATTALION, CONSIDER CLOSELY WHAT YOUR ATTITUDES WOULD BE IF YOUR PROBABILITY OF COMMANDING A BATTALION-SIZED UNIT WERE TO BE A TOSS-UP/ 50-50% CHANCE. PLACE YOURSELF IN THIS MINDSET.

****ANSWER ALL THE REMAINING QUESTIONS IN THIS MINDSET****

It is really IMPORTANT that you try to place yourself in a temporary mind-set that reflects this probability throughout the remaining questions. EVEN IF YOU'VE NOT YET COMMANDED A COMPANY, PROJECT YOURSELF INTO THIS SITUATION. Please carefully weigh the impact that such an insight means to you, your family, and your career attitudes.

TO CHECK YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE INSTRUCTIONS, PLEASE INDICATE BELOW WHICH MINDSET THE SURVEY HAS ASKED YOU TO APPLY (place an X in the appropriate space below):

_____ HIGHLY UNLIKELY

_____ A TOSS-UP/50-50 Chance

_____ HIGHLY PROBABLE

REMAINING IN THIS MIND-SET (Please circle one each, #23-40)...

23. I would be enthusiastic about being an army officer.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

24. Changing professions now would be difficult for me to do.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

25. Even if it were to my advantage, I do not feel that it would be right to leave the army now.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

26. I would be proud to be in the military profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

27. There are no pressures to keep me from changing professions.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

28. I believe people who have been trained in a profession have a responsibility to stay in that profession for a reasonable period of time.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

29. Being an army officer would be important to my self-image.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

30. It would be too costly for me to change my profession now.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

31. I would feel a responsibility to the military profession to continue it.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

32. I would regret having entered the military profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

STAY IN THAT MIND-SET...

33. Too much of my life would be disrupted if I were to change my profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

34. I would remain in the military because of a sense of loyalty to it.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

35. I would dislike being an army officer.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

36. I would feel guilty if I left the military.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

37. Changing professions now would require considerable personal sacrifice.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

38. I would not identify with the military profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

39. Given these circumstances, I do not feel any obligation to remain in the military profession.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

40. I have put too much into the military profession to consider changing now.

Strongly Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly Agree

41. ONE LAST QUESTION: How accurately do you believe that you were able to project yourself into the hypothetical situation regarding your command selection potential (circle answer below)?

NOT AT ALL ACCURATELY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VERY ACCURATELY

- SURVEY STOPS HERE -

PLEASE STOP WORK ON THE SURVEY & RETURN IT TO YOUR SECTION POC

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