TION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
	3 June 1994	Master's Thesis, 2 Aug 93-3 Jun 94

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Doctrine, Organization and Employment of the 4th Cavalry Group During World War II

5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)

Captain John N. Tully, USA

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

This study investigates the role played by VII Corps' World War II Cavalry Group, the 4th Cavalry Group, in the European Theater of Operations. The thesis seeks to determine if the group executed its doctrinal mission during the war. Prior to and during World War II cavalry mechanized and as a result the U.S. Army revised the doctrinal role of cavalry. Prior to mechanization, cavalry performed the full range of offensive and defensive missions. These missions included traditional cavalry missions such as reconnaissance, pursuit, and exploitation. However, with mechanization the doctrinal role of mechanized cavalry narrowed to only one of horse cavalry's former missions, reconnaissance. Equally important, the tactics and techniques employed by mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units shifted to emphasize infiltration tactics and avoidance of combat. This study revealed that the 4th Cavalry Group as organized for World War II was deficient in several key areas; specifically, the doctrinal mission was flawed, the doctrinal employment technique was flawed, and the group lacked organizational depth. The 4th Cavalry Group did not perform its doctrinal mission as it was narrowly defined before the war. It did perform reconnaissance extensively, but generally in support of other missions, such as security or offensive operations.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

4th Cavalry Group, 4th Cavalry Regiment, Cavalry Doctrine WWII, Cavalry Employment WWII, Cavalry Organization WWII, Mechanized Cavalry WWII

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

139

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING SF 298

The Report Documentation Page (RDP) is used in announcing and cataloging reports. It is important that this information be consistent with the rest of the report, particularly the cover and title page. Instructions for filling in each block of the form follow. It is important to *stay within the lines* to meet *optical scanning requirements*.

Block 1. Agency Use Only *(Leave blank)*.

Block 2. Report Date. Full publication date including day, month, and year, if available (e.g. 1 Jan 88). Must cite at least the year.

Block 3. Type of Report and Dates Covered. State whether report is interim, final, etc. If applicable, enter inclusive report dates (e.g. 10 Jun 87 - 30 Jun 88).

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. A title is taken from the part of the report that provides the most meaningful and complete information. When a report is prepared in more than one volume, repeat the primary title, add volume number, and include subtitle for the specific volume. On classified documents enter the title classification in parentheses.

Block 5. Funding Numbers. To include contract and grant numbers; may include program element number(s), project number(s), task number(s), and work unit number(s). Use the following labels:

C	- Contract	PR	- Project
G	- Grant	TA	- Task
PE	- Program Element	WU	- Work Unit Accession No.

Block 6. Author(s). Name(s) of person(s) responsible for writing the report, performing the research, or credited with the content of the report. If editor or compiler, this should follow the name(s).

Block 7. Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 8. Performing Organization Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number(s) assigned by the organization performing the report.

Block 9. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es). Self-explanatory.

Block 10. Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Report Number. *(If known)*

Block 11. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere such as: Prepared in cooperation with...; Trans. of...; To be published in.... When a report is revised, include a statement whether the new report supersedes or supplements the older report.

Block 12a. Distribution/Availability Statement. Denotes public availability or limitations. Cite any availability to the public. Enter additional limitations or special markings in all capitals (e.g. NOFORN, REL, ITAR).

- DOD - See DoDD 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."
- DOE - See authorities.
- NASA - See Handbook NHB 2200.2.
- NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 12b. Distribution Code.

- DOD - Leave blank.
- DOE - Enter DOE distribution categories from the Standard Distribution for Unclassified Scientific and Technical Reports.
- NASA - Leave blank.
- NTIS - Leave blank.

Block 13. Abstract. Include a brief *(Maximum 200 words)* factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report.

Block 14. Subject Terms. Keywords or phrases identifying major subjects in the report.

Block 15. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 16. Price Code. Enter appropriate price code *(NTIS only)*.

Blocks 17. - 19. Security Classifications. Self-explanatory. Enter U.S. Security Classification in accordance with U.S. Security Regulations (i.e., UNCLASSIFIED). If form contains classified information, stamp classification on the top and bottom of the page.

Block 20. Limitation of Abstract. This block must be completed to assign a limitation to the abstract. Enter either UL (unlimited) or SAR (same as report). An entry in this block is necessary if the abstract is to be limited. If blank, the abstract is assumed to be unlimited.

DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE 4TH CAVALRY GROUP DURING WORLD WAR II

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN N. TULLY, CPT(P), USA
B.S., Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1994

DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE 4TH CAVALRY GROUP DURING WORLD WAR II

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JOHN N. TULLY, CPT(P), USA
B.S., Texas A&M University, College Station, Texas, 1981

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1994

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: CPT(P) John N. Tully

Thesis Title: Doctrine, Organization, and Employment of the 4th Cavalry Group During World War II

Approved by:

MAJ Stephen C. McGeorge, B.A., Thesis Committee Chairman



LTC Gary L. Bryant, M.S., Member



COL Catherine H.T. Foster, Ph.D., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 3rd day of June 1994 by:



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE 4TH CAVALRY GROUP DURING WORLD WAR II by CPT (P) John N. Tully, USA, 139 pages.

This study investigates the role played by VII Corps' WW II Cavalry Group, the 4th Cavalry Group, in the European Theater of Operations. The thesis seeks to determine if the group executed its doctrinal mission during the war.

Prior to and during WW II cavalry mechanized and as a result the U.S. Army revised the doctrinal role of cavalry. Prior to mechanization, cavalry performed the full range of offensive and defensive missions. These missions included traditional cavalry missions such as reconnaissance, pursuit, and exploitation. However, with mechanization the doctrinal role of mechanized cavalry narrowed to only one of horse cavalry's former missions, reconnaissance. Equally important, the tactics and techniques employed by mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units shifted to emphasize infiltration tactics and avoidance of combat.

This study revealed that the 4th Cavalry Group as organized for WW II was deficient in several key areas; specifically, the doctrinal mission was flawed, the doctrinal employment technique was flawed, and the group lacked organizational depth. The 4th Cavalry Group did not perform its doctrinal mission as it was narrowly defined before the war. It did perform reconnaissance extensively, but generally in support of other missions, such as security or offensive operations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My grandfather, Brigadier General Joseph Merit Tully, U.S. Army (deceased), was the 4th Cavalry Regiment/Group, Commander from 14 November 1941 to 27 November 1944. He led the 4th Cavalry from a peacetime horse and mechanized cavalry regiment to a mechanized cavalry group; from the beaches of Normandy, through France, Belgium and into Germany. My grandfather died when I was young, so it has been with great interest and pride that I researched the accomplishments of the 4th Cavalry. As the record shows the 4th Cavalry Group performed admirably throughout the war.

In addition, I would like to thank my Uncle, Colonel Harry A. Clark, Jr., U.S. Army (retired) for his assistance in gathering some of the documents I used for this thesis. My Uncle also served with the 4th Cavalry. His service with the 4th Cavalry Regiment began as 2LT, Rifle Platoon Leader, in what was an all horse cavalry regiment in July 1939. He went on to serve as a machine-gun platoon leader, troop commander, even an acting squadron commander for a short period, before he was assigned as the XO, 24th Recon Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment (Mech), in April 1943.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The thesis topic is the 4th Cavalry Group of World War (WW) II, a unit that experienced three major organizational changes within four years of entering combat in Europe. The doctrinal mission of WW II mechanized cavalry groups was reconnaissance for corps or larger organizations. Using the operations of the 4th Cavalry Group in the European Theater of Operations as a case study, my thesis question will determine if the 4th Cavalry Group performed its doctrinal mission during WW II. In order to answer this question I will address the following subordinate questions were addressed:

What was the doctrine for cavalry groups during WW II? Was the existing doctrine modified, if so, how?

What were the missions assigned to the 4th Cavalry Group?

Was the table of organization and equipment (TO&E) of WW II cavalry groups suitable to accomplish the missions they were assigned? If not, how was it modified?

Studying WW II cavalry doctrine and the 4th Cavalry Group's organization and operations prior to and during the

war, will result in a historical document which will be useful in analyzing current cavalry organizations and doctrine. This is necessary because the U.S. Army continues to debate and revise the organization and missions of its cavalry units. For example, in 1991-1992, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) reorganized battalion scout platoons from an M3, Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, equipped organization capable of fighting for intelligence, to a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) equipped platoon designed for passive reconnaissance or stealth. This transition will soon be complete for Continental United States (CONUS) units as well.

In addition, in support of the U.S. Army's new force projection strategy, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) has reorganized into a Light Cavalry Regiment (LCR). One of the roles envisioned for the LCR is to perform reconnaissance and security missions for a CONUS based contingency corps or task force.[1] The 2nd ACR's transformation from a forward-deployed heavy ACR to a CONUS based LCR, with different capabilities and limitations, requires a review of doctrine and history to ensure it is properly employed. Lastly, with the implementation of the L-series TO&E, U.S. Army heavy divisions are in the process of reintroducing tanks into divisional cavalry squadrons after a previous reorganization in the 1980s removed tanks.[2]

As one can see from the previous examples, change in U.S. Army cavalry doctrine and organizations continues.

Change is expected; as the threat, equipment and capability evolves, or doctrine changes, so do organizations. Nevertheless, the question remains to be seen if the recent changes were necessary and are they in fact improvements. The importance of studying historical cavalry operations is evident when one considers the U.S. Army's principles of war, our doctrinal foundation. Field Manual 100-5 (1993) identifies three of the nine principles of war, security, surprise, and economy of force, as the basic missions of cavalry.[3] Cavalry security operations enhance the security of the force by providing, at a minimum, early warning. Cavalry reconnaissance operations gather information for the commander, allowing him to make informed decisions and to strike the enemy where he least expects. The mobility of cavalry and its ability to provide commanders security make it ideally suited for economy-of-force roles; thereby, allowing commanders to mass combat power at the decisive point. World War II offers many insights in these areas for large scale conventional operations.

However, there can be a tendency among victorious armies not to look at their operations in a critical light. In the flush of victory, lessons learned are frequently overlooked or forgotten. There are still lessons to be

learned from studying VII Corps' cavalry group, the 4th Cavalry, particularly in light of the development of the LCR. Finally, and perhaps most important, I believe, as do many historians, that the study of history can supply experience and enhance critical judgment.[4] The review of 4th Cavalry's WW II doctrine, organization, and operations will provide a historical record to enhance the critical analysis of current cavalry organizations and doctrine. First a review of the regimental history and other events leading up to WW II.

One of the oldest cavalry regiments, the Fourth Cavalry, was originally activated as the First Cavalry Regiment in March 1855 and organized at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri.[5] During the Civil War, Congress designated all the mounted troops (dragoons, mounted rifles, and cavalry) as cavalry and numbered them by seniority. The 1st Cavalry was redesignated the 4th Cavalry.[6] A regiment with a distinguished history, elements of the 4th Cavalry participated in 20 Civil War Campaigns, 8 Indian War Campaigns (23 Medals of Honor were awarded to 4th Cavalry troopers during the Indian Wars), and 10 Philippine Insurrection Campaigns.[7] The 4th Cavalry was stationed in Hawaii throughout WW I and therefore did not see any action. In 1919 the Regiment returned to the United States for service in Texas along the Mexican Border. In 1924 elements of the Regiment transferred to Fort D.A. Russell, Wyoming,

and Fort Meade, South Dakota. In 1927 the entire Regiment consolidated at Fort Meade, which remained its home station until deployed for WW II.[8]

The roots of 4th Cavalry's eventual mechanization can be traced to the U.S. Army's first large scale attempt to mechanize after WW I, the Experimental Mechanized Force. The Experimental Mechanized Force was organized at Fort Meade, Maryland in July 1928, primarily with old WW I equipment. Just two months later the Experimental Mechanized Force disbanded due to a lack of funds to either repair the old equipment or purchase replacements. In 1930, the outgoing Army Chief of Staff, General Summerall, in an effort to prevent the threatened closure of Ft. Eustis, Virginia, directed the establishment of the Mechanized Force as a "permanent army fixture" and moved it to Ft. Eustis.[9] Despite the statement of permanence the force never became viable, primarily due to lack of an influential constituency and resulting lack of funds. In 1931, General Douglas MacArthur, Army Chief of Staff, disbanded the Mechanized Force and assigned its remnants to the cavalry. MacArthur issued a directive that each branch mechanize to the greatest degree possible. Furthermore, he stated that "To enable cavalry to develop its organization and equipment so as to maintain its ability under modern conditions to perform its mission...the Mechanized Force will be reorganized as a reinforced cavalry regiment."[10]

In 1933, to comply with the Chief of Staff's directive, the Cavalry Branch experimented by dismounting and moving the 1st Cavalry Regiment from Marfa, Texas, to Ft. Knox, Kentucky. This experiment was expanded with the mechanization of the 13th Cavalry Regiment, which together with the 1st Cavalry Regiment and supporting assets from other branches formed the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized). In 1940, Cavalry Branch's 7th Cavalry Brigade and Infantry Branch's Provisional Tank Brigade formed the nucleus of the autonomous "Armored Force" established under General Chaffee. In forming an independent armored force General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, recognized that there was too much institutional inertia against mechanization within the Cavalry and Infantry branches.[11] The formation of the independent armored force signalled the demise of the cavalry branch as a full partner among the combat arms. The chief of cavalry lost mechanization, and the prestige that went with it.[12]

Prior to 1939 there was not a strong movement for mechanization within the U.S. Army. Part of this resistance to change can be blamed on the fact that the Army was starved for funds. After the stunning armored victories by the German Army in Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 the forces espousing mechanization grew stronger.

In 1940 a corps cavalry regiment was provided for each corps as part of the War Department's reorganization of

forces into armies and corps.[13] To support this, in February 1940, at the recommendation of the Chief of Cavalry, two of the twelve Regular Army Cavalry Regiments, the 4th and 6th Cavalry, were transformed into hybrid horse-mechanized (H&M) corps reconnaissance regiments (figure 1).[14] The move was necessary to ensure that the corps cavalry regiments were mobile enough to keep up with divisional and corps units which might move by truck. The new organization contained a regimental staff and band, headquarters troop (included a 37mm anti-tank platoon and pioneer platoon), service troop, and two reconnaissance squadrons: one horse portee'(horse squadron with organic wheeled transportation) and one mechanized.[15] This unique organization sought to take advantage of the high speed mobility of trucks and armored cars on good road networks and the excellent cross-country mobility of horse cavalry in rough terrain. When necessary the entire regiment could move on wheels and sustain an average rate of 25 miles per hour. The 1940 Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) strength of the regiment, including an attached medical section and a chaplain, was 70 officers, 1 warrant officer (the band leader) and 1521 enlisted soldiers; aggregate strength of 1592. The 60 man medical attachment contained 4 doctors, 2 dentists, and a veterinarian.[16]

The horse squadron portee', a motorized horse cavalry unit, consisted of a squadron headquarters and three

rifle troops; authorized squadron strength of 20 officers and 510 enlisted. The squadron headquarters consisted of a headquarters section, communications section, and a caliber .50 machine-gun platoon. Each rifle troop contained three rifle platoons and a light machine-gun platoon. Additionally, the squadron contained 555 horses which could be transported in squad horse semi-trailers (thus the portee' designation) of eight horses each.[17] When necessary the troopers could unload the horses and be operational within a few minutes.

The mechanized squadron also consisted of a squadron headquarters and three troops: two reconnaissance troops equipped with scout cars and motorcycles and a third motorcycle troop equipped with solo motorcycles and either tricycles or motorcycles with sidecars. Major items of equipment found in the squadron included 48 scout cars, 84 motorcycles, and 39 tricycles or motorcycles with sidecars. Each scout car was equipped with two caliber .30 and one caliber .50 machine-guns, making the squadron relatively heavy in machine-guns compared to the horse squadron. The TO&E strength of the squadron was 24 officers and 542 enlisted; aggregate strength, 566.[18]

By the spring of 1941, Cavalry Branch considered the horse and mechanized concept successful and transformed seven federalized National Guard Cavalry Regiments into H&M corps cavalry regiments and assigned them to the appropriate

corps. However, while some may have found the H&M concept acceptable, many within the War Department continued to push for full mechanization of Army forces. The Chief of Cavalry, although not opposed to mechanization per se, vigorously opposed mechanization if it resulted in the loss of any additional horse cavalry.

As part of further reorganization within the War Department, the General Headquarters (GHQ), U.S. Army became the Headquarters, Army Ground Forces (AGF) with control over training, mobilizing, and equipping the expanding ground army. The AGF was initially commanded by Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, a cavalryman. Under this reorganization General McNair gained control over infantry, cavalry, coast artillery (including antiaircraft artillery), field artillery, tank destroyers, and the Armored Force.[19] Furthermore, the War Department decided not to replace the branch chiefs as they retired and to absorb the branch offices into the headquarters AGF.[20] A proponent of modernization, General McNair had previously concluded, based on the Army GHQ maneuvers of 1941, that horse cavalry was no longer viable. Now he was in a position to make changes. In March 1942, a month after Major General John K. Herr retired as the last Chief of Cavalry, the War Department moved to expand the mechanization of the U.S. Army.[21]

Prior to this, Herr had passionately resisted any initiatives to mechanize if the changes were at the expense of existing horse cavalry. MG Herr refused to accept that many of the traditional roles of cavalry could be filled by mechanized and armored forces. These views and his contention that horse "cavalry should be employed in large units" resulted in a bitter working relationship with the War Department General Staff.[22] Beginning in 1942, nondivisional cavalry regiments retired their horses and were transformed into mechanized reconnaissance units; however, the two cavalry divisions initially retained their horses. The 1st Cavalry Division eventually turned in their horses and deployed to the Pacific Theater, essentially operating as a light infantry division. The 2nd Cavalry Division, deployed without horses to North Africa, inactivated in 1944 and converted its regiments into service units.[23]

The 4th Cavalry Corps Reconnaissance Regiment, Horse-Mechanized, received its orders to fully mechanize while participating in Army Day celebrations in Omaha, Nebraska on 6 April 1942. En route to their home station, Fort Meade, South Dakota, the regiment turned in their horses at Fort Robinson, Nebraska after conducting one last regimental review with horses. During the remainder of 1942, the regiment reorganized and completed mechanization, which included the addition of light tanks, assault guns,

and the new 1/4-Ton "Bantam" or "jeep", now the primary reconnaissance vehicle in reconnaissance units.[24]

The cavalry regiment, mechanized (figure 2), consisted of a regimental staff and band, headquarters troop, service troop, and two reconnaissance squadrons (mechanized). The regimental staff included authorization for three liaison officers with armored cars and crew. The 1942 TO&E strength of the regiment, including attachments, increased by 50 men and now contained 79 officers, 5 warrant officers and 1558 enlisted soldiers. The medical attachment increased by 5 men for an aggregate strength of 65 men, to include retention of the 4 doctors and 2 dentists; the veterinarian position was deleted. Each reconnaissance squadron now contained two reconnaissance troops and a support troop.[25]

The reorganized reconnaissance platoons contained an 81mm mortar squad, a pioneer and demolitions squad, and two reconnaissance sections. Each reconnaissance section contained an M8 armored car (firepower and command and control), two jeeps (reconnaissance), and a solo motorcycle (to provides messenger and traffic control).[26]

In addition to the increased firepower gained within the reconnaissance platoons by the addition of armored cars, the squadrons added a support troop. The support troop contained 17 light tanks (headquarters section and three tank platoons), and an assault gun platoon with three 75mm

guns mounted on half-track vehicles. The assault guns were intended for direct fire and were not equipped with indirect fire control equipment. The support troops were the principle striking force within the regiment.[27]

In addition to mechanizing, the regiment participated in the Tennessee Maneuvers from 10 September 1942 to 7 November 1942, and finished the year with intensive home station training. The regiment also lost many experienced personnel during this period of reorganization. The regiment provided a complete enlisted cadre for the 3rd Cavalry and for numerous reconnaissance troops of infantry divisions. Furthermore, the regiment sent more enlisted men to Officer Candidate School than any division in the Second Army. In July 1943 the regiment moved to the Desert Training Center established by General George S. Patton in the California-Arizona desert. The regiment, billeted at Camps Young and Coxcomb, California, completed two cycles of training replacements, each culminating in a regimental maneuver exercise. After completion of desert training the regiment moved to Camp Maxey, Texas, and began preparations for overseas movement. On 5 December 1943 the regiment sailed for England. On 21 December 1943, while stationed at Singleton, West Sussex, England the regiment underwent its third major reorganization in less than four years.[28]

As part of the reorganization of corps headquarters and organic troops outlined in War Department Circular No. 256, October 1943, the regiment was reorganized as a cavalry group, mechanized (figure 3). The intent behind the Army-wide reorganization was to form groups flexible enough to routinely form task forces without any reorganization of units or disruption of units within the old regimental system. To this end, and to economize on personnel and equipment, all nondivisional regiments were abolished in favor of flexible groups. The principle emphasized pooling of units to reduce administrative overhead and facilitate rapid massing of combat power under the command and control of groups.[29]

Theoretically, three to four battalions (self-administered) were attached per group headquarters. At the time it was felt that nondivisional units were best employed in combat as either groups or under divisional control. By streamlining nondivisional units, the corps could concentrate on training and tactical functions and the field army assumed much of the corps administrative functions. In general, staffs were streamlined downward to provide sufficient personnel for combat requirements. The smaller staffs were provided under the general concept that, due to swift operations and the need to keep subordinate commanders with their units, field orders should be oral or in message form and not issued formally to subordinate commanders.[30]

These changes resulted in a considerably leaner cavalry group headquarters and headquarters troop. In addition, the regimental band, service troop, and, much of the attached medical detachment, were deleted or reassigned at squadron level. The cavalry reconnaissance squadrons gained some of the administrative, medical, and logistics assets previously located at regimental level. In addition, the squadrons added a third reconnaissance troop and, with the addition of three more assault guns to the TO&E, formed a six gun assault gun troop. The new squadron TO&E (figure 4) resulted in more robust and self-sufficient squadrons capable of independent operations.

The reorganized 4th Cavalry Group consisted of the group headquarters and headquarters troop, an attached chaplain, a small attached medical detachment (a dentist and enlisted dental technician), and two attached cavalry reconnaissance squadrons, the 4th and 24th Squadrons (formerly the 1st and 2nd Squadrons, 4th Cavalry Regiment). The aggregate strength of the group was approximately 1628 personnel, a reduction of 14 personnel from the mechanized regiment TO&E. In addition, the group retained the 60th Army Ground Forces Band (the old 4th Cavalry Band) as an attachment. In the opinion of one cavalry group commander, the organization "was a compromise organization conceived late in the planning stage after troop spaces had been allocated to other important troop demands."[31]

Besides the major organizational and equipment changes the 4th Cavalry experienced prior to entering combat, doctrine was also modified to reflect organizational changes, modernization, and new philosophies on reconnaissance. In the following chapter I will discuss these issues and further discuss the organization and capabilities of the cavalry group.

Endnotes

[1]Briefing slides on the Light Cavalry Regiment, presented by representatives of U.S. Army Armor Center to Armor branched CGSC Students, August 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

[2]George Salerno, "Repairing the Broken Sabre: Overview of L-Series Divisional Cavalry," Armor 1 (January-February 1994): 30.

[3]U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1993), Chapter 2, 23.

[4]Gary P. Cox, "Of Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War," The Journal of Military History 56 (July 1992): 390.

[5]U.S. Army, The History Of The Fourth United States Cavalry (Washington: Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 1964), 1.

[6]John K. Herr and Edward S. Wallace, The Story of The U.S. Cavalry (Boston: Little and Brown, 1953), 116.

[7]The History Of The Fourth United States Cavalry, 2-24.

[8]S.D. Slaughter et al., "Cavalry Group as an Economy Force-4th Cav Gp, 19-30 Dec 44," Committee 15 Research Report, The Armored School, 1950, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 15.

[9]Mildred H. Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co, 1947), 20-21, 36-37.

[10]Gillie, 47-48.

[11]Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1991), 23-24.

[12]Gabel, 30.

[13]Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., The Twilight Of The U.S. Cavalry, 1917-1942 (Lawrence, KS.: The University Press of Kansas, 1989), 170.

[14]Herr, 248.

[15]Truscott, 170.

[16]War Department, Table of Organization (T/O) No. 2-51, Cavalry Regiment, Horse and Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 3.

[17]War Department, Table of Organization (T/O) No. 2-55, Cavalry Squadron, Horse, Regiment, Horse and Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 1.

[18]War Department, Table of Organization (T/O) No. 2-65, Cavalry Squadron, Mechanized, Regiment, Horse and Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 1-2.

[19]U.S. Army, "Report of Activities: Army Ground Forces," Headquarters, AGF, 10 January 1946, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6.

[20]Truscott, 187-188.

[21]Herr, 252.

[22]Truscott, 188.

[23]Mary L. Stubbs and Stanley R. Connor, Armor-Cavalry, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 70-72.

[24]Slaughter et al., 15-16.

[25]War Department, T/O No. 2-71, Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 2-3.

[26]War Department, Training Circular No. 42, Employment of Cavalry Mechanized Reconnaissance Elements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 1-2.

[27]Ibid., 11.

[28]Slaughter et al., 15-16.

[29]War Department, Circular No. 256, Reorganization of Corps Headquarters and Organic Troops (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 1-3.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Slaughter et al., ii.

CHAPTER 2

DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZATION

Doctrine

As Cavalry Branch launched its experiment with the 1st Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized, at Fort Knox in 1933, the branch grappled with determining the proper employment and missions for mechanized cavalry. Mechanized Cavalry, a 1932-1933 Cavalry School manual stated "the employment of a mechanized cavalry regiment is a project for development."[1] Adopting the principles of employment of cavalry as far as possible, the manual stated the typical employment of the regiment included reconnaissance and security for the main body, rapid deployment and attack by the combat car squadron, occupation of captured ground, pursuit, and withdrawal.[2] In general, mechanized cavalry consisted of units designed for reconnaissance and combat. The Cavalry School manual categorized motorized vehicles into two classes of cavalry fighting vehicles: armored cars and combat cars. Those motor vehicles with a high degree of road mobility, extended range, firepower, armored protection, and designed for reconnaissance were classified as armored cars. Those motor vehicles with a high degree of

cross-country mobility, possessing firepower, and relatively heavier armor, and designed for fighting, including shock-action, were designated combat cars.[3] The designation combat cars represented, in most cases, tanks, a subterfuge to Infantry Branch's proponency for the development of tanks, formally considered an infantry support vehicle at that time.

Two favorable characteristics of the armored car were, among others, its mobility and long range, making them especially valuable at conducting long distance reconnaissance, and harassing and delaying missions. For combat cars, two favorable characteristics were its invulnerability and shock action. The value of shock action lying in the combat cars ability to close with and crush the enemy. In terms of mechanical reliability, both types of vehicles were considered unreliable, the combat car being the worst of the two.[4]

In maneuvers against unmechanized forces in 1936, the 7th Cavalry Brigade, Mechanized, repeatedly defeated the larger light force. Those maneuvers aggravated a simmering debate between those lobbying for a powerful mechanized cavalry organization and those that felt mechanized cavalry was getting away from its traditional missions. Some proposed stripping tanks from the 7th Cavalry Brigade and replacing them with light scout cars. Still others felt these maneuvers supported the idea of mixed horse and

mechanized units.[5] In testimony before a congressional committee in 1939, General Herr, the Chief of Cavalry, when discussing the organization for cavalry expounded on the merits of mixed, horse and mechanized, cavalry. He stated the United States with its large population of horses and its industrial base was positioned to establish the best cavalry in the world. Concerning the role of cavalry he argued that those "who wish to reduce cavalry to a purely reconnaissance arm, are entirely wrong...."[6] Herr argued that while reconnaissance was important to cavalry, it was not its primary mission. Furthermore, cavalry must fight to execute its missions of reconnaissance, pursuit, and covering, in addition to fighting with the other arms to meet the main mission.[7]

The debate continued, with the proponents of lighter mechanized cavalry, focused on reconnaissance, eventually winning the argument. The War Department manuals that outlined the concepts and principles for the doctrinal use of cavalry evolved to reflect mechanization and changing philosophies. Significantly, cavalry doctrine changed to differentiate between missions for horse cavalry units and missions for mechanized cavalry units; the future of mechanized cavalry lying with reconnaissance while horse cavalry remained a multi-functional combat arm. Equally important, the tactics and techniques employed by mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units shifted from seeking successful

results from its ability to "concentrate rapidly for a decisive attack or to withdraw quickly in order to renew action elsewhere,"[8] to emphasizing infiltration tactics and avoidance of combat.

For horse cavalry units, WWII doctrine retained most of the historic combat arms cavalry missions: offensive and defensive combat, reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance. On the other hand, the primary mission identified for mechanized cavalry units was reconnaissance. Mechanized cavalry units were to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration, fire, and maneuver. If infiltrating reconnaissance elements were stopped by enemy action then reserves were committed to penetrate weak points, allowing reconnaissance elements to continue their infiltration.

The new doctrine preached avoidance of combat except when strictly necessary to accomplish the mission. Mechanized reconnaissance units contributed to the security of the supported force by reporting the locations of enemy forces and by providing early warning of an attack. After closure of the main force with the enemy, mechanized reconnaissance assets would either move to an exposed flank, maintain liaison with an adjacent flank, or move into a reserve role.

To illustrate these points, some of the cavalry missions found in the 1941 edition of Field Service Regulations, FM 100-5, Operations, included offensive

combat, exploitation, pursuit, security, limited defense, delays, and mobile reserve. FM 100-5 further specified

> Mechanized reconnaissance units are pushed well forward and to the flanks. They may be reinforced by armored or motorized units, heavy in firepower to delay or block hostile armored or motorized threats. The cavalry regiment, horse and mechanized, contains both portee' and mechanized units. Its primary mission is continuous ground reconnaissance. It may be used for any suitable cavalry mission. It should be reinforced when serious combat is anticipated.[9]

Field Manual 2-15, Employment of Cavalry, dated 1941, describes the horse and mechanized cavalry regiment as a unit "organized and equipped especially to perform reconnaissance and security missions for the army corps."[10] The manual further specified the employment of horse and mechanized regiments.

> The regiment carries out its missions during the concentration and movement of the corps, when contact with the enemy is gained, during battle, pursuit, and retirement. It may be employed as corps reserve. In addition to reconnaissance and security missions, and to carry out these missions, the regiment engages in offensive and defensive operations. When performing reconnaissance and security missions, the regiment normally operates in close cooperation with corps aviation. It may at times be reinforced or supported by motorized Infantry and Engineers and by truck-drawn artillery.[11]

While the emphasis on reconnaissance is evident in both field manuals, Cavalry FM 2-15 (1941) identified as its basic doctrine "the primary mission of cavalry is combat."[12] In addition, while the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 listed

reconnaissance as the primary mission of horse and mechanized regiments, the 1941 edition of Cavalry FM 2-15 listed both reconnaissance and security missions, a significant difference. The basic difference between reconnaissance and security forces is the focus of their missions. As described in FM 100-5 (1941), reconnaissance forces are oriented on obtaining information on the enemy and terrain; security forces are oriented on protecting the friendly force from surprise attack and observation. Reconnaissance units seek to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, and, by working through seams and around flanks and the rear, determine the strength, composition, and intention of the enemy. If required, reconnaissance units attack to gain the information they need. Security missions include advance, flank or rear guards, covering force, and counter-reconnaissance. Forces assigned to security missions conduct reconnaissance as a secondary mission. Security forces are expected to drive back weak enemy forces and to secure for the main body the time and space required for its deployment in reaction to enemy action or as previously planned.[13]

In July 1942 the War Department published Training Circular No. 42, Employment of Cavalry Mechanized Reconnaissance Elements, to outline general employment of mechanized cavalry units until the appropriate field manuals could be updated. The circular stated the primary function

of the corps cavalry regiment, mechanized (as well as the mechanized reconnaissance units in infantry, motorized and cavalry divisions), was reconnaissance. The Training Circular (TC) qualified the statement-the most efficient reconnaissance is carried out by stealth, by further specifying reconnaissance must be aggressive, since essential information frequently can be obtained only through attack. In addition, the TC stated the cavalry regiment could precede the corps at distances up to 150 miles to gather information for the corps commander, and to furnish security against surprise, including the establishment of a counter-reconnaissance screen. However, if missions of security, counter-reconnaissance, delaying action, pursuit, covering a withdrawal, or retirement were executed, they were at the expense of reconnaissance.[14]

Training Circular No. 42 (1942) further outlined the capabilities of the cavalry regiment. The regiment was heavy in firepower but weak in the number of personnel required for close combat. It was equipped to overcome light resistance or bypass established positions and should be able to penetrate hostile screens by utilizing the firepower of the support elements (tanks and assault guns). Faced with missions involving sustained combat, the regiment should be reinforced. The regiment could advance 125 to 150 miles, daily, on a front of 50 to 75 miles, when moving unopposed on good road networks. The unopposed rate of

march was from 25 to 30 miles per hour, this dropped to a maximum of 10 to 15 miles per hour when contact was imminent.[15]

The War Department further modified mechanized cavalry doctrine in September 1943 when it published Training Circular No. 107, Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Units. With the exception of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Divisions (horse), the remainder of the cavalry regiments were by this time transformed into mechanized reconnaissance units. Mechanized reconnaissance elements were spread throughout the Army either as reconnaissance troops in infantry divisions, reconnaissance squadrons in armored divisions, or corps reconnaissance regiments assigned to each corps. This circular further established reconnaissance as the primary mission of mechanized cavalry. Reconnaissance units were envisioned to contributed to the security of the main body by reporting enemy locations and giving warning of attack; information upon which to base the employment of tank destroyer units.[16] So complete was the focus on reconnaissance for mechanized cavalry that Training Circular 107 deleted all mention of counter-reconnaissance, guard, pursuit, withdrawal, or any other mission previously executed by cavalry.

Also of great significance, TC 107 (1943) further emphasized infiltration tactics. "Cavalry reconnaissance units employ infiltration tactics rather than combat to gain

information.... When stealth fails, reconnaissance units engage in combat with enemy forces which threaten the success of the mission."[17] If combat was necessary, the reconnaissance squadron had the capability to engage in offensive or defensive combat; although decisive engagement should be avoided.

While still retaining the full range of "traditional" cavalry missions for horse cavalry, the 1944 edition of Field Service Regulations, FM 100-5, Operations, narrowed the mission of mechanized cavalry to conform with Training Circular No. 107.

> Mechanized cavalry units are organized, equipped, and trained to perform reconnaissance missions employing infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. They engage in combat only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.[18]

Mechanized cavalry performed distant, close or battle reconnaissance of routes, areas, and zones. Depending on the terrain, the reconnaissance could be either mounted or dismounted. Also, mechanized reconnaissance was of great use for distant reconnaissance and when operating over an extended front.[19] Under the definitions of the time, distant reconnaissance provided information on the enemy while the opposing forces were still widely separated and on which the commander based "strategic" (use here is not synonymous with current U.S. Army doctrinal definition) decisions. Close reconnaissance began as the opposing

forces approached contact and provided the commander the information needed on which to base "tactical" decisions. Battle reconnaissance occurred after the forces closed and focused on ascertaining the strength and disposition of the enemy in contact.[20] To understand those reconnaissance missions in our current battlefield framework, equate distant reconnaissance with deep operations and close and battle reconnaissance with the actions that occur in close operations. Reconnaissance troops and squadrons generally would operate with two subordinate units forward and one in reserve. Although dependant on the terrain and routes in the sector, a troop could generally be expected to reconnoiter a 10 mile front and a squadron a 25 mile front.[21]

Furthermore, FM 100-5 (1944) stated the operations of mechanized reconnaissance and aviation were complementary. When the opposing main bodies closed, reconnaissance either moved to an exposed flank to provide reconnaissance, moved into reserve, or was used to maintain liaison between units. Aviation provided much greater depth to the reconnaissance effort. Aviation, under the right circumstances could provide reconnaissance information in great depth behind the enemy security forces.[22]

The intrinsic value of horse cavalry offered by its mobility and flexibility was not transferred to mechanized cavalry. Counter-reconnaissance, exploitation, pursuit,

delaying, and seizing key terrain, to name some of the missions, were left in the domain of horse cavalry;[23] of which there were not any units deployed (with horses that is) to combat theaters.

After the publication of Training Circular No. 107, cavalry manuals were revised to comply with the new doctrine. For example, Field Manual 2-20, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Mechanized, 1944, also states "Reconnaissance missions are performed by employment of infiltration tactics, fire, and maneuver. Combat is engaged only to the extent necessary to accomplish the assigned mission."[24]

In accordance with the pooling philosophy adopted in 1943, Training Circular No. 107 described the cavalry group as an administrative headquarters (much like the current U.S. Army Brigade Headquarters), which trained and tactically commanded attached reconnaissance squadrons. The only units organic to the group were the group headquarters and headquarters troop. However, combat experience appears to have tempered the Army's pooling philosophy and in November 1944 the War Department published Circular No. 439, which amended a portion of Circular No. 256, Reorganization of Corps Headquarters and Organic Troops (1943). Specifically, while continuing to stress tactical flexibility, the amended philosophy emphasized and

encouraged continuity of command, by retention of assignment of battalions to their parent group.[25]

Each cavalry reconnaissance squadron was envisioned to have the capability to reconnoiter a zone 25 miles wide while maintaining a reconnaissance troop and the tank company in reserve. The size of the group zone was dependent upon the number of attached squadrons. For example a group with four attached squadrons could reconnoiter a zone 75 miles wide if one squadron was held in reserve. The size of the zone also varied depending on the routes available, terrain and weather, and the information desired by the commander. In addition, the squadrons could march from 100 to 150 miles daily at the rate of 25 miles per hour on good roads.[26]

The basic reconnaissance vehicle within the group was the jeep, a logical vehicle considering the emphasis on infiltration. Although relatively heavy in firepower when compared to an infantry regiment, the group was not organized or designed for sustained combat. When faced with sustained combat, TC 107 (1943) specified reconnaissance units should be reinforced with "suitable attachments", to include: infantry, field artillery, tanks, tank destroyers, and engineers.[27]

The group commander was responsible for advising the corps commander on the status of training and the tactical employment of all the ground reconnaissance units in the

corps. Other ground reconnaissance units found in the corps included one cavalry reconnaissance troop in each infantry division and one cavalry reconnaissance squadron in each armored division.

To summarize, prior to WW II cavalry was a full partner among the combat arms. With mechanization and the resulting decline of horse cavalry, the role of cavalry narrowed considerably. When cavalry lost proponency for mechanization, the branch was further weakened. Missions previously considered appropriate for cavalry were assumed by the Armored Force or motorized infantry. Prior to mechanization U.S. Army doctrine called for cavalry to perform the full range of offensive and defensive missions. These included traditional cavalry missions such as reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, pursuit, exploitation of a breakthrough, and liaison. However, with mechanization the doctrinal role for mechanized cavalry narrowed to only one of its former missions, reconnaissance. Subsequently, all the mechanized cavalry organizations of WW II were organized, trained, and resourced to perform reconnaissance as their primary mission.

Organization

The WW II cavalry group consisted of an organic headquarters and headquarters troop and two attached cavalry reconnaissance squadrons. Per Table of Organization and

Equipment No. 2-22, Headquarters and Headq.arters Troop, Cavalry Group, Mechanized, dated November 1944, the group headquarters consisted of the command, operations, and administrative and supply sections, staffed by 11 officers and 14 enlisted soldiers. The assistant S-2, a captain, was additionally slotted as the only liaison officer authorized at group headquarters. The headquarters troop consisted of the troop headquarters and communications platoon. The troop headquarters included the Troop Commander, First Sergeant, drivers, and mess and maintenance sections; authorized strength 1 officer and 25 enlisted soldiers. The communications platoon authorized strength was 1 officer and 19 enlisted troopers. In addition, attached to the group headquarters were a medical detachment, consisting of a dentist and dental technician, and a chaplain. Aggregate strength of the group headquarters and headquarters troop, including attachments was 74 (15 officers and 59 enlisted).[28] Throughout the war, the 4th Cavalry Group Headquarters also retained the 60th Army Ground Forces Band as an attachment, size undetermined. As discussion in following chapters will show, the retention of the band was fortuitous for the group. Already lacking organizational depth, the band provided much needed security for the group command post (CP) during operations. The group TO&E was not authorized a security platoon, previously authorized in the regimental service troop.

Each reconnaissance squadron, mechanized (figure 4), within the 4th Cavalry Group contained a headquarters, and headquarters and service troop (strength 138), three reconnaissance troops (A, B, and C-strength 145 each), the assault gun troop (strength 93), the light tank company (strength 97), and an attached medical detachment (strength 14). The aggregate strength of each squadron was 777 men, officers and enlisted.[29] Major items of equipment found in each reconnaissance squadron included seventeen M5 light tanks, six 75mm assault guns, forty M8 light armored cars, eighty-four 1/4-ton trucks (jeeps), twenty-six M3A1 half-track personnel carriers, four M3 half-track ambulances, three tank recovery vehicles, three 81mm mortars, twenty-seven 60mm mortars, and thirty-one bazookas.[30] The squadron was designed to be a relatively self-contained organization.

The headquarters, and headquarters and service troop consisted of a headquarters section, mounted in half-track command vehicles, a communications platoon mounted in four armored cars, a maintenance platoon, and a transportation platoon consisting of sixteen 2-1/2-ton trucks which were the supply vehicles of the squadron.[31]

Within each reconnaissance troop were a headquarters section and three reconnaissance platoons. The reconnaissance platoon consisted of three M8 armored cars and six jeeps (1/4-ton truck), routinely organized into three reconnaissance sections; each section consisted of one

armored car and two jeeps. The primary reconnaissance vehicle within the platoon was the jeep. Within each platoon three jeeps were equipped with .30 caliber light machine-guns on pedestal mounts and three with 60mm mortars. In addition, three of the jeeps were equipped with a short-range, SCR (Signal Corps Radio) 510 FM radio.[32] These trucks were not intended for offensive action.

The M8 armored car was intended for use as a command and control platform. Each armored car was equipped with a medium-range, SCR 508 FM radio for internal communication and a long-range, SCR 506 AM radio for communicating to higher headquarters. The M8's main armament was the 37mm anti-tank gun. This gun fired armor piercing, high explosive and canister ammunition. When firing armor piercing rounds the maximum range of the gun was only 400 meters.[33] Each M8 was also armed with a co-axial .30 caliber light machine-gun and a .50 caliber anti-aircraft gun mounted on a ring mount above the turret. While the 1/4-ton truck possessed excellent cross-country mobility, the armored car had limited mobility cross-country. However, the M8 did have superb range and speed on roads, in addition to a higher level of armor protection for the crew.

The basic organization of the reconnaissance troop was, for the most part, identical in all the reconnaissance organizations in the corps. The exception, the reconnaissance squadron of the armored divisions (compared

to the squadron in the cavalry groups) had an additional reconnaissance troop and an additional assault gun platoon (two guns per platoon).

The primary offensive weapon of the cavalry squadron was the light tank company, F Company. Each company had seventeen M5 light tanks, three five-tank platoons and a two-tank headquarters section. The armament on each M5 light tank consisted of a 37mm main gun and three .30 caliber light machine-guns, one bow, one co-axial, and one antiaircraft. The anti-aircraft machine-gun was pedestal mounted on the turret.[34] The M5 possessed both good road and cross-country mobility. Its light armor provided protection against small arms fire. Training Circular No. 107 stated the role of the tank was "destruction of personnel."[35] The tank company was considered most effective when committed as a unit, supported by fire from assault guns to suppress anti-tank positions. Medium-range SCR 508 FM radios were found on all the tanks.

The assault gun troop, E Troop, was organized into a headquarters platoon and three two-gun platoons. The troop was equipped with 75mm assault guns mounted on a M5A1 light tank chassis, fully tracked, with an open turret. Each assault gun track also came equipped with a light bow machine gun and a .50 caliber anti-aircraft gun, pedestal mounted on the turret.[36] They were designed for employment in both direct fire and indirect fire modes, although normal

employment in the cavalry called for direct laying. They were considered effective against automatic weapon and anti-tank fire using either high explosive or smoke ammunition. Additionally, the high explosive anti-tank round could defeat armor. The assault guns were intended to be held in reserve and used to support the reconnaissance elements as the need arose. As in the case of the light tanks, mounted in each gun carriage was a medium-range SCR 508 FM radio.

All the machine-guns in the squadron, with the exception of the co-axial and bow machine-guns, were provided with ground tripods. This amounted to 39 caliber .50 and 44 caliber .30 machine-guns available for dismounted defensive operations. However, these weapons were best employed from their vehicles. The squadrons were not resourced with the personnel to operate and resupply all these weapons when separated from their vehicles. In addition, each soldier was provided a personnel weapon: either a carbine (the vast majority), M-1 rifle, a .45 caliber pistol, or a .45 caliber sub machine-gun. Together with the 81mm and 60mm mortars, the 37mm anti-tank guns on the M8s and M5s, and the 75mm assault guns, the squadrons possessed a great deal of firepower.[37]

The squadron's attached medical detachment consisted of two doctors and twelve enlisted medics or technicians. The transportation authorized for the medical detachment included four M3 half-track ambulances and one 1/4-ton jeep.

The group aggregate for medical personnel, including the two squadron's medical detachments and the dental team at group headquarters, totalled 30; a considerable reduction from the 65 medical personnel previously authorized under the regimental TO&E.

In addition to shifting medical assets to squadron control, the group TO&E relocated administrative and logistics assets from group control to squadron control. The reorganization gave the reconnaissance squadrons the ability to operate logistically independent from the group headquarters. And as you will see in the following chapter this was necessary as the squadrons frequently operated independently or widely separated.

Endnotes

[1]The Cavalry School, Mechanized Cavalry, (Academic Division, The Cavalry School, Fort Riley, Kansas, 1932-1933), 55.

[2]Ibid., 55-57.

[3]Ibid., 3.

[4]Ibid., 4-7.

[5]Mildred H. Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co, 1947), 98-101.

[6]Mary L. Stubbs and Stanley R. Connor, Armor-Cavalry: Army Lineage Series, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 70.

[7]Ibid.

[8]War Department, FM 2-15, Cavalry Field Manual, Employment of Cavalry (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 1.

[9]War Department, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations-Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941), 8.

[10]FM 2-15 (1941), 4.

[11]Ibid., 4.

[12]Ibid., 5.

[13]FM 100-5 (1941), 40-49.

[14]War Department, Training Circular No. 42, Employment of Cavalry Mechanized Reconnaissance Elements (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 11.

[15]T.C. No. 42 (1942), 11.

[16]War Department, Training Circular No. 107, Employment of Mechanized cavalry Units (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 1.

[17]Ibid., 5.

[18]War Department, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations-Operations (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 9-10.

[19]Ibid., 52.

[20]FM 2-15 (1941), 89.

[21]FM 100-5 (1944), 10.

[22]Ibid., 51-53.

[23]Ibid., 8-9.

[24]War Department, FM 2-20, Cavalry Field Manual, Cavalry Reconnaissance Troops, Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 2.

[25]War Department, Circular No. 439, Untitled Change Document (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 4.

[26]T.C. No. 107 (1943), 6-7.

[27]Ibid., 4.

[28]War Department, Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), No. 2-22, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Group, Mechanized (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1944), 1-4.

[29]War Department, TO&E No. 2-25, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 2.

[30]Ibid., 2-3.

[31]Harry A. Clark Jr., "Operations of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), 4th Cavalry Group (VII Corps) in the Normandy Campaign, France, 6-27 June 1944," Student Monograph, 1949, Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, GA, 4.

[32]Ibid., 4-6.

[33]T.C. No. 107 (1943), 2.

[34]Clark, 5.

[35]T.C. No. 107 (1943), 3.

[36]Clark, 5-6.

[37]Ibid., 5-6.

CHAPTER 3

COMBAT RECORD

Normandy

Attached to the VII United States (U.S.) Corps, First Army, the 4th Cavalry Group's combat experience began with the D-Day invasion of Western Europe in Normandy (see Figure 5). The VII Corps' missions were to establish a beachhead on the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula at Utah Beach, to link up with V Corps landing on Omaha Beach, and to capture the port of Cherbourg. In support of the invasion the group was initially parcelled out on special missions and portions of the group, even individual troops, were attached to separate infantry or airborne divisions.

The 4th Cavalry Group's first combat mission began when a detachment from both squadrons, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Edward Dunn, Commander, 4th Cavalry Squadron, landed on the Isles St. Marcouf, six thousand yards off Utah Beach, as part of the Normandy invasion on D-Day, 6 June 1944. The VII Corps Field Order Neptune, Assault of Utah Beach and Capture of Cherbourg, stated the mission of the detachment as:

> (1) Will land on the Iles St. Marcouf at H-2 hour on D day to capture and destroy any enemy installations

thereon. (2) Upon relief by Det 535 AA Artillery late on D day will land on UTAH BEACH and proceed to VII Corps CP to provide local guard.[1]

Aerial reconnaissance had shown signs of trench work on the islands; and, since the islands had a commanding view of the beaches, the decision was made to secure the islands prior to H-hour, 0630 hours. The detachment landed at 0430 hours, found the islands uninhabited, and, except for a large number of mines, encountered no other obstacles. The islands were turned over to an anti-aircraft unit the next day, and the task force moved onto the beach where they initially secured the VII Corps Command Post (CP) at Audouville La Hubert.[2]

Troop B, 4th Cavalry Squadron was attached to the 82nd Airborne Division during the Normandy invasion. The mission of this element was to reconnoiter routes and act as a screening force for seaborne elements of the 82nd Airborne Division seeking to link-up with their division headquarters element around Ste. Mere Eglise. The lead element of Troop B, the Third Platoon, was the first unit from the group to reach the mainland, landing on Utah Beach at 0930 hours, 6 June 1944. After unsuccessfully attempting to fight their way to Ste. Mere Eglise they were given the mission of evacuating injured paratroopers from damaged gliders in the area.

On D+1 the platoon linked up with the headquarters element of the 82nd Airborne Division in an orchard north of

the Ste. Mere Eglise-St. Sauveur road. On D+2, two M8 armored cars, acting as the advance guard for two companies of paratroopers, attacked a suspected German garrison in the vicinity of Carquebut. After spraying the building with fire from their .50 caliber machine-guns, 125 Germans quickly surrendered. On D+3, while patrolling, the platoon was involved in a meeting engagement with a German convoy of approximately 150 men. The platoon leader immediately attacked with his three armored cars spraying the Germans with canister from their 37mm guns and .50 caliber machine-gun fire. Farther down the road they encountered and destroyed three anti-tank guns and six half-track motorcycles. During three days of combat the platoon killed or captured 300 Germans, including five officers, destroyed three two-ton trucks, six motorcycles, and three anti-tank guns. The platoon losses included four wounded in action and two damaged jeeps, all the result of artillery fire received on Utah Beach.[3] On D+4, the 3rd Platoon linked up with the remainder of B Troop and the Troop was used by the 82nd Airborne Division for combat patrols.

Doctrinally, the reconnaissance platoon was misused from this first mission. The 3rd platoon, B Troop, 4th squadron was not used primarily for reconnaissance missions, but, instead executed security missions. Doctrinally mechanized cavalry contributed to the security of the main force by reporting enemy activity. This platoon instead was

actively and highly successfully used in a guard mission, involving combat not stealth.

Troop C, 4th Cavalry Squadron was given a similar mission and attached to the 101st Airborne Division. Troop C landed on Omaha Beach on 9 June 1944. The troop was used for flank security during the attack on Carentan and for liaison with adjacent divisions. On the final day of their attachment, 15 June, Troop C, reinforced with 10 tanks and two reconnaissance platoons from Combat Command A (CCA), 2nd Armored Division (2AD), made two unsuccessful attempts to penetrate the enemy positions in front on Carentan.[4]

On 23 June, Troop B was attached to the 90th Infantry Division and given the mission of conducting reconnaissance from Portbail to Barneville on the Cotentin Peninsula. This mission lasted for six days and on 29 June the Troop was attached to the 39th Infantry Regiment, 9th Infantry Division with the mission of reconnoitering the advance of the regiment to Auderville. The troop successfully infiltrated the enemy's defensive line, under the cover of darkness, by rolling downhill through their positions with the engines of their jeeps and armored cars turned off. Troop B pushed ahead to Auderville and attacked the surprised garrison. By daylight the troop was in complete control of the town and had captured over 500 prisoners.[5] On 3 July the troop reverted to 4th Squadron control.

By the 18th of June, the Group Headquarters and 4th Cavalry Squadron, minus B Troop, were consolidated to perform the mission of maintaining contact between the 9th and 79th Infantry Divisions as VII Corps drove on the vital port of Cherbourg. On 19 June the Group (minus 24th Squadron) was attached to the 9ID with the mission of protecting the division's right flank, as the VII Corps initiated its attack to capture Cherbourg (Figure 6). After brushing aside small pockets of resistance the squadron relieved an infantry battalion and from this position protected the left and rear flanks of the division. While this mission was performed predominantly from dismounted defensive positions, the squadron managed to infiltrate patrols behind enemy lines, in one case for three days, to gather information and acquire targets for artillery fires.[6]

On 15 June 1944, the 24th Cavalry Squadron(-), 4th Cavalry Group, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Gaston, Jr., landed on Utah Beach. The following day they were attached to the 4th Infantry Division (4ID) and assigned the mission of relieving the 22nd Infantry Regiment on the Quineville-Montebourg ridgeline (Figure 7). The 4ID's reconnaissance troop was attached to the squadron for this mission. The squadron, in an economy-of-force role, was given the mission of screening the ridgeline and preventing any enemy movement to the south. The reconnaissance troops dismounted and conducted the relief in place during the

hours of darkness. Unfortunately, the reconnaissance troops were unable to utilize their vehicles due to the lack of cover and concealment and the close proximity of the enemy. Troop E established a battery position and registered their guns. An artillery liaison officer from VII Corps, with forward observers, was attached to the squadron to provide additional fire support. To complete the defense the squadron commander placed Company F and Troop A, less one platoon on the screen line, in reserve.[7]

Enemy prisoners of war revealed the strength of the enemy opposing the sector as a reinforced infantry regiment. During the following two days both sides exchanged artillery fire and probed the perimeters with small patrols. The sector included the coastal town of Quineville and extended along a pronounced ridge 4000 yards to the west. Due to the nature of the terrain the squadron established dismounted positions and linked them together with mounted patrols as best as the terrain would permit. North of the ridge was the Sinope River Valley which contained one intact bridge which led to the town of Bourg de Lestre.

On 18 June the Troop C Commander, Captain Bone, was given the mission of sending a dismounted patrol to reconnoiter the crossroads north of the intact bridge and northwest of Bourg de Lestre. A 20 man patrol crossed the bridge at 0300 hours, 19 June and established positions at the crossroads by 0500 hours. At 0630 hours three Germans

were killed as they approached the crossroads. A large fire fight ensued with the Germans counterattacking the patrol with approximately 100 men. The patrol withdrew with heavy losses; 8 killed in action (KIA), and 7 captured (and later recovered after Cherbourg fell). At 1400 hours the squadron commander ordered the tank troop commander to conduct an attack to the crossroads. After Troop E fired a 10 minute high explosive (HE) artillery preparation in the vicinity of the crossroads, followed by a concentration of white phosphorous (WP), two tank platoons attacked the enemy positions. The maneuver caught the enemy unprepared and resulted in the destruction of approximately 75 enemy soldiers, two anti-tank guns, and a large ammunition cache. The following day patrols verified the Germans, many of whom were later reported by French civilians as wounded, had withdrawn from Bourg de Lestre during the night. By noon, 20 June, it was apparent that General Von Schleiben, the German Commander, had ordered a withdrawal of the remnants of his four divisions towards Cherbourg. By this time the 9ID had completely cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, isolating Schleiben's forces on the peninsula.[8]

After reporting the withdrawal of the enemy forces to 4ID headquarters, the squadron received orders on 20 June to extend their screen to the west and to reconnoiter to the north in the area east of the Sinope River. Troop B, using dismounted strong points linked by mounted patrols, remained

to cover the entire squadron front west of the Sinope River, while A and C Troops moved out mounted on 20 June. Both troops, task organized with assault guns, were followed by Company F in reserve and Troop E (minus), supporting. Both troops pushed out their screen against light resistance, encountering fleeing enemy columns, and picking up enemy stragglers. The squadrons eastern sector, along the channel was for the most part unoccupied by Germans. Troop A captured two Germans guarding a bridge prepared for demolition over the Sinope River and secured the bridge. By 1945 hours, 21 June, Troop A's screen was stopped by enemy resistance along the line Theville-Gonneville-Le Theil. The 4ID reinforced the squadron late on the 21st of June with a company of tank destroyers, followed by the division's reconnaissance troop on 22 June. On 22 June, Troop C, continuing to push its screen northwest, was stopped by enemy resistance. The troop determined the enemy's new main line of resistance extended from Theville north through Coaqueville to the coast.[9]

On 23 June the 4th Infantry Division attached the 24th Squadron to the 22nd Infantry Regiment with the mission of protecting the regiments supply route. Up to this point, because of enemy activity, almost the entire infantry regiment was occupied with keeping their supply route open. The use of the squadron in this case was an economy of force, releasing the infantry regiment for other missions.

The squadron established dismounted positions, reinforced by armored cars in depth, to secure the road. During the following four days, in addition to defending the supply route, the squadron's tank company, operating detached from the squadron, participated with the infantry in the seizure of the towns of Pinabel and Gonneville (see Figure 7). With capture of Gonneville the threat to the supply route lessened considerably and a portion of the squadron was used to contain enemy forces located at the Maupertus Air Field. After a savage fight the air field was reduced by the 22nd Infantry on 26 June. During the 24th Cavalry Squadron's first 11 days of combat, primarily defensive missions, they killed 205 and captured 342 enemy soldiers, while sustaining 11 KIAs, 45 WIAs, and 3 MIAs.[10]

After the fall of the city of Cherbourg (figure 8) the Group Commander, Colonel (COL) Joseph M. Tully, assigned the 4th Squadron(-) the mission of guarding the left flank of the 9ID as it pushed out to eliminate resistance in the remainder of the peninsula. The squadron was given the mission of working through 15 consecutive objectives to the northeast tip of the Cotentin Peninsula, Cape de la Haque. The 4th Squadron was to capture or destroy all enemy troops, neutralize enemy fortifications, and seal off all escape routes. The entire operation was conducted dismounted; the cavalry troops fought as infantry, alongside infantry, certainly not a mechanized cavalry mission. The 75mm

assault guns of the squadron were not used for direct fire, as originally intended, but instead supported the operation with indirect fire. At the completion of the Cape de la Haque mission the 4th Squadron(-) had captured 600 prisoners.[11]

From 2 to 8 July the entire group was attached to the 101st Airborne Division with the mission conducting offensive operations to destroy scattered enemy resistance in the Cape de la Haque Peninsula. Although consolidated the group was still not executing its doctrinal mission specified in TC 107 (1943), reconnaissance for corps or larger units. Regardless, following this mission the entire group was attached to the 9ID, which instructed the group to relieve the 8th Infantry Regiment. The new defensive mission consisted of fixing an isolated pocket of enemy forces established on two islands surrounded by marshy terrain. On 15 July the group, less the 24th Squadron, was relieved from this mission and moved to an assembly area to prepare for the planned breakthrough at Marginy. Also on 15 July, LTC John F. Rhoades assumed command of the 4th Squadron. The previous commander, LTC Edward C. Dunn transferred to group headquarters to assume duties as the group executive officer.[12]

From 15 to 19 July the 24th Squadron was attached to the 330th Infantry Regiment, 83rd Infantry Division. During this attachment the squadron conducted screening and flank

security operations, defended gaps between infantry battalions and provided tank support during offensive operations. On 19 July the 24th Squadron, less Troop B attached to the VII Corps CP to provide local security, was attached to the 2nd Armored Division (2AD) and moved into an assembly area to prepare for the breakthrough. While in the assembly area they conducted maintenance and installed hedge-cutting devices on their tanks and assault gun tracks.[13]

Up to this point the group had operated extensively dismounted and for the most part attached to infantry divisions. When attached to infantry divisions the divisional cavalry reconnaissance troops were frequently attached to the squadrons. Furthermore, due to the parcelling out of the group, the group commander at any one time, generally controlled only one of his two squadrons. Although trained and equipped for mounted reconnaissance, much of the operations to this point were dismounted and consisted primarily of security and defensive missions. Furthermore, many of the missions were economy-of-force operations. Due to the abundance of non-doctrinal missions executed by the group during the Normandy Campaign, the group had learned to be versatile and prepared for a variety of missions.

Concerning the equipment used by the group, the following lessons were learned during their initial combat

experiences. The performance of the 37mm, using canister ammunition at close quarters, was very successful against personnel and light skinned vehicles. Unfortunately, the armor piercing rounds of the 37mm guns were found inadequate. Employing tanks with infantry support also proved very effective. In addition, the assault guns were found to be most effective when employed, for indirect fire, as a battery.[14]

Breakthrough

To break the near-stalemate in the Cotentin Peninsula General Omar Bradley, First Army Commander, decided to use VII Corps to initially break through a portion of the front following a massive aerial bombardment (Figure 9). First Army's Operation Cobra would open a penetration south of Marginy, then pass Patton's Third Army out into more open country to exploit the penetration. Operation Cobra began on 25 July with the "mightiest air armada ever planned in support of a ground attack";[15] saturation bombing along a 7000 yard by 4000 yard front. Despite heavy fratricide from Army Air Corps bombs hitting VII Corps units the initial penetration was successful.

The group headquarters and 4th Squadron were attached to the 1st Infantry Division (1ID), motorized, for the breakthrough. The plan called for the 4th Squadron, minus C Troop, to follow Combat Command "B" (CCB), 3rd

Armored Division (3AD), also attached to 1ID, through the initial penetration, then peel off to the north and west to screen the armored forces. Troop C was attached to a task force, commanded by the assistant division commander, which planned to establish a security screen southwest of Marigny. Late in the afternoon of 25 July, after a four hour aerial bombardment, the 4th Squadron moved out through bomb pitted roads behind CCB.[16]

Late on 26 July CCB was held up by strong enemy resistance in front of Marigny and the squadron deployed out to high ground to the west of the column and set up screening positions. The following morning Troop B was ordered to extend the screen farther to the west and Troop A was ordered to attempt to find a western bypass around Marigny. Troop A discovered a large enemy force positioned across the Marigny-La Cardenniere road which threatened the division's main axis of advance. Troop A attacked with two reconnaissance platoons and one platoon of tanks. With the support of artillery fires from Troop E they penetrated the enemy position and established blocking positions to contain the force. Shortly thereafter Troop A was counterattacked by a superior German force. Despite suffering heavy casualties, they held their positions against continuous attacks until relieved by a reinforced infantry battalion.[17]

For the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Operation Cobra began at 0600 hours, 27 July. Attached to

2AD, the squadron initially reconnoitered south through the area bombed by the air corps. Later on 27 July, at 1500 hours, the squadron was parcelled out to two task forces assigned missions to reconnoiter in force. Task Force One, consisting of the 3rd Battalion 66th Armored Regiment, Troop A and 3rd Platoon Company F, 24th Reconnaissance Squadron, and some attached engineers, was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force towards Tessy sur Vire. Task Force Two, consisting of the 2nd Battalion 66th Armored Regiment, 24th Squadron(-), and one company of infantry, was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance in force towards Villebaudon. Both task forces encountered stiff resistance from enemy units conducting delaying actions.[18]

On the night of the 27 July, Troop A, reinforced with a platoon from Company F, pushed out forward of their task force to establish a counter-reconnaissance blocking position. Troop A continued attacking towards the task force objective the following morning. On the night of 28 July the squadron's interrogation and prisoner of war team discovered from a German prisoner that the German 2nd Armored Reconnaissance Battalion was bivouacked 800 meters from Task Force Two. Thereby alerted to the threat, both task forces repulsed enemy attacks at first light without losing any ground. Troop A attacked and seized the high ground south of Le Mesnil Baudon. Later that day the troop repulsed a counterattack by a German force attempting to

retake the high ground. Late in the day of the 28th the 1st and 2nd Platoons of Troop F were attached to separate tank battalions of the 66th Regiment.[19]

On the 28th, the 4th Squadron was ordered to extend their reconnaissance screen south of Cametours. After reaching that area at 1300 hours on the 29th they were attached to the 4ID and given the mission of destroying enemy remnants in the area west of Notre Dame Cenilly which the division had by-passed as it attacked south. This mission was rescinded at 1500 hours and the squadron was instructed to move southward, conduct a forward passage of lines through friendly forces at Hambye, cross the Sienne River and seize the ridgeline in the vicinity of Percy and Mesnil Bonant. The goal of the reconnaissance was to determine the strength of the enemy positions and acquire a line of departure for the division to continue operations south. However, the squadron was stopped by strong enemy forces south and east of Hambye. The squadron launched local attacks and patrols, mounted and dismounted, to find the enemy's flanks, composition and strength. They deduced that the Germans intended to hold the line north of the Sienne River barrier in an effort to stop the American drive.[20]

On the morning of the 30th, Troop C patrolled to the east from Hambey towards Villebaudon, only to encounter two tiger tanks controlling the road. Other probes to the

southeast towards Percy were also stopped. By noon it was apparent the squadron lacked the firepower to penetrate the solid German defensive line between St. Denis-le-Gast to Villebaudon. The squadron was recalled and given the missions of maintaining contact between the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions and of mopping up enemy forces between two advancing infantry regiments. These missions were accomplished by having the divisional reconnaissance troop, still attached to the squadron, cover the division's left flank, Troop C maintained contact between two infantry regiments and Troop A was attached to the 8th Infantry Regiment for mopping up operations behind the regiment. Troop B maintained contact between the two divisions. The 4ID's "Commander's Recorded Oral Orders for 31 July" stated, "4th Rcn Squadron will continue present mission. One Rcn Troop and one Tank Troop will be in division reserve."[21]

These missions continued until 1 August when the 4th Squadron received a priority mission to push reconnaissance to the vital road network at Villedieu. The importance of this town to the German defense was later borne out in captured documents quoting Field Marshall von Kluge, the German Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front. "Villedieu, spring board for the east and south, as well as Avranches the anchor point for Brittany must be held under all circumstances, or will have to be recaptured."[22]

Troop B swung west around friendly infantry positioned north of Villedieu and found the western and southern approaches of the town open. Seizing the initiative, the troop moved into Villedieu, followed by Troops A (dismounted), E, and Company F. The squadron eliminated resistance within the town and quickly established a defensive line, tanks in reserve, for the expected counterattack. The enemy counterattacked with an estimated company of infantry supported by tanks and other armored vehicles. The attack was met by small arms fire, bazooka, 37mm, and, for the first time, direct fire from the 75mm assault guns of Troop E. The enemy retreated, leaving three destroyed armored vehicles, only to launch three more counterattacks in the next six hours, all repulsed. The squadron was later relieved by a reinforced infantry battalion.[23] For their action the Commander, 4ID, in "Order of the Day Number 9, Commendation For Meritorious Service," dated 2 August 1944, recognized Troops A and B, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. In part the citation read

> With a daring and lighting fast thrust, the Cavalry troops attacked the town. Troop "B" immediately surrounded the town with a bold, well planned, and executed maneuver so as to prevent the escape of any enemy troops. Troop "A" dismounted upon contacting the elements of Troop "B" and entered the town from several directions. With daring and aggressive action the last elements of enemy resistance were destroyed or captured.[24]

The 31st of July marked the end of the breakthrough phase and 1 August the beginning of Third Army's breakout from Normandy and into Brittany. The group operations during this critical operation were for the most part conducted mounted. The preponderance of missions executed by the 4th Squadron were mounted security missions. On the other hand, the 24th Squadron executed security and offensive operations as part of tank heavy task forces. The highlight of the period was 4th Squadron's seizure and defense of the critical communications and road center, Villedieu.

At midnight on the 1st of August the group headquarters and 4th Squadron were reattached to 1ID and given the mission of screening the division's right (southern) flank on its advance towards Mortain. On 2 August 1ID requested and received the attachment of the 24th Squadron and subsequently gave the 24th Squadron the mission of covering the left rear flank of the division. The division's reconnaissance troop and a platoon of infantry also supported this mission. This task force was placed under the command of the 4th Cavalry Group Commander.[25] On the 3rd of August the group commander was instructed to cover the First Army's right flank during its move east towards Paris, while remaining attached to 1ID. For the next four days the group aggressively conducted counter-

reconnaissance and screening operations, to include the seizure of Barenton, as the First Army pushed east.[26]

Mortain Counterattack and Falaise Pocket

On 7 August the German 7th Army Group counterattacked in the vicinity of Mortain with the intent of cutting across the Cotentin Peninsula and isolating the Third Army moving to the south and east. Elements of the 4th Cavalry Group were immediately involved in delaying actions. Penetrating enemy forces came within 200 yards of the group command post. "Every available individual, including the kitchen and members of the band, were utilized to man positions outposting the CP."[27] An even more serious situation was developing in the 30th Infantry Division (30ID) sector. The group, less 24th Squadron which remained to screen 1ID's left flank, was quickly attached to 30ID with the mission of filling the gap between the 1ID and 30ID. By the end of the day, the enemy had retaken Mortain and the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry, 30ID was cutoff and surrounded (Figure 10).[28]

The XIX Corps Commander, realizing that reinforcements were needed, dispatched the 134th Infantry Regiment, 35th Infantry Division (35ID) to reinforce the 30ID. The Group Commander, COL Tully, established liaison between this regiment and 30ID, and briefed the

reinforcements on the enemy situation. In addition, the group commander directed the group assistant operations officer, Major Matthew Beebe, to join the regiment on 8 August. This proved fortuitous when later that day two battalions of the reinforcing regiment were also isolated by enemy forces. The operations officer provided a critical communications link between the isolated regiment and the 30ID. The next day the 320th Infantry, with fire support from the 4th Squadron, succeeded in breaking through to the surrounded regiment. By the 9th of August the height of the crisis had passed and the Commanding General, 30th Division, commended the commanding officer and all elements of the group, "For the important role played by the group in the Mortain counterattack while attached to the 30th Division...."[29]

The group, less the 24th Squadron, was attached to the 35th Infantry Division from 9-12 August and was used to fill the gap between the 30th and 35th Infantry Divisions. On 12 August, the group headquarters and the 24th Squadron were attached to the 1ID.

On 11 August three tanks from Company F, 4th Squadron (still attached to 35ID) escorted a resupply convoy to the beleaguered 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry. Other than aerial resupply, and the unique use of empty artillery smoke shells filled with critical medical supplies fired to the battalion for resupply,[30] this was the first resupply to

reach the surrounded battalion in five days of continuous combat. On the same day, 30ID recaptured Mortain and by 12 August the Germans broke off their ill-fated attempt to cut off the Third Army. General Bradley now saw an opportunity to crush the German Army in Normandy in the Falaise Pocket.

The 4th squadron was attached to the 4th Infantry Division from 12 August until 14 August, then it reverted to group control and joined the group screen. On 16 August the group reverted to corps control and was put in reserve until the next day when it was given the mission of establishing a screen to cover the eastward advance of VII Corps and to establish contact with Third Army units. Company B, 237th Engineer Battalion, was attached to the group for this mission. By the 19th of August allied armies had completely encircled the Falaise Pocket; unfortunately, portions of the German Seventh Army and Fifth Panzer Army had escaped east. On 20 August, the group, still under corps control, was ordered to screen the assembly of the 9ID, while preventing any enemy movement to the south. After 9ID moved into sector, the group was attached to the infantry division. Also, effective 21 August, the 759th Light Tank Battalion was attached to the group and was put in reserve by the group commander. The 759th would remain attached to the group for much of the rest of the war.

Exploitation and Pursuit

On 24 August, the First Army, now comprised of the VII, V, and XIX Corps, moved east towards the Seine River between Melum and Paris (Figure 11). Third Army was exploiting the breakout by this time and the move was a route march with the 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced, reconnoitering the corps' advance against no opposition.[31] This action, up to the Seine, constituted a rare doctrinal use of the group. On 25 August, the group reached the Seine River and, the 24th Squadron reconnoitering along the river for bridges and fording sites, found a ponton bridge constructed by the Seventh Armored Division (7AD) at Tilly. That evening the group commander instructed the 24th Squadron to cross the Seine, in conjunction with elements of the 3AD, and to set up a screen along the corps' left boundary. The remainder of the group, with attachments, crossed the following morning, with the reconnaissance squadrons instructed to push out the screen.[32] The tank battalion, less one company detached to the corps CP for security, remained in reserve. The 4th Squadron moved out with three reconnaissance troops abreast and quickly encountered enemy opposition.

> Troop C having discovered...an enemy axis and supply route, succeeded in capturing or destroying four enemy staff cars, six trucks and two motorcycles as well as killing twenty enemy and capturing thirty...by waylaying them on this route.[33]

The 24th Squadron, moving north from their assembly area at Seine Port, encountered enemy positions in the vicinity of Reau. Troop A was stopped by an enemy position estimated at 300 personnel. Likewise, portions of Troop B were stopped by an enemy heavy weapons company northeast of Reau. A platoon from Troop B, led by Lt. Rubin, bypassed the fight and moved to the east-west road through Tournan-Enbbie. This road turned out to be an enemy communication route and the platoon was able to cause considerable damage to enemy traffic with their 37mm and machine-gun fire.[34]

While both reconnaissance squadrons were heavily engaged on either flank the group headquarters and tank battalion pushed ahead in the center of the sector, towards the Marne River. The headquarters pushed ahead until stopped by enemy forces just east of Chevry Cossigny on 26 August. The tanks cleared out the enemy forces in the vicinity of the group CP and discovered a German Infantry Regiment of undetermined strength on the west side of the highway. Since the reconnaissance squadrons were unable to assist, the group commander committed his reserve, two tank companies, to block the enemy regiment attempting to retreat east. By daybreak the following morning 96 prisoners had been captured in the vicinity of the group CP.[35]

After receiving information of heavy vehicular traffic in the vicinity of Grisy-Suisnes, the group commander ordered one company of light tanks from the 759th

Tank Battalion, supported by the assault guns of 24th Squadron, to attack Grisy. The assault guns established positions 4000 yards from Grisy and decimated a German column in the town, destroying over 40 vehicles. At about the same time the group commander ordered one tank platoon and a troop from the 83rd Reconnaissance Squadron, temporarily attached to the group due to the fluid situation, to attack a group of Germans in the forest northeast of Grisy. They executed this mission capturing 75 more prisoners. However, this action forced other Germans to withdraw in the direction of the group CP, while the corps commander was paying a visit. Soon mortar fire and small arms fire erupted around the CP. "Even our band had taken up a skirmish line along the road toward the enemy, affording local security for our CP."[36] To help eliminate the dismounted threat the corps commander loaned the group a company of infantry from the 9ID and along with the 759th Tank Battalion they annihilated the pocket of Germans. Only 40 more prisoners were taken after 103 81mm mortar rounds were dropped on the surrounded force.[37]

The group, during the period 26-27 August, captured 496 prisoners and inflicted heavy casualties on a fleeing enemy. The action described above was one of many actions marking the beginning of the allies pursuit of the Germans to the Siegfried Line or West Wall. Continuing the pursuit, the entire group crossed the Marne River on 28 August and

was the first American unit to occupy Chateau Thierry in WW II. The situation remained very fluid as the group, pursuant to corps orders, pushed a security screen behind the fleeing enemy forces. Numerous German convoys were destroyed during this period. The allies advanced so quickly that on 30 August elements of the 4th Squadron were forced to stop due to a shortage of gasoline. Portions of the squadron were able to keep moving and at Seraincourt ambushed another enemy convoy, killing six and capturing 50 enemy soldiers.[38]

As the First Army neared Belgium, General Omar Bradley, the Twelfth Army Group Commander since the break through, saw a chance to destroy the German Seventh Army, then withdrawing towards Brussels, by wheeling the First Army north to trap the German army. However, by doing this, almost a 90 degree wheel for VII Corps, it would open a gap between VII Corps, the right flank corps of First Army, and Third Army.

The corps commander initially thought of dropping off the 9ID to fill the gap, but in an economy-of-force move he decided instead to form a special task force under the 4th Cavalry Group Commander. The task force consisted of the 4th Cavalry Group, 759th Tank Battalion, and engineers. In the words of the corps commander:

> He was to reconnoiter toward Laon-Vervies, protect the east flank of the VII Corps, and maintain contact with

> the Third Army-no small task even for a Joe Tully. Later his reconnaissance mission was extended to the Meuse between Dinant and Givet and he was given a motorized infantry battalion, a tank destroyer battalion, and a field artillery battalion.[39]

This action marked an important milestone in the use of the 4th Cavalry Group; the use of the group, heavily reinforced, as a semi-independent task force in an economy-of-force offensive role. Although not a doctrinal use of the group, the reinforcement of the group, when sustained combat was expected, followed established doctrinal technique. The corps commander's use of the group in an economy of force enabled him to mass his three divisions to deliver a crippling blow to the remnants of the German Seventh Army. By the end of the Mons action on September 5, the corps had captured 25,000 prisoners and was already reorienting to the east.[40]

In the meantime, the 4th Cavalry Task Force, executing the missions outlined above, continued to push north and east. The group successfully filled the gap, eliminated resistance in its sector, and captured a bridgehead over the Meuse River, later turned over to V Corps. Operating across a frontage varying from 10 to 20 miles wide, the group advanced with reconnaissance squadrons, reinforced, forward on each flank. When unable to overcome resistance, the infantry battalion, generally trailing five miles behind the squadrons in the center of the sector, was brought forward with the artillery battalion

to eliminate the resistance. The engineers removed mines, booby traps and reduced road obstacles.[41] Organized for combat as described below the group was able to proceed rapidly and crossed into Belgium on 4 September.

> During the rapid advance across France and Belgium, squadron commanders normally attached a platoon of TD's, a platoon of the squadron's own light tanks and a section of assault guns to each reconnaissance troop. Reconnaissance troop commanders, in turn, placed a section of TD's, a section of light tanks and one assault gun with each of their leading platoons. Platoons normally moved with the section of tanks in the lead [followed] by the assault gun...TD's bringing up the rear. With this amount of fire power platoons were able to brush aside a great deal of enemy resistance and keep pushing rapidly forward.[42]

With the corps moving east towards the Siegfried Line fortifications along the German-Belgium border, the group, reinforced, was tasked with screening the right flank and rear of the corps in its attack on Liege. On 8 September the Commanding General, VII Corps, directed the group to seize Malmedy, an important communications center near the 1939 pre-war German border. The group moved out within a 22 kilometer front with the reconnaissance squadrons, reinforced, leading and the group headquarters and attachments following.

> For the group's advance...a formation of three main columns was used. Group headquarters, with the tank battalion followed by the infantry battalion (motorized) and the artillery battalion advanced in the middle with one cavalry squadron reinforced with a company of TD's on each flank. Reconnaissance troops of the cavalry

squadrons fanned out to cover all main roads in the zone of advance. This proved to be a flexible and highly satisfactory formation.[43]

Siegfried Line

The 4th Squadron pushed ahead and seized Malmedy on 11 September against stiff resistance. Also on the 11th the 24th Squadron reached the la Salm River and found enemy strongpoints located along the east bank at all possible crossing sites. Troop C, 24th Squadron supported by the attached 87th Field Artillery Battalion, engaged the enemy at Grand Halleux, driving the enemy into the forest where Belgium Forces of the Interior assisted in their destruction. Also on this date Company A, 297th Combat Engineers and a treadway bridge detachment were attached to the group. The 24th Squadron forded the river the following morning and pushed the screen south and east of Malmedy.[44]

The group consolidated at Malmedy then continued to push reconnaissance east trying to determine the enemy's main line of resistance. As the corps reached the approaches to the Siegfried Line, German resistance began to stiffen. Every step forward was contested. On 14 September, Troop A, 4th Squadron crossed into Germany and secured the town of Kalterherberg, thus becoming the first element of the 4th Cavalry Group to cross into Germany. It was also on this date that the corps commander commended the group commander and the men of 4th Cavalry Group and

attachments for the role they played in the advance from the Aise River to the German border.

> By the skillful employment of the group and its attachments during the advance through France and Belgium to the Siegfried Line, in a sector comparable in size to that normally delegated to a division, the corps had been saved from diverting an infantry division and was able to mass three divisions of the corps....[45]

On 14 September 1944, the group was given the mission of screening an 18 kilometer front on the right or southern flank of the VII Corps (Figure 12). The corps commander was using the 4th Cavalry in another economy-of-force mission, allowing him to mass the remainder of the corps to attack the Siegfried Line in the vicinity of Aachen. At that time the 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced, consisted of the 4th and 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons, the 759th Light Tank Battalion (less Co A), the 87th Field Artillery Battalion (105mm, Self-Propelled), the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion (three inch, towed) and Companies A and C, 297th Combat Engineer Battalion.[46]

On 15 September the group sent dismounted patrols forward into heavily wooded forests, the 24th Squadron north into the Monschau Forest and the 4th Squadron east into the Buchholz Forest. Patrols from both squadrons encountered enemy patrols, concrete anti-tank obstacles (dragons teeth), well camouflaged pillboxes, mines, blown bridges, iron gates and extensive roadblocks consisting of felled trees in great

depth. Forced to use the narrow forest trails in the thick woods the squadrons made limited progress.[47]

Due to the terrain the group was forced to operate primarily with dismounted platoon strong points forward and roving tank patrols protecting flanks, gaps, and rear areas. The squadrons, reinforced with tank destroyers and engineers, established platoon strong points with tank destroyers integrated into the platoon positions. The squadrons sent out dismounted patrols with engineers to reduce the numerous road blocks in the sector. In most cases the road blocks were covered at least by sniper fire and many small engagements resulted. The group commander directed the tank battalion to move to Rocherath and patrol the Rocherbath-Elsenborn-Kalterherberg roads to interdict enemy movement through the lines and to be prepared to support the squadrons as needed. The 87th Field Artillery Battalion, in positions west of Bullingen continued to fire in direct support of the squadrons and laid interdicting fires on known enemy positions and crossroads along communication routes.[48]

On 18 September the corps extended the group zone to include the towns of Hofen and Alzen; the group zone was now 25 kilometers in width. Due to the extreme width of the zone, all reserves were committed to hold a portion of the Siegfried Line through the end of September. Roving tank patrols and indirect fire support played an important role

in denying enemy movement through gaps which existed along the front. Through vigorous dismounted patrolling, the continuos movement of armored vehicles and even supply trucks behind the forward positions, and responsive interdicting fires, the group deceived the enemy into thinking a much more powerful force existed. This deception was born out through statements of enemy prisoners of war.[49]

On 1 October First Army directed the entire V Corps to take over the exact sector currently occupied by the 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced.[50] The relief completed, on 2 October the group, with attachments, moved north and took over the Monschau-Lammersdorf sector from elements of the 9ID. The terrain and intensity of German artillery forced the group to operate primarily dismounted. The group commander placed the reconnaissance squadrons forward, reinforced with engineers and portions of the tank destroyer and artillery battalions. The engineers manned front line positions and laid and maintained booby traps and mines. The artillery and tank destroyer battalions(-) established positions in the vicinity of the group CP at Rotgen. The group commander established a secondary line of defense with the tank battalion. For the balance of October, and part of November, the group defended this wide sector and performed maintenance on their vehicles. The opposing forces continued to probe the perimeters and exchanged considerable artillery fires during this period.

To facilitate responsive artillery fires in the sector, the group commander directed the establishment of a fire direction center under the control of the artillery battalion. This center managed the fires of the 105mm artillery howitzers, the 3-inch guns of the tank destroyers, and the 75mm assault guns of the reconnaissance squadrons and the tank battalion. "This resulted in economy of ammunition expenditure and a smooth working artillery plan...."[51]

During this period of defense along the Siegfried Line COL Tully commented to a group of observers that the group TO&E required some changes. To begin with, he stated a replacement for the light tank was needed, as the 37mm gun was too light; he recommended a tank with a 57mm gun. Along those same lines he stated the 37mm anti-tank gun on the armored cars was also inadequate. He also recommended the addition of a platoon of armored infantry to each troop. This was necessary because the group found itself extremely shorthanded when performing holding missions. Other recommendations included authorizing officers pistols instead of carbines, due to the lack of space in armored vehicles, and the authorization of tanker combat suits for all personnel riding in open jeeps. Not associated with a TO&E change he commented that the assault guns had been very effective against road blocks and armored vehicles. Finally, the 759th Light Tank Battalion, attached to the

group, reported that, although untrained in reconnaissance, their association with the group had been their most successful employment in the war to date.[52]

The group, with the same mission, was attached to V Corps from 1-10 November before it was relieved by the 102nd Cavalry Group. Reverting to VII Corps control, the group pulled back to Aachen and Eynatten and spent the next 13 days resting, refitting, and relaxing. On 23 November the group moved up to fill a gap between two infantry regiments and also protect the right (southern) flank of the 1ID in the Huertgen Forest. The 24th Squadron was attached to the 4ID, while the remainder of the group, reinforced, was attached to 1ID. On 27 November the Group Commander, Colonel Joseph M. Tully was relieved to assume duties in the 90th Infantry Division and Colonel John C. MacDonald assumed command.[53]

The Battle of the Huertgen Forest would turn out to be some of the most costly and bitter fighting of the war. The 4th Squadron, attached to 1ID, and assigned a 2000 yard zone between the two infantry divisions, attacked dismounted for 15 days with the net gain of 5000 yards and over 80 casualties. On 7 December VII Corps suspended offensive operations while the exhausted 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions were relieved by fresh divisions, the 9th and 83rd Infantry Divisions. However, the cavalry was not relieved; instead the group was attached to the fresh divisions and

continued to fight on, reaching the edge of the forest on 13 December.[54] The 24th Squadron, while attached to the 4ID had maintained road blocks, patrolled, maintained contact between combat teams, and screened tne rear areas from small groups of by-passed enemy. Once attached to the 83ID, the 24th Squadron filled a gap between two infantry regiments, establishing strongpoints and maintaining contact between the infantry units.[55]

On 10 December the corps resumed offensive operations to seize the Roer River dams (Figure 13), necessary to ensure safe crossing of the river. The group HQ, reinforced, but less the two reconnaissance squadrons, was attached to the Fifth Armored Division (5AD) on 11 December when that division was committed on the VII Corps' extreme right flank. The group HQ, with the 85th Reconnaissance Squadron attached, was tasked with protecting the right flank of the division. The division made little progress against stiff enemy opposition. On 13 December the 4th Squadron rejoined the group; the 24th Squadron remained attached the 83ID. On 16 December, while VII corps continued its attack to the Roer River, the Germans launched a major counteroffensive in the Ardennes against lightly held sectors belonging to V and VIII Corps. The Battle of the Bulge had begun.

On 18 December the 24th Squadron, less Troop A, reverted to group control as the 5AD prepared to capture the

remaining high ground west of the Roer. The 4th Cavalry Group was attached to Combat Command B, 5AD, and given the supporting mission of attacking and seizing Bogheim and Obermaubach. The group at this time consisted of the 4th and 24th Reconnaissance Squadrons, 759th Light Tank Battalion, 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion (towed), 75th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, Troop D, 85th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, and Company B, 297th Combat Engineer Battalion.[56] The Group Commander, Colonel MacDonald, assigned the mission of seizing Bogheim to the 4th Squadron, Reinforced, and Obermaubach to the 24th Squadron, Reinforced. The remainder of the group would attack to seize a hill to support, by fire, 4th Squadron's attack.[57] Attacking dismounted, with Company F tanks in support, the 4th Squadron succeeded in capturing Bogheim, but paid a heavy price. The squadron commander recorded:

> The Squadron's actions at Bogheim successfully relieved the 5th Armored Division of the need to use their already extended forces to eliminate the Bogheim strong point, at the same time secured the Division's right flank. The Squadron lost every line troop commander, three of its line troop executive officers, two platoon leaders and twenty-five percent of the enlisted strength of the three reconnaissance troops.[58]

For the gallantry exhibited during the Bogheim Battle, 20-21 December, the 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation.[59] While the group was fully engaged in the fight to the Roer, events

were occurring in the Ardennes that would soon affect the group. Late in the afternoon of the 20 December, General Collins, VII Corps Commander, received instructions to turn over control of his divisions to XIX Corps and move his headquarters and corps troops south. At 1900 hours, 21 December, the group was ordered to turn over its sector to the 8th Infantry Division and move the group southeast to Belgium. Although unconsolidated and still engaged in a tough dismounted fight with the enemy, the relief was completed by 0500 hours, 22 December.

The Battle of the Bulge

The group, still largely ignorant of the seriousness of the situation in the Ardennes, began their road march south at 1200 hours, 22 December. Greatly reduced in strength from the previous fighting, the group commander "counted 35 vehicles in the leading squadron with only the driver aboard."[60] The 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced, now consisted of the 4th and 24th Reconnaissance Squadrons, the 759th Light Tank Battalion (-), and the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion(-) with Company C, 297th Engineer Battalion. By 0930 hours, 23 December, after moving 80 miles, through a very confused situation, the group engaged elements of the 2nd Panzer Division at Haversin, Belgium, a town first liberated by the group in September (Figure 14). Ordered to

screen the readjustment of VII Corps (now consisting of the 2AD, 75ID, and 84ID), 24 December found the group

> extended over a frontage of about 20 miles, reduced in strength from bitter fighting in the Huertgen Forest, dispersed between elements of the 2d Armored Division, and confronted with attacking elements of elite German armored units on their drive to the Meuse.[61]

During the road march the group was re-directed to the northwest to support VII Corps' mission of blocking the German drive to the Meuse. Originally ordered to screen the adjustment of the corps and guard selected river crossings, the group became intermingled with the 2AD as it attacked south. To solve this command and control problem, the corps commander attached the group to 2AD effective 1200 hours, 24 December.

Troop A, 24th Squadron, reinforced with a platoon of light tanks from Company F, a platoon of assault guns from Troop E, and a platoon of assault guns from the 635th Tank Destroyer Battalion, succeeded in cutting the German supply line at Humain early on 25 December. The Germans, realizing a large advance party from the 2nd Panzer Division needed fuel desperately, counterattacked on 25 December with elements of the German Panzer Lehr Division. Enemy tanks, leading the attack, were initially engaged on the outskirts of town by tank destroyers using newly issued high velocity armor piercing rounds. Unfortunately, the rounds ricocheted harmlessly off the Mark V (Panther) tanks until the tanks

closed to within 150 yards when two tanks were destroyed. Three more Mark Vs overran the tank destroyer positions and the reinforced troop was driven out of town at daybreak. Although the group attempted to recapture Humain three more times on the 25th of December, all attacks were repulsed by the German defenders. On the 26th of December the Commanding General, 2AD, ordered Combat Command B and R, with the 4th Cavalry Group attached, to reduce Humain; this was completed on 28 December. As stated by the group commander, the fight for "Humain was a black spot for the 4th Cavalry Group, for, there in a period of some twenty-four hours, the group took its worst beating of the war."[62] With the fight for Humain completed the group reverted to its previous screening mission.

Rhineland and Central Germany

After the threat in Belgium was eliminated, the group returned to Aachen in early February and replaced their M5 light tanks with M24 light tanks. The new tanks, with a much lower silhouette than the M5s, were armed with a 75mm gun, which although still inferior to German tanks, were nevertheless an improvement. During the latter part of February the VII Corps crossed the Roer and swept across the Cologne Plain. By 6 March, elements of the group had reached the banks of the Rhine (figure 15). The German's defensive strategy along the Rhine was unhinged on 7 March

when elements of First Army captured the Remagen Bridge. Fourth Squadron crossed the Rhine on 21 March and took up positions along the northern edge of the expanding Remagen Bridgehead. On 23 March the First and Third Armies attacked across the Rhine and the battle for Central Germany began. The group was used to secure VII Corps' northern flank, from the Rhine to the east (Figure 16). As stated in First Army's postwar AAR, "in this defensive role it released critically needed infantry to expand the corps bridgehead."[63] Although Victory in Europe did not occur until 8 May 1945, for all intents and purposes the conflict ended for the 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced, in late April when VII Corps linked up with the Russians along the Elbe River.

The 4th Cavalry Group was involved in 306 days of combat in the European Theater of Operations, including participation in the Normandy, Northern France, Ardennes-Alsace, Rhineland and Central Europe Campaigns. A record of combat employment by type mission is listed below:[64]

Offensive	66 days	21.6%
Defensive	65 days	21.2%
Reconnaissance	10 days	3.3%
Security	96 days	31.4%
Special Operations	69 days	22.5%

These percentages were based on analysis conducted after the war by General Study Board Number 49, Mechanized Cavalry Units. The board categorized the mission data based

on the following criteria. Security operations included screening (both moving and stationary), blocking, flank protection, maintaining contact, and filling gaps. Offensive combat included attack, pursuit, and exploitation operations. Defensive combat included area and mobile defense, holding key terrain, and delaying action. Special operations included rear area security [doctrinally a security mission], mobile reserve, and liaison duties within the field armies (Army Information Service). Furthermore, the board noted that reconnaissance and security missions normally entailed offensive combat.[65]

Throughout much of the European Campaign the group was augmented with a light tank battalion, an artillery battalion, a tank destroyer battalion (towed), and a company of engineers. LTG J. Lawton Collins, VII Corps Commander, was quoted as calling the 4th Cavalry Group his "Light Armored Brigade."[66] Originally intended only for reconnaissance, the corps commander, from the D-Day invasion of France to Victory in Europe Day, used his cavalry group for much more.

Endnotes

[1]VII Corps D-DAY (Cherbourg) Report 4, "VII Corps Field Order: NEPTUNE," 28 May 1944, Battle Analysis Series, Volume 1, Part 3, D-Day: Cherbourg, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3.

[2]John F. Rhoades and Dale E. Strick, Fighting Fourth (Frankfurt: Blumlein and Co., 1945), U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1.

[3]Robert R. Tincher, "Reconnaissance In Normandy: In Support of Airborne Troops," The Cavalry Journal 1 (January-February, 1945): 12-14.

[4]Rhoades and Strick, 2-3.

[5]Ibid., 2.

[6]Ibid., 3-4.

[7]Harry A. Clark Jr., "Operations of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (Mechanized), 4th Cavalry Group (VII Corps) in the Normandy Campaign, France, 6-27 June 1944," Student Monograph, 1949, Infantry School Library, Fort Benning, GA, 9-11.

[8]Ibid., 12-18.

[9]Ibid., 18-21.

[10]Ibid., 22-25.

[11]Pierre V. Maltby, "4th Cavalry in Diverse Roles," The Cavalry Journal 3 (May-June 1945): 10-11.

[12]Rhoades and Strick, 4.

[13]Frederick H. Gaston, "History of 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized From 1-31 July 1944," Army Ground Forces Report, 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1-4.

[14]Clark, 30.

[15]J. Lawton Collins, Lighting Joe An Autobiography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 238.

[16]Rhoades and Strick, 5-6.

[17]Ibid., 6.

[18]Gaston, 4.

[19]Ibid., 5.

[20]Rhoades and Strick, 7.

[21] VII Corps Cobra Report 15, Special Report Cobra, 4th Infantry Division, "Oral Orders By Major General Raymond O. Barton July 31," Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3, Part 1, Cobra, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

[22]VII Corps Report, "G-2 Periodic No. 114," 27 September 1944, quoted in Rhoades and Strick, 8.

[23]Rhoades and Strick, 9.

[24]VII Corps Cobra Report 15, Special Report Cobra, 4th Infantry Division, Order of the Day Number 9, "Commendation For Meritorious Service," 2 August 1944, Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3, Part 1, Cobra, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

[25]VII Corps Cobra Report 184, "1st Infantry Division G-3 Report August 1944," Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3,

Part 2, Cobra-Mortain-Siegfried, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6.

[26]George W. Coolidge, "AGF Report No. 564: After Action Reports of the Fourth Cavalry Group from 1 August 1944 to 31 October 1944," Army Ground Forces Report, 29 January 1945, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, (August AAR), 2-4.

[27]Ibid., 4.

[28]Ibid., 5.

[29]Ibid., 6.

[30]Collins, 255.

[31]Ibid., 258

[32]Coolidge (August AAR), 14.

[33]Ibid., 14.

[34]Ibid., 15.

[35]Ibid., 15.

[36]Ibid., 16.

[37]Ibid., 16.

[38]Ibid., 19.

[39]Collins, 263.

[40]Ibid., 264.

[41]H.A. Tribolet and S.F. Jarrell, "Immediate Report No. 73: Combat Observations", Army Ground Forces Report, 8

October 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

[42]Joseph M. Tully, "AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the Fourth Cavalry Group," Army Ground Forces Report, 29 December 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3.

[43]Tully, 2.

[44]Coolidge (September AAR), 9.

[45]Ibid., 11-12.

[46]Ibid., 11-12.

[47]Ibid., 12.

[48]Ibid., 13.

[49]Maltby, 9.

[50]U.S. Forces, European Theater, "The General Board Study Number 49: Mechanized Cavalry Units," 1946, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Appendix 6, 8.

[51]Coolidge (October AAR), 3.

[52]H. A. Tribolet, S. F. Jarrell, and H.G. McFeely, "Immediate Report No. 77: Combat Observations", Army Ground Forces Report, 12 October 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

[53]S.D. Slaughter et al., "Cavalry Group as an Economy Force-4th Cav Gp, 19-30 Dec," Committee 15-Research Report, The Armored School, 1950, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25-26.

[54]Rhoades and Strick, 22.

[55]VII Corps Report 28, "VII Corps AAR 1-31 December 1944," Battle Analysis Series, Volume 5, Part 1, Ardennes, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20.

[56]S.D. Slaughter et al., 29-30.

[57]Ibid., 29-31.

[58]Ibid., 41-42.

[59]Ibid., 172-173.

[60]Ibid., 47.

[61]Ibid., 55.

[62]Ibid., 68.

[63]U.S. Army, "Combat Operations, First Army, Europe 1944-1945," HQ, First Army, 18 November 1946, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 57.

[64]"The General Board Study Number 49: Mechanized Cavalry Units," Appendix 3, 2.

[65]Ibid.

[66]Slaughter et al., 1.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Chapter one introduced the purpose of this thesis and provided the history and evolution of the 4th Cavalry up to October 1943. Chapter two answered two subordinate questions: What was the doctrine for cavalry groups during WW II? Was the existing doctrine modified, if so, how? In addition, chapter two outlined the organizational structure of the cavalry group, providing a basis to evaluate the adequacy of the group's TO&E during combat. Chapter three summarized the group's combat missions, answering in part the subordinate question: What were the missions assigned to the 4th Cavalry Group? I will further examine and discuss doctrine and the group's combat record in this chapter.

Comparing the doctrine and organization outlined in chapters one and two, to the group's combat record in chapter three, will answer the remaining subordinate questions. Specifically, was the TO&E of WW II cavalry groups suitable to accomplish the missions they were assigned? If not, how was it modified; first a review of doctrine as compared to the missions executed by the group.

As discussed in chapter one, the corps reconnaissance regiment was established in 1940 to provide reconnaissance and security for the corps. As the unit evolved from a horse cavalry regiment, to a cavalry regiment(horse and mechanized), to a fully mechanized cavalry regiment, and finally to a cavalry group, mechanized, the doctrinal role of the group narrowed. The primary role eventually assigned to the group was one of reconnaissance.

Given that background it is interesting to note that the first combat mission given to the group was an amphibious assault of a suspected enemy position off the coast of Normandy. It was clear by the assignment of that first mission that the VII Corps Commander, General J. Lawton Collins, planned to use his cavalry group for more than just reconnaissance. Although certainly a part of almost any mission, reconnaissance as the primary mission was the least executed mission performed by the group; accounting for only 3.3% of their missions during the war. Security missions, on the other hand, accounted for 31.4% of the missions executed by the group during the war. The remaining 66% of the missions executed by the group were almost evenly divided between offensive, defensive, and special operations missions.

Missions executed by the group and discussed in the previous chapter included amphibious assault, VII Corps

Command Post security, route, zone and area reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, liaison between units, area defense, delaying, attack in zone, attack of a position, counter-reconnaissance, screening (both moving and stationary), filling gaps between units, mobile reserve, rear and flank security, advance guard, covering force, and seizure of key terrain. In addition, many of these missions were executed as an economy of force. Interestingly, the doctrine of the time listed the majority of these missions for horse cavalry.

A significant change in cavalry tactics occurred when the Army adopted the emphasis on infiltration tactics and avoidance of combat for mechanized cavalry units. Based on the group experience the reliance on infiltration tactics for mechanized reconnaissance was flawed. Although certainly a technique with utility, particularly for dismounted patrols, the emphasis on infiltration tactics as the primary means of reconnaissance did not survive contact with the enemy. The Group Commander, COL Tully, stated his training prior to the war emphasized "combat" reconnaissance and not relying on infiltration. He further commented:

> Experience in the campaigns of Western Europe has proven the doctrine of "sneaking and peeking" by reconnaissance units to be unsound, as we have had to fight to obtain information in practically every case.... Our units are taught that immediately upon contact with the enemy, they automatically establish

counter-reconnaissance toward his front and work something around his flanks to develop the situation.[1]

The realization that the accomplishment of reconnaissance missions normally requires offensive combat explains the low percentage of missions categorized as primarily reconnaissance by the group, only 3.3%. An example of a mission originally assigned as reconnaissance, but more in the realm of offensive combat, was 4th Squadron's seizure of the critical communications center, Villedieu, during the Breakout From Normandy. Villedieu was an excellent example of a commander aggressively using highly mobile cavalry to achieve quick decisive results. Even dismounted reconnaissance frequently resulted in offensive combat, as was the case with 24th Squadron's reconnaissance of the crossroads outside of Bourg de Lestre in the Sinope River Valley.

Two of the few recorded incidents of infiltration located in the available records occurred during the Normandy Campaign. In the first case, the 4th Squadron, attached to the 9ID for flank security, infiltrated patrols behind enemy lines, in one case for three days. But even in this case they conducted reconnaissance in support of flank security, the primary mission. Another example of infiltration occurred, not for reconnaissance, but rather as part of the 4th Squadron's attack of Auderville, also during the Normandy Campaign. In that case elements of the

squadron rolled their vehicles, with the engines off, downhill and past the defenders before the Germans realized their position had been penetrated.

In an interview with Colonel Harry A. Clark Jr., U.S. Army (retired), former Executive Officer, 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, he mentioned they did not actively pursue infiltration. When infiltration occurred it was more likely a result of a fast moving, fluid situation, rather than trying to sneak past the enemy.[2] These cases generally occurred when the squadron bypassed enemy resistance as part of an exploitation or pursuit. Based on Colonel Clark's comments and those of the group commander it appears the leadership of the 4th Cavalry Group did not fully support the pre-war cavalry doctrine of reconnaissance by infiltration.

Unfortunately, the pre-war emphasis on infiltration tactics resulted in a group incapable of penetrating established enemy positions or executing security missions against an armored threat. The group was organized and equipped for reconnaissance by infiltration; therefore, the predominance of jeeps and light armored vehicles in the reconnaissance squadrons. Reconnaissance platoons, equipped with jeeps and armored cars, were not equipped for sustained combat. Given that the reconnaissance platoons lacked strength, the squadron had to rely on its principal offensive weapons, the light tank and the assault gun, to

provide strength. Unfortunately, given the nature of the threat, the light tank was inadequate. Although highly maneuverable, the light tank lacked an adequate main gun and armor protection. On the other hand, the 75mm assault gun performed well during the war, although not in the direct fire role originally envisioned. Nevertheless, to produce greater artillery effects, some cavalry leaders recommended a 105mm replacement in the latter stages of the war.

An example of the inadequacy of the squadron TO&E is provided in the following example. During First Army's Breakthrough in Normandy, the 4th Squadron was ordered to cross the Seinne River and seize the high ground in the vicinity of the towns Percy and Mesnil Bonant. The goal of the mission was to determine the disposition and strength of enemy positions and acquire a line of departure for the 4IDs attack south; a guard or covering force security mission. However, after conducting a forward passage of lines the squadron was stopped by enemy resistance. Despite repeated local attacks, mounted and dismounted, the squadron was unable to penetrate or break through the enemy positions. Neither infiltration nor aggressive offensive action was effective. The squadron lacked the power to penetrate the defensive line.

Given the group organization and conduct of operations in Western Europe, the idea of conducting reconnaissance up to 150 miles forward of the corps, first

espoused in Training Circular No. 42 (1942), also was flawed. Unless the opponents initiated hostilities widely separated, which they did not in Western Europe, the group lacked the power to push distant or deep reconnaissance. Except for the breakout and pursuit through France and Belgium, and in Germany east of the Rhine, most of the operations in Western Europe were conducted along relatively contiguous lines. For example, the campaigns in Normandy and along the Siegfried Line were not marked by widespread maneuver, but, tough, time consuming attrition warfare, followed eventually by a penetration and rapid exploitation.

The closest the group came to performing distant reconnaissance was during the breakout and pursuit to the German border. Even then the group conducted operations more appropriately categorized as offensive or security operations. Distant reconnaissance was replaced, in part, by an arm of the Army which was also tasked with providing distant reconnaissance, the Army Air Corps.[3] Whether or not ground distant reconnaissance would have been feasible in a different theater, marked by extensive maneuver warfare, such as the Russian Front, is debatable and warrants further study.

Although doctrinally a corps or larger asset, a review of the groups combat history reveals that the group operated under corps control for 167 days, infantry division control for 94 days, and armor division control for 28

days.[4] Interestingly, First Army's postwar "Combat Operations Data," states "Corps commanders retained the cavalry in the corps net even when the units were attached to divisions."[5] It appears by that statement that the cavalry group was an important asset the corps commanders wanted to closely manage.

Attachment to divisions was particularly prevalent during the Normandy Campaign. That campaign started with separate reconnaissance troops supporting airborne troops with combat patrols and mounted security operations. During later operations the squadrons were attached to both armored and infantry divisions, although attachment to infantry divisions was more prevalent. The attachment of the group to infantry divisions may have been a reflection of the deficiency of reconnaissance assets organic to infantry divisions. Authorized only one mechanized reconnaissance troop the infantry division lacked a robust reconnaissance capability (arguably a condition which exists in the current light divisions).

The attachment of the group to divisions during periods of relatively limited maneuver may also reflect the lack of any better option for the corps commander. Doctrinally (Training Circular No. 107, 1943), when main opposing forces closed, reconnaissance assets collapsed to an exposed flank, maintain liaison with adjacent units, or revert to the reserve. In Normandy and during portions of

VII Corps offensive in the Huertgen Forest, the corps commander chose not to keep his cavalry group consolidated under corps control, instead he attached the squadrons, to separate infantry divisions. When attached to divisions the group executed offensive and defensive missions in addition to traditional cavalry roles, such as filling gaps, liaison, rear and flank security, and mobile reserve; many of these missions in an economy-of-force role.

Although trained for mounted reconnaissance it is evident from reviewing the groups combat records that they operated dismounted extensively. For example, the group's defensive economy-of-force mission along the Siegfried Line. While the group defended primarily from dismounted platoon strongpoints, it was the mounted firepower available from the tanks and armored cars, combined with indirect fires, that deceived the enemy into thinking a more powerful force opposed them. That the group, reinforced, was successful in holding what became the entire V Corps sector is a testament of the quality of the unit and the capability of a cavalry group properly reinforced. Dismounted operations were so prevalent that the group commander and post-war studies recommended adding motorized infantry to the TO&E.

Unfortunately, the group did not always enjoy success in dismounted infantry operations, particularly offensive missions. The worst casualties of the war for the group occurred, during VII Corps drive to the Roer, when

elements of the 4th Squadron seized the town of Bogheim in a dismounted attack. Lacking the firepower and protection of their vehicles the squadron lost four troop commanders (two KIA and two WIA), in addition to five lieutenants and 25% of the enlisted reconnaissance troops. Bogheim and the Huertgen Forest offensive highlights the misuse of a mechanized cavalry unit in a dismounted role. The group's dismounted operations in the Huertgen Forest, attached to infantry divisions, placed the group in a weakened state to execute the follow on mission in the Ardennes and invariably led to more casualties.

The second wartime Group Commander, Colonel MacDonald, felt the single greatest deficiency the cavalry group faced in WW II was the lack of consideration given it when attached to infantry divisions. This applied to not only the cavalry group but other attached corps units, such as separate tank, tank destroyer and artillery units. He felt that in almost all cases the group could have performed its mission better if it had remained under corps control. He stated "These units too often were simply attached orphans neglected shamefully in the manner of rest from combat, supply assistance...and decorations."[6] The best example of this was the group's initial deployment in the Battle of the Huertgen Forest. The squadrons were initially attached to the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions in late November. However, when those two exhausted divisions were

replaced with fresh infantry divisions, the cavalry was not similarly relieved. They were attached to the fresh divisions and continued to fight on. Employed in this manner the group required additional dismounted rifle strength which it did not have.

During the Breakout from Normandy, the group initially screened the advance of the VII Corps. However, as the corps shifted into the pursuit the group's mission changed to an offensive economy of force. The group, continuing to attack, filled a division sector and maintained contact with the Third Army as the VII Corps wheeled north to crush the German Seventh Army at Mons. Initially reinforced with a tank battalion, towed tank destroyer battalion, and a company of engineers, they were later reinforced with an additional infantry battalion, an artillery battalion, and more engineers.

Prior to the attachment of the infantry battalion, the basic tactical array of the group consisted of the two reconnaissance squadrons, reinforced with a company of towed tank destroyers and engineers, forward. The tank battalion and one company of tank destroyers were held in reserve under group control. With the attachment of the infantry battalion the group advanced along three parallel routes, the reconnaissance squadrons, reinforced, and the tank battalion, forward. The infantry and artillery battalions followed, under group control, in reserve. In both cases

the group commander committed the reserve when the leading elements were unable to overcome resistance.

The organization for combat within the squadrons during the groups rapid advance through France and Belgium was as follows. The reconnaissance platoons led with a section of light tanks, followed by an assault gun, the platoon leader, then the rest of the platoon; a section of towed tank destroyers brought up the rear. With this formation the platoons were able to brush aside light contact and rapidly continue the advance. Heavier resistance was fixed with a portion of the platoon while the remainder bypassed and continued the advance. In this manner the group was able to maintain a rapid advance and inflict heavy casualties on a disorganized and fleeing enemy.

The group when tasked with defending wide stretches of the Siegfried Line used a similar tactical organization as described for offensive operations. The difference being, the cavalry squadrons, reinforced, held the advance positions and the tank battalion was held in reserve. Only when the group sector was expanded to holding 25 kilometers of the Siegfried Line was the light tank battalion committed and the group was forced to operate without a reserve.

Both offensive and defensive tactical arrays point out a basic deficiency of the cavalry group, the lack of a third squadron. Without the attachment of the tank

battalion the group commander could not retain tactical flexibility and could not have executed the missions assigned to the group. Furthermore, this array of cavalry squadrons forward did not allow for the rotation of reconnaissance squadrons into the reserve. Except in the rare cases when the group was held in reserve the reconnaissance squadrons received little relief from front line duties throughout the war. This deficiency is best stated in the words of Lieutenant Colonel Rhoades, Commander, 4th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron.

> Habitually...the 4th Cavalry had to commit both squadrons, with the result that neither squadron was able to refit and train replacements unless the entire group was relieved. I know my casualties were higher than necessary due to lack of opportunity to absorb replacements and due to fatigue of personnel.[7]

The workload on the squadrons was further exacerbated by the group's requirement to secure the VII Corps CP. Throughout the war the group commanders rotated reconnaissance troops, or a tank company from the attached light tank battalion, to meet this requirement.

Other equipment and organizational deficiencies of the group included the lack of a credible anti-armor capability, a shortage of liaison officers and medical personnel, and considering the extent of dismounted operations, a lack of infantrymen. The habitual attachment of a towed tank destroyer company to each reconnaissance

squadron highlights the inadequacy of the squadrons organic anti-tank capability. As previously discussed the 37mm gun found on the armored car and light tank was not powerful enough to destroy the majority of German tanks. Unfortunately, as the action in Humain during the Ardennes Counteroffensive showed, even the 3-inch tank destroyers were at a disadvantage against advanced German armor.

The size of the attached medical detachment was inadequate. The aggregate strength of the attached medical detachment dropped from 65 personnel (under the Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized TO&E), to 30 personnel (under the Cavalry Group TO&E). Under the group organization each squadron was authorized 14 medical personnel and the group headquarters was authorized a 2-man dental team. In addition to the deficiency of personnel, the squadrons were only authorized 4 ambulances. Fourteen medical personnel equipped with 4 ambulances were not sufficient for a squadron which, with attachments, routinely contained seven troop size elements.

Finally, the group and squadron headquarters lacked sufficient liaison officers. Frequently operating on Corps, even Army boundaries, with squadrons attached to separate divisions, the group headquarters alone required several liaison officers. However, the group and squadron headquarters were only authorized a single liaison officer each.

The regiment's reorganization in 1943 into a group, which relocated combat support and combat service support assets from regimental level to squadron level, logistically proved to be superior over the centrally managed regimental organization. The reorganization made the squadrons much more autonomous and flexible. It is questionable whether the squadrons could have moved from attachment from one division to another, or operated as dispersed as they sometimes were, under the centrally managed regimental system. When attached to divisions the squadrons received their supplies in the same manner as the regiments of the division. Similarly, when operating for the corps the squadrons received logistics support through Field Army installations.[8]

In summary, the TO&E of the cavalry group was not suitable to accomplish the missions it was assigned. The most critical deficiency of the group TO&E was the lack of a third squadron. Furthermore, the group, organized and equipped under the false premise that its primary mission was reconnaissance executed using infiltration tactics, naturally lacked the combat power to perform many of the missions it was subsequently given. To alleviate the inadequacy of the group TO&E, given the missions assigned, the VII Corps Commander reinforced the group with substantial attachments. At a minimum, from the Normandy Breakout until the end of the war the group, reinforced,

included a towed tank destroyer battalion, a tank battalion, and a company of engineers. An artillery battalion and an additional engineer company were also frequently attached and less frequently an infantry battalion. Without those attachments it is doubtful the group could have executed the missions it received. Finally, with the exception of fielding a more capable light tank in the latter stages of the war, there were not any substantial TO&E changes made during the war.

Formal analysis of mechanized cavalry operations in the European Theater was initiated in 1945 with the establishment of General Study Board No. 49: Mechanized Cavalry. The mission of the board was to capture lessons learned from the war and make recommendations concerning the tactics, employment, technique, organization, and equipment of mechanized cavalry units. The final report was approved in 1947 and among other findings concluded

> That the mission which was assigned to mechanized cavalry, reconnaissance with minimum of fighting, was wrong.... That the future role of mechanized cavalry should be the traditional role of a highly mobile, heavily armed and lightly equipped combat force, and that the capability of mechanized cavalry...to perform that role, should be exploited.[9]

Furthermore, the study recommended, for employment by the corps, that a regimental cavalry organization replace the existing cavalry group organization. The proposed mechanized cavalry regiment TO&E consisted of a headquarters

and headquarters troop, a service troop, three organic mechanized cavalry squadrons, and an attached medical detachment; aggregate strength 3621 personnel. A major proposed change to the cavalry squadron TO&E was the addition of a 197 man Dragoon Troop.[10]

In 1948, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) was organized and became the only active duty successor of the WW II cavalry group. During this time the only active duty cavalry regiments were in the U.S. constabulary or part of the 1st Cavalry Division (organized as an infantry division but retaining its cavalry regiment designations). The ACR consisted of three "reconnaissance battalions" and had an authorized strength of 2883 personnel; a substantial increase from the 1628 personnel authorized the WW II cavalry group but less than the 3621 man regiment recommended by General Study Board No. 49. Later in 1948, three additional armored cavalry regiments, the 2nd, 6th, and 14th, were organized from cavalry units in the U.S. Constabulary in Germany. The ACRs, equipped with 72 light and 69 medium tanks,[11] were substantially heavier in tanks than its WW II predecessor, the cavalry group.

Endnotes

[1]Joseph M. Tully, "AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the Fourth Cavalry Group," Army Ground Forces Report, 29 December 1944, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3-4.

[2]Harry A. Clark Jr., former Executive Officer, 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, interview by John N. Tully in San Antonio, Texas, December 1993.

[3]Edward M. Fickett, "AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics," Army Ground Forces Report, 5 June 1945, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

[4]U.S. Forces, European Theater, "The General Board Study Number 49: Mechanized Cavalry Units," 1946, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, Appendix 3, 16.

[5]U.S. Army, "Combat Operations Data, First Army, Europe 1944-1945," HQ, First Army, 18 November 1946, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 57.

[6]S.D. Slaughter et al., "Cavalry Group as an Economy Force-4th Cav Gp, 19-30 Dec," Committee 15-Research Report, The Armored School, 1950, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS, iii.

[7]"The General Board Study Number 49," Appendix 16, 3.

[8]S.D. Slaughter et al., 154-155.

[9]"The General Board Study Number 49," 20.

[10]Ibid., Appendix 13, 2.

[11]Mary L. Stubbs and Stanley R. Connor, Armor-Cavalry: Army Lineage Series, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 76.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I will answer the thesis question and interpret the results in terms of current cavalry discussions and possible lessons learned. To begin with, a review of the results of the research in the previous chapters.

Prior to WW II cavalry was a full partner among the combat arms. Beginning in the 1930's a movement to focus mechanized cavalry on reconnaissance only arose. The debate continued, with the proponents of lighter cavalry, focused on reconnaissance, winning the dispute.

The branch was further weakened when cavalry lost proponency for mechanization. Missions previously considered appropriate for cavalry were assumed by the Armored Force or motorized infantry. Prior to mechanization U.S. Army doctrine called for cavalry to perform the full range of offensive and defensive missions. These included traditional cavalry missions such as reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, pursuit, exploitation of a breakthrough, and liaison. However, with mechanization the doctrinal role for mechanized cavalry narrowed to only one

of its former missions, reconnaissance, while horse cavalry retained its traditional missions. Equally important, the tactics and techniques employed by mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units shifted to emphasize infiltration tactics and avoidance of combat. Subsequently, all the mechanized cavalry organizations of WW II were organized, trained, and resourced to perform reconnaissance as their primary mission.

The combat record revealed that the group performed almost the full range of ground combat missions. Of note, many of the missions were doctrinally considered horse cavalry missions. In addition, the group did not operate exclusively as a corps asset and did not perform distant reconnaissance as envisioned in pre-war doctrine. Also, the group executed extensive dismounted operations (both offensive and defensive), a particularly poor use of a mechanized cavalry unit. Finally, the group was frequently used to bolster the combat power of infantry divisions. Unfortunately, the group's last wartime commander felt the group was shamelessly neglected when operating attached to infantry divisions.

The previous chapter discussed how the 4th Cavalry Group as organized for WW II was deficient in several key areas; specifically, the doctrinal mission was flawed, the doctrinal employment technique was flawed, and the group lacked organizational depth. Concerning the doctrinal

mission, the group was used for far more than just reconnaissance. In fact, the group was used extensively for security and offensive and defensive economy-of-force roles. The doctrinal employment technique, emphasizing infiltration tactics, did not survive contact with the enemy and in fact was not stressed during the group's pre-war training. Organizationally the group lacked a necessary third squadron and its reconnaissance squadrons lacked firepower, particularly antiarmor. In addition, considering the extensive use of the group for dismounted operations, it lacked adequate rifle strength. To mitigate those deficiencies the VII Corps Commander habitually reinforced the group with extensive attachments, notably, light tank, tank destroyer, and engineer units.

An analysis of the preceding chapters draws me to the conclusion that the 4th Cavalry Group did not perform its doctrinal mission as it was narrowly defined before the war. It did perform reconnaissance extensively, but generally in support of other missions, such a flank security or offensive operations. The employment of the 4th Cavalry Group did not follow established pre-war doctrine.

Nevertheless, despite the organizational deficiencies previously noted, the cavalry group, when properly reinforced, was a powerful tool for the corps commander. The 4th Cavalry demonstrated a mechanized cavalry unit could execute a myriad of tactical missions,

particularly traditional horse cavalry missions. For example, the 4th Cavalry Group, Reinforced, enjoyed great success exploiting the Breakout From Normandy and filling large sectors in economy-of-force roles. The maintenance of the cavalry group simply for reconnaissance was both a waste of a valuable resource and particularly during times of crisis, such as the Battle of the Bulge, a luxury the corps commander could not afford.

Now that I have answered the thesis question, of what use is the information in the preceding four chapters. To begin with I feel the historical study of the 4th Cavalry Group will supply the reader with experience and increase their capability to critically analyze current cavalry organizations and doctrine; and while beyond the scope of this paper I will briefly examine several ongoing cavalry developments in light of this historical review.

To begin with let us review the current scout platoon organization for U.S. Army heavy divisions. Previously an M3, Cavalry Fighting Vehicle, equipped organization capable of fighting for intelligence, the Army is in the process of transitioning to a High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) equipped platoon designed for passive reconnaissance or stealth.

Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (1988) states "the scout platoon performs reconnaissance, provides limited security, and

assists in controlling movement of the battalion task force."[1] The platoon operates as part of the battalion and is not expected to perform defensive, offensive, or retrograde operations. One of the commander's primary sources of intelligence, the importance of the scout platoon cannot be understated. In fact, recent analysis at the National Training Center reveals "that 90% of successful operations are based on successful reconnaissance."[2]

Despite the fact that current doctrine recognizes the limitations of the battalion task force scout platoon, the 4th Cavalry Group Commander's realization that one must at times fight for intelligence cautions against the HMMWV organization. Arguably a task force scout platoon that goes looking for a fight will not last very long. Yet, scouts must have the capability to survive unexpected contact and at times fight through a counter-reconnaissance screen to gain intelligence. A modern version of the cavalry group's M8 Armored Car, such as the Marine Corps' wheeled Light Armored Vehicle with 25mm gun (LAV-25), thermal sight capable, may be a superior interim solution to the HMMWV. The experiences of the 4th Cavalry Group in WW II points toward a reevaluation of a HMMWV scout platoon designed for stealth only.

With the implementation of the L-series TO&E, U.S. Army heavy divisions are in the process of reintroducing tanks back into divisional cavalry squadrons after a

previous reorganization in the 1980s removed tanks. The reintroduction of tanks is a judicious decision when viewed with the knowledge of WW II cavalry operations. Specifically, the 4th Cavalry Group suffered from a lack of an adequate armor capability. When you consider "the fundamental role of the division cavalry squadron is to perform reconnaissance and security missions in close operations"[3], the requirement for organizational strength, gained with armor, is prudent.

Finally, the insights we gain by reviewing the 4th Cavalry Group's WW II employment are probably most applicable to the Army's latest attempt to form a light cavalry regiment (LCR), the 2nd LCR; particularly when you consider that the armored cavalry regiment was the post WW II descendant of the cavalry group. With a third squadron and organic engineer, aviation, air defense, chemical and military intelligence units, the current cavalry regiment bears little resemblance to the WW II cavalry group. However, when focusing only on the cavalry squadrons there is a remarkable similarity between the WW II and current organizations. The three ground cavalry squadrons of the 2nd LCR are organized along the same structure as the modern heavy armored cavalry regiment (ACR), with three cavalry troops, a tank company, and a howitzer battery assigned to each squadron (almost identical to the WW II cavalry reconnaissance squadron).

The difference between the current heavy and current light cavalry squadrons is the equipment. Instead of M1A1 Abrams tanks, M3, Cavalry Fighting Vehicles (CFVs), and self-propelled howitzers the squadrons of the 2nd LCR are equipped with HMMWVs and towed howitzers. Where previously the heavy cavalry troops were authorized two tank platoons with four M1A1 tanks each, you now have two HMMWV-TOW (Tube-launched Optically-guided Wire-controlled) missile platoons of four HMMWV-TOWs each. Furthermore, instead of two platoons of six M3, CFVs, you have two platoons of ten HMMWVs each. Instead of 14 M1A1 tanks in the tank company of each squadron you have 12 HMMWV-TOWs in an anti-tank company. Basically, for the 2nd LCR's interim TO&E, all M1A1 tanks were replaced by HMMWV-TOWs and all M3, CFVs were replaced by HMMWVs.[4]

However, the 2nd LCR HMMWV dominated squadron described above is only a transitory organization until the TO&E is finalized and new equipment fielded. The current "proposed" TO&E replaces all the HMMWV-TOWs with the Armored Gun System (AGS), an experimental light tank with a 105mm main gun, scheduled for fielding in 1999. Furthermore, M113A3 Armored Personnel Carriers replace the HMMWV scout vehicles. A LCR squadron equipped with the AGS and M113A3s certainly would overcome some of the firepower deficiencies noted in the WWII cavalry squadrons. However, decisions on

how to equip the LCR have not been finalized and in fact several options are under consideration.[5]

One of the alternatives under consideration is to retain the HMMWVs as the reconnaissance vehicle in the scout platoons. Actually there are two variations of the HMMWV scout vehicle alternative; one with six HMMWVs in the platoon and five men per vehicle and one with ten HMMWVs with three men per vehicle. In both variations the HMMWV-TOWs would be replaced by the AGS once it is fielded.[6] Interestingly, a HMMWV/AGS equipped LCR cavalry platoon would look somewhat like the jeep/M8 Armored Car cavalry platoon of the WW II cavalry squadron.

The interim 2nd LCR squadron TO&E, equipped with HMMWVs, has many of the same organizational shortcoming of the WW II cavalry squadron. Recognizing the limited capability of the current organization, it is apparent that a critical review of the doctrinal role of the LCR is necessary. Although the M113A3/AGS equipped LACR cavalry troop currently stands as the leading option, the fact of the matter is the AGS will not be fielded until 1999. Considering one of the LCR's missions is to support a CONUS based contingency corps or task force with a reconnaissance, security and economy-of-force capability, it appears the HMMWV equipped LCR, like its WW II predecessor, will require extensive augmentation to perform its mission in a mid-to-high intensity conflict. However, in the current era of

force reduction the contingency corps commander may not have the assets to properly reinforce the LCR. This was not the case in WW II; as previously described, General "Lightning Joe" Collins, the VII Corps Commander, habitually reinforced the 4th Cavalry Group. Assuming the LCR will have to fight without augmentation, at least initially, the U.S. Army must ensure we field a force capable of executing the missions it will most likely have to face. The requirements for a highly lethal and survivable LCR is highlighted by a statement made in a recent article by General Sullivan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

> International arms sales make high-tech weapons available to any customer who can afford them. These sales significantly increase a Third World military force's ability to fight at extended ranges with increased accuracy and lethality, thereby compounding the problems of an intervention force.[7]

As the U.S. Army evolves into a force projection organization, the requirement for highly deployable, light armored cavalry only increases. The challenge is to design an organization which maximizes versatility, lethality and survivability, while maintaining the lightness and therefore deployability of the force. While the AGS appears to be step in the right direction, I would argue that the HMMWV or the M113A3 are not suitable reconnaissance or security platforms for either the LCR or battalion task force scouts.

In closing, I hope my cursory analysis of current and proposed cavalry organizations will encourage others to critically analyze ongoing cavalry changes. The review of the employment and lessons learned of the 4th Cavalry Group will certainly offer many insights.

Endnotes

[1]U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force (Washington: Department of the Army, 1988), Chapter 1, 8-9.

[2]Paul E. Funk, "Future Thrusts," Armor 1 (January-February 1994): 47.

[3]U.S. Army, Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1990), Chapter 2, 5.

[4]Al Bowen, Maneuver Team, Organizational Development Directorate, Combined Arms Center-Combat Development, interview with the author at Fort Leavenworth, KS, on 25 March 1993.

[5]Bowen.

[6]Bowen.

[7]Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," Military Review 9 (September 1993): 15.

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATION DIAGRAMS



Fig. 1. Cavalry Regiment, Horse and Mechanized. Source: T/O No. 2-51 Cavalry Regiment, Horse and Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), 2-4.



Fig. 2. Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized. Source: T/O No. 2-71 Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), 1-4.



Fig. 3. Cavalry Group, Mechanized. Source: TO&E No. 2-22 HHT, Cavalry Group (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944), 1-4.



Fig. 4. Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron. Source: TO&E No. 2-25 Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 1-4.

APPENDIX B

MAPS



Fig. 5. The Final Overlord Plan. Source: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Map III.



Fig. 6. Western Cotentin Peninsula. Source: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Map XXIII.



Fig. 7. Eastern Cotentin Peninsula. Source: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Map XXIII.



Fig. 8. The Attack on Cherbourg. Source: Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951), Map XXIV.



Fig. 9. Breakthrough in Normandy. Source: Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map X.



Fig. 10. German Counterattack at Mortain. Source: Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map X.

Fig. 11. Pursuit to the Border. Source: Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map X.



Fig. 12. Breaching the Westwall. Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map III.



Fig. 13. The Approaches to Duren. Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, U.S. Army in WW II, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map VIII.



Fig. 14. 4th Cavalry/The Ardennes. Source: Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Map VIII.



Fig. 15. Operation Lumberjack. Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The Final Offensive, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map VIII.



Fig. 16. Breakout From Remagen. Source: Charles B. MacDonald, The Final Offensive, U.S. Army in WWII, ETO (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), Map XII.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Collins, J. Lawton. Lightning Joe-An Autobiography. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979.

Gillie, Mildred H. Forging the Thunderbolt. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co, 1947.

Herr, John K. and Edward S. Wallace. The Story of the U.S. Cavalry. Boston: Little and Brown, 1953.

Rhoades, John F. and Dale E. Strick. Fightin [sic] Fourth. Frankfurt: Blumlein and Co., 1945.

Truscott, Jr. Lucian K. The Twilight of the U.S. Cavalry. Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1989.

Periodicals

Cox, Gary P. "Of Aphorisms, Lessons, and Paradigms: Comparing the British and German Official Histories of the Russo-Japanese War." The Journal of Military History 56 (July 1992): 389-401.

Funk, Paul E. "Future Thrusts." Armor 1 (January-February 1994): 47-50.

Maltby, Pierre V. "4th Cavalry in Diverse Roles." The Cavalry Journal 3 (May-June 1945): 8-11.

Salerno, George. "Repairing the Broken Sabre: Overview of L-Series Divisional Cavalry." Armor 1 (January-February 1994): 29-34.

Sullivan, Gordon R. and James M. Dubik. "Land Warfare in the 21st Century." Military Review 9 (September 1993): 13-32.

Tincher, Robert R. "Reconnaissance In Normandy." The Cavalry Journal 1 (January-February 1945): 12-17.

Government Publications

Blumenson, Martin. Breakout and Pursuit. U.S. Army in WWII, ETO. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

Cole, Hugh M. The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge. U.S. Army in WWII, ETO. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

Gabel, Christopher R. The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.

MacDonald, Charles B. The Siegfried Line Campaign. U.S. Army in WWII, ETO. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

_____. The Final Offensive. U.S. Army in WWII, ETO. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

Stubbs, Mary L. and Stanley R. Connor. Armor-Cavalry. Army Lineage Series. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. U.S. Army in WWII, ETO. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951.

US Army. Mechanized Cavalry. Fort Riley, Kansas: Academic Division, The Cavalry School, 1932-1933, reprinted 1936, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

US Army. Field Manual 71-2, The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force. Washington: Department of the Army, 1988.

US Army. Field Manual 71-100, Division Operations. Washington: Department of the Army, 1990.

US Army. Field Manual 100-5, Operations. Washington: Department of the Army, 1993.

US Army. The History of the Fourth United States Cavalry. Washington: Department of the Army, Lineage and Honors, 1964.

War Department. Circular No. 256, Reorganization of Corps Headquarters and Organic Troops. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

War Department. Circular No. 439, Untitled Change Document. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.

War Department. FM 2-15, Cavalry Field Manual: Employment of Cavalry. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

War Department. FM 2-20, Cavalry Field Manual: Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.

War Department. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations--Operations. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941.

War Department. FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations--Operations. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.

War Department. Table of Organization and Equipment(TO&E) No. 2-22, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, Cavalry Group, Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944.

War Department. TO&E No. 2-25, Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943.

War Department. Table of Organization (T/O) No. 2-51, Cavalry Regiment, Horse and Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

War Department. T/O No. 2-55, Cavalry Squadron, Horse, Regiment, Horse and Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

War Department. T/O No. 2-65, Cavalry Squadron, Mechanized, Regiment, Horse and Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940.

War Department. T/O No. 2-71, Cavalry Regiment, Mechanized. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942.

War Department. Training Circular No. 42, Employment of Cavalry Mechanized Reconnaissance Elements. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942.

War Department. Training Circular No. 107, Employment of Mechanized Cavalry Units. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943.

Government Documents

Coolidge, George W. "AGF Report No. 564, After Action Reports of the 4th Cavalry Group from 1 August to 31 October 1944." Army Ground Forces Report, 29 January 1945. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

_____. "AGF Report No. 491: Account of Operations of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron." Army Ground Forces Report, 29 December 44. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

_____. "AGF Report No. 494: Account of Mechanized Reconnaissance in Amphibious Operations." Army Ground Forces Report, 31 December 44. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Fickett, Edward M. "AGF Report No. 1007: Mechanized Cavalry Organization and Tactics." Army Ground Forces Report, 5 June 1945. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Gaston, Frederick H. "History of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, Mechanized From 1-31 July 1944." Army Ground Forces Report. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Tribolet, H.A. and S.F. Jarrell. "Immediate Report No. 73: Combat Observations." Army Ground Forces Report, 8 October 1944. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Tribolet, H.A., S.F. Jarrell and H.G. McFeely. "Immediate Report No. 77: Combat Observations." Army Ground Forces Report, 12 October 1944. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Tully, Joseph M. "AGF Report No. 483: Notes on the Fourth Cavalry Group." Army Ground Forces Report, 29 December 1944. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

US Army. "Report of Activities: Army Ground Forces." Headquarters, AGF, 10 January 1946. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

US Army. "Combat Operations, First Army, Europe 1944-1945." HQ, First Army, 18 November 1946. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

US Forces, European Theater. "General Board Study Number 49: Mechanized Cavalry Units." 1946. Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

VII Corps D-DAY (Cherbourg) Report 4. "VII Corps Field Order: Neptune." 28 May 1944. Battle Analysis Series, Volume 1, Part 3, D-Day: Cherbourg, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

VII Corps Cobra Report 15. Special Report Cobra, 4th Infantry Division. "Oral Orders By MG Raymond O. Baron July 31." 1944. Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3, Part 1, Cobra, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

VII Corps Cobra Report 15. Special Report Cobra, 4th Infantry Division. "Commendation For Meritorious Service." 2 August 1944. Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3, Part 1, Cobra, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

VII Corps Report 28. "VII Corps AAR 1-31 December 1944." Battle Analysis Series, Volume 5, Part 1, Ardennes, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

VII Corps Cobra Report 184. "1st Infantry Division G-3 Report August 1944." Battle Analysis Series, Volume 3, Part 2, Cobra-Mortain-Siegfried, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Unpublished Monographs, Theses, and Briefings

Briefing on the Light Cavalry Regiment, presented by representatives of U.S. Army Armor Center to Armor branched CGSC Students, August 1993, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Clark Jr., Harry A. "Operations of the 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, 4th Cavalry Group, Normandy Campaign." Student Monograph, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Fort Benning, GA., 1948-49.

Littel, Mark T. "The Light Armored Cavalry Regiment: Reconnaissance Force of the Future." Student Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993.

Slaughter, S.D. and , James Browning, Charles Hollis, Frederick Hughes. "Cavalry Group as an Economy Force-4th Cav Group, 19-30 Dec 1944." Committee 15-Research Report, The Armored School, 1950.

Unpublished Interviews

Clark Jr., Harry A. Interview by John N. Tully, 29 December 1993. Transcript in the hand of John N. Tully, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Bowen, Al. Interview by John N. Tully, 25 March 1994. Transcript in the hand of John N. Tully, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. LTC Gary L. Bryant
   Dept of Joint/Combined Opns
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

2. Center of Military History
   U.S. Army
   Washington, D.C.

3. Combined Arms Research Library
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

4. Defense Technical Information Center
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, VA 22314

5. Early Entry, Lethality and
   Survivability Battle Laboratory
   Fort Monroe, VA

6. COL Catherine H.T. Foster
   1414 Price Drive
   Cape Girardeau, MO 63701

7. MAJ Stephen C. McGeorge
   Combat Studies Institute
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900

8. Military History Institute
   U.S. Army
   Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013

9. Mounted Battle Space Laboratory
   Fort Knox, KY 40121

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 11 May 1994

2. Thesis Author: CPT John N. Tully

3. Thesis Title: Doctrine, Organization and Employment of the 4th Cavalry Group During World War II

4. Thesis Committee Members Signatures:

Gary L. Bryan

Catherine A. T. Foster

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

(A) B C D E F X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

S A M P L E	Limitation Justification Statement	Chapter/Section	Page(s)	S A M P L E
SAMPLE	SAMPLE	SAMPLE	SAMPLE	
	Direct Military Support (10)	Chapter 3	12	
	Critical Technology (3)	Sect. 4	31	
	Administrative Operational Use (7)	Chapter 2	13-32	
SAMPLE	SAMPLE	SAMPLE	SAMPLE	

Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

Limitation Justification Statement	Chapter/Section	Page(s)

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: J. N. Tully

STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. Foreign Government Information. Protection of foreign information.

2. Proprietary Information. Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. Critical Technology. Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. Test and Evaluation. Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. Contractor Performance Evaluation. Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. Premature Dissemination. Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. Administrative/Operational Use. Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. Software Documentation. Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. Specific Authority. Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. Direct Military Support. To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).