


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NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT TO THE ARMY



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

BRIAN J. CUMMINS, CPT(P), USA
B.A. Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, 1982

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1994

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National Reconnaissance Support
to the Army

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Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.

This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national military strategy anticipates a less defined threat than during the Cold War. Also, downsizing pressures will proportionately reduce national and service intelligence support to the combatant CINCs and the services. This situation will require the Army to rely more than ever on national reconnaissance to support its warfighting intelligence needs.

A review of the Gulf War and JUST CAUSE indicates that although national intelligence has the capability to answer many tactical and operational reconnaissance questions, it generally fails to do so. The reasons are that national intelligence is focused to serve senior government policy makers not warfighters. National intelligence products are often caveated by differing analytic assessments that in effect are either ill-suited or cause confusion for tactical commanders. Finally, joint doctrine did not clearly set out coordination procedures or the process by which national reconnaissance is transmitted to tactical users in a timely manner.

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National Reconnaissance, Imagery, SIGINT,
Gulf War, JUST CAUSE

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE


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
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
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement)

ABSTRACT

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE SUPPORT TO THE ARMY by
CPT (P) Brian J. Cummins, USA, 141 pages.

This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national military strategy anticipates a less defined threat than during the Cold War. Also, downsizing pressures will proportionately reduce national and service intelligence support to the combatant CINCs and the services. This situation will require the Army to rely more than ever on national reconnaissance to support its warfighting intelligence needs.

A review of the Gulf War and JUST CAUSE indicates that although national intelligence has the capability to answer many tactical and operational reconnaissance questions, it generally fails to do so. The reasons are that national intelligence is focused to serve senior government policy makers not warfighters. National intelligence products are often caveated by differing analytic assessments that in effect are either ill-suited or cause confusion for tactical commanders. Finally, joint doctrine did not clearly set out coordination procedures or the process by which national reconnaissance is transmitted to tactical users in a timely manner.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL PAGE.....	ii
ABSTRACT.....	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....	iv
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE.....	27
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.....	36
4. CASE STUDIES.....	46
DESERT SHIELD/STORM.....	46
OPERATION JUST CAUSE.....	91
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.....	116
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	129
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....	141

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

You can never do too much reconnaissance.

General George S. Patton,
from "War As I Knew It"

Thesis Question

Using DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and JUST CAUSE as historical case studies, can National Intelligence (National Reconnaissance) satisfy the Army's tactical intelligence requirements?

A New Strategy and a New Challenge for Intelligence

On August 2, 1990, the day Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, President George Bush unveiled a new national security strategy in a speech at Aspen Colorado. The strategy recognized that the previous historical conditions that formed the basis of US foreign and defense policy since the end of World War II had changed. The ideological and military threat from communism had all but disappeared. The Soviets relinquished their capability to control events in

Eastern Europe, subsequently allowing Warsaw Pact members to discard pro-Soviet communist governments. A series of devastating political and economic crises compelled the Soviet Union to abandoned its confrontational approach to capitalism and seek immediate political and military accommodation with the West. This new condition meant that the US could significantly reduce its military from a force designed to defeat a massive Soviet conventional attack in Western Europe to one that could respond to diverse regional threats.¹

The new national military strategy centered on four main principles: deterrence, forward presence (though significantly limited than in the past), crisis response, and reconstitution.² Although these principles appear similar to previous national defense policy precepts, there are important differences. For example, in a war scenario against Russia, deterrence is no longer based on forces in being, but rather the capability to build up forces. This assumes two things: one, that the Russians would need long lead times to prepare for an offensive in Europe (estimated up to two years), thus allowing the U.S. to reconstitute enough forces to deter and/or defeat the them; and two, national intelligence will be able to precisely detect hostile acts and determine enemy intentions.³

These changes to national defense strategy will place enormous new burdens on the intelligence community.

Concurrent with the change in strategy, is the downsizing of forces. By 1995, the military will have cut 30 percent of it pre-Gulf War strength.⁴ The consequence is that in future military operations there will be fewer forces available to deploy overseas. The responsibility for assessing the threats that a smaller US military must combat will fall heavily on the national intelligence community. The combatant Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs), and the Army as a service, will rely upon national intelligence products to support combat oriented reconnaissance requirements to include: comprehensive situation monitoring prior to hostilities, broad surveillance of remote areas of the globe, and direct reconnaissance support to forces who deploy from the continental U.S. (CONUS) to overseas theaters.

Although the above requirements are certainly not new, they do represent a shift in philosophy for the national intelligence community. Although the term intelligence is universally used, the meaning for the Army is starkly different than understood at the national level. For the Army, the term tactical intelligence support is better described as reconnaissance and surveillance. For the national intelligence community, intelligence support has emphasized the analytical process of intelligence production. The Army's warfighting manual FM 100-5 Operations, describes the necessity for force projection

Army commanders who are separated from their support by great distances, to frequently turn to senior headquarters for answers to their tactical intelligence requirements. These intelligence requirements can only be satisfied by aggressive reconnaissance to see the enemy and to anticipate his reactions. When done correctly, the reconnaissance allows the tactical commander to retain the offensive initiative.⁵ The force projection Army of the future will look to national intelligence community to tailor intelligence products in a manner that best fits Army intelligence requirements.

Historically our national intelligence agencies, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the National Security Agency (NSA), were very effective in gathering intelligence concerning the Soviet Union and its immediate communist allies. As the main threat to the U.S. and NATO, the preponderance of the U.S. collection and analytical efforts were either directly related to the Soviet intelligence issue or on problems tangentially connected to Soviet influence. This emphasis however, made US analysis of non-Soviet intelligence problems less consistent in content, quality, scope, and ability to predict behavior.⁶ The new national defense strategy with its emphasis on regional problem areas seems to have caught the national intelligence community at a disadvantage. Regional threats can no longer be analyzed in

a U.S. vs Soviet mental framework. Intelligence analysts must now consider an array of 160 nations and many other independent groups as separate entities without the simplicity of the East-West division. Unfortunately, little long term intelligence analysis can be carried over from the previous understanding of superpower interests as an influence on regional conflicts.⁷

The national community may have a hard time fulfilling its expanded support role for the Army. Although a shrinking of the services' force structure would logically argue for an expansion of national and service intelligence capability, the reality is that there is heavy pressure within Congress to cut back and/or consolidate intelligence organizations. The new national security strategy argues for a reduced military and many in Congress see this as also a reason to reduce the intelligence community as well. For example, no longer will analysts from CIA, DIA, and the Army compete in analyzing the newest model Russian tank: there simply will not be enough people for this kind of overlapping effort.⁸ The reduction in resources, plus new missions, will place a great strain on the national intelligence community's capability to support national intelligence requirements while simultaneously increasing its intelligence support to compensate for the cuts suffered by the services' intelligence organizations.

My masters thesis will examine these issues and how they will affect the Army. I will evaluate the national intelligence support, (better described as national reconnaissance support), that the Army received from a recent historical perspective. I will examine the utility and quality of national intelligence during operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and operation JUST CAUSE. The first case study, DESERT SHIELD/STORM represents a future model of the force projection Army involve in what the new national security strategy calls a major regional crisis. In contrast, JUST CAUSE examines the the integration of national intelligence by a forward deployed CINC into his campaign plan. In both case studies national intelligence (reconnaissance if using the Army definition of intelligence) present distinct features for evaluation. Success or failure of national reconnaissance in aiding the Army to accomplish its mission during those operations may suggest the future successes or shortcomings national reconnaissance will have in supporting the Army intelligence requirements.

Importance of the Problem

Military success is often directly linked to the quality of intelligence. Field Manual 100-5 Operations, recognizes the criticality of intelligence: "Intelligence operations are the organized efforts of a commander to

gather and analyze information on the environment of operations and the enemy. Obtaining and synthesizing battlefield information prior to beginning operations is a vital task."⁹ U.S. Army intelligence doctrine, Field Manual 34-1, states unequivocally that intelligence is the key to military success.¹⁰

In an era of limited resources and greatly reduced budgets, the possibility exists that the Army may not receive timely and tailored intelligence from which to make detailed plans to execute force projection operations. The result could risk the success of an operation and/or needlessly endanger U.S. and allied forces to hostile threats.

Background on the Problem - Reduction of Defense and Intelligence Budgets

With the end of Cold War, a less clear 'New World Order' emerged.¹¹ The national security of the U.S. and its NATO allies was seemingly more secure than at any other time since the end of World War II. The defense spending levels of the eighties could not be politically sustained by the Bush administration. The question was not whether the defense budget would be cut, but rather by how much. Political opinion on this issue went from one extreme of an immediate 50 percent cut in the defense budget to the Bush administration's more gradual deflation. Former Secretary

of Defense Richard Cheney stated that from 1985 out to 1997, defense spending will drop by 37 percent in real terms. By his calculation this reduction will leave defense spending at 3.4 percent of the Gross National Product: the lowest amount since Pearl Harbor.¹² The federal outlays for 1993 were 18.3 percent, down from the Reagan era defense peak in 1987 of 27.3 percent. Interestingly enough the lowest federal outlays for defense spending during the Carter years were 22.5 percent in 1980.¹³

The National Foreign Intelligence Program, a umbrella of various funding and program initiatives within the intelligence community, has been substantially cut back. Just as it reduced the defense budget, Congress also has substantially reduced the intelligence budget since 1990 under the premise that since the Soviet Union was no longer a threat to U.S. national security there was no longer a requirement to have a robust intelligence budget. For each of the last three fiscal years, Congress has reduced the amount of funding for U.S. intelligence activities. Although the actual intelligence program budgets are classified, mandated personnel decreases alone among the national component of the intelligence community will amount to 17.5 percent by 1997.¹⁴ Tactical intelligence programs which directly support the uniformed services took a greater cut of upwards to 25 to 30 percent since 1990, far greater than the cuts suffered by the national intelligence agencies

(CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter-intelligence efforts of the FBI).¹⁵ The assumption behind this reduction of service intelligence was twofold. One, the services could not support their intelligence force structure given new budget constraints, and two, a smaller but more "efficient" national reconnaissance structure could off-set the cuts suffered by the services. This downward trend continued in the 1994 intelligence appropriations budget. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence recommended a substantial cut in the Clinton Administration's request for intelligence funding which by itself was smaller than proposed by the Bush administration.¹⁶

The most common solution to match available budgetary resources to intelligence requirements is to consolidate assets from national to tactical level so as to maximize efficiency. Senior officials of both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government believe that when times are tough reorganization can enable fewer personnel with less funding to do better and/or turn out more work than was the case prior to the directed reorganization. The difficulty with this approach to intelligence organizations is that there is no clearly identifiable "bottom line" to show profit or loss like in a commercial venture. Quantifiable statistics such as the number of reports written, imagery frames acquired, and the like, do not answer the key question of intelligence: Was the

intelligence support on hand of any use when it was needed? For all practical purposes there is no real basis to evaluate whether a particular reorganization will contribute to the overall effectiveness of an operation, or worse, be harmful.¹⁷

However during hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1991, the Congressional intentions on the reorganization of the intelligence community were outlined by Senator Boren:

Our own interest in reorganization was born out of concern that, despite a sizeable growth in development in intelligence during the 1980's, military commanders were not receiving timely and relevant intelligence regarding the threats and contingencies which they perceived as the most threatening. The members of this Committee became concerned that national and tactical intelligence bureaucracies were isolated from each other resulting in duplication, waste and poor performance. ...The tactical and national intelligence communities appear to be excessively isolated from one another, leaving each free to pursue self-sufficiency through organic systems and organizations on the argument that national systems of civilian systems cannot be relied upon for support. The national community, likewise, emphasizes its peacetime missions and pays scant attention to the commander's needs. ...Finally, we undertake this review in light of the economic realities that will confront us in the 1990's. If budget deficits are to be brought down, government spending must be reduced, and intelligence will be forced to share in these reductions. We must look for ways then to do more with less. If we can streamline, if we can avoid unnecessary duplication, if we can find more efficient ways of accomplishing

the intelligence mission, then by all means we should adopt them.

As we begin this important review of the intelligence community, I think that it is worthwhile to consider an analogous, and very recent, reorganization effort. Back in 1986, if there was one thing that united the military services-other than the Soviet threat-it was their fierce antipathy toward the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization Act, at least initially. And yet few today would deny that our victory in the Persian Gulf was in large part attributable to General Schwarzkopf's streamlined management structure-a structure that was at least in part established under the Goldwater-Nichols bill which hammered out in part in this very room. ...Our ultimate goal is the same: better intelligence and a better product in the national interest of the United States.¹⁸

However this strategy to consolidate resources has some definite drawbacks. Intelligence is useless if its not timely, or tailored to the user. Highly centralized organizations often reduce duplication of effort but cannot usually support multiple and rapid requests for support. This problem was examined during Congressional testimony on intelligence restructuring when the former Assistance Secretary of Defense for C3I, Mr. Donald C.Latham stated:

I believe a very important need for intelligence estimating and analysis is closeness to the user. As a negotiating ambassador for much of the last two years, I found it invaluable to have people close to me who could do quick analysis, often relying on secure communication with Washington. They could respond in a matter of hours than some detached office that responded in weeks or months to some central tasking that I could not influence. I am sure the feeling is even more acute

for a military commander in combat, and it seems to me that the biggest need in terms of intelligence analytical capability for many, many tasks is for commanders in the field to be able to have people with them who can conduct dialogue with national offices that have expertise, so that analysis can be done quickly and catered to the commander's needs.¹⁹

What becomes apparent is that Congress equates bureaucratic efficiency with effectiveness. The two terms are not synonymous. A centralized intelligence structure may be cost efficient in terms of budgetary resources but very ineffective in terms of providing timely and tailored intelligence support. Although Congress is moving to cut budgets and direct organizational consolidation, it must be pointed out that they offer no empirical evidence that supports their strategy other than the organizational impact the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act had on the services.

New Intelligence Missions in a "New World Order"

Today the interests of the intelligence community must go beyond the framework of the Cold War and examine issues very different in substance to the U.S.' previous national security interests. This refocus of the national components of the intelligence community will have an effect on the military services' intelligence components. The downsizing initiatives within the intelligence community will by necessity force the services to provide greater support to the national level during peacetime. The net

effect will be the reduced ability to devote resources to typically service unique intelligence problems. The bottomline is that national reconnaissance may not have the resources to support Army intelligence requirements and at the same time tackle new intelligence problems, such as treaty verification, economic competitiveness, social unrest and over population, and ecological damage, to name a few. These new missions are very challenging, often causing the intelligence community to break with older methods of analysis.²⁰ Although in peacetime national intelligence agencies will take the lead in solving nearly all intelligence problems, the Army assists these efforts to a great extent by providing personnel to support these intelligence activities.

Here are some of the current national intelligence problems requiring Army participation. The Russian republic and the former Soviet Republics of Ukraine and Kazakhstan have roughly 30,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. While these governments are presently not likely to become belligerent with the United States, internal war and loss of control these nuclear weapons to extremists or terrorists cannot be ruled out.²¹

As a major national security interest, the United States has a serious stake in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whether nuclear, chemical or biological. Also troubling is the proliferation of

ballistic missile systems that may be used to deliver those weapons of mass destruction. Although the Soviet system may have collapsed, there are other nations hostile to the United States or our allies who may be tempted to use such weapons if the opportunity presents itself. The development of these weapons may generate regional arms races by countries concerned for their survival. As an example, the development of nuclear weapons in North Korea may compel neighboring countries (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) to also develop nuclear weapons as a counterbalance. It is a situation which could quickly escalate out of control.

The intelligence community expends great efforts to monitor the control and movement of existing weapons of mass destruction. It also tracks the development and production of these weapons and the production of potential delivery systems. The intelligence developed has been the basis for diplomatic actions by the United States and non-governmental organizations charged with treaty compliance.²²

The U.S. intelligence community is virtually the sole agent for verifying many bilateral and multilateral agreements such as Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Conventional Armed Forces Europe Agreement (CFE). The intelligence community plays a big role in advising U.S. negotiators on such agreements. Parallel to these agreements, the intelligence community is increasingly required to monitor and verify the effectiveness of economic

sanctions imposed by the U.S. or the UN on either a unilateral or multilateral basis.²³

The last few years has seen the recognition of a strong domestic economy as an element of U.S. national security. This recognition has caused a reexamination of the role the intelligence community has to play in protecting U.S. industry from espionage and ensuring the survival of economic competitiveness abroad.²⁴ While the debate is far from over, clearly the national components of the intelligence community will expand their scope to areas previously thought out of the jurisdiction of the intelligence discipline.

Increasingly the intelligence community is supporting the operational deployments of the United Nations peacekeeping forces with intelligence on threats to the safety of such missions. The most recent examples have occurred in support of UN operations in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia.²⁵ When U.S. forces are actively deployed in UN operations, intelligence support is substantially enhanced.

The intelligence community plays a significant, though largely silent role, in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. The FBI and the CIA are by law responsible for the domestic and foreign aspects of these two extremely important intelligence problems. However the actual "pick and shovel" work is done by the armed services

and other DoD intelligence gathering organizations, like NSA. Intelligence support may include the monitoring the movements of terrorists and drug traffickers, developing data bases on their tactics, training, operations, weapons, and providing early warning to thwart their actions. Another important aspect to this intelligence problem is determining terrorists' and drug traffickers' relationships to foreign governments or to groups within the United States.²⁶

A more traditional role of the intelligence community (from a military perspective) is the effort devoted to support U.S. forces deployed around the globe. The Army as an example, must prepare for many different types of contingencies ranging across the conflict spectrum: from all out war to peacekeeping operations. While the threat of nuclear war has seemingly lessened in recent years, confrontations with ethnic, religious, and political regional rivals has increased substantially. The breakup of the communist block has unleashed formerly suppressed age-old conflicts. These regional conflicts make prediction and early warning extremely difficult. It is very possible U.S. forces may be deployed in regions where we may have little solid intelligence on a potential enemy's order of battle or his military strategy and political objectives. Although the national components of the intelligence community are obligated to anticipate such problems, the data bases for

many regions of the world are very incomplete as compared to our knowledge of the former Soviet Union.

MMAS Assumptions:

The following assumptions will be applied to the research project.

1. The Army will continue to consolidate intelligence functions and resource thus relying more on national reconnaissance to fill the intelligence void.
2. Although the intelligence requirements of the combatant CINCs and the Army are important, national policy makers will always receive first priority for national reconnaissance support.
3. Intelligence missions will become more varied and complex in the future. There will be less time to provide early-warning in regional conflicts; order-of-battle information on future threats will not be as extensive as compared to the former Warsaw Pact ORBAT.
4. Joint and Army doctrine will not have a measurable effect on Congress's determination to reduce the budget and/or mandate consolidation initiatives.
5. The criteria for intelligence quality as defined by Joint Pub 2-0 are valid.

Limits of the Topic

I intend to keep my MMAS project unclassified. Although national reconnaissance collection systems and methods are highly classified, most of the data I need is published in open source government or commercial press. Classified material is usually related to sources and methods of intelligence collection which is not the intention of this paper. This project will not address specific sources and methods nor the technical capabilities of particular collection and dissemination systems. The focus is on making an assessment of the quality of the national intelligence community's support to the Army by using the two historical case studies, DESERT SHIELD/STORM and JUST CAUSE.

The second limitation is that most of the joint and service doctrinal literature is in some form of rewrite. The experience of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, and JUST CAUSE, the shrinking intelligence community, and finally the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act, have necessitated a rewrite of most of the doctrine. I am currently working with the test publications, available drafts of new editions, or older versions of doctrinal literature.

Delimitations

The scope of the project is narrow. In this regard I plan to delimit my thesis by focusing principally on imagery intelligence (IMINT), and signals intelligence (SIGINT), the two most technically oriented, and resource consuming disciplines within the intelligence community. SIGINT as a discipline is subdivided into three general categories: COMINT (communications intercept), ELINT (electronic intelligence i.e. radar emissions), and FISINT (Foreign instrumentation intelligence, or electromagnetic emissions associated with weapons testing). In my study I will emphasize the COMINT element of SIGINT with possible inclusion of ELINT if the case studies warrant inclusion. FISINT will not be dealt with at all since it is a discipline closely associated with peacetime strategic weapons testing. Other intelligence disciplines will not be examined in any great detail, although they may be presented if pertinent to the assessment of national reconnaissance in the case studies.

Definitions

The intelligence field is divided into three general areas of concentration as identified in the May 1993 draft version of FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations. From the Army perspective, intelligence

supports operations at all levels within the environments of peace, conflict, or war in the following manner:

Strategic intelligence. As the term implies, is the highest level of intelligence. It is concerned with the basic capacity of a nation to produce military forces, the overall dispositions, missions, and the capabilities of those forces, and the military intentions of its leaders. An important element since World War II of strategic intelligence is strategic indications and warning - the systematic effort of national and theater assets to identify and warn against a possible attack. By content, strategic intelligence is primarily for senior governmental officials, often with political overtones taken into account in its analysis. Intelligence organizations that concentrate on developing strategic intelligence are civilian and military manned joint agencies such as CIA, DIA, NSA, and to a more limited extent Defense Mapping Agency, Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of the Treasury, and Department of Justice.²⁷

Operational intelligence. Is the bridge between strategic and tactical intelligence. It identifies the ability of the enemy within a theater area operations that could affect the campaign or contingency plan of a combatant [^]INC. The echelon focus at this level is situation dependent. It reflects the nature of the theater of war

itself by: supporting friendly campaigns and operations by predicting enemy campaign plans, to include their center of gravity, lines of operation, decisive points, pivots of maneuver, and other components necessary for the design of campaigns. It also focuses primarily on the intelligence needs of theater, Army group, field Army, corps, or joint task force (JTF) commanders.²⁸ Intelligence organizations may often be joint service. The operational level usually requires a mix of national reconnaissance assets to augment theater intelligence systems to adequately cover a combatant CINC's area of responsibility. Examples of operational targets include location and capabilities, missions of enemy armies, corps, divisions, air wings, naval forces, and irregular forces.²⁹

Tactical intelligence. Sometimes called combat intelligence, tactical intelligence seeks to determine enemy composition, disposition, and if possible intentions of enemy units immediately threatening to friendly units. It is here that intelligence requirements among the services differ the greatest. A ground force intelligence officer may monitor enemy battalions and regiments, while his Air Force or Naval counterpart may be concerned with individual aircraft and ships. This level of difference is dictated by the respective requirement of the particular service warfighter and his mission. Such difference in perspective,

has in the past complicated intelligence cooperation between the services.³⁰

Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). To help commanders build and maintain this common picture, intelligence organizations and systems must provide mutual support, operating on a shared information basis. No service nor echelon of command has sufficient assets to collect information and produce intelligence to meet all needs. Accordingly, within the limits imposed by security, intelligence must be distributed down and across echelons. Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) provide a focal point for much of this activity. The JIC facility is designed to accomplish most intelligence functions of the joint command. The JIC is directly subordinate to the J2 and includes the personnel who manage internal intelligence operations and correlate intelligence data obtained from multiple sources within the intelligence community. The J2 staff elements plan and direct the activities overseen by the J2, while the JIC elements are actively engaged in production and dissemination of operational intelligence support to the commander. Personnel assigned to a JIC are dependent on the J2's concept of JIC operations, the methods employed by the command to respond to time-sensitive and deliberative operational requirements, and the missions and functions of command and its subordinate units. These typically include

the intelligence analysts and target planners involved in the integration, interpretation, and analysis of information to be produced into intelligence. The J2 function of collection and production management remains a separate and distinct role.³¹ The JIC of a combatant command with operational level service components, or joint task forces is primarily responsible for producing the intelligence required to support its CINC and his staff. Since the combatant command's area of responsibility and area of interest normally coincide with those of its immediate subordinates, the JIC obtains much of its finished intelligence from service component intelligence centers if they are not consolidated with the JIC. Its analysis would differ principally in that it integrates service component intelligence products and projects further into the future to support the formulation of theater campaign plans involving joint forces. The analysis may also differ in that it will integrate controlled intelligence information not available to lower echelons. Some examples of JICs include: Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC), the Molesworth Joint Analysis Center (JAC) in Great Britain, and the Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) at USACOM. These centers have hundreds of analysts and are required to handle all the theater intelligence needs without great augmentation from the national level.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Background of Joint Intelligence Doctrine

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the pertinent elements of national, joint, and Army intelligence doctrine, its development, and influence on operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM.

By definition doctrine is the blue print from which all military operations evolve. It offers a common perspective from which to plan, operate and train for war.¹ The 1986 DoD Reorganization Act, combined with the Gulf War and to a lesser degree Operation JUST CAUSE, reinvigorated the preeminence of joint doctrine over individual service doctrine. The latest editions of the services' key warfighting documents, the Army's FM 100-5 Operations, the Marine Corps' FMFM-1 Warfighting, and the Air Force AEM 1-1 Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, all address joint operations in greater detail than in previous editions.² (Until recently the Navy did not have a written doctrine in the same sense as the Army's FM 100-5. Since the Gulf War the Navy has created a command for the purpose

of developing naval doctrine.) Service doctrine recognizes the principles of war, the value of fighting as a team, and the admission that future conflicts will not be fought by a single service. Although unique service capabilities are highlighted, they are placed in a joint context. These operational documents stress the need for good intelligence as key element for success. FM 100-5 states that in force projection operations (the more likely future type operation the Army will be involved in), the Army will routinely rely on higher levels of government agency and joint intelligence support prior to, and during movement into the anticipated battle area.³

Until very recently, intelligence doctrine lagged behind operational doctrine. Before the Gulf War, national, joint and service level intelligence doctrine suffered from narrow parochial focus and omissions. Although the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act provided the legislative framework for more joint intelligence interoperability, it was not until after Panama and the Gulf War that serious efforts were made to develop a joint intelligence doctrine that offered any semblance of standards. The shortcomings and conflicts in Joint and Army intelligence doctrine caused a major rewrite. Since the end of the Gulf War, DIA has worked on the final version of Joint Pub 2-0 Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. In its place is the June 1991 Test Pub written prior to the Gulf War. The four supporting

intelligence publications in the series: Intelligence Support for Joint Operations 2-01, Targeting 2-01.1, CounterIntelligence Support 2-01.2, and Joint Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Intelligence Support to JTFs 2-02, are all in rewrite and currently are not scheduled for publication until 1994.⁴

The passage of the DoD Reorganization Act stimulated many DoD level joint initiatives to include the designation of select DoD intelligence agencies as Combat Support Agencies. For example, in 1988, Secretary of Defense Carlucci designated the National Security Agency (NSA) as a Combat Support Agency (CSA) with respect to those activities it performs in support of the warfighting CINCs and the services.⁵ The intent of the measure was to improve NSA's SIGINT support to the JCS and theater CINCs during peacetime and during conflict. However, NSA SIGINT doctrine to support combatant CINC's and services, is long on generalities but short on specific measures. Some of the principles described in the 1991 SIGINT Annex to Joint Pub 2-0. state that NSA will: respond immediately to changing situations, provide assistance to military commands, provide SIGINT support to unified and specified commands, and develop SIGINT support plans for contingency operations. In spirit, the principles sound very supportive, but they are written in such a way as open for a wide interpretation. However, the SIGINT Annex identifies other principles not

necessarily in the interest of combatant CINCs or the services. NSA also states that it will exercise SIGINT operational control over all SIGINT activities of the U.S., validate and prioritize peacetime information requirements of military commanders, and ensure that capabilities of SIGINT activities designed for warfare or contingency deployment are productively used during peacetime in support of appropriate readiness requirements.⁶ Altogether NSA unequivocally declares to support the SIGINT intelligence requirements of the CINC's and the services, but yet also states it will retain operational control and tasking authority over those assets.

Four serious doctrinal deficiencies became evident during the build-up of forces in the Persian Gulf. These were indications and warning (I&W), battle damage assessment (BDA), Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) organization and operations, and multi-service/agency interoperability.⁷ These four issues caused considerable problems during the during the Gulf War and to a more limited degree in Panama. Although innovative ad hoc solutions were improvised, adequate doctrine could have lessened or eliminated much of the confusion and conflict. The principle problem was that joint doctrine either did not address the above issues, only mentioned them in broad terms. For example the concept of a theater JIC as the focal point for all AOR intelligence coordination is not mentioned in previous editions of Joint

Pub 2-0, although it is described in general terms in the 1987 version of FM-34-1.⁸ The May 1993 draft version of FM 34-1 goes into far greater detail of joint intelligence operations to include a force projection vignette that describes the interlinking of joint and army corps level intelligence exchanges and support.⁹

Another significant problem that almost "broke" the intelligence architecture in Southwest Asia was poor interservice intelligence interoperability. This problem took on two forms, one being actual disseminating systems, the second being format and analytical content. In an optimum environment, interoperable systems allow the timely sharing of intelligence across service lines and from national systems. Joint Pub 0-2 Unified action Armed Forces (UNAAF) explicitly states that intelligence systems must be interoperable to ensure success in joint operations. Intelligence doctrine must provide interoperability in both procedures and systems.¹⁰ However this stated goal was never totally achieved prior to the Gulf War. The services relied on a multitude of unique intelligence collection and dissemination systems that fit well within their the confines of service doctrine. National intelligence could not easily be transmitted to the Army without a prodigious set of ad hoc solutions. Similarly, intelligence could not be passed among the services for the same general reasons. In his testimony before Congress, General Schwarzkopf stated

that aside from BDA, intelligence interoperability problems were the single largest intelligence shortcoming of the war.¹¹

The Marine Corps manual FMFM 1 Warfighting, states that doctrine is to provide a basis for harmonious actions and understanding.¹² However the pre-Panama and Gulf War editions of Joint Pub 2-0 may have caused more confusion rather than provide guidance. It describes national intelligence support for tactical components, and the role of operational intelligence as an ad hoc arrangement of intelligence producers and skip echelon support. In contrast to strategic and tactical intelligence, operational intelligence applies not to a particular level of command, but rather to the functions of supporting operations at any level.¹³ This definition of operational intelligence is not in synchronization with the recent emphasis operational doctrine has placed on the operational level of war. At that level operational intelligence should be in support of campaign objectives and other major military operations. The operational level of war is the crucial bridge between the strategic and tactical. In appendix B. of the 1991 Joint 2-0 Test Pub, the Army took exception to the Pub's definition of operational intelligence rightly explaining that it did not match either in accuracy or consistency with Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations.¹⁴

When published later in 1994, the final version Joint Pub 2-0 corrects this definitional problem.

Summation of Joint Doctrine

Efforts within the Department of Defense to develop better joint doctrine prior to Panama and the Gulf War fell short of the mark. Though the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act pushed the services and the national intelligence agencies to at least nominally recognize the criticality of supporting the combatant CINC's intelligence requirements, it took the two conflicts to provide the real catalyst for change. A major lesson learned was that a solid joint intelligence doctrine is paramount to providing the framework from which an organizational concept can be developed. Once an intelligence organization is decided upon, then decisions concerning the collection and processing systems architecture can be formulated.¹⁵ Fortunately the latest edition of joint intelligence corrects many of the doctrinal omissions and deficiencies of prior editions. National intelligence agencies are also making a better effort to synchronize their strategic intelligence responsibilities with the intelligence needs of combatant commanders. Whether this effort will have a lasting effect remains to be seen.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

My research methodology will assess the success or failure of national reconnaissance support to the Army by using the principles of intelligence quality as outlined by Joint Pub 2-0. The Pub identifies seven principles that describe the qualitative attributes of intelligence to the joint force and service component commander. These principles are: timeliness, objectivity, usability, readiness, completeness, accuracy, relevance. Although stated slightly different, the new Army FM 34-1 (draft) recognizes the universality of these principles as fundamental to determining successful intelligence support to Army warfighters.¹ These principles offer qualitative standards to measure the adequacy of intelligence. None of these principles are intended to stand alone, but rather are to be used together to evaluate the usefulness of intelligence. Failure to meet the conditions set forth by the principles outlined by Joint Pub 2-0 is by definition an intelligence shortfall. The consequences do not necessarily mean subsequent failure in a military operation, but

certainly the inadequate intelligence will cause ill-informed decisions by the warfighter that has the potential for disaster.

The relationships among these seven principles are complex and overlapping. Although these principles are applicable to any echelon of intelligence, the joint level must balance the broad framework associated with national level concerns and the tightly focused tactical intelligence requirements of the services. Joint intelligence doctrine tries to balance these two competing ends of the intelligence spectrum so as to increase the probability that combatant commanders will receive the best possible understanding of the enemy's capabilities and intentions. Although joint doctrine is not directive, it provides a mental structure for common understanding of the situation and a basis for reasoned judgment. The seven principles then are just as applicable to national intelligence support as they are to operational and tactical intelligence.

I will apply the seven principles to the two case studies of my thesis, DESERT SHIELD/STORM and JUST CAUSE of Chapter Four. Both case studies are relevant to service and joint intelligence doctrine, and intelligence organizational support structures at both national and theater levels. Also DESERT SHIELD/STORM and JUST CAUSE best represent future models of large scale military operations in major

regional conflicts as defined by the 1992 national military strategy.²

Each case study highlights unique features of intelligence support from national reconnaissance means. CENTCOM J-2, and ARCENT G-2's, experience in Southwest Asia is an excellent model of a predominantly CONUS based CINC who is compelled to rely upon national assets to develop the intelligence picture until theater and service assets can enter the area of operations. This model best represents the future force projection Army as identified in the latest national military strategy. Conversely, JUST CAUSE represents a forward deployed CINC who is required to leverage theater and national intelligence assets to attain theater and strategic operational objectives.

If the methodology applied to the two case studies can show that national reconnaissance support to the Army met all seven principles outlined in Joint Pub 2-0, then it is reasonable to assume that future national intelligence support to the Army will satisfy future Army intelligence requirements. If on the other hand the case studies show that national reconnaissance support did not satisfy Army intelligence requirements as defined by the criteria in Joint Pub 2-0, then it can also be assumed that future intelligence support from national sources will not be adequate for Army intelligence needs. The implications of the latter situation, considering the smaller force

structure of the Army, and the desired importance national reconnaissance has for the future are very serious. It questions the assumption raised during Congressional hearings on the restructuring of the intelligence community that a more centralized intelligence based primarily on national assets is inherently more efficient and effective than currently exists within the intelligence community.³

The following are the seven principles of intelligence quality as defined by Joint Pub 2-0. figure II-2, and pages II-10 to II-15.

1. Timeliness. Intelligence must be available in time to use it effectively. Timely intelligence is essential in preventing surprise, conducting a defense, seizing the initiative, and using forces effectively to obtain objectives. The principle applies to the intelligence process of developing EEIs (essential elements of information, a national and joint term that is similar to the Army term PIR, priority intelligence requirements), identifying and stating requirements, and collecting and producing intelligence. Timely intelligence [at the joint and national level] is critical for the tactical commander's directing and cueing his own collection resources and sensors to meet threats and engage the enemy. A pivotal consequence of timely intelligence is the fact that the more timely the data is, the less likely it has been analyzed for

its significance and accuracy. A J-2 must balance his requirement to report significant intelligence changes with his requirement for accuracy. Accuracy and timeliness often have conflicting objectives. Inaccurate reporting wastes resources and weakens the J-2's credibility. However accuracy demands additional time, but if too much time is devoted then the information may be too late to be of any use. The J-2 must develop a close working relationship with the commander so that the J-2 is aware of lead time required [to implement decisions].

2. Objectivity. Commanders should receive objective intelligence. Commanders must have the best possible view of the enemy and the situation for the identification, consideration, and determination of military objectives. Intelligence must present the actual situation as best understood, at all times. A complete and accurate understanding of the enemy is predicated on objective intelligence. For intelligence to be objective it should be free from excessive political constraints. The methodology must not be directed or manipulated to conform to a desired military or political result. Support of political positions through unobjective reporting of military intelligence must be avoided. Intelligence concerning a situation is one of the factors in determining policy, but policy must not determine the intelligence. Although sound

and objective intelligence may conflict with a current position, perception, or policy, it must nevertheless be presented as best understood by the intelligence officer. [Because of this problem], the principle of objective reporting is the one least attained by intelligence organizations. By definition, intelligence that is not objective, also fails the principles of accuracy, relevance, and completeness.

3. Usability. The form in which the intelligence is provided to the user should be tailored for particular applications or suitable for general use without additional analysis or manipulation. As much as practical, intelligence must be in a form suitable for application when it is received. Intelligence production and tailoring of intelligence materials must be done in the perspective of the user's need for timely application of information. Dissemination must be direct and concise with the users and the intelligence purpose in mind. Attaining this principle requires intelligence producers to understand the circumstances for use of their products and implies the user's responsibility to communicate his intent or situation and any particular requirements of content.

4. Readiness. Intelligence structures, data bases, and products must be responsive to existing and contingent

requirements of commanders, staffs, and forces.

Intelligence assets and resources that are oriented to areas where there is a high probability of operations must be maintained in a high state of readiness. In the past, intelligence has often been unprepared to support initial employment of forces at the beginning of operations. For this reason, intelligence personnel should be oriented to the probable areas where operations can occur, to understand potential enemies, and to be capable of producing intelligence information that is usable by all elements of a joint force.

5. Completeness. Although absolute "complete intelligence" is only theoretically possible, the principle of complete intelligence has meaning in relation to the principles of relevance, accuracy, and that the intelligence requirements are relative to the commander's responsibilities and objectives. Commanders, staffs, and forces should receive all the intelligence they need to accomplish their missions and for the security of their forces. Intelligence requirements must be prioritized, and intelligence collection and production should reflect the commander and the J-2's prioritization of their intelligence needs. Complete intelligence allows commanders to take best advantage of a situation. Without it, initiative, flexibility, and the advantage of surprise may be yielded to

the enemy. Historical examples where significant elements of intelligence was lacking are: Pearl Harbor 1941, the Battle of the Bulge 1944, the SS MAYAGUEZ rescue attempt in 1975, and Grenada Operation 1983.

6. Accuracy. Intelligence must be factually correct, convey an appreciation for facts and the situation as they exist, and estimate future situations and courses of enemy action based on those facts and sound judgment. It is not enough that intelligence is true; to be accurate, it should identify and describe what must be known of the situation. The principles of completeness, timeliness, and relevance, bear on accuracy and they should be applied in identifying and stating intelligence requirements. If requirements are not accurately developed, intelligence products will probably be unsuitable for the operation. Objectivity of intelligence also bears on accuracy. If the intelligence product is skewed by bias in collection, analysis, or dissemination, the resulting erroneous or incomplete portrayals of the situations may foster faulty operational decisions.

7. Relevance. Intelligence information should be relevant to determining, planning, conducting, and evaluating operations. It must contribute to the decisionmaker's understanding of the enemy and his own situation relative to the enemy. The intelligence must be

appropriate to the purposes for which it is needed and how it will be applied for the operation. The intelligence system must provide understanding and insights into the situation through information that is directly applicable to the responsibilities of each echelon of supported commands, and should bear on the command's potential, planned, and underway courses of action. For intelligence to be truly relevant, it must also meet the qualitative criteria of being complete, accurate, timely, objective, and usable. From this, one can see some of the interrelationships of the fundamental principles.

Endnotes

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CHAPTER 4

CASE STUDIES

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

I would tell you very candidly that based on some analysis that we were getting, we'd still be sitting over there waiting [to launch the ground campaign] if we were dependent upon that analysis.

Testimony before Congress by General Schwarzkopf, June 1991.

Introduction

This chapter will examine the role national and theater intelligence assets played in supporting the Army Central Command (ARCENT) commander and subordinate ECB (echelon corps and below) units during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. After examining the historical events and the intelligence force structure available at the time, an assessment will be made of the intelligence successes or shortfalls using the research methodology outlined in chapter 3. The criteria for success in the research methodology are from the 1991 Joint Pub-2. Although it is a fundamental guide for the unified commands, it is also

applicable to subordinate combatant commands and national intelligence organizations involved in supporting joint operations.¹

The dual campaigns of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM were the first large scale joint and combined military operations conducted by the United States since the Vietnam War, and the largest mobilization of reserves since World War II.² The operation also tested the impact of the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act on the military. There were several areas in which the Reorganization Act affected CENTCOM's combatant command authority. The intent of the law was to strengthen the CINC's authority while clarifying the lines of communication from the NCA through the CJCS to the warfighting CINC. This would avoid the duplication of chains of command as occurred during the Vietnam War. The Reorganization Act also delineated clear guidance to the Department of Defense field agencies. DIA and NSA were designated as Combat Support Agencies (CSA) with respect to combat support activities they performed for the warfighting combatant commands. The intent was to make DoD agencies more responsive to the intelligence requirements of the military during peacetime and in time of hostilities.³

Recently established joint procedures and doctrine provided a basis for the integration of combat forces and national intelligence support into CINCCENT's AOR. While each service provided forces to CENTCOM, CINCCENT commanded

and decided how to best organize them during the early months of the build-up in Southwest Asia. As stated later by General Schwarzkopf, "Goldwater-Nichols established very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force in the Gulf."⁴ Though this statement may have been true for the uniformed services, it was less so for the Combat Support Agencies responsible for theater intelligence support. In 1987, a Secretary of Defense study of DoD Defense Agencies found that Combat Support Agencies were for the most part not tailored to meet command-unique intelligence requirements. For example, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) was under resourced to meet all the mapping needs of the Unified and Specified commands. Of significant was DMA's growing backlog of inadequately mapped areas of the Third World to include Iraq and other portions of the Gulf region.⁵ Although DIA was responsive in crisis support, the study criticized its incomplete intelligence data bases which hindered realistic contingency planning. Compounding the problem was the progressive increase of newer intelligence concerns, such as technology transfers and worldwide terrorism, but without the increases in personnel billets to handle the work load.⁶ Thus DIA and DMA were failing to meet the Joint Pub 2-0 intelligence principle of completeness. These shortfalls, and gaps in intelligence data bases would later haunt CENTCOM during the

initial period of the Gulf crisis, seriously hampering the planning process.

The impact of the 1986 DoD Reorganization Act on the quality and quantity of intelligence provided to CENTCOM is debatable. What is certain, is that Congress perceived that the 1986 Reorganization Act was instrumental to the success of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and that it represented a model for streamlining the intelligence community. In an opening statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in March 1991 by Senator John W. Warner, he stated:

Mr. Chairman [Boren] if we learn the lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm well and we apply the principles [of] Goldwater-Nichols, I am certain that we will structure a defense intelligence apparatus to support our troops and insure our security which is second to none throughout the world.⁷

Though successful in streamlining DoD command and control responsibilities, the principles of Goldwater-Nichols may not be as easily applicable to the intelligence community. As I will point out from the historical review of DESERT SHIELD/STORM, the national intelligence community was given an incredibly complex task to provide a quantity of tailored intelligence data and analysis that any other operational theater would have provided to itself. Intelligence problems were not related to chains of command nor operational authority alone (the general point of the DoD Reorganization Act), but also to substantive content.

This situation may have profound implications for the future of Army support by national reconnaissance, because DESERT SHIELD/ DESERT STORM represents the model for future intelligence support for a largely CONUS based Army that must project itself into a major regional conflict.⁸ As U.S. armed forces are concentrated in the continental United States, theater CINCs will be forced to rely more on national reconnaissance and less on theater assets, a situation the XXVIII Airborne Corps currently operates under. The impact of relying almost exclusively on national intelligence can lead to shortfalls or outright intelligence gaps. National intelligence systems have a finite collection capability and when other world priorities are weighed, the availability of these assets becomes even more limited. Also, intelligence analysis is often prepared for the strategic policy making perspective rather than oriented to tactical and operational concerns. Individual service intelligence organizations are responsible for service unique intelligence concerns. Unfortunately the individual service intelligence components do not have very much influence on tasking and leveraging of national collection systems unless the intelligence issue coincides with a national intelligence interest. During the late eighties, national intelligence was still focused almost exclusively on the Soviet problem. Thus an in-depth, and continuous study of Iraq's military capabilities did not receive

comparable attention. Like many obscure parts of the world, Iraq was nothing more than a tangential area of concern for national (and even service) intelligence. Though much of the DIA and CIA's, pre-war estimates of Iraq's warfighting capability was extremely important to operational planning, its analytical shortfalls had negative consequences for the air and ground campaign. Notably poor were the assessments of the extent to Iraq's nuclear program, the number of troops deployed into the Kuwaiti theater of operations, and the fighting competency and quality of the Iraqi army. All of these problems had the sum effect of weakening the accuracy of the intelligence provided to CENTCOM and to the Army.

CENTCOM's Role in National Reconnaissance Collection

In nearly every military operation, national intelligence is crucial to developing the framework and data bases from which the theater CINC and services can draw upon for planning purposes. For some regions of the globe, national and theater intelligence collection is well delineated and stratified to produce overlapping coverage of important targets. EUCOM and PACOM probably best represent this relationship. Theater airborne and ground intelligence collection assets provide tremendous amounts of information for analysis and dissemination. The information is analyzed at both theater and national levels, and by each respective

service per their particular intelligence concerns. National collection systems complement the collection efforts of theater systems by providing depth of coverage and other capabilities. Like theater collection, the information obtained by national collection means is shared so that each respective echelon (national , theater , or service) can analyze and produce intelligence required at that particular level. Also, theater collection provides an essential element to strategic indications and warning (I&W) of hostile actions. Organic or OPCON intelligence systems in a mature theater provide the respective CINC an immediate I&W capability that greatly supports the national intelligence agencies I&W efforts. For example, during the Cold War EUCOM had an extensive intelligence network of SIGINT and IMINT systems to monitor the Soviets in Eastern Europe. The coverage was so complete that a no-notice surprise attack into West Germany was extremely unrealistic. Today COM has similar capabilities within its respective AOR. The mature forward deployed unified command is a key player in the greater intelligence community structure.⁹ This is in distinct contrast to CENTCOM which is CONUS based, making it a less active participant in the development of the theater intelligence picture. In peacetime, CENTCOM headquarters is located at McDill AFB Florida, some eight thousand miles from its wartime AOR. Aside from the command and control problem this created,

CENTCOM was also purposely understaffed. During the event of a crisis, CENTCOM's staff would be augmented with personnel from the services, but for peacetime purposes the staffing was maintained at a minimum. This conscious understaffing would have an immediate impact on intelligence collection, causing an initial over reliance on national intelligence systems to compensate for limited collection and analysis capabilities until theater intelligence assets could be brought up to adequate strength.

The Iraqi intelligence problem posed special collection challenges not experienced in Europe or the Pacific. Since CENTCOM is not a forward deployed unified command it had no organic or supporting intelligence collection resources from which to task and direct. Intelligence collection in this AOR is principally the responsibility of nationally directed resources. Although CENTCOM J-2 would analyze the collected data to develop another view or respond to the CINC's unique intelligence questions, CENTCOM J-2's leverage on influencing the Iraqi intelligence target-deck was limited as compared to other unified commands.¹⁰ What this means is that although national intelligence collection was significantly more important to CENTCOM's wartime mission it had less influence on the collection requirements. CENTCOM had no significant capability to collect and disseminate intelligence that could be responsive to Army requirements in the AOR; at

least not until theater intelligence collection assets could be brought to the region.

The Army would have to rely on national collection for updates and verification of previous assessments on Iraqi ground forces. The impact was that the Army (as a 'junior partner' within a CINC's AOR) had less influence on adjusting national collection compared to CENTCOM, and significantly less given that CENTCOM is CONUS based. The bottomline is that it is easier to get national intelligence to respond to your needs forward deployed than CONUS based: the direction under the new national military strategy. The impact was a weakened intelligence readiness posture according to Joint Pub 2-0, especially prior to the initiation of hostilities.

Assessing Iraq's Army

The US intelligence community was concerned about Iraq's hostile intentions prior to the Gulf War. The eight year war between Iraq and Iran was covered extensively by national systems so as to provide the National Command Authority and other high officials in the government an accurate assessment to the ebb and flow of the war. It was in the interest of the U.S. that neither side win nor lose decisively but rather to equally exhaust themselves. As an Army intelligence officer assigned to the CIA's National Photographic Interpretation Agency (NPIC), I became very

familiar with the war from an imagery perspective. During the height of the conflict in 1988-89, NPIC published daily national intelligence summary reports on the war's progress by charting the movements of the battlelines, and locating concentrations of Republican Guard formations. Republican Guard units were the elite Iraqi forces whose presence on the battlefield would often indicate imminent offensive operations. These units would become CENTCOM's operational "center of gravity" during the ground phase of the DESERT STORM. General Schwartzkopf's decision to target the Republican Guards for destruction was based on their prominent role within the Iraqi armed forces. .

National intelligence and the open press had often described the Iraqi army as a "battle hardened," well equipped, and trained desert army.¹¹ War weary would have been more accurate. Most of these claims of military prowess were applied after Iraq's series of tactical victories over the Iranians in the final year of the Iran-Iraq War. The Iraqi army did not often fight the Iranians in desert areas. Instead they fought a series of inconclusive battles in the swamps and marshes near the Shatt-al-Arab water-way, and in the mountainous regions dividing the middle and northern border of the two countries. In contrast to their string of victories in 1988, Iraqi army military performance was fairly substandard. During the eight year conflict with Iran it

was not uncommon for Iraqi brigades to surrender en mass, or break and run under the slightest pressure. Except for the Republican Guard offensives in 1988, the Iraqi's seldom fought multi-division size battles and never on the scale envisioned by in U.S. AirLand Battle doctrine.¹² What seems to have happened is that Iraq's seemingly spectacular victory over Iranian "fanatics" overly impressed the world and the U.S. national intelligence community. By the war's end Iraq had the world's fourth largest army, equipped with the best Soviet export arms, and an inflated reputation for being the premier fighting outfit in the Persian Gulf second only to Israel.¹³ The assessment raises question with the intelligence principle of objectivity of the national analysis. In contrast to this favorable assessment, Iraq's warfighting capability was for the most part poor, particularly the morale of the conscript regular infantry and heavy mechanized divisions. These units comprised the majority of all Iraqi divisions. During combat the Republican Guard was often called on to force regular army soldiers to fight by means of death threats. The poor Iraqi morale, badly remedied by death threats, was probably the single most significant factor in their mediocre combat performance. Only the politically reliable, well fed, well paid Republican Guards had any significant fighting capability. Difficult missions such as passage of lines, attack, counterattack, and retrograde operations were often

beyond the competency of regular army units. Their most proficient combat mission was a Soviet derivative of the static defense in depth. The mediocre quality of the Iraqi Army was further magnified given that the Republican Guard never consisted of more than eight out of the estimated 56 divisions on active service by 1989.¹⁴ However the CIA and DIA assessment prior to the Gulf war was that Iraqi army was formidable, well trained, and committed to carry out Saddam's orders. This assessment caused confusion and a schism between the Army and the Air Force during the air campaign in January 1991 over targeting priorities. The Army wanted more interdiction mission flown against front line Iraqi ground troops while the Air Force wanted to concentrate on destroying the Iraqi command and control structure. Again, the problems with the initial accuracy and objectivity of baseline intelligence resulted in causing significant planning and targeting problems.

Since the Iraqis were portrayed as more competent and aggressive than they actually turned out to be, national, and to a lesser degree theater, intelligence estimates consistently were faulty as to the numbers of enemy troops in the Southern Iraq/Kuwait region. By the time of the air phases of the theater campaign, DIA estimated that the Iraqis had at least 43 divisions with 540,000 troops deployed throughout the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO).¹⁵ This figure was based on an assumed

strength of twelve thousand soldiers per division, plus assorted auxiliary and other support units. Similarly, CENTCOM J-2 and ARCENT G-2, assessed the Iraqis nearer to 450,000 to a half million troops within the KTO although dispositions of Iraqi units near Basrah and the Euphrates Valley, to include Republican Guard infantry units, was often baffling.¹⁶ Though national reconnaissance imagery and radio intercept gave hints that the Iraqi's were not as strong as estimated, the spotty coverage precluded any in depth analysis of their true strength. Some intelligence suggested that Iraqi tank platoons were only equipped with four vice seven tanks; artillery batteries had six, not the eight, howitzers as was observed during the Iran-Iraq War; and that many of the front-line infantry units were below authorized troop strength. However, not all units were observed, others were at full strength, and Iraqi concealment and/or deception could not be discounted. Since the evidence was inconclusive because of spotty coverage, the best course of action was to assume that the Iraqis were at full strength.¹⁷ ARCENT requested greater coverage but national intelligence assets were often redirected to other pressing concerns to include map making, and searching for Western hostages early in the crisis. These circumstances left CENTCOM J-2 and ARCENT G-2 at a disadvantage of satisfying the principle of completeness. Theater reconnaissance aircraft could have filled the coverage

holes, but they too were under constraints. Air Force RF-4C, U2, TR-1, and Tornado could produce wide-angle imagery, but were not survivable enough to be allowed to overfly the KTO until the Air operation commenced.¹⁸ The SR-71 Blackbird was capable of overflying the KTO at nearly MACH III, but unfortunately the Air Force had mothballed its last aircraft less than year earlier. Ironically that decision was partially based on the assumption that national reconnaissance could offset the retirement of the SR-71 program saving the enormous operating expense for the small number of aircraft involved.¹⁹

National Assessment of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction

Prior to the Gulf war, U.S. intelligence collection focused on Iraq's attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction, especially chemical and nuclear weapons. Extensive Iraqi counterintelligence and a pervasive security service limited U.S. knowledge of Iraq's weapons programs. Also the intentions of Iraq's leadership, from Saddam to his field commanders was in question.²⁰ Though Saddam used nerve agents and mustard gas against the Iranians and the Kurdish population in Iraq, both were helpless victims with no meaningful defense or retaliatory capability. Given their SCUD and other indigenously produced ballistic missiles that could range nearly all of the Persian Gulf, it

was only prudent to assume that Saddam would probably use these weapons against the U.S. to cause as many casualties as possible.

In the fall of 1990, the CIA published a report stating that there was a high degree of probability that Saddam would use his available chemical weapons stocks which numbered somewhere around 2000 to 4000 tons of toxins against coalition forces in the event of a war. During the final years of the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq used SCUD missiles loaded with high explosives as a terror weapon. Multiple salvos were launch against Teheran the capital of Iran, in an effort to destroy the morale of the Iranian people. The Iraqis used nerve and blister agents extensively against unprepared Iranian ground forces, the proximate cause to Iran's eventual defeat on the battlefield.²¹ These developments focused CENTCOM's Directorate of Intelligence (J2) on Iraq's the potential threat to US interests in the AOR. Interestingly enough, before the invasion of Kuwait national intelligence agencies assessed that Iraq did not have the means to mate chemical weapon war' ds onto ballistic missiles. After the invasion the assessment was reversed, causing General Schwarzkopf to question the relevance and objectivity of national intelligence. As far as he was concerned Washington was doing nothing but hedging all bets.²² The uncertainty about Saddam's intentions influenced CENTCOM's decision to destroy 90 percent of Iraqi

artillery near the breach areas of the ground attack and all mobile missiles within the Iraqi inventory. The intent was to eliminate all reasonable chemical delivery means. For the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) this objective was ranked just below isolating the Iraqi leadership and gaining air supremacy. Reducing Iraqi ground forces through air attrition received bottom ranking, demonstrating the concern Saddam's perceived chemical threat was to Coalition forces. Though the targeting decision was the safest course of action in terms of reducing risk to Coalition forces, it was partially made in an intelligence vacuum. National intelligence did not have a complete understanding of Saddam's use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War. The Iranians and the Kurdish population had no retaliatory means, thus Saddam could use chemical weapons with a high degree of relative impunity. In stark contrast, the Coalition forces were well trained and equipped to survive and fight in a chemically contaminated environment. More importantly, unlike Iran, the U.S. had tremendous retaliatory means at its disposal.

During the air campaign, chemical weapons related facilities were repeatedly struck to ensure maximum damage. Post strike analysis showed at least 75 percent of the known chemical warfare production capability was destroyed.²³ Even suspected chemical storage sites were also hit, to include the infamous "baby milk" plant. By January 30th, a

combination of aircraft and Tomahawk cruise missiles struck 31 confirmed and suspected facilities related to Iraq's chemical and nuclear weapons production. Half were assessed destroyed. From CENTCOM's perspective Saddam's chemical production capability was eliminated as a serious threat to the Coalition.²⁴ Combined with the destruction of nearly all front line artillery batteries along the Saudi/Kuwait border, the Coalition effectively stripped away Saddam's chemical delivery means regardless of his intentions to use them.

If Saddam's chemical warfare capability was essentially destroyed, his nuclear program did not suffer as severe a set back as was initially thought. Nuclear weapons production was a top intelligence priority for national intelligence agencies before and during the war. However estimates of when Iraq could produce a nuclear bomb ranged from six months to ten years. This huge "window" was caused by the incompleteness of intelligence on Saddam's nuclear program. The exact extent of his program was not fully known until after the Gulf War when U.N. inspection teams discovered a more mature weapons program than was originally assessed. Post war analysis discovered that national intelligence underestimated the nuclear effort by at least fifty percent.²⁵ There was clearly a shortfall of on the data on Iraq's nuclear operations caused by an excellent

concealment program aided by the closed nature of the Iraqi society.

A significant intelligence accuracy problem during the war was the overly optimistic assessments of damage to the nuclear weapons facilities caused by aerial bombing. Military and civilian officials presented confident estimates of the destruction of Saddam's nuclear development facilities, although this was not actually the case. Overestimation of bomb damage was not unique to the Gulf War, but rather a phenomena of aerial bombing. Pictures of bomb damage often give the appearance that targets look worse than they usually are. After World War II, the Air Force conducted an in depth study of their strategic bombing efforts against Germany and found that it did not have the devastating effect on German armament production as thought, although great destruction was brought upon German cities. Over assessing the impact of strategic bombing occurred in Korea and Vietnam as well.²⁶

On January 23, 1991, President Bush announced that U.S. pinpoint attacks had put Saddam out of the nuclear bomb-building business for a long time to come. A CENTCOM spokesman made an even stronger statement later in the month by stating to the press that Iraq's nuclear weapons production capability was a "100 percent" destroyed.²⁷ As far as CENTCOM was concerned, they achieved their goals of destroying the nuclear weapons related facilities. However

their assessment was wrong. They damaged only the known facilities. The fault was not with CENTCOM but with the original national intelligence estimate produced by DIA. Part of the reason for the shortfall may be related to the amount of attention and resources were devoted to the intelligence problem. For example in July 1990, DIA had only two fulltime estimate analysts working the Iraqi intelligence desk, while in contrast, DIA had over forty-two personnel assigned to the POW/MIA issue.²⁸ The point is that at the national level the POW/MIA issue was politically more sensitive than the issue of Iraq's nuclear program. Although in a strategic sense the Iraqi nuclear problem was a more vital concern to U.S. national security interests it politically did not merit the intelligence resources like the POW/MIA issue.

The Intelligence Architecture for Southwest Asia

The principal focus of intelligence collection and analysis during DESERT SHIELD was to provide the theater component commanders with an accurate picture of Iraqi intentions and capabilities. To do this, the theater-level intelligence structure had to rely extensively on national level intelligence sources. Before DESERT SHIELD, the CENTCOM intelligence staff did not initially have the resources, equipment, or organizational structure necessary to deploy and support operations of the scope of a DESERT

SHIELD/STORM. Nor did it have the numbers of trained personnel with special skills to execute the wartime mission.²⁹ Normally a CINC would have both national and theater intelligence collection assets immediately available for use. However the build-up of theater intelligence assets was intentionally delayed by General Schwarzkopf during the early months of DESERT SHIELD. He and the National Command Authority were extremely concerned that the Iraqi forces would continue their attack into Saudi Arabia, and possibly as far as the United Arab Emirates before sufficient U.S. forces could be brought in-theater to deter or defeat such an attack.³⁰ Therefore, the priority of CENTCOM was to build-up combat forces as quickly as possible. This decision delayed the arrival of Army echelon above corps (EAC) military intelligence battalions very late in the campaign. The 513th MI brigade was ARCENT's link to theater and national systems. The first unit to arrival did not receive all its equipment until December. The Joint Imagery Processing Center, the only facility that could produce annotated hard-copy photographs, did not arrive until December. ARCENT's organic intelligence structure was not complete until C+160, the day the air operation began. Also, in order to mask intentions, CENTCOM directed that intelligence collection units remain well back from the border, severely hindering their effectiveness.³¹ XVIIIth Airborne Corps' MI battalions arrived in-theater after

September 1990, but were unable to develop a good situation awareness of the battlefield until they moved to forward positions in late January 1991. VIIth Corps was not equipped for out of Europe contingencies and thus had great difficulty monitoring events away from forward positions. The Corps was almost totally dependent on national intelligence until the ground war phase when it was given the authority to move its organic intelligence collection assets up to the front.

As soon as the mobilization of resources began CENTCOM J-2 identified its peacetime structural deficiencies to DIA and the military intelligence board (MIB). The MIB deployed a joint-service team to the theater in November to assist in the development of a wartime staff. A CENTCOM joint intelligence center (JIC) was established to act as a clearinghouse for intelligence requirements for the component commanders. These actions greatly facilitated the J-2's mission requirements, but CENTCOM's intelligence capability never matured to the level of other unified commands.³² Over time CENTCOM J-2 grew in size to over 700 hundred personnel and was able to perform nearly all their required missions, but progress was very slow. In a Congressional after action report, a CENTCOM intelligence staff officer stated: "In the final analysis, no theater-wide intelligence architecture was developed. The J-2

mainly focused on meeting the day-to-day, minute-by-minute requests of the CINC."³³

It would be unreasonable that every CINC's staff be manned at a wartime level, the services could not afford the drain on manpower given their other missions. However, it is not unreasonable to have contingency plans to rapidly expand a CINC's staff in the event of an emergency. At the time, CENTCOM had no plans to expand itself to fight a campaign the size of DESERT STORM, a reflection of its limited intelligence readiness.

One notable innovation within the CENTCOM J-2 was the combining of the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) into the CENTCOM JIC. This combination was unique among unified commands. Normally a JRC is part of the J-3 Operations Directorate, but because of the timeliness requirements of the many theater intelligence problems, the JRC was made an integral part of the JIC. This special structure allowed direct contact between the reconnaissance and intelligence platform managers and the theater level intelligence analysts who needed timely information to respond to CINCCENT'S intelligence requirements.³⁴ The JRC also controlled Army corps level assets such as Guardrail, Quicklook II, and OV1-D aerial reconnaissance platforms with the intent of harmonizing theater and corps collection. To ensure that there was no duplication and conflict in airborne intelligence collection, the JRC conducted daily

reconnaissance and surveillance conferences between CENTCOM components and other Coalition countries.

However not all the participants were equal. The JFACC, Air Force Lieutenant General Horner, was committed to the General Schwarzkopfs guidance of conducting strategic air operations to cripple Iraq's war making effort. To ensure that the strategic campaign continued unhindered, the Air Force skimmed its own reconnaissance requirements off the top to support strategic bombing of Iraq. As far as the Air Force was concerned, Army requirements to shape the battle for the Corps commanders through the monitoring and subsequent interdiction of Iraqi ground units was secondary. For example, diverted RF-4C missions were not offered up at the daily conference as part of the available reconnaissance systems.³⁵ Because of the limited reconnaissance assets, ARCENT often could not meet the targeting parameters set forth in the Air Force targeting guidance. The Air Force required that targets be revalidated every eight, then four hours, prior to attack. ARCENT's daily target set of over a hundred targets made revalidation within Air Force timelines impossible given the available reconnaissance systems on hand. With little leverage on the use of theater and national reconnaissance many Army nominated targets never made it into the daily air task order (ATO). Concerns that the Corps commanders could not shape the battlefield were presented to the CINC who rejected the ARCENT criticism out

of hand. From General Horner's view as JFACC, the CINC's strategic air operation came first. Success in the strategic air phase of the campaign would result in the same conditions that ARCENT was desiring to achieve by interdiction of front line Iraqi combat units. Since the CINC retained for himself the distinction as land component commander he met with the JFACC on a daily basis providing direct guidance. General Schwarzkopf would personally direct changes in the ATO picking specific targets, typically upsetting ARCENT targeting plans. The result at ARCENT and corps was frustration, particularly among Army targeting cells who had to come up with new targets based on old information which did not meet Air Force validation timelines.

The JRC tasking of corps aerial reconnaissance assets caused friction with the Army component. The JFACC argued that these assets were needed to augment theater and national reconnaissance efforts as stipulated by the CINC, and could not be reserved for Army use alone. The mobile SCUD search is a case in point. Iraq's launching of Scud missiles at Israel in an attempt to widen the war and split the Coalition elevated SCUD missile targets to top priority during the air phase of the campaign. Though the SCUDs were militarily insignificant, their use for political purposes was more important. Theater controlled JSTARS was diverted to Western Saudi Arabia to augment national reconnaissance

in a SCUD hunting operation. This left the corps level OV1-D to fill in the coverage gap, further diluting the ARCENT and corps collection requirements. Although ARCENT's efforts to prepare the battlefield were degraded by the shifting of corps owned assets to theater use, the situation could not be avoided. The political implications of the Iraqi SCUD barrage on Israel could not be ignored. If it had been successful in drawing Israel into the conflict then it is very well conceivable that the whole air and subsequent ground campaign could have been derailed. As it turned out, the diverted national and theater intelligence collection only indirectly disrupted the SCUD terror assault. The quick nature of the Iraqi "shoot and scoot" tactics made detection extremely difficult, if not near impossible. The Iraqi missile units maintained excellent radio security, only infrequently communicating target data and fire commands with higher headquarters, frustrating SIGINT collection. Though this Iraqi tactic often saved SCUD units from destruction it also obviated any military utility of the SCUD assaults. There were some targeting successes however. An Army SIGINT unit from the 513th MI Brigade was tasked to assist in the search for mobile SCUD units. Equipped with a modified version of the TLQ-17 high frequency jammer known as "Sandcrab," it was ideal for detecting and interfering with long-range, high frequency communications use in controlling SCUD launches. Operating

from remote sites in Saudi Arabia, this unit was effective in jamming Iraqi communications, forcing them to use less secure communications means. When the data obtained from the "Sandcrab" system was combined with signal data obtained from Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) systems and airborne collection, it provided a superior method for targeting SCUD missile units.³⁶ The combination of national and theater reconnaissance assets forced the Iraqi's to launch SCUDs only at night. Finally the addition of special operating forces in western Iraq further limited their launch locations.³⁷ Faced with this combined effort SCUD attacks dropped off dramatically both in frequency and accuracy even though few SCUD launchers were actually destroyed. The Iraqi Scud strategy was blunted but at a price. The massive redirection of national and theater reconnaissance to solve an issue that had political versus military objectives meant that ARCENT's targeting goals for the upcoming ground campaign would not be met.

National Level Intelligence Support to CENTCOM and ARCENT

Immediately upon the release of the CIA, and DIA warnings of a probable invasion of Kuwait, DIA activated an Intelligence Task Force (ITF) in the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon. The ITF mission was to provide direct support to the Joint Staff's plans and operations, and to serve as a clearinghouse for the numerous

requests for information pouring into the NMIC from worldwide commands.³⁸

DIA also deployed a National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) to accompany CENTCOM's initial deployment to Saudi Arabia. NMIST is an ad hoc organization to provide direct support intelligence collection planning and coordinate requests for information (RFI) between the theater and DIA. NMIST has self contained satellite communication equipment. This proved crucial later in the campaign when operational and other non-intelligence traffic saturated the communication lines from the United states to Saudi Arabia. Eleven NMIST teams were deployed to support forces in the Southwest AOR. The NMIST network was critical to the CENTCOM J-2, often providing the only dedicated communication link among the intelligence staff components, subunified staff elements and the national intelligence community.³⁹ By the war's end, the extra DIA NMIST teams processed more than half of all the requests for intelligence sent to the intelligence task force in the Pentagon. In the final tally, they processed more than 2,700 separate RFIs compared to 166 information requests similar NMISTs teams processed during operation JUST CAUSE.⁴⁰

The National Security Agency (NSA) increased its operations to support deployed military forces, as well as continue its support to national decision makers. Special

liaison and support teams were deployed to CENTCOM to assist collection management and coordination with national intelligence efforts.

Although the response appeared robust and possibly overwhelming, there was a great deal of initial confusion and lack of coordination among the service intelligence organizations and the national intelligence agencies. The central problem was that the intelligence community as a whole was not prepared to digest and cope with the volume of intelligence requirements to support the large scale campaigns of DESERT SHIELD/STORM.⁴¹ In the early period of DESERT SHIELD various agencies and intelligence staffs often duplicated, or worse, produced contradictory analysis, which caused confusion among U.S. deploying forces. Developing a comprehensive picture of the region was difficult. The intelligence methods and analytical procedures used against the Soviet problem did not transfer very well to Southwest Asian intelligence problems. The peacetime standoff in Europe allowed the US intelligence community to conduct sophisticated and comprehensive collection from a variety of strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence assets arrayed against the Warsaw Pact and the Soviets. Information gathered was often used to derive a detailed assessment of their intentions and capabilities. In contrast to Iraq, Warsaw Pact intentions were fairly well understood and the capabilities of their armed forces were

well assessed. In Europe, Army division intelligence battalions often actively monitored the daily situation, providing continuous updates to the huge Soviet data base retained by national intelligence agencies.⁴²

However, Iraq's recent war experience with Iran, combined with their appreciation of U.S. intelligence collection capabilities in electronic eavesdropping, caused the Iraqis to harden much of their command and control systems and place self-imposed restrictions on their use of radio and radar transmissions. This imposed severe limitations on US collection, more than the US intelligence had been accustomed to against the Soviet Union.⁴³ After the air war began and the Iraqi hardened communication bunkers were systematically destroyed, signal interception became easier to obtain as the Iraqis were forced to use less secure means of communication.⁴⁴

Once signal security was breached by the Iraqis, the results were often deadly. On January 26, the Army cell of the NMJIC received a national intelligence SIGINT report of a proposed commanders' conference to be held in the Iraqi 3rd Corps sector within a couple of hours. The Army cell scanned available data to deduce a probable location for the meeting, and found a likely building within the 3rd Corps sector. They immediately contacted ARCENT and after some furious coordination with Air Force elements, was able to redirect two FB-111s to the target. The pilots passed over

the building at high altitude and found it well lighted with civilian and military vehicles outside. The pilots then hit the building with 2000-pound bombs, completely demolishing the building. Although intelligence later confirmed that the 3rd Corps commander lived, the air strike was serious enough for the Iraqis to attempt a highly rare helicopter evacuation.⁴⁵

Though the dramatic strike on the Iraqi 3rd Corps commander's meeting highlights the lethal results of poor signal security, the Iraqis suffered from other command and control problems as well. The Iraqi forces were equipped with a variety of communication equipment purchased from the Soviet Union, France, and other countries that had their own unique encryption systems. These foreign radios were distributed widely throughout the Iraqi Army often causing the Iraqis to use different radios side by side in the same vehicles. This caused significant problems once radio-silence was broken. The effects of the Allied air operation made it increasingly difficult for Iraqi signal troops to maintain the multiple types of radio nets with their own special encryption systems. Often they were forced to send messages in the clear or use rudimentary encryption devices.⁴⁶ By the time the ground operation began, CENTCOM J-2 was able to routinely intercept Iraqi communications, revealing the locations of all significant maneuver divisions.

Other elements of the national intelligence community scrambled to backfill knowledge gaps on Iraqi forces, and geography. On top of providing direct support to CENTCOM, national intelligence also had the task of monitoring land, sea, and air traffic into Iraq. Early during the crisis, national attention was devoted to finding Western hostages. Later the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) had to overcome a nearly insurmountable hurdle by developing and supplying 1:50,000-scale maps of Southwest Asia, a region the size of the eastern United States.⁴⁷

This heavy load on the national intelligence community caused periodic gaps in intelligence collection. The National reconnaissance could not keep continuous surveillance of Iraqi divisions to include the well equipped Republican Guard units. CENTCOM's intelligence requirements did not receive the continuous national systems coverage desired by the J-2. National systems could not meet all the demands within the theater.

Substantively, the quality of the intelligence did not always satisfy tactical demands for planning purposes. During the early portion of the campaign, national intelligence agencies produced many reports and special intelligence estimates. Field commanders complained that these reports were often caveated, too broad and footnoted with differing points of view.⁴⁸ Frequently, tactical units were sent national agency prepared finished estimates and

intelligence summaries which catered more to the needs of the theater and National Command Authority level. Another complaint was that National intelligence was too redundant in content and volume. The intelligence analysis was of little use because it was not tailored to the specific needs of field commanders. One post-war study estimated that up to 80 percent of the intelligence traffic was redundant.⁴⁹ Thus field commanders received identical products over scare communications nets that were of little value, leading to frustration and loss of confidence in the intelligence system.

During a congressional testimony immediately after the war, General Schwarzkopf complained bitterly about the analysis from CIA and DIA as being too heavily caveated. Conclusions were so heavily footnoted and watered down that they were near useless for planning purposes. Many national estimates were worded so perfectly that no matter what happened, national intelligence agencies could always claim they were right. This was no help at all for his field commanders and only stoked the flames of distrust between Washington and CENTCOM. During testimony about the bomb damage assessment discrepancy between CIA and ARCENT G-2, Schwarzkopf complained that national intelligence estimates offered no help in making important tactical decisions.⁵⁰

There is a well known and very frustrating habit among intelligence analysts at the national level to write

their assessments in such a way as to address every possible outcome. This tendency is an outgrowth to present or incorporate opposing views in predictive analysis. At the strategic level all reasonably supported positions are presented to form a comprehensive picture of the intelligence problem at hand. By removing other viewpoints from predictive analysis it is possible to present to the decision maker a false confidence in a particular outcome while the actual probability of that outcome occurring may be low. The assessment that Saddam's nuclear program could produce a bomb within six months to ten years is an extreme example of differing points of view in a strategic estimate. For the operational and tactical warfighter this type of intelligence is not very useful. Offering a "menu" of differing options on an enemy's course of action without emphasizing the most likely is of no use to a tactical commander.

The only notable exception to the overall dissatisfaction with national analysis was the targeting templates prepared by the Army's Imagery Threat and Analysis Center (ITAC). These templates identified enemy positions via imagery to the resolution of single tank revetments. In the 3rd Armored Division, lead U.S. tanks fired on Iraqi tanks of the crack Tawakalna Republican Guard Division from over 3000 meters by using thermal optic sights. The enemy tanks were in the exact positions as depicted on the

templates. The 24th Mechanized Division found the templates so accurate that the division commander was able to keep his forces out of the range of enemy artillery and destroy it with the intelligence on hand.⁵¹ However, disseminating these templates was extremely difficult. Many of the maneuver divisions of ARCENT found themselves forced to piece together their own intelligence picture of the battlefield from various intelligence products not designed for their planning requirements.⁵² The results of these efforts were mixed. In the 24th Infantry Division (Mech), the "re-analysis" of national products led to more confusion than certainty about the Iraqi forces. This prompted the division Commanding General to reject any significant revision to DIA or other national assessments unless there was information to refute the analysis. From that CG's perspective, national level analysts had more access to information than his own G2 section, and thus they were probably closer to "ground truth" than his own people.⁵³ DESERT SHIELD/STORM reconfirmed the requirement for timely dissemination of tailored intelligence to tactical level forces. However, inadequate system capabilities, coupled with a limited communication link to receive national or even theater products hindered tactical planning at division and below.

National intelligence support to Corps level units was also less than adequate, particularly after VII Corps

started to arrive from Europe in late November 1990. Upon arrival the Corps immediately began offensive planning; however, it required extensive information about the future battlefield. Dissemination of data was a continuous problem even though national collection was near peak systems performance late in the year. The information requirements to launch a five division attack across the Iraq/Kuwait border were nearly unending. Tactical commanders wanted high quality information on Iraqi order of battle, precise locations for targeting purposes, and maintain an "unblinking eye" throughout the corps' area of operations. These demands could not be met to the satisfaction of VIIth Corps. The adjacent XVIIIth Airborne Corps was better structure to interpret and receive national level intelligence. As the Army's contingency Corps, the corps received fully processed national reconnaissance from the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) systems located at Ft. Bragg. By contrast, VIIth Corps and even ARCENT did not possess such a capability. Sporadic coverage by national systems was unacceptable, and thus ARCENT and VIIth Corps increasingly required sparse theater assets to fill-in the coverage gaps.⁵⁴

Another critical area of intelligence to Army commanders was the terrain assessment. General Schwarzkopf's scheme of maneuver around the exposed Iraqi right flank would be meaningless if the terrain could not

support the attack. By October the General wanted precise intelligence on the trafficability to the west of Kuwait. Apparently there was no known report or study of the trafficability on the terrain south of the Euphrates River to the Saudi border. Although US military attache`s were stationed in Iraq during the Seventies and Eighties, no one thought it was important enough to examine trafficability problems in Eastern Iraq. This reflects the importance of basic intelligence collection that our defense attache officers should be required to collect.⁵⁵ To make up for this deficiency, comparable terrain was found in Saudi Arabia, and extensive terrain analysis was conducted. From that analysis, it was extrapolated that the ground to the west of Kuwait could support the movement of armored formations. In hindsight, it was fortunate that CENTCOM had the time to conduct the terrain analysis before committing ground troops to battle. This critical intelligence gap points to a weakness in national intelligence data bases severely failing to meet the intelligence principles of completeness and readiness.

Several problems can be clearly identified that limited the degree to which national intelligence supported combat commanders. First, not every national intelligence agency was familiar with the needs of combatant commanders. Case in point is the CIA. Although individual analysts often worked with their military counterparts providing

substantial intelligence to DESERT STORM planners, generally the CIA adopted a "hands-off" approach toward supporting combatant commanders. This may have been in deference to DIA; however, it refused to join the newly created National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) located in the Pentagon, sending only liaison officers. When questioned by Congress, the official reasons given were: (a) CIA was answering over a thousand queries posed by CENTCOM, and (b) CIA prepares joint intelligence everyday with other national agencies represented in the NMJIC. The principle difference though is that the NMJIC is operated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff while other joint assessment forums are normally chaired by the CIA.⁵⁶

From its chartered position within the intelligence community, the CIA had good reason not become too entwined with the military intelligence effort. In an attempt to avoid the "light at the end of the tunnel" optimism that characterized many Vietnam era reports from the field, the CIA adhered to its charter as outlined in Executive Order 12333: to provide the President and other senior policy makers an autonomous analysis free from parochial biases. Although during peacetime this strategy works reasonably well, during the Gulf War it caused serious friction with CENTCOM. The most heated difference of opinion was the contrasting views among the CIA and CENTCOM and ARCENT G-2

over the effectiveness of the air operation against Iraqi units deployed in the KTO.

The objective of the air preparation of the battlefield was to reduce the overall Iraqi ground force by 50 percent prior to launching the ground operation. ARCENT G-2 was given the mission to develop a BDA methodology to estimate when the air operation reached its goal. Problems immediately developed. The massive air operation tempo quickly outstripped the establish theater intelligence architecture to assess BDA results. Not since the Vietnam War had the DoD intelligence community been faced with such a large scale BDA challenge.⁵⁷ Relying mostly on nationally derived intelligence, CIA took the lead in claiming that ARCENT G-2's BDA estimate was much too high. This opinion was expressed in a Presidential Daily Brief (PDB), which is distributed to the President and other senior officials. The CIA felt compelled to state its opinion that it could not confirm the BDA damage reported by CENTCOM (ARCENT G-2). CENTCOM countercharged that Washington did not have timely access to theater-produced intelligence, such as guncamera, pilot reports, and U2 and RF-4C aerial reconnaissance photos, and that national systems only covered approximately 20 percent of the daily targets. Significantly, SIGINT was inconclusive as a source of intelligence because the Iraqi army in the KTO maintained near complete radio silence throughout the air campaign leaving the CIA rely almost

exclusively on national reconnaissance photos to assess BDA.⁵⁸ However, the coverage by these assets was not timely over targets, was often hindered by bad weather, and collected a smaller sample of the targets than actually hit by the Air Force. Finally, CIA and even DIA photo analysts were not inclined to declare targets destroyed or even damaged unless obvious signs of destruction were evident, like a turret blown off a tank, or some other form of catastrophic damage. That high a standard was not realistic. Modern munitions often cause complete internal destruction of a vehicle although outwardly it may appear intact.⁵⁹

ARCENT G-2 recognized the inadequacy of using only SIGINT and imagery to make a BDA assessment. Imagery was useless in determining the crew casualties. In some photos seemingly intact vehicles would be surrounded by bomb craters left by an armor penetrating B-52 strike. Using the CIA bomb damage assessment standard, the vehicles would be assessed as intact although the effects of concussion alone from the BLU-97 dropped by a B-52 is enough to kill the crew. Bad weather was also a substantial factor in delaying post-strike reconnaissance assessments. Compounding the problem was the quality that national systems coverage produced, it was either too wide angle, or the other extreme, too pin pointed, thus precluding a total comprehension of the target.

SIGINT suffered from disadvantages too. Because of Iraqi radio SIGINT could not corroborate the effects of the bombing. When Iraqi units stayed in place, they maintain very good radio silence, relying on ground line communication or even courier to send messages. Only when the divisions of the Republican Guard and regular army tried to reorient into blocking positions to stop the U.S. VII Corps ground attack did theater SIGINT collection assets like RIVET JOINT and TR-1 start receiving voluminous Iraqi radio and radar emanations.

To make up for these deficiencies in imagery and SIGINT, ARCENT G-2 developed a BDA formula for estimating the level of destruction wrought upon Iraqi ground forces. Although the methodology was considered suspect by Washington and the Air Force (the Air Force in contrast to the CIA, complained that ARCENT was undercounting the bombing effects), post-war analysis showed it came closest to the truth than any other BDA method used. The ARCENT G-2 BDA formula was innovative and greatly supported General Schwarzkopf's overall campaign plan. It was clear from this episode that making an empirically based assessment using national systems alone was not possible in a conflict of this size. Although the BDA controversy died out once the ground campaign began, it had a serious and lasting effect, General Schwarzkopf and many elements of his staff lost faith in national reconnaissance to collect and analyze data

in support of his campaign objectives. From an intelligence producer's point of view, the worst situation to be in is to have the recipient of intelligence lose confidence in the product. But that is exactly where national intelligence agencies stood in regard to the overall situation on the eve of the ground operation in February 1991. In the end, national reconnaissance efforts could not meet many of the intelligence principles outlined in Joint Pub 2-0. As time went on their influence and relevance waned as the theater intelligence assets expanded in numbers and capability.

An Assessment of National Reconnaissance using Joint Pub 2-0 Principles

In summation, how well did national reconnaissance support the theater and Army intelligence requirements? General Schwarzkopf was backed by an intelligence community unmatched by any other country. Although most of the case study has pointed out the problems CENTCOM and ARCENT suffered through prior to receiving and disseminating theater and Army intelligence, one should keep in perspective the intelligence problems Saddam had. He had no intelligence to support his operational or strategic plans. His tactical intelligence was not much better, often being deceived by CENTCOM deception operations. However, this gross intelligence disparity should not lull us into complacency. Each war is different from the last and we

should not plan on a future opponent repeating the mistakes of his predecessor. Using the principles of intelligence quality as defined in Joint Pub 2-0, we can briefly assess the quality of national reconnaissance support to the Army.

From the perspective of timeliness, national reconnaissance supported the theater and Army combatant commanders for indications and warnings purposes. At the theater level, national systems were able to provide early warning on SCUD launches, and when possible, special tip-offs when the Iraqis broke radio silence. However from an Army perspective, national reconnaissance generally failed in timeliness. Its biggest shortfall was its support to the BDA problem.

Objectivity is often in the "eye" of the beholder. It must be remembered that national reconnaissance is oriented to serve the intelligence needs of the President and other senior policy makers. By the definition of Joint Pub 2-0, intelligence must be free from political influence, but at the national level that is near impossible. Prior to the Gulf War, national intelligence estimated that Iraq could not deliver chemical munitions via ballistic missiles, but reversed itself during DESERT SHIELD. Though the assessment may have recognized the fact that the Iraqis had the possibility to launch chemical munitions from ballistic missiles, the reversal only added to CENTCOMs concerns, prompting the air operation emphasis on destroying SCUDs and

chemical munition deliverable artillery batteries, to the detriment of other ground targets.

The greatest complaint from tactical commanders was that national intelligence products were not usable for tactical planning requirements. The content was often too broad, aimed at the theater audience. Lack of 1:50,000 maps and terrain analysis and traffic suitability studies were also great shortfalls. By the time of the ground operation these problems were for the most part resolved, but not without a great deal effort that could have been better used elsewhere. If the ground offensive had to take place in the autumn of 1990, CENTCOM would have taken great risk given the significant intelligence gaps.

Of all the categories, intelligence readiness was the least successful. The peacetime nature of CENTCOM, its manning level, and CONUS stationing, all contributed to the over reliance on national reconnaissance to fill the intelligence void until sufficient theater assets could be brought in Southwest Asia. For all practical purposes neither national nor theater were ready to wage the intelligence battle at the outset. Joint Pub 2-0 mentions that historically intelligence has often been unprepared to support the initial employment forces. DESERT SHIELD was no different. Almost immediately it was recognized that the peacetime intelligence structure at national and theater level could not transition into a wartime operation. Though

innovative ideas saved the situation, in place procedures would have made the transition much easier.

From a theater and Army perspective there was never enough data on Iraqi war fighting capabilities. After the Iran-Iraq war and prior to the rise in tensions in early 1990, Iraq was not as high an intelligence concern as was the POW/MIA issue. Concentrating on politically sensitive issues, DIA reduced its effort on Iraq and in the process losing sight of the changes to the Iraqi ground order of battle. During DESERT SHIELD, national intelligence assessed Iraqi forces to be greater in strength than was actually the case. This assessment influenced the Coalition force levels and other campaign planning factors.

Since the Iraqi force levels in the KTO were assessed using Iran-Iraq war force structures, their assessed capabilities to fight were overestimated as well. In some instances units were attrited far beyond the 50 percent level because they were assumed stronger than they actually were. But even with this intelligence accuracy problem, the Army did receive excellent tactical templates of Iraqi positions. Ground combatant commanders praised the templates for their attention to detail usability for planning purposes. The only drawback was the lack of dissemination systems to electronically send upgrades to Division and below combat units.

Finally relevance. In a sense both theater and Army received relevant intelligence on the Iraqi operational center of gravity, the Republican Guard. They were the key to Iraq's hold on Kuwait and targeting them for destruction meant that Kuwait could be liberated, and Iraq's warfighting capability broken. Although intelligence was sometimes spotty, the focus was never lost. When national reconnaissance was combined with theater intelligence collecting assets, movements of the Republican Guard prior to the initiation of the ground operation could be monitored very closely. Afterwards, theater assets kept a close watch providing VIIth Corps a fairly accurate picture until the lead elements of the Corps made contact with the enemy.

During DESERT SHIELD/STORM, national reconnaissance was certainly not an abysmal failure, but it did fall short of meeting many important Army tactical intelligence requirements. what saved the situation was the long build-up prior to the commencement of hostilities. This "grace" period allowed CENTCOM to build the theater intelligence infrastructure to support combat operations. By January 1991, theater intelligence was robust enough to fight the intelligence battle with less reliance on national systems.

JUST CAUSE - The Invasion of Panama 1989

The military invasion of Panama in December 1989 represented the failure of diplomatic and other efforts to oust the Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega from power. From an operational and intelligence perspective, JUST CAUSE sits in stark contrast to the intelligence experiences of DESERT SHIELD/STORM. Nearly all aspects of the intelligence environment were completely the opposite from each other. Where CENTCOM's experience highlighted the intelligence problems of a CONUS based Commander in Chief (CINC), SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern Command) was an active participant in the intelligence process because of its forward deployed status. SOUTHCOM viewed itself as "quality control" for the national intelligence view of military issues in the region.⁶⁰ Being forward deployed in Panama allowed SOUTHCOM an invaluable perspective on the threats to U.S. interests, a luxury CENTCOM never had. The operations were also distinctly different in their military scope and political objectives. The Gulf War was a situation which the U.S. actively sought allied participation whether military or political, where as JUST CAUSE was clearly an operation with little military significant outside the Western Hemisphere. The Bush administration took great pains to limit the political involvement of other countries in Panama's affairs.

The two operations had other contrasts. JUST CAUSE was a complex contingency operation marked by a tactical requirement to strike many targets simultaneously. DESERT SHIELD/STORM was noted for its long build-up and drawn out multi-phased campaign plan. From an intelligence perspective, SOUTHCOM had well detailed knowledge of the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) prior to the execution of the mission. CENTCOM by contrast had to frantically reevaluate Iraqi force capabilities given the pre-war intelligence gaps in the national data bases.

However, as different as the two operations were, there were some intelligence similarities. Like the Gulf War, national intelligence support to SOUTHCOM was sensitive to political influence. There was second guessing of SOUTHCOM's intelligence estimates, especially the more controversial aspects of JUST CAUSE. Also, intelligence objectives between SOUTHCOM and the national intelligence community did not always match.

For many years, SOUTHCOM supported national reconnaissance collection against Cuba, Nicaragua, and other groups hostile to United States interests in Latin America. However, as the political relationship between Panama and the U.S. deteriorated in the mid-1980s, SOUTHCOM's intelligence focus shifted to the support contingency plans against Noriega and the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF). One such plan known as BLUE SPOON, represented an umbrella

of psychologic actions to undermine the authority of the PDF. The objective was to force the PDF to either collapse or rid itself of Noriega. Although this plan was later criticized as being too "timid" in its intent, CINCSOUTHCOM, General Woerner, probably did the best he could do given the political leeway granted to him by the Reagan and Bush administrations. During that time it was the stated U.S. foreign policy of not interfering in the domestic problems of Panama. Subsequently it was desired that Noriega be ousted from office by the Panamanians rather than from overt U.S. action. Woerner himself was bluntly opposed to a large scale invasion because of the concern over the resulting economic, human, and political costs to both the United States and Panama.⁶¹ To support BLUE SPOON, Woerner would rely on theater intelligence, especially HUMINT, to assess the reaction of the PDF, and step in to restore law and order if the PDF collapsed altogether.

After the fraudulent elections of May 1989, and subsequent failed coup attempt, the Bush administration approved a plan aimed at directly removing Noriega from power. The PDF in this view was looked upon as the enemy. This shift in operational philosophy immeasurably simplified the intelligence process by moving away from determining whom within the PDF would oppose Noriega, to targeting all PDF companies for destruction. Immediately upon assuming command of SOUTHCOM in October 1989, General Thurman,

General Woerner's successor, reevaluated the BLUE SPOON plans and modified them to reflect a more aggressive operation to crush the PDF and capture Noriega. The latter, was the more difficult aspect of the plan because it required continuous surveillance on his whereabouts. It was also where intelligence from national to theater proved to be the weakest.

The operation against Noriega presented unique intelligence challenges. Extensive analytic intelligence on the PDF and Noriega was available prior to the operation. The nature of the operation, especially the tight time constraints, precluded the multiple assessments by various intelligence organizations as to the PDF's combat abilities. SOUTHCOM was able to accurately assess the PDF's strengths and weaknesses satisfying almost all the intelligence quality principles outlined in Joint Pub 2-0. The only significant issue of disagreement between SOUTHCOM and national intelligence was whether Noriega could lead a guerilla war in the jungles of Panama essentially dragging the U.S. into a war of attrition. The CIA assessed that he do could mount such an effort, while SOUTHCOM J-2 was confident he could not. SOUTHCOM J-2 felt that the CIA's assessment was not based so much on facts but rather on worst case possibilities. By the time JUST CAUSE was executed in December 1989, the only truly loyal followers of Noriega were fellow criminals. These people had no

inclination to wage a guerilla war from the jungles. Also the population as decidedly hostile to Noriega, making any guerilla action doomed to failure. Although national intelligence may not have understood this point, SOUTHCOM and Noriega's cronies understood this fact very well. The point is that SOUTHCOM may have had a better sense of objectivity and accuracy than Washington. The forward deployed nature of SOUTHCOM J-2 afforded an opportunity to penetrate the confusion and conflicting political interests that the national intelligence agencies must suffer through in Washington.

Setting the Stage, SOUTHCOM's Intelligence Role

Since the late seventies, relations with Panama steadily deteriorated, taking a nose dive soon after General Manuel Noriega took power in 1983. The worsening situation raised grave concern over the future of American military forces in Panama and the subsequent implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties. Upon entering office in 1981, the Reagan administration believed that Soviet inspired communist influence in Latin America represented a potential long term threat to the stability of the region, and ultimately to the security of the United States. The theater intelligence of SOUTHCOM, supported U.S. foreign policy objectives by augmenting national intelligence

collection and analysis of events in Latin America. Major national intelligence objectives included collection against denied areas such as Cuba, transshipment of arms from Soviet bloc countries to Central and South America, and issues of a non-military national concern. For example, the National Security Agency fully supported the Justice Department's anti-drug operations which in the main was not a specific intelligence mission of SOUTHCOM (until much later during the war on drugs campaigns). However, national intelligence deferred the issue of interstate violence in Central America almost exclusively to SOUTHCOM. As stated by the former SOUTHCOM CINC, General Paul Gorman, only three intelligence staffs were working on this issue full time: SOUTHCOM's, the combined Sandinista-Cuban staff in Managua, and Castro's staff in Havana. As he saw it, SOUTHCOM J-2's main intelligence effort in the region provided quality assurance for the whole U.S. intelligence community especially on the military intelligence aspect.⁶² This active participation in the intelligence process enabled the SOUTHCOM J-2 to develop a sense of relevance and completeness of his intelligence products that the CENTCOM J-2 could not achieve.

When General Gorman first took command in 1983, national intelligence had a very bleak estimate for the prospect of survival of democracy in Central America. The national estimates focused on controversial order-of-battle

data depicting the growing number of insurgents in contrast to the declining number of government troops.⁶³ Gorman adjusted his priority intelligence requirements to focus on the reasons why the guerrillas fought and why soldiers deserted. This new focus clarified the particular policies that had to be taken so as to achieve national strategic objectives for the region. Essentially CINCSOUTH was able to coordinate and focus national and theater intelligence collection to achieve regional policies that would fit national foreign policy objectives. SOUTHCOM was proactive in the intelligence and policy process which resulted in a stabilization of the region.⁶⁴

A key technique use by SOUTHCOM in shortening the intelligence cycle of collection, process, and dissemination, was to dispatch intelligence analysts from Quarry Heights Panama, to Washington to review national data bases. By General Gorman's own account a "treasure-trove" of information was collected by national reconnaissance but not fully processed into finished intelligence. Part of the problem was that although some of the information did not seem significant in Washington, to SOUTHCOM's forward deployed perspective it was very important. By General Gorman's insistence, DIA put together an ad hoc team to support SOUTHCOM's intelligence requirements. This direct coordination had immediate benefits for field operations and further compressed the intelligence cycle making the

intelligence system more responsive.⁶⁵ The lesson from this is that the forward deployed CINC was in a better position to direct the efforts of national reconnaissance than were senior administrators from Washington. Just as a commander can only command best at the front, the closer to the source of action, the better the intelligence analysis. By the time of JUST CAUSE, this same proactive participation in the intelligence process would enable the J-2 to easily identify and target any organized resistance by the PDF within Panama.

Collaboration and Confrontation with Noriega

Washington's early view of Noriega was that he could be useful to the Contra effort in Nicaragua. To maintain support for the Contras' sagging guerilla fight against the Nicaraguan Sandanistas, William Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, in 1985 reaffirmed the CIA's intelligence relationship with Noriega.⁶⁶ Although Noriega's reputation was already notorious, the attitude taken by the CIA and other offices of the executive branch was that "Noriega may be an SOB, but at least he's our SOB." But as time went on, it became increasingly clear that Noriega was becoming a real embarrassment and of little value towards U.S. foreign policy objectives or intelligence operations in the region. While attending an Inter-American Defense Board meeting at Ft. McNair in 1986, the *New York Times* published a series of

scathing articles by Seymour Hersh describing Noriega's involvement in murder, election-fixing, narcotrafficking, relations with the CIA, and participation as a double agent for Cuba. In a rage, Noriega immediately returned to Panama, convinced that the Reagan administration was trying to oust him as it had Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines.⁶⁷ This incident plus others of a similar nature, made Noriega an enemy of U.S. interests in the region. Thus began the string of events leading to the invasion on December 20th 1989 known as Operation JUST CAUSE.

After the failure of diplomatic and economic sanctions to rid Panama of Noriega, the Reagan administration resorted to covert action. President Reagan approved an intelligence finding authorizing the CIA to work with dissenting PDF elements with the objective of fomenting an uprising from within its ranks. However, by 1988 CIA covert actions were of limited value. The Reagan administration was still "wounded" over the Iran-Contra affair and the Congress took excruciating efforts to become part of the intelligence decision making process. Upon review of the finding, the Senate Committee on Intelligence blocked the action, fearing that it would probably lead to Noriega's murder thus further alienating U.S. good will in Latin America. Also Democratic members of Congress were opposed to Reagan's foreign policy approach throughout the region. The Democratic party line during the 1988

presidential election was that there was too much confrontation with some countries (Nicaragua, and Cuba), and too much concession to countries who violate human rights (El Salvadore, Guatemala, and Honduras). By January 1989 the Reagan administration left office without removing Noriega. This situation bolstered Noriega's image in the press and among anti-American elements in Latin America. It also encouraged him to take bolder and even reckless acts of sabotage against U.S. property, and endanger the safety of Panamanian as well as U.S. citizens. During the May 1989 Organization of American States brokered national elections, Noriega's thug dignity battalions abused voters and committed blatant fraud at the polls. Opposition candidates were severely beaten in public. Clearly Noriega felt that the U.S. would take no action against him. He became more irresponsible, at one point ordering all U.S. planes to be shot down.⁶⁸ The Bush administration retaliated by ordering a complete cut-off of all contacts with the PDF by American military personnel. Although this action had diplomatic overtones, it had the negative affect of cutting SOUTHCOM's overt HUMINT contacts within the PDF.

The failed PDF coup in October 1989, revealed the serious impact President Bush's orders had on intelligence. Although the coup plotters spoke to CIA and SOUTHCOM liaison officers at length prior to the coup in an attempt to seek U.S. support, both General Thurman, and Washington, were

dubious about their sincerity. The concern was this coup was nothing more than an elaborate trick by Noriega to make the U.S. look bad. It had the potential to be a political disaster for President Bush. Though very little happened in Panama without it being known by SOUTHCOM intelligence, determining intentions was more difficult. The many deadly purges within the PDF by Noriega had eliminated most of SOUTHCOM's and the CIA's HUMINT capability. In hindsight, U.S. assistance to the coup plotters could have ended Noriega's control of Panama thus precluding JUST CAUSE. However, the confusion of the day's events, and Washington's too close management of the situation, caused the U.S. to let the opportunity slip by. Though Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, and Secretary of Defense, Cheney, both testified that the coup-plotters had no intention of handing Noriega over to the SOUTHCOM authorities, evidence indicates the contrary.⁶⁹ The problem that national intelligence could not solve was determining credibility among alleged anti-Noriega elements in the PDF. Noriega was a master of deception who often outmaneuvered his political opponents. This fact alone diminished the credibility of any HUMINT obtained by SOUTHCOM or the CIA. Other forms of intelligence such as SIGINT also suffered from the similar problems. SOUTHCOM and national intelligence could collect all they want, but yet they could never be sure of its reliability. Although there was no

information to counter the sincerity of the coup plotters, the conservative inclination of national intelligence distrusted anti-Noriega elements within the PDF. When the political costs of failure were considered, the Bush administration was reluctant to take a gamble on an event not totally within its control. General Thurman came to believe that the PDF had to be destroyed in one blow so as to remove the only support Noriega had on power. The direct targeting of the PDF prompted General Thurman's desire to strike 27 targets simultaneously, and capture Noriega before he could rally opposition among the Panamanian people.⁷⁰

Intelligence Support to the Planning and Execution of
Operation JUST CAUSE

With the change of emphasis to the operational plans, the intelligence and political processes became simplified. SOUTHCOM would focus its intelligence to the military objectives of destroying the PDF and its criminal support element the "dignity battalions." The failed October 1989 coup within the PDF identified the 6th and 7th Companies at Rio Hato, and Battalion 2000 at Fort Cimarron as units most loyal to Noriega. During the coup, the 7th flew to Panama City to Noriega's aid while Battalion 2000 traveled by truck. This fact made JUST CAUSE planners highlight the seizing of airports at Rio Hato and Panama City, and related bridges a high priority.⁷¹

A huge intelligence advantage for American forces was the fact that thousands of soldiers were stationed in Panama itself. One of the most unique elements of JUST CAUSE that certainly will not be repeated elsewhere, was the long-standing U.S. military presence within Panama. For many years the mission of U.S. forces was to defend the Panama Canal against a foreign attack. The PDF equipped and trained by the U.S. to augment Canal defense missions and provide local security. Although JUST CAUSE was correctly identified as a forced entry invasion, it also had the elements of a coup d'etat. The U.S. forces stationed in Panama to protect the government and the Panama Canal from foreign attack, would now be used to replace the Panamanian government.⁷² Troops involved in the operation were allowed to scout and observe specific targets of the operation. Many exercises and full rehearsals were conducted at or near actual military objectives. This increased the confidence among the troops who would execute the plan giving them almost unprecedented knowledge of the local area. But as obvious as the exercises were, in the main they did not tip off Noriega as to U.S. determination to oust him. The many months of psychological warfare against each other conditioned the PDF and Noriega to accept the exercises as nothing more than a U.S. attempt to unnerve him. As the planners had hoped, the constant exercises lulled the Panamanians into a sense of complacency making them

oblivious to the dramatic increase in activity 48 hours prior to the attack. Thus in a strange twist of events, operational security for JUST CAUSE was maintained by the constant level of military activity, rather than it being a tip-off as is usually the case. Noriega was convinced that the U.S. did not have the political will to get rid of him.⁷³

With the PDF Companies well targeted for destruction, the other object of the plan, the capture of Noriega took shape as well. A special team from the National Security Agency, and a CIA liaison officer, worked directly for General Thurman. Their mission was to coordinate the theater and national effort to continuously monitor Noriega's communications. It was known that Noriega moved many times during the day and night and sent false radio and telephone traffic to further conceal his whereabouts. Special forces teams were inserted into Panama long before the operation to observe key operating locations and in advance of H-hour staked out seven of the more likely spots. However, with all the attention and focus given to maintain Noriega's whereabouts, at best SOUTHCOM could only keep abreast of him approximately 75 to 80 per cent of the time.⁷⁴ This was just not enough. At least 24 hours prior to H-hour, NSA intercepted a telephone call to Noriega by an unknown caller in the United States informing him that a source within the U.S. State Department said that the

invasion was imminent. Although Noriega increased his movements, he did not put the PDF on alert.⁷⁵ It is possible that Noriega thought this may have been another attempt by the US to unsettle him in the ongoing war of nerves, not realizing the scope of the invasion. Unfortunately the NSA team lost contact of Noriega hours prior to the attack. On the 19th of December, day before the invasion, Noriega visited the city of Colon on the Atlantic side of the isthmus. Instead of returning by plane as the team had thought, Noriega traveled by car and then took an unexpected trip to Torrijos/Tocumen airport to visit one of his prostitutes. Eventually the NSA tracking team deduced that he was at the airport and informed the inflight Ranger battalion. They missed him by the narrowest of margins.

Although Noriega escaped capture he was of little use to the PDF. The excellent list of possible hideouts made prior to the operation, plus the subsequent arrest of many loyalists over the following days kept Noriega constantly moving. SOF teams were often no more than an hour behind Noriega as he moved from one location to the next.⁷⁶ Not catching Noriega turned out to be a temporary embarrassment for the Bush administration, but from the Army's point of view, Noriega was neutralized as a factor of any consequence. Extensive precautions were taken to ensure he did not escape the country, nor try to seek asylum in either

the Cuban or Nicaraguan embassies. The fact that he evaded surveillance can not be considered an intelligence failure given the difficulty of monitoring his every movement. Also, in capture missions such as the one planned for Noriega, the NSA tracking team had to keep tabs on a target who knew that he was being watched. It is a small wonder that SOUTHCOM could keep Noriega on the run at all.

The resistance by the "dignity battalions" soon after the collapse of the PDF, turned out to be a nasty surprise. These "units" were composed of criminals and street thugs who had no sympathy among the Panamanian people. SOUTHCOM J-2 held a low opinion of their fighting qualities and predicted that most would melt away once the shooting started, which most did. However, being criminals who were feared and hated by the local population, many faced jail or some form of retribution if Noriega was ousted. This explains in some measure why many of these thugs fought harder than the PDF. SOUTHCOM HUMINT should have provided a better indication of their intention to fight, but in the end the dignity battalions had little impact on the overall operation.⁷⁷ They had more of an impact on the press and Washington than they did on the military situation. Just as the press was reporting that the U.S. would find itself in a prolonged guerilla war, the last of the opposition collapsed.

Although the situation was well in hand, and all military objectives were achieved within the first 24 hours, Noriega's escape caused undue concern in Washington. The CIA raised the possibility that Noriega would initiate a guerrilla operation from the Panamanian jungles - a view not considered likely by SOUTHCOM J-2. Exhausted by the many days on the run, Noriega surrendered himself to U.S. drug enforcement agents through the intercession of Papal intermediaries.

An Assessment of National Reconnaissance using Joint Pub 2-0 Principles

The intelligence lessons learned from JUST CAUSE are very similar to the lessons learned from the Gulf War. The location of SOUTHCOM's headquarters at Quarry Heights, Panama, was an ideal location to collect intelligence. The forward deployed U.S. forces were able to develop an objective and accurate intelligence picture that could not be replicated in Washington. The CINCSOUTHCOM was able to create framework from which relevant intelligence could be developed to shape foreign policy objectives. SOUTHCOM was able to have a better understanding of the situation by augmenting the national reconnaissance efforts rather than having national intelligence products "spoon-fed" to the CINC like CENTCOM. This fact improved the usability of the

intelligence developed for the CINCSOUTHCOM's planning requirements.

The only intelligence shortfall that adversely the intelligence principles of completeness, and timeliness, in SOUTHCOM was when the White House banned further contacts with the PDF in early 1989. As outlined previously, this political decision seriously hurt SOUTHCOM, and CIA HUMINT efforts. Contacts associated with the PDF and other close to Noriega dried up. The consequence of this decision was the "sluggish" response by Washington and SOUTHCOM to take advantage of the October 1989 coup within the PDF.⁷⁸ Aside from this shortfall, the intelligence support from SOUTHCOM J-2 was often superior, meeting the quality standards outlined in Joint Pub 2-0. SOUTHCOM was better able to satisfy the seven principles of intelligence quality than CENTCOM, even though Southwest Asia is arguably more important to U.S. security interests than Latin America. The one distinguishing factor between the two is that SOUTHCOM is forward deployed and CENTCOM is not. This single fact made all the difference in making one CINC an active participant in the intelligence process and the other less so.

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CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Putting timely, useful intelligence in the hands of a myriad of consumers where and when they need it is the *raison d'etre* of military intelligence. Failure to provide that link at the critical moment may mean the difference between success or failure in a future operation.¹

LTG Leonard H. Perroots

As the army draws down in strength during the post Cold War era, the Army leadership wants to break with history by not allowing peacetime neglect to seriously degrade quality. Bull Run, Kasserine Pass, and Task Force Smith were are all testaments to an undertrained, and ill-equipped Army thrown into battle. To break with this dubious historical legacy, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan made a pledge not to forfeit the hard work of the last twenty years. Intelligence has a crucial role in this.

The Army is transitioning from a forward deployed force principally in Europe and Korea, to a CONUS based power projection force. This new reality makes the

capability to collect, process, and analyze intelligence all the more critical. Army forces may be deployed to regions without the benefit of a forward established infrastructure such as in Europe or Panama. The Army will require detailed intelligence of the region and any enemy forces located there well before the arrival of forces. This new situation places great responsibility upon national reconnaissance to substitute theater and service component intelligence collection and analysis. Concurrent with the return of forces to the U.S., is the dramatic military budget decreases similar to the years preceding World War II. These mutual developments demand an efficient and effective national reconnaissance infrastructure to accurately and completely identify threats, their capabilities, and intentions. Our combat forces, though smaller in size, will still be very potent. We can hurt the enemy, but if they inflict sizable casualties on us, we may not be able to generate the replacements and/or the reinforcements to shore up setbacks. Given this situation, the intelligence has to be right the first time: obtain at least a 95 percent solution. Inaccurate intelligence estimates can no longer be underwritten by our forces; there just will not be enough forces available to absorb mistakes.

Can national reconnaissance be a substitute for theater intelligence? Can it simultaneously provide the intelligence support required by the Army component

commander? The case studies of JUST CAUSE, and DESERT SHIELD/STORM, suggest answers to these questions. In the main, national reconnaissance was not structured to meet the operational intelligence requirements of the unified CINCs, and less so for the Army commanders' tactical intelligence requirements. Was it a total failure? Not by standards used by our allies or enemies. Saddam and Noriega would have been overjoyed to have the least useful intelligence our national reconnaissance could provide. However, we can not judge the quality of national reconnaissance support based on what is acceptable to others. Our forces expect and deserve the best intelligence support that can be delivered.

National reconnaissance systems have particular advantages and disadvantages that must be understood prior to the commitment of forces into a hostile environment. Within certain limitations, national intelligence collection systems are more than capable of creating the strategic and operational intelligence framework prior to the outbreak of hostilities. They can range deeper to collect data than any theater or army tactical system currently available. This is not surprising since this is what they were designed to do in their strategic peacetime role. Although, national reconnaissance can support military operations over the spectrum of conflict, they work best in a pre-hostilities environment when data can be methodically collected against

a known target. During hostilities, national systems still are a tremendous asset to the combatant commander, but as examined from the DESERT SHIELD/STORM case study, they have definite limitations. The inadequate intelligence on Iraq illustrate the limitations of national reconnaissance: the enemy order of battle was not precise; national reconnaissance was incapable of solving the BDA intelligence problem without massive augmentation; and battlefield requirements for timely data was greatly exceeded by demand. A big analytical advantage for national reconnaissance was that Iraqi forces were organized and equipped with Soviet equipment, and for the most part followed Soviet warfighting doctrine. They were analogous to the scenario for employing the intelligence tools developed to monitor the Soviet Union.² In contrast, future military commitments of forces will certainly require information which the national intelligence community is currently ill-prepared to provide. Shifting the national reconnaissance focus from the Soviet threat in Europe to a less defined threat in other regions of the globe will require an incredible change in both collection and analytical methodologies.

The point to learn is that national systems can not provide enough stand alone coverage to satisfy all the intelligence questions an operation the size of DESERT SHIELD/STORM required. It comes back to the point that these systems, and the analytical infrastructure associated

with national reconnaissance were not specifically designed for the wartime intelligence needs of combatant commanders.

Another critical point in the case studies is that a regionally forward deployed CINC has the opportunity to be an active partner in the intelligence process. SOUTHCOM had a much greater influence on coordinating the efforts of national reconnaissance than did CENTCOM. Forward deployment entails strategic national interest which requires some level of national intelligence focus. A forward deployed CINC can act as "broker" for satisfying Army specific intelligence requirements that require the use of national reconnaissance assets. But if future U.S. forces are to be largely CONUS based, then how will a CONUS Army gain better access to direct the collection and analytical process? Congress believes the answer lies in an intelligence community version of Goldwater-Nichols where centralization will increase efficiency - doing more with less.

Although the Reorganization Act may have improved inter-service cooperation, trying to do the same for the intelligence community may only cause more centralization of reconnaissance assets. This will inevitably limit the amount of participation of the services in the intelligence process. An intelligence community version of Goldwater-Nichols could have the effect of buttressing the "Beltway

Barrier" between the U.S. Combatant Commands and the intelligence agencies in Washington D.C.³

Even if there were a desire to buy more national reconnaissance assets, this does not always translate into increased support for the Army component commander. Tactical forces have specific intelligence requirements that national, and at times, even joint intelligence sources can not meet. Intelligence analysts must be thoroughly familiar with the unique needs of an Army war fighter, if the intelligence is to have value. ARCENT G-2 was able to make the key intelligence assessments on Iraqi forces because it was manned with people who knew what ground commanders needed to know.⁴ Although this may sound incredibly obvious, in the rush to consolidate intelligence capability at national and joint service levels, may cause a wide gulf between the intelligence producer and the intelligence customer. The end result being where the tactical commander's intelligence needs go unresolved, leaving intelligence to be collected for its own internal benefit.

During testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, General Paul Gorman stated that a centralized hierarchy of intelligence collection and analysis cuts the CINC out of the intelligence fusion process and leaves him with products that may or may not be suited to his intelligence needs.⁵ This is exactly what General Schwarzkopf complained about in post-Gulf War testimony;

nationally prepared intelligence products offered little application for his tactical commanders. As stated in both Joint Pub 2 and FM 34-1, intelligence is primarily for the combatant commander. Given this doctrinal pronouncement, from an Army perspective, only intelligence professionals with a background in the intelligence requirements of the land component commander have the training and expertise to make the critical estimates that allows a commander to decide on a particular course of action. During DESERT SHIELD, Army intelligence analysts identified the Republican Guard as the Iraqi center of gravity to Saddam's hold on Kuwait. In Panama it was the PDF and dignity battalions which kept Noriega in power. Those key assessments drove the campaign plans which evolved into the great wheel around the Iraqi flank, and the simultaneous destruction of the PDF forces. Further more, few within the national intelligence community had the professional Army training and experience to help General Franks slam VIIth Corps into the Republican Guard at the optimum time and place.⁶ National intelligence agencies just do not have the ability to provide the type of detailed, tailored intelligence that ARCENT G-2 could give to the ground components.

Aside from all the technical problems of delivering intelligence to users, the "analytical culture" of intelligence support at the strategic level versus the theater or the service level is a problem that must be

recognized. Strategic intelligence responds to political issues at the NCA level. Intelligence for the services is concerned with narrower issues of enemy combat strength, capabilities, and so forth. Strategic intelligence can not avoid having its intelligence focus influenced by some aspect of politics. Just months prior to the invasion of Kuwait, DIA had only two full time intelligence analysts working on the Iraqi intelligence desk, but had over forty assigned to the POW/intelligence issue. Given the Middle Eastern strategic interests the United States, the formula should have been reversed. However, the POW/MIA issue was a political "hot potato." Under its own circumstances, SOUTHCOM had similar problems. Noriega, was long recognized as a corrupt, untrustworthy dictator, however U.S. foreign policy objectives of thwarting communism made him a bedfellow of the CIA. As long as Noriega assisted the Contras' fight against the Sandanistas, his money laundering and other criminal activities were ignored. Although the Reagan administration's war on drugs became a major domestic issue, stopping communism was more important. The U.S. took no action against Noriega's drug activity, money-laundering, alien smuggling, and evasion of U.S. technology embargo to communist countries.⁷ SOUTHCOM's constant stream of derogatory intelligence on Noriega was not acted on because of "larger" political objectives.

Throughout its history the national intelligence community, has often been stung by Congress for real and alleged intelligence failures. For this reason national intelligence tends to cover its bets on important intelligence issues. Rare is the intelligence estimate that takes "risk" by making a bold prediction of an enemy course of action. At the national level there is no incentive to take risks because there is no payoff. In other words, at the national intelligence level there is much to lose by being wrong, but little to win when bold. When General Schwarzkopf complained that national intelligence was often so caveated and full of disclaimers it was of no use to his tactical commanders, he was describing the "analytical culture" of strategic intelligence. The warfighter does not have the resources to cover his operational or tactical bets; he needs timely, tailored intelligence in order to choose the best course of action.

Probably the most frustrating manifestation within the national intelligence community is its reluctance to admit ignorance. When data does not exist to make an empirically based prediction, national intelligence tends to speculate. Speculation is not an intelligence estimate, it is an opinion. As Chairman JCS, Admiral Crowe discovered that Congressmen have a strange ingrained belief that intelligence is always right, and more in tune with a particular issue than a CINC. Unless the national

intelligence community supported a CINC's view, Congress was inclined to favor the intelligence community assessment. This made the national intelligence community an active participant in controlling the decision making process.⁸ Given an environment that penalizes risk, the national intelligence community presents a worst case scenario when facts are slim. It is always safe to predict the world is caving-in than admit ignorance thus forfeiting out on the decisionmaking process. This is the reason the CIA presented its differing assessment from CENTCOM on the BDA issue. The CIA was honestly not sure of the air war's results, but politically did not want to risk agreeing with CENTCOM's analysis given the political costs if CENTCOM had been wrong.

SOUTHCOM was confronted with this problem as well. When Noriega initially evaded capture after the invasion, the CIA speculated that he and his PDF loyalists would initiate a guerilla campaign from the Panamanian jungles. Between the lines, CIA was raising the specter of increased U.S. casualties and possibly a Vietnam-like war in Panama. A closer look at the situation showed that some of the best trained PDF units chose not to fight U.S. combat units because the loyalty to Noriega was not as strong as some thought. Only a small cadre of self interested fellow criminals remained loyal to Noriega. Not the type people likely to suffer the hardships of a guerrilla war.

Combatant commanders, whether a CINC or an Army brigade commander, require an unequivocal intelligence estimate on the enemy, or at least an indication that data is too incomplete to make an informed assessment. Solid intelligence is needed to drive the other elements of the decision making process. Unless the national intelligence community can change its "analytical culture," its analytical products will never totally satisfy the intelligence portion of a combatant commander's decision cycle. If the intelligence does not satisfy the customer, he will fill the vacuum himself. The CINC's and the services will find ways to recreate, reorganize their own intelligence set-ups.

Recommendations for further study

The following recommendations to the intelligence problems identified in this thesis should be examined. They represent follow on issues outside the scope of the thesis but pertinent to the issue of national reconnaissance support to the Army.

1. Forwarding deploying intelligence resources with a combatant CINC is a clear advantage in obtaining and influencing national reconnaissance collection strategies and analysis. Since forces are returning to the U.S., an examination should be studied as to the possibility of

stationing a CONUS based CINC's intelligence assets in a forward foreign location.

2. Make the unified combatant CINCs a standing member of the intelligence oversight board of the National Security Council. The objective is to give them leverage on national intelligence estimates and collection.

3. Make the unified combatant CINC's J-2 standing members of the military intelligence board (MIB).

4. During times of crisis, designate national reconnaissance collection and analysis as supporting command functions at the disposal of the supported CINC. The theater intelligence architecture should have absolute intelligence reporting responsibility within the CINC's area of responsibility. The intent is to let the CINC make the intelligence calls without the "second guessing" by the national intelligence community.

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