Organizing for War: Past and Present
Abstract
The monograph begins with a historical examination of the triangular concept that, was the foundation for the Army's reorganization and force design on the eve of World WAR II. Then the monograph examines the pentomic concept which developed during the early years of the Cold War and was the operational concept for the Army until 1961. The historical sketches provide a foundation for analysis using a three part methodology. The methodology considers the strategic requirements that shape the nation's needs for its army, the operational concept that determines how the Army will fight and the system processes that influence the size, shape and complexion of the force. The monograph continues with a discussion of Clausewitz' understanding of the nature of war in relation to the Army's view of military theory and doctrine. It concludes with an examination of the Army's current situation, identifying several problems the Army must carefully consider. First, strategic requirements that ought to help determine the shape of the force are, themselves, unclear. Second, the Army's definition and understanding of war, a central part of its operational concept, has become increasingly more complex. Third, the Army's force structure, the reality of the force, is a function of Congressional willingness to provide money for the Army's budget. Finally, this study of past experiences provides a framework from which force planners can approach the increasingly complex problem of future war and force design.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA284634
Entities
People
- Morton Orlov Ii
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College