The Nature of War and Campaign Design.
Abstract
This paper discusses the nature of war and warfare. It contends that unclear policy objectives and a lack of strategy contributed to strategic defeats in Vietnam and Somalia despite tactical successes. This was in part the result of a tendency to confuse war and warfare. This confusion is a natural result of prevailing theories of war which tend to blur the distinction between war and warfare. In response, this paper postulates a new theory of war that clarifies the distinction between war and warfare. It views war as a matter of decision making and discusses it as a function of a group's will and capability relative to its interests in the context of the enemy. The theory defines capability as a function of five sources of power: military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and cybernetic and discusses the complex, situation dependent relationship between will and capability. Finally, the paper postulates a methodology of campaign design based on the proposed theory and concludes by discussing its practical use for the United States Army. Capability, War, Theory, Warfare Nature of war, Sources of power, Campaign design, Will
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- May 17, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA284657
Entities
People
- Steven W. Peterson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College