Counter-Insurgency in Cuba: Why Did Batista Fail

Abstract

This thesis analyzes the counterinsurgency efforts of the second Batista regime of Cuba, 1952-1958, using the Sword Model, developed by Max G. Manwaring and John T. Fishel. The Sword Model is a paradigm developed to predict the probability of success of insurgencies by evaluating seven major criteria which are referred to as dimensions. The thesis concludes that all seven dimensions were detrimental to the longevity of the Batista regime. The major contributors to Batista's failure were his lack of legitimacy and poor unity of effort within the government as well as between Cuba and the major intervening power, the United States. Weak democratic traditions in Cuban society and a biased international news media exacerbated the crisis. Based on the research conducted, it is believed that the Sword Model, would have accurately predicted the outcome of the second Batista regime were it available during the 1950's. The Sword Model, is therefore a viable tool in evaluating insurgencies

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 03, 1994
Accession Number
ADA284697

Entities

People

  • Ricardo J. Blanco

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Civil Engineering
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • Industrial Plants
  • Insurgency
  • International Law
  • Law
  • Military Organizations
  • Military Training
  • National Politics
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Political Systems
  • Students
  • Terrorists
  • United States
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Military and Counterinsurgency Studies.
  • Underwater engineering and Marine Technology.