Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context

Abstract

This report examines the broad outlines of U.S. strategies of deterring nuclear use by regional adversaries and, when deterrence may be ineffective, for defeating such threats. It represents an application of the concepts contained in a companion document (Watman and Wilkening, 1994), in which the basic ideas underlying deterrence have been reformulated to make them more applicable to regional conflicts. Regional nuclear confrontations will involve brinkmanship, i.e., a competition in risk-taking in which the side that is more risk acceptant and that can credibly make sufficiently devastating threats has the upper hand. Credibility, in turn, is determined by the balance of resolve and the balance of power between the contestants.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1994
Accession Number
ADA286788

Entities

People

  • Dean Wilkening
  • Kenneth Watman

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Counter WMD
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Space

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Defense
  • Air Force
  • Arms Control Treaties
  • Ballistic Missiles
  • Chemical Weapons
  • Civil Defense
  • Command And Control
  • Command And Control Systems
  • Fusion Weapons
  • Human Behavior
  • Military Facilities
  • National Security
  • Nuclear Weapons
  • Treaties
  • Urban Areas
  • Warning Systems
  • Weapons Effects

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies