Reconstituting a Production Capability. Past Experience, Restart Criteria, and Suggested Policies.
Abstract
With the transition to lower U.S. military force levels, near-term reductions in defense procurement seem inevitable. Budget pressures will dictate not only that smaller quantities of individual weapon systems be acquired but also that many long-enduring production lines be shut down. In addition, production lines of new weapon systems may well be dismanfled soon after the initial production runs are complete. At the same time, the United States must maintain a capability to respond to regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests and to reconstitute its forces in the event of extended conflicts. Indeed, reconstitution is one of the four foundations of the new national military strategy enunciated by President George Bush in 1990. In this report, we examine one promising reconstitution option: activating the industrial base to produce major weapon systems whose production lines have been shut down. This report examines the following major production-restart issues: cost and schedule relative to those of new programs, measures to ameliorate the problems of restart, criteria for selecting restart candidates, and alternative reconstitution strategies. The specific questions we set out to answer and the conclusions we reached are as follows.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA288463
Entities
People
- Fred Timson
- Giles Smith
- John L. Birkler
- Joseph Large
Organizations
- RAND Corporation