The U.S. Submarine Production Base : An Analysis of Cost, Schedule, and Risk for Selected Force Structures. Executive Summary,

Abstract

Our study thus had three purposes: To determine the practicality of extending the current gap between submarine starts, given the time required to restart production. We wanted to make sure we took into account the full potential advantages of deferring the length of the gap-the longer production is put off, the more money should be saved. So we sought to find the longest gap possible that still allowed meeting force objectives. To compare the cost of producing submarines after the longest gap practical with that of continuing production. This is equivalent to determining which is greater-the savings from postponing production or the offsetting costs of shutdown and restart-and by how much. To characterize the largely unquantifiable risks involved in a reconstitution strategy.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jan 01, 1994
Accession Number
ADA288636

Entities

People

  • Fred Timson
  • Giles Smith
  • James Chiesa
  • John L. Birkler
  • John Schank

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Acquisition
  • Attack Submarines
  • Boats
  • Commerce
  • Department Of Defense
  • Engineers
  • Governments
  • Los Angeles Class
  • Maintenance Costs
  • National Security
  • Navy
  • Nuclear Powered Submarines
  • Nuclear Propulsion
  • Production Rate
  • Public Policy
  • Seawolf Class
  • United States

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Life Cycle Cost Analysis
  • Public Financial Management and Budgeting