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
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**An Occasional Paper of
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Warfare Studies**

**U.S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping:
Putting PDD 25 in Context**

Donald C.F. Daniel, Ph.D.



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Newport, Rhode Island

**US PERSPECTIVES ON PEACEKEEPING:
PUTTING PDD 25 IN CONTEXT**

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Views and interpretations expressed herein are the author's and are not necessarily those of any agency of the US Government.

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INTRODUCTION

On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). It lays out his "Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," defined as encompassing activities from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The Directive was the product of "an inter-agency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs in order to develop a comprehensive policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period."¹ The document is unusual for its detail on the criteria which the American Executive Branch is to apply when making decisions about whether and how to support United Nations peacekeeping missions. This article presents some of its main provisions and puts it in the context of the factors which shaped its development. These include long-rooted and competing foreign policy tendencies, a general American ambivalence toward the UN, the priority of foreign policy in the Clinton White House, the impact of Congress, and the related impact of public opinion.

SUMMARY OF PDD 25

The unclassified version of PDD 25 contains six sections, the longest of which lays out the factors which the Administration will consider when making decisions at three levels: whether or not to support the establishment of an UN or regionally-sponsored operation; whether American personnel should participate in an approved operation; and whether they ought to participate significantly in enforcement missions where combat is likely.

The following lists the criteria which the document says ought to be applied at the first level:

- UN involvement advances US interests and there is an international community of interests for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis.

1 "The Clinton's Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," Department of State Publication 10161 (Washington, DC: Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, May, 1994), p. ES1.

- There is a threat to or breach of international peace and security . . . defined as one or a combination of the following:

- international aggression;
- urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence; or
- sudden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence or the threat of violence.

- There are clear objectives and an understanding of where the mission fits . . . between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

- For traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping . . . , a ceasefire should be in place and the consent of the parties obtained before the force is deployed.

- For peace enforcement (Chapter VII) . . . , the threat to international peace and security is considered significant.

- The means to accomplish the mission are available, including the forces, financing, and mandate appropriate to the mission.

- The political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction . . . are considered unacceptable.

- The operation's anticipated duration is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the mission.²

Additional more rigorous standards are identified for deciding whether American personnel are to participate in an operation:

- Participation advances US interests and . . . the . . . risks . . . are considered acceptable.

- Personnel, funds, and other resources are available.

- US participation is necessary for . . . success.

- The role of US forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint for US participation can be identified.

- Domestic and Congressional support . . . can be marshalled.

- Command and control arrangements are acceptable.³

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Finally, even more rigorous standards are laid out when there is a possibility of significant American participation in enforcement missions where combat will likely occur. Specifically, there must be:

- a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;
- a plan to achieve those objectives decisively; and
- a commitment to reassess and adjust, as necessary, the size, composition, and disposition of our forces⁴

Among the second level criteria above is one which calls for acceptable command and control arrangements. PDD 25 devotes an entire section to this issue. It makes clear that US troops will always remain under American command, but lays open the possibility of operational control of those forces by a non-American "competent UN commander." By operational control is meant the assignment of tasks to US forces for a specific mission or during a specific time frame. The foreign commander is proscribed, however, from "chang[ing] the mission or deploy[ing] US forces outside the area of responsibility agreed to by the President" of the United States, nor is he allowed to "separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization."⁵

Two conditions will almost automatically limit the extent to which the US will agree to place forces under UN operational control. One is the extent of the participation by US forces: the greater their role, the less likely it is that the US will give up control. A second obtains when US forces participate "in a major peace enforcement mission that is likely to involve combat." Such a mission "should ordinarily be conducted under US command and operational control or through competent regional organizations such as NATO or ad hoc coalitions."⁶

The remainder of PDD 25 focuses on the role of regional organizations, on the need to reduce mission costs, on measures to strengthen the UN's ability to manage peace operations, and on measures to strengthen the US's ability to support them. On regional organizations, US policy accepts the appropriateness of peace operations by regional organizations while emphasizing that the UN remains the

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*, p. 10.

6 *Ibid.*, p. 9.

primary body having the authority to conduct them. On costs reduction, the document calls for implementation of various measures within the UN including the establishment of an Inspector-General's office. It also makes clear American determination to see a reduction of the US's share of the UN's peace operations budget from 31.7% to 25%, adding that the Congress is ready to force the issue by probably refusing to fund more than 25% after fiscal year 1995. Suggestions to strengthen the UN focus on reconfiguring and expanding the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, establishing quick-reaction teams and capabilities (such as a modest airlift capability through pre-negotiated contracts), establishing as well a Peace Operations Training Program, and laying out how the US can assist in such endeavors on a reimbursable basis. Finally, suggestions to strengthen US support focus particularly on how the Departments of Defense and State should share responsibilities.

In sum, PDD 25 reflects a highly cautious and deliberate frame of mind. It contains numerous guidelines for making decisions about peace operations and US participation in them, and it recommends measures for improving the conduct of operations and associated UN and US capabilities. Fundamentally, it "aims to ensure that our use of peacekeeping is *selective and more effective*."⁷

The document was in gestation over a year. Predictions that it was about to be issued proved premature as it was either "put on hold" or re-drafted to make it more cautious in tone.⁸ The final version is the product of the various factors impinging on the Administration. These include differences about the US's role in world affairs.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 3. Emphasis in original.

8 Quote is from Michael Gordon and Thomas L. Friedman, "Disastrous US Raid in Somalia Nearly Succeeded, Review Finds," *The New York Times*, October 25, 1993, p. A10. See Barton Gellman, "Wider UN Police Role Supported," *The Washington Post*, August 5, 1993, p. A1; Steven Holmes, "Clinton May Let US Troops Serve Under UN Chiefs," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1993, p. A1; Elaine Sciolino, "US Narrows Terms for Its Peacekeepers," *The New York Times*, September 23, 1993, p. A8; Paul Lewis, "US Plans Policy on Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, November 18, 1993, p. A7; Eric Schmitt, "US Set to Limit Role of Military in Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, January 29, 1994, p. A1.

COMPETING FOREIGN POLICY TENDENCIES

Any nation contemplating a role in peace support operations must consider how much it is willing to commit to a community of interests transcending national borders and to employ its military to advance those interests. Yet it is these very considerations which historically have occasioned sharp and recurring disagreements in the United States. In his recent review of *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations*, Professor Ernest May identifies several competing long-term tendencies among Americans concerning foreign relations. While cautioning against over-simplification, he singles out those represented by John Quincy Adams on the one hand and Thomas Jefferson and Woodrow Wilson on the other. Building on the example set by George Washington, Adams called for firm commitment to internal improvements and counselled against foreign entanglements even when the independence of other nations was in the balance. In contrast, Jefferson and Wilson wanted the United States to participate actively in a community of mutually-supportive democratic nations. Wilson went further when proposing that they organize formally to maintain peace and advance democracy thereby. "The aftermath of the Cold War," May tells us, "finds these competing conceptions still alive."⁹

May adds that within the context of this historical competition were recurring disputes about when the US should resort to military force. Such disputes occasioned "[s]ome of the fiercest contention" among Americans with the "[n]ext in ferocity [being] contention over economic coercion."¹⁰

There was, of course, remarkable internal agreement for much of the Cold War that the United States should commit itself to the defense of far-flung states in Europe and Asia, but that agreement was due to the circumstances which no longer obtain. The period of bipartisan foreign policy, as it was termed, reflected near obsession with the perceived ideological and politico-military threat from the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China. Walter Rostow captured some of that spirit when he wrote about the impact of the launching of the Sputnik satellite in 1957:

9 May, "Who Are We?"; Two Centuries of American Foreign Relations," *Foreign Affairs*, 73, 2 (March/April 1994), p. 136.

10 *Ibid.*

There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by [its] launching This intrinsically harmless act of science and engineering was also . . . a powerful act of psychological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political life which radically reversed the nation's ruling conception of its military problem¹¹

Concerned as well about a Soviet/Communist threat to outflank the West by fomenting instabilities in the "Third World," John Kennedy in his Inaugural Address verbalized American determination to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend or oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty."

The Kennedy and the early Johnson eras were perhaps a high point in the willingness of the public to employ or threaten the use of American military forces to support others in far distant lands. The experience in Vietnam eroded that willingness and laid the foundations for the Nixon and Weinberger Doctrines.

Shortly after becoming President, Richard Nixon effectively called back Kennedy's pledge to "pay any price" if it meant deploying military forces, particularly ground elements, to help defend others. When explicating his policy, he referred not only to material concerns, but to psychological ones as well: "To contribute our predominant contribution [to the defense of others] might not have been beyond our physical resources But it certainly would have exceeded our psychological resources."¹²

The Weinberger Doctrine did not appear until the end of 1984 when Caspar Weinberger, as Defense Secretary, took issue with Secretary of State George Schultz's willingness to advocate the use of force. With the ready assistance of military officers whose memories had been seared by the Vietnam experience, Weinberger crafted the following guidelines:

1) Do not commit combat forces overseas unless the engagement is deemed vital to our national interests or that of our allies.

11 Walter Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 366.

12 Richard Nixon, *US Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971*, p. 11.

2) If combat troops are committed, do so wholeheartedly, with the clear intention of winning.

3) We should have clearly defined political and military objectives.

4) We should know precisely how our forces can accomplish the mission, and the relationship between forces and objectives must be continually re-assessed.

5) There should be reasonable assurance of public support.

6) The commitment of combat forces abroad should be a last resort.¹³

A corollary to these principles, associated in particular with Colin Powell, is emphasis on the employment of overwhelming or clearly decisive force—as seen in Granada, Panama, and in the Gulf War—when the decision is made to use force.

The above developments provided the broadest context underlying the formulation of PDD-25. Among the more specific conditioning factors are the general ambivalence which American policymakers have had and continue to have about the United Nations.

AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS THE UN

The United States was solidly in the forefront of efforts to establish the League of Nations as well as the United Nations, but in both cases it drew back—so far back in the former instance that it never joined. Cold War East-West tensions and deadlock in the Security Council—ironically due to a veto power which the United States had itself advocated—convinced those responsible for foreign policy to put greater faith in collective defense than in collective security. The changed makeup of the UN as more developing countries entered also gave rise to North-South disagreements about the distribution of power in the UN and the priorities to be given to the “Third World’s” agenda. In the 1970s and ’80s in particular, Administration and Congressional spokesmen complained that the UN constituted an

¹³ Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Speech to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, November 28, 1984.

unfriendly environment and that its methods and processes should be significantly reformed.

Possibly because George Bush had served as US Ambassador to the UN, his Administration's criticism of the organization seemed more muted than that of President Reagan, but his spokesmen were no less insistent on the need for structural reform in the Secretariat and in various agencies. Not surprisingly, however, the aftermath of the Gulf War caused a turnaround in expressed confidence. Bush's August 1991 *National Security Strategy* document referred to a "new United Nations," that was "[n]ow...beginning to act as it was designed" and needed strengthening to meet its potential.¹⁴ His next and final *National Security Strategy* described the UN as a "central instrument for the prevention and resolution of conflicts and the preservation of peace," and stated that the US would pay its full dues and take "an active role in the full spectrum of UN peacekeeping and humanitarian relief planning and support."¹⁵ At the same time, Congressional and other critics of the UN receded into the background.

As for peacekeeping *per se*, all concerned had agreed during the Cold War that both superpowers should not participate except in a supporting role—such as providing lift or specialized equipment—or with a few individuals assigned to small operations such as UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) in the Middle East. Those restrictions were lifted as well after the Gulf War. In particular, President Bush responded to an internationally-felt need to deal with the starving in Somalia by undertaking the UNITAF (Unified Task Force) mission, but he did so in a typically American way; that is, it was a UN-sanctioned but not commanded operation involving large numbers of troops under American control with an exit date (which was not met, however) specified at the start. That date was January 20, 1993, the day President Clinton assumed office and the responsibility to direct American foreign policy.

14 *National Security of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991), p. 13.

15 *National Security of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 1993), p. 7.

CLINTON AND FOREIGN POLICY

In order to understand what led this particular President to issue PDD 25 as it finally appeared, one must understand that domestic policy is, far and away, Clinton's number one concern. His rise to the Presidency was through state government and gubernatorial ranks—and of a very small state at that. An imperfect but nevertheless telling indicator of his priorities are statements by his foreign policy team that they had gotten the President to dedicate one hour a week to the subject.¹⁶ A Democratic Party foreign policy scholar provided yet another way of putting it when he stated that the President's "top foreign policy priority is health care reform."¹⁷

Clinton's domestic focus matches the mood of the nation, which treats foreign policy as an irritant, as something which gets in the way of dealing with fundamental concerns about jobs, taxes, health care, crime and the like. One reporter has pointed out, e.g.:

Shortly after . . . Clinton took office he held a town meeting in Chillicothe, Ohio, during which an audience chosen by lottery asked him about everything . . . from health care to Hillary. But in the 90 minutes he did not get a single question on foreign policy . . . In all the town meetings [he] has held since . . . , you could count on one hand the number of unprompted foreign policy questions he has received from the public¹⁸

That the President is a devotee of domestic policy does not mean that he has no foreign policy views. When campaigning he was more hawkish than President Bush on air strikes in Bosnia, and he called for a UN rapid deployment force that "could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing attacks on civilians, providing humanitarian relief, and combatting terrorism and drug trafficking."¹⁹ In his Inaugural Address he spoke along the

16 See Albert R. Hunt, "There Is No Clinton Foreign Policy," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 21, 1994, p. 17.

17 Morton Kondracke, "UN Speech Aside, Clinton Foreign Policy Still Murky," *Roll Call*, September 30, 1993, [NEXIS].

18 Thomas L. Friedman, "There's Nothing Like Foreign Policy for Producing Ennui," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1993, Sec. 4, p. 3.

19 On Bosnia, see Michael Klare, "Know Them by Their Enemies: Clinton and Bush on Foreign Policy," *The Nation*, 255, 13 (October 26, 1992) [NEXIS], and Michael

same lines but on a higher plane: "When our vital interests are challenged, *or the will of the international community is defied*, we will act . . . with force if necessary." (Emphasis added.) No doubt with his approval, his Ambassador to the UN in June 1993, Madeleine Albright, advocated "assertive multilateralism" to help "failed societies . . . in the interests of their people and of international peace and security."²⁰

Within a few months, however, that sense of assertiveness had waned considerably as the President and his foreign policy team launched a concerted effort to lower expectations about peacekeeping in general and US ground participation in particular.²¹ A major event was the President's September 27, 1993, speech to the General Assembly where he advised that the UN would have to learn "to say 'No'," i.e., be more selective, when contemplating whether to use peacekeeping forces. In other words, though PDD 25 did not appear until early May, it had been well telegraphed ahead of time.

Why the transition from a policy of assertiveness to one of caution? What happened is not difficult to explain: a White House determined to push its domestic agenda fell prey to the recurring difficulties faced by the UN and its forces in Somalia and Bosnia and to sharp domestic disagreements over the assertiveness policy. Some disagreement came from the Pentagon. Faced with budget cuts and downsizing, military leaders feared having ground troops bogged down materially and morally in the midst of belligerents more eager to kill than to accommodate one another. Some in the military were also quite skeptical of the effectiveness of air strikes to influence the belligerents in any lasting way.²²

Cooper et al., "10 Key Decisions for the Next President," *US News and World Report*, 113, 15 (October 19, 1992) [NEXIS]. On a UN RDF, see Michael Kramer, "The Political Interest: Clinton's Foreign Policy Jujitsu," *Time*, March 30, 1992 [NEXIS].

20 Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations, and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC, June 24, 1993.

21 See, e.g., citations in note 8 dating from September 1993 onward plus Barton Gellmann, "US Reconsiders Putting GIs Under UN," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1993, p. 1; Anthony Lake, "The Limits of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, February 6, 1994, Op-Ed page. See also the following Reuters article which appeared after the promulgation of PDD 25: "Clinton Defends Limiting Commitments of US Troops Abroad," *Washington Post*, May 29, 1994, p. 15.

22 See William Pfaff, "The Civilians Overrule the Pentagon," *The Baltimore Sun*, April 14, 1994, p. 14; Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon Is Wary of Role in Bosnia," *The New*

More important, however, was the opposition from Congress and the sense that American public opinion fundamentally would not approve US involvement in costly missions with little prospect of quick and lasting success.

CONGRESS AND PEACEKEEPING

The relationship between Congress and the Executive Branch on peacekeeping is well-summarized in the 1994 *Report of the Working Group on Peacekeeping and US National Interest*, co-chaired by Senator Nancy Kassenbaum and Representative Lee Hamilton:

As the members of the United Nations have extended the scope of the world's organization peace operations, and the costs of American participation has risen, the role of UN peace operations in US policy has become a serious issue between the legislative and executive branches. If the two branches don't heal this division. . . , efforts to improve the UN's effectiveness in peace operations will be derailed by US domestic discord.²³

Very senior and influential legislators such as Senators Sam Nunn, Robert Byrd, and Robert Dole and Representatives Thomas Foley, Richard Gephardt, Lee Hamilton, Robert Michael, and Newt Gingrich have publicly advised—in some cases, quite critically—the White House on the need for caution and strict limits in committing ground troops.²⁴ Even “liberal internationalists” such as Senators Pell and Biden have weighed in; for example, the US has agreed to provide about 50% of the troops necessary to help implement a general agreement in Bosnia, but Senator Pell has been among those arguing

York Times, March 15, 1994, p. A1; and Elaine Sciolino, “US Military Split on Using Air power Against the Serbs,” *The New York Times*, April 29, 1994, p. A1.

²³ *Peacekeeping and the US National Interest: Report of the Working Group on Peacekeeping and US National Interest*, (Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 1994), p. 16.

²⁴ See, e.g., Paul Bedard and Bill Gertz, “Senators Seek Bosnia Resolution: Bipartisan Effort Urges Vote Authorizing Military Action,” *The Washington Post* (May 5, 1993); David B. Ottoway, “Hill Leaders Wary of Bosnia Plan,” *The Washington Post*, May 6, 1993; Clifford Krauss, “Many in Congress, Citing Vietnam, Oppose Attacks,” *The New York Times*, April 28, 1993, p. A10; Clifford Krauss, “White house Tries to Calm Congress,” *The New York Times*, October 6, 1993, p. A16; and Thomas Friedman, “Seeking a Balance: Calls for Pullout Grow in Congress after Losses in Mogadishu Raid,” *The New York Times*, October 6, 1993, p. 1.

that that percentage is far too high.²⁵ Congress also registered its lack of enthusiasm for peacekeeping by refusing in separate votes to rid the US of its arrearages in the UN peacekeeping account, to create of a special \$30 million fund that would have facilitated US participation in peacekeeping, or to build a command center at the UN and train foreign peacekeepers.²⁶

A number of factors underlie Congressional opposition. The Kasenbaum/Hamilton group report finds the disagreements on peacekeeping to be "symptomatic of larger problems—differing opinions between the executive and legislative branches on the relative importance for foreign and domestic needs and the direction of foreign policy in general, as well as specific doubts about the United Nations and its implications for US security."²⁷ On the latter, Congressmen have expressed fears of outsiders dictating US policy or commanding US troops in risky operations.²⁸ They also fear open-ended commitments not only when US troops are committed but also when they are not since the US assessment for peacekeeping calls for it to pay nearly one-third of the costs. As Senator Robert Byrd put it, "Where will these funds come from? We . . . should not cut domestic spending to pay for these foreign adventures."²⁹

His reference to domestic concerns brings to mind the telling observation of former House Speaker Thomas O'Neill that "All politics is local." At a national level, no organizations are more sensitive to public opinion than the Congress and the White House, and both seem to have concluded that the American public wants a very cautious and deliberate approach.³⁰

25 David Binder, "Senators Criticize Bosnia Aid Plan," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1993, p. A8.

26 "House Votes Against UN Peacekeeping Fund," *The Washington Times*, September 14, 1993, p. 4; David Rogers, "House Strips Pentagon Budget of Funds for Future Peacekeeping Operations," *The Wall Street Journal*, October 1, 1993, p. 4; Warren Strobel, "UN Peacekeeping Cries for Big Bucks," *The Washington Times*, March 10, 1994, p. 13; and Ann Devroy, "Clinton Signs New Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping," *The Washington Post*, May 6, 1994, p. A32.

27 *Peacekeeping and the US National Interest*, op. cit. at note 23, p. 16.

28 See, e.g., Daniel Williams, "Joining the Pantheon of American Misssteps," *The Washington Post*, March 26, 1994, p. 18; Robert Novak, "Blue Helmets for Americans," *The Washington Post*, April 25, 1994, p. 16; and Devroy, op. cit. in note 26, pp. A1 and A32.

29 Robert C. Byrd, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," *The New York Times*, August 19, 1993, p. 23.

30 See, e.g., *ibid.*, "War Powers Act Called Unlawful, But Not Apt to Go," *The*

PEACEKEEPING AND PUBLIC OPINION

A review of polling data—which, it must be admitted, fluctuate often and can be difficult to interpret—suggests several conclusions. The first is that most Americans are generally not very well-informed about foreign affairs. For example, an early 1994 *Times Mirror* poll indicated that only 13% of the respondents could “identify Boutros-Boutros Ghali” and only 28% could name the Serbs as “the ethnic group which had conquered much of Bosnia.”³¹ A second conclusion is that, if polling data are representative, then a majority or near majority generally approves of the UN, of UN peacekeeping, and of US participation in peacekeeping, including operations where force may have to be used for humanitarian purposes. A March 1994 *New York Times* poll of 1107 people indicated that 89% believed that it is somewhat or extremely important to cooperate with other countries through the United Nations, 63% believe the UN should send military troops to enforce peace plans in trouble spots, and 59% believe that the US has a responsibility to contribute military troops to such operations.³² These data are not inconsistent with those of a February 1994 University of Maryland poll of 700 people.³³ Eighty-one to 83% favored the idea of UN peacekeeping operations “in the event of large-scale atrocities” or “gross human rights violations” and 67% favored them “in a civil war when the combatants want help.” Forty-nine percent favored the US contributing troops “in most cases” and 42% “in exceptional cases that directly affect US interests.” An April poll by the same organization, again of 700 people, showed “66% favor[ed] contributing US troops to the existing UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia to deliver humanitarian aid and monitor safe havens,” and “56% favor[ed] sending a very large force of ground troops, including US troops, to occupy contested areas and forcibly stop ethnic cleansing.”³⁴ Interestingly enough, “63 % favor[ed] con-

Washington Times, May 4, 1993, p. 6; Hunt, *op. cit.* at note 16, p. 17; and “White House Criticized for Reliance on Polls,” *The Providence Journal-Bulletin*, April 14, 1994, p. A8.

31 Chart in *Time*, March 28, 1994, p. 22.

32 Survey data provided to the author by Edward Luck, President of the United Nations Association of the USA. See his “The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN Peace Operations,” in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming), Chapter 4.

33 Program on International Policy Studies, University of Maryland, News Release, February 18, 1994.

tributing US troops to a UN peacekeeping force of 8-10,000 to police the new agreement between the Bosnian government and the Croats . . . , though only 56% favor[ed] having Congress authorize the money for the US to pay its share of the costs" In addition, respondents exhibited "ambivalence about involvement in Bosnia" in that 59% did not wish to "risk a repeat of the same mess we got ourselves into in Somalia" and 41% accepted that the "US might get bogged down in another Vietnam."

Public ambivalence seems to be what many policymakers have keyed on. Noting that polling data supported the deployment of US troops to Bosnia, *The Wall Street Journal* went on to add that "Pentagon officials and NATO allies worry that public and Congressional support would crumble as soon as the US suffered any deaths."³⁵ Polling and anecdotal evidence give credence to these concerns. For example, after 18 US Rangers were killed in Mogadishu on October 3, 1993, a University of Maryland poll of 803 Americans showed that 28% favored immediate withdrawal, 43% favored withdrawal by 31 March (the date specified by the President), and only 27% favored staying until "we have stabilized the country, even if this takes longer than six months."³⁶ Even more important for US policy is what constituents tell their representatives. A flood of calls made to Senator Bill Bradley's office after the Ranger incident was "overwhelmingly in favor of withdrawing US forces" from Somalia.³⁷ Similarly, Senator John McCain's office received 402 calls in one day, with 400 favoring immediate withdrawal.³⁸

CONCLUSION

PDD 25 reflects a highly cautious and deliberate approach to UN and US involvement in peace operations. Long-rooted competing tendencies about the US's role in foreign policy and contentions about the

34 Program on International Policy Studies, University of Maryland, News Release, April 11, 1994.

35 "US Officials Fear That Public Backing for Bosnia Peacekeeping Is Tenuous," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 1994, p. 1.

36 As cited in David C. Morrison, "Vietnam Syndrome Survives," *The National Journal*, 25, 4, (October 30, 1993) [NEXIS].

37 Caption under photograph, *The New York Times*, October 7, 1993, p. A10.

38 Clifford Krauss, "White House Tries to Calm Congress," *The New York Times*, October 6, 1993, p. A16.

use of force are part of the explanatory context. They were evident not only in the differing views between power centers in Washington, but also over time in one power center, the White House. Clinton the new President was markedly more enthusiastic about the possibilities of peacekeeping than the later Clinton who, committed to his overriding domestic agenda, found himself beset by peacekeeping concerns including opposition from influential Congressmen.

At the end of the day, public opinion may be the most decisive. An Adamsian-like concern for improving domestically and avoiding foreign entanglements seems to run below the surface of an otherwise generally supportive public attitude toward the UN and peace operations. Sensing that concern, political leaders at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue seem unconvinced that the public would sustain support for operations which may be costly and long-term. It is now a cliché to say that Clinton's is a minimalist foreign policy in tune with a public which voted for him because he represented domestic change.³⁹ PDD 25 fits into that pattern.

39 See Thomas L. Friedman, "Theory vs. Practice: Clinton's Stated Foreign Policy Turns into More Modest 'Self-Containment,'" *The New York Times*, October 1, 1993, p. A2.