


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**NORTHEAST ASIAN CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES (CBS): FROM A REGIONAL
CONTEXT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRONTIER**

by

Edward A. Olsen

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
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
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
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NORTHEAST ASIAN CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMs): FROM A REGIONAL CONTEXT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL FRONTIER

The end of the US-USSR cold war transformed international relations. The organizing principles that shaped the post-Second World War period collapsed. Most of the world has adjusted, albeit fitfully, to the new circumstances. Compared to most regions of the world Northeast Asia's adjustment process has been more troubled. The prime reason for its difficulty is the continuation on the Korean peninsula of a relic of the cold war. The two Korean states remain entrenched in their own anachronistic theater of an ideological struggle which no longer preoccupies the global system.

As a consequence of this geopolitical throwback's persistence in the post-cold war era Northeast Asian tensions remain convoluted. As part of a larger global community the three states of the region - Japan, South Korea (the Republic of Korea [ROK]), and North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea [DPRK]) simultaneously must cope with new global trends and relics of the past.

This analysis shall address Northeast Asia's prospects for reconciling its outstanding problems. It will survey the context of Northeast Asia's divisive regional and bilateral issues, the Japanese and Korean contexts in

which they are perceived, and then focus on one particular aspect that might be an instrument for reducing regional tensions: the use of environmental confidence building measures (CBMs).*

* Although this study will refer to CBMs, it is important to point out that many analysts prefer "Confidence and Security Building Measures" (CSBMs).

I

Before assessing the nature and possible utility of environmental¹ CBMs, it is worthwhile setting the stage upon which they have emerged. There are two national categories of CBMs of importance in Northeast Asia: inter-Korean CBMs and Japan-Korea CBMs. The latter category is divided by Tokyo's need to deal with Seoul and Pyongyang. Non-national, functional CBMs also are important in Northeast Asia. All these regional CBMs have a long and turbulent history that shall be addressed shortly. Before doing so, however, it is important to clarify the present context in which today's CBMs exist. Throughout most of the cold war years Northeast Asia was notable for the dominance of certain sets of bilateral relations and by the absence of some bilateral relationships. Japan had bilateral ties with the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and South Korea. South Korea had bilateral ties with the United States and Japan. North Korea had bilateral ties with the Soviet Union and China. Absent were North Korea-Japan and North Korea-United States ties; South Korea-China and South Korea-USSR ties; and, of course, ROK-DPRK relations. The latter were not merely "absent;" the two Koreas were technically at war, modified by the 1953 truce that halted the active Korean war. Not until very late in the cold war, as conditions changed in China and the Soviet Union, and in their relations with the United States, was South Korea able to establish bilateral relations with Beijing and Moscow.

One consequence of this complex of bilateral connections was the lack of a multilateral security network comparable to either NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The US-Japan-ROK equivalent of a "network" was notable for the weakness of the Japan-ROK leg for a variety of reasons that shall be addressed below, and for its stress on the United States' role as a strategic nexus which exerted enormous influence on other diverse aspects of the region - economic, diplomatic, political, etc. Something similar existed in the DPRK-PRC-USSR equivalent of a "network" in which the Sino-Soviet adversaries alternately played off North Korea or were maneuvered around by the Kim Il-sung regime in Pyongyang.

Had the cold war not ended at a point when Asia's economic prominence in world affairs was growing in stature, the old awkward bilateral relationships might have persisted indefinitely. That was not to be, however, and Northeast Asia was compelled to adjust to global trends that were predisposed toward a reduced emphasis on unilateralism and bilateralism and a greater emphasis on multilateralism. These have been most evident in Asia from the perspective of those who perceived a shift in global power away from the Atlantic-centered economic powers and toward a Pacific Basin focus.² Not all observers have accepted the inevitability of a smooth transition. Samuel Huntington's suggestion that civilizations will clash more freely in the post-cold war period,³ if accurate, could prove calamitous for Asia because the "Confucian" and "Japanese" civilizations occupy such prominent positions.

Barring such divisive developments, the prevailing wisdom as of 1994 seems to be that multilateralism is in the ascendency. Not

surprisingly, South Koreans have been more vocal and enthusiastic advocates for multilateralist approaches than either Japanese or North Koreans. Although multilateralism seems to be intellectually appealing to many Japanese, their aspirations for greater parity with the United States in US-Japan bilateral relations are an inhibiting factor for both Tokyo and many Japanese researchers. In short, Japanese national pride and ambitions could be constrained by rampant strategic multilateralism. Japanese caution in this regard echoes the reluctance often displayed by U.S. officials in the past. The American shift toward greater enthusiasm for multilateralism reflects a greater awareness of US dependence upon interdependent global systems.⁴ Curiously, when it comes to multilateralism, North Koreans remain perversely close to the reluctant position formerly held by the United States and their posture is somewhat similar to contemporary Japanese caution. Pyongyang's stance is attributable to its *juche* (self-reliance) ideology and its deep-rooted concern with national sovereignty, both of which shall be explored below. Clearly, South Koreans are in the forefront in the region with regard to a commitment to strategic multilateralism.

There has been a surge in South Korean advocacy of various multilateralist options for Seoul. Several well thought through and innovative research analyses appeared in the wake of the end of the cold war by government-backed scholars.⁵ These analyses are in harmony with the thrust of the ROK government's foreign policy under President Kim Young-sam and Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo that is patently designed to cope with post-cold war pluralism and its uncertainties. President Kim outlined that policy in a speech on "A New Diplomacy" presented to the

Pacific Basin Economic Council, May 24, 1993, in Seoul.⁶ Foreign Minister Han elaborated on that policy before the Korean Council on Foreign Relations, May 31, 1993, in Seoul. The new policy's five themes are "globalism," "diversification," "multi-dimensionalism," "regional cooperation," and a "future orientation." Four of the five are openly predicated on greater multilateralism amongst South Korea's neighbors and in the world beyond.⁷

Of particular importance for the generic issue of Asian CBMs, the ROK's new emphasis on "diversification" and "multi-dimensionalism" closely parallels Japan's long-standing approach to its national security called "comprehensive security" (*sogo anzen hoshō*) which treats Japan's security in the broadest possible context that includes diverse non-military factors (mainly economic, diplomatic, political, and cultural).⁸

Over time Japan's security policy has evolved into a defacto model for South Korea, despite early denials that it existed.⁹ Seoul's preliminary caution in expounding such a policy reflected a fundamental factor in South Korea's foreign relations, namely its extreme caution with regard to being too closely identified with any Japanese-initiated developmental model. This concern stems from the entire Korean nation's bitterness and resentment over the harsh colonial experience under Imperial Japan's tenure on the peninsula from the turn of the century to the end of World War Two. Virtually all Koreans are hyper-sensitive to charges that they are following Japan's lead. South Koreans show extreme sensitivity to that accusation because North Koreans regularly denounce the ROK for being a puppet of American and Japanese "imperialist" interests.

This entire issue rankles because the parallels between South Korea's economic development from the Park Chung-hee era to the present and Japan's record from the Meiji era to today are vivid. As South Korea's security posture broadened to encompass the same sort of non-military factors regularly cited by Tokyo, it became increasingly awkward for Seoul to camouflage the similarities. This matter was complicated by the widespread recognition that Japan's comprehensive security doctrine was made possible by the perceived steadfastness of the US military commitment to Japan which permitted Tokyo the latitude to experiment with new approaches. Seoul never has been as confident as Tokyo about the reliability of the United States as its strategic benefactor, much less the notion that the ROK might become the kind of genuine partner that is proclaimed for Japan in the US-Japan alliance.

Against that background, South Korea's enthusiasm for multilateralism may seem hard to explain. On the most cautious level, in South Korea there continues to be reluctance to go too far out on the multilateralist limb. Seoul still routinely stresses the primacy of the US-ROK alliance as the foundation for its security and foreign policies. This, too, is in tandem with Tokyo's view of Japan's alliance with the United States. Furthermore, as South Koreans look to the future of a reunited Korea in an Asia likely to be characterized by a pluralistic balance of powers, there is a clear desire to hedge Korean bets by assuring that the unitary Korean nation-state will have sufficient ground, air, and naval forces to defend itself without external assistance and to become a viable partner in security relations with its three neighbors (China, Japan, and

Russia) and the United States. The latter reflects Korean aspirations to be at the center of future regional cooperation. These views are the essence of a major ROK presidential commission ("The Twenty-First Century Commission") that worked for five years and produced a five volume study of how a unified Korea should cope with events unfolding around it.⁹

Against that prudent set of contingency plans, however, South Korea has been far bolder than Japan and North Korea with regard to making multilateralist strategic overtures. While Japan experiments at the margins of Northeast Asian strategic multilateralism and focuses instead on expanding its existing, established, roles in Asia-wide fora (such as the Asian Development Bank and a variety of regional economic organizations such as the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation group, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Pacific Basin Economic Council, etc.) and North Korea attempts to create new bilateral ties with Japan and the United States, South Korea has taken the lead in trying to shape a viable Northeast Asian regional security subsystem that would be comparable to ongoing efforts in Southeast Asia and Europe.

The development of regional security arrangements by the ASEAN states in the post-cold war era is beyond the scope of this analysis, but the impact that process has had on Korea's efforts in Northeast Asia is of central concern. ASEAN regional security efforts experienced a watershed in a series of meetings in Brunei and Singapore from May-July 1993 that set the stage for an expanded dialogue and the creation of the Asian Regional Forum (ARF).¹⁰ Partly provoked by anxiety that North Korea might try to

participate in ASEAN meetings,¹¹ Seoul took the initiative in proposing the creation of a Korean peninsula-centered equivalent of a "mini-CSCE" for the Northeast Asian sub-region to parallel the ASEAN-PMC security dialogue.¹²

Although that idea initially received less attention than the ASEAN efforts, Seoul persevered. The plan to broaden South Korea's foreign and defense policy base toward a counterpart of Japan's comprehensive security appears to have had its roots in the ROK Foreign Ministry and among scholars who were interacting with their counterparts elsewhere in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating on the so-called "second track" level. Encouraged by post-cold war shifts in global relationships, and by US reactions to the new era, Seoul diversified its bureaucratic support network for this broader approach to security. This is most evident in public shifts by the ROK Ministry of Defense, acknowledging its revised "defense objectives" that include a mandate to "contribute to the security of the region and to world peace." The Ministry also was tasked with explaining its options vis-à-vis a Northeast Asian multilateral security organization.¹³ This was illustrated by ROK Defense Minister Rhee Byong-tae's Spring 1994 tour of Germany, Russia, and Japan under the banner of "new military diplomacy" as contrasted to what MOD sources described as its former "US-only policy."¹⁴ Although this also can be seen as part of a long-term ROK effort to undercut North Korea's ties to Russia and to strengthen ROK-Japan military-to-military relations, it has tremendous implications for Seoul's regional aspirations.

Those plans are still evolving and the precise nature of the prospective organization remains to be negotiated by the likely member states, but Seoul is in the forefront in pushing its agenda. Although the inaugural meeting of ASEAN's Regional Forum (ARF) in Bangkok, July 25-28, 1994, had many other topics on the table that received greater media attention, Seoul succeeded in accelerating discussion -- especially among the non-ASEAN dialogue partners (that include Japan, South Korea, and the United States) -- of the merits of what Seoul calls a subregional Northeast Asian Security Dialogue (NEASD) among the two Korean states, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States.¹⁵ In response to these South Korean moves, North Korea has expressed interest in also joining the ARF¹⁶ and may be trying to generate interest in a US-DPRK security relationship.¹⁷ While intriguing and an indication that North Korea eventually will have to play a role in any regional security arrangements if they are to be comprehensive, these moves by Pyongyang are overshadowed by the scope of Seoul's overtures. South Korea's policymaking toward Northeast Asian regional security structures clearly are setting the pace and must be followed closely by all concerned. The attention they have garnered is suggested by the access granted to the ROK as an observer at the December 1994 Budapest summit of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), an offer by a CSCE representative to assist Asian countries in the creation of a counterpart organization, and Japanese Defense Agency support for South Korea's plan.¹⁸ Seoul fully intends to try to apply whatever lessons may be learned from the CSCE experience to South Korea's efforts to foster the creation of a comparable organization in Northeast Asia.

Notes

¹ There are many analyses of Northeast Asian affairs which utilize the word "environment" in terms of a social scientist's milieu. Illustrative examples are: Cha Young-koo, "Strategic Environment of Northeast Asia," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1986, pp. 278-301; Park Sang-seek, "Security Environment in Northeast Asia and Challenges to the New Government of Korea," Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1988, pp. 5-28; Kihl Young-whan, Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1992, pp. 621-637; and Momoi Makoto, "The Emerging Strategic Environment and Prospects of Naval Arms Control in the Far East," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1989, pp. 59-76. For the sake of clarity this analysis shall avoid using the word "environment" in that sense and will only use it in the ecological and scientific sense.

² Two excellent examples of that shift in emphasis are: Norman D. Palmer, The New Regionalism and the Pacific (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991) and Mark Borthwick, Pacific Century, The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992). See also the shorter study by Kawasaki Tsuyoshi, "The Geo-Strategic Foundation of Peace and Prosperity in the Western Pacific Region," Working Paper No. 3, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, July 1994; which argues for the acceptance of a "concert of Asia."

³ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.

⁴ For balanced perspectives on this US shift toward multilateralism, see Patrick M. Cronin, "Pacific Rim Security: Beyond Bilateralism," Pacific Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1992, pp. 209-220; and his "Multilateral Security Approaches to Asia," Strategic Review, Spring 1992, pp. 66-68. See also James T.H. Tang, "Multilateralism in Northeast Asian Security: An Illusion or a Realistic Hope?" Working Paper No. 26, North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue: Research Programme, York University, Canada, April 1993. The author and David Winterford addressed the consequences of multilateralism for overall US policy in Northeast and Southeast Asia in "Asian Multilateralism: Implications for US Policy," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1994, pp. 9-40. For a succinct, contemporary Japanese assessment of recent trends, see Horimura Takehiko, "Aja taiheiyo no 'chiiki shugi'-saikin no doko," IIA Newsletter, (*Nippon kokusai mondai kenkyujo*/Japan Institute of International Affairs) May 1994, pp. 1-3.

⁵ See: Kil Jeong-woo, "Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula: In Search of a Multi-Dimensional Approach," The Korean Journal of National Unification, Vol. 1, 1992, pp. 45-62; Song Young-sun, "Prospects for a New Asia-Pacific Multilateral Security Arrangement," Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1993, pp. 185-206; Kim Kook-chin, "Peace and Security in Northeast Asia, A Plea for the Multilateral Regime in the Region," Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1993, pp. 96-110; Lee Seo-hang, "Multilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective," IFANS Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1993, pp. 1-13; and Park Hee-kwon, "Multilateral Security Cooperation," Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1993, pp. 251-266. See also Song Young-sun's paper, "The Architecture of Multilateral Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia: ROK's Perspectives," presented at the First Northeast Asia Defense Forum, Seoul, Korea,

November 3-5, 1993, co-sponsored by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo).

⁶ Text from the Presidential Secretariat, cited in Source Material section, Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 343-347.

⁷ Han Sung-joo, "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy: New Korea's Diplomacy Toward the World in the Future," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 227-245.

⁸ That doctrine is stated in Comprehensive National Security Study Group, Report on Comprehensive National Security (Tokyo: Prime Minister's Office, 1980). See also Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan's Concept of Comprehensive National Security (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1984).

⁹ The author evaluated that shift in its formative stages in an analysis that initially was controversial in South Korea because of its candor in pointing to parallels between Japan and the ROK: "Korean Security: Is Japan's 'Comprehensive Security' Model a Viable Alternative?" in Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter, Editors, The US-South Korean Alliance; Time for a Change (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992). For a clear explanation of the ways in which South Korea's new policies emulate what Japan's security policy includes, see Do Joon-ho, "Security Strategy for the 21st Century," Korea Focus, January-February 1994, pp. 106-108. (From Weekly Chosun, November 25, 1993).

¹⁰ That lengthy analysis by fifty of South Korea's leading experts in relevant issues is succinctly summarized in The Korea Herald, May 11, 1994, p. 2.

¹¹ That evolution is described more fully in Olsen and Winterford, op. cit.

¹² See the statements by ROK Assistant Foreign Minister for Policy Planning, Kwon Pyong-hyon reported by Yon hap, May 27, 1993.

¹³ The Korea Herald, May 25, 1993, p. 2.

¹⁴ The Korea Herald, March 11, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁵ The Korea Herald, May 7, 1994, p. 3.

¹⁶ Frank Ching, "Discussing Regional Security," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), May 12, 1994, p. 38, and FEER, July 28, 1994, pp. 22-23 and August 4, 1994, pp. 14-15; and The Korea Herald, May 26, 1994, p. 2, July 24, 1994, p. 2, and July 26, 1994, p. 1.

¹⁷ Reuters wire service report citing a report in The Australian, The Korea Herald, July 30, 1994, p. 2.

¹⁸ The Korea Herald, July 28, 1994, p. 1. See also K.A. Namkung, "Interdependence in Northeast Asia: The Role of North Korea in Regional Economic Integration," in Michael P. Bellows, Editor, Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), p. 145.

¹⁹ The Korea Herald, June 17, 1994, p. 2, August 17, 1994, p. 2, and August 31, 1994, p. 1.

II

Clearly this context in which Northeast Asian CBMs are conducted can have intrinsic importance, but it also helps to influence the context of both the national CBMs and the functional CBMs. Each shall be examined. Both clusters encompass military and non-military CBMs. Environmental CBMs are a sub-set of the non-military cluster and incorporate both national and functional attributes. Equally important environmental CBMs do not exist in a vacuum. They are a byproduct of a larger quest for means to reduce regional tensions and to solve problems. Therefore, it is worthwhile elaborating on the larger CBM process of which they are a part. Partly as a result of the lingering cold war milieu in Korea and partly as a result of residual cold war thinking among the other state actors, military CBMs loom largest in Asia as a whole and Northeast Asia as a sub-region. In contrast to Europe where arms control is perceived by many to have played a crucial role in ending the superpower cold war, the Asian arms control track record is relatively unimpressive. There are numerous reasons for these differences, primarily related to the nature of the alliance systems at work in each part of the world. Moreover, it is important to note that there are skeptics about the efficacy of arms control's role in the European theater of the former cold war.¹ Nonetheless, considerable scholarly attention has been paid to the desirability of pursuing arms control CBMs in the Asia-Pacific region.² Understandably, because of the similarities between

the North-South Korea situation and the former divisions in Europe, Koreans have paid more urgent attention to this topic than have Japanese.³

As Drs. Cha Young-koo and Choi Kang illustrate in an analysis, South Korean concerns over military CBMs are torn between recognition of the immediate threat posed by ground based North Korean conventional weapons and its nuclear option and an awareness that overall Asia-Pacific CBMs "should be more maritime-oriented than ground-oriented"... "given the maritime nature of the geographical setting."⁴ That sense of ambiguity in Korea reflects a larger problem with CBMs in the Asia-Pacific area, namely the problem associated with prioritization and feasibility.⁵ The entire region, but especially Northeast Asia, today is preoccupied by concern over the possible consequences of a North Korea nuclear weapons program. This contentious issue has aroused great interest and much analysis.⁶ This is not the place to assess that highly technical issue in any depth. What is important here is its likely impact on overall prospects for CBMs. There are two basic alternative views one may take in response to this issue. Either the North Korean nuclear question is so important that no other CBMs can compensate for resolving that core issue, or the nuclear question is so thorny and susceptible to disaster that it requires those who work on Korean issues to seek alternative means to reduce tensions. Pursuing either alternative to an extreme raises problems: unacceptable risks of a devastating war, on the one hand, and

unpalatable concessions that smack of appeasement, other the other hand.

Fortunately, neither extreme seems necessary. Various coercive pressures far short of armed conflict may suffice to force Pyongyang to conform to external pressures, although some harbor doubts they can be effective.⁷ Again, fortunately, there are a variety of negotiations-based options that can be used which recognize that one of the purposes of North Korea's nuclear option is to serve as diplomatic bargaining leverage in a high stakes game of inter-Korean brinkmanship.⁸ The final outcome of this negotiating process remains to be seen, of course, but the process itself underscores both the utility and characteristics of CBMs as an approach. In any CBM, all parties need to make enough concessions so that the results allow all to walk away from the process with a sense of achievement and a shared vision of progress. That mutual give and take process is precisely what is supposed to instill the confidence in a CBM.

While never an easy task, the Korean nuclear question is particularly nettlesome. Beyond the major issues of war and proliferation that are well known, there are a range of more subtle facets that spill over into other areas of CBMs and are thus worth outlining here. The international media have amply covered the dangers of a nuclear arms race between the two Koreas and Japan. That is a key element in US concerns over proliferation. Much less attention has been paid to other nuances of these three states' nuclear relationship. For example, Japan's growing accumulation of

plutonium has not produced nearly the Western acrimony focused on North Korea,⁹ yet it aroused profound suspicions of a double standard among both South and North Koreans. Pyongyang published a formal "White Paper" from its Foreign Ministry with many explicit accusations.¹⁰ To be sure, most external analysts do not take North Korea's views on this issue at face value.¹¹ Interestingly, some South Korean mainstream specialists who ordinarily do not sympathize with the Pyongyang regime do share suspicions of Japan and resentment of US and UN handling of the nuclear issue.

At the core of this shared Korean concern is an issue that complicates all other Northeast Asian potential CBMs -- nationalism. There is a multi-leveled feeling in South Korea that North Korea's possession of some nuclear capability might be acceptable. On the popular level, this shows up as "nuclear nationalism," a sense that the entire Korean nation would be better off vis-à-vis Japan if it were nuclear armed, and that the ROK would eventually inherit whatever the DPRK might possess once unification occurs, so South Koreans should not be so worried. That attitude may have helped sales of over two million copies of a novel, (The Roses of Sharon Have Bloomed) which describes both Koreas jointly producing nuclear weapons for use against Japan in the future when it attempts to invade Korea. These ideas and the novel's commercial success led to it being translated into Japanese.¹² It is difficult to determine how meaningful any of that popular sentiment is. On a more profound, intellectual level, it should be taken very seriously. Two examples will suffice. Prominent and respected South Korean researchers have

taken similar positions. Dr. Kim Tae-woo and Dr. Kim Min-seok (Senior Researchers at the Defense Ministry's Korea Institute for Defense Analysis) argued that the ROK's strategic prerogatives have been unduly limited by the US-ROK alliance, that Seoul has been "reduced to a spectator," and that South Korea should assert its "nuclear sovereignty" to determine for itself what is best for the Korean nation so that its technology-based security will be enhanced and it will remain a serious player in future multinational negotiations.¹³

Another prominent South Korean expert and well known commentator on the ROK military, Dr. Ji Man-won, observes that North Korean fear of infringement on the DPRK's sovereignty lies at the core of the nuclear problem, because Pyongyang cannot yield on an issue that defines its ideological essence. Dr. Ji also makes the link between nuclear sovereignty and major political-military CBMs, on the one hand, and generic sovereignty and smaller scale CBMs, on the other hand. The latter include a variety of non-military CBMs that are ordinarily seen as indirect ways to set the stage for political-military CBMs. Dr. Ji suggests that the two clusters of CBMs can only be carried out in tandem, and one cannot be considered effective incremental steps toward the other because of North Korean sovereignty concerns.¹⁴ This linkage is important to both military and non-military CBMs in the national and functional clusters. It may be a limiting factor for those seeking a resolution to contemporary nuclear problems, but it could be just as limiting for

other problems that might be amenable to the CBMs which are the focus of the remainder of this analysis.

Despite that cautionary note, which will be returned to in the conclusion, the magnitude, danger, and intractability of the nuclear question in Korea compels those who aspire to reduce Northeast Asian security tensions to pursue supplementary CBMs that might mitigate the most serious tensions. One prominent example also is in the military CBM category, but blends into environmental issues. This is the issue of naval arms control. Because so much of the Asia-Pacific region is maritime oriented, security in the area necessarily emphasizes naval issues. The same logic applies to economic and environmental issues. Maritime CBMs can encompass all three facets. CBMs at sea in the Asia-Pacific area suffer from the mixed legacy of the pre-war Washington Conferences that created systems designed to forestall war, but that are often seen as contributing factors en route to the Second World War. Moreover, in the postwar/cold war years, the United States' dominance at sea in the region was so great that Washington was understandably reluctant to sanction any experimentation with existing arrangements. This produced a tendency among US officials, but especially within the US Navy, to view proposals for explicit naval arms control and for ancillary maritime CBMs based on multilateral coalitions as policies that could inject unnecessary changes calculated to reduce US power in the Pacific.¹⁵ Many Asians understood this predisposition of the United States and were wary of stepping on American toes. One Japanese scholar, Izumi Hajime, was unusually explicit about the

broader implications of confronting the United States: "avoiding discussions of naval arms control is essential in obtaining support of the Pentagon for US involvement in a multilateral approach to security dialogue."¹⁶

Despite this past tendency, which remains strong in some quarters, there is intensified interest in the overall topic.¹⁷ More important for this analysis, there is growing extrapolation of these maritime security concerns to broader functional issues such as economic and environmental cooperation at sea.¹⁸ While that approach lends itself to many optimistic projections that shall be examined below, a cautionary note regarding maritime CBMs must be injected here. Nascent naval rivalry in Asia has been widely noted with regard to China, Japan, India and among the ASEAN states. Much less attention has been paid to the potentials for naval rivalry within the confines of Northeast Asia. Japan's naval prowess is widely accepted, based on a solid naval tradition and the effectiveness of Tokyo's contemporary Maritime Self-Defense Forces. Too often Korea seems to be a naval vacuum. This perception probably is warranted regarding North Korea, but it is not warranted vis-à-vis South Korea. There has been a concerted campaign within South Korea to generate support for the development of a serious naval capability for the ROK, making it capable of being a regional player at sea in cooperation with the United States and Japan, but also of holding its own against regional competitors.¹⁹ The ROK National Assembly has been supportive of those objectives.²⁰ Precisely where these efforts may lead is problematic, but one path

could take South Korea toward far greater naval cooperation with Japan.²¹ Yet another path might see Seoul guiding a united Korean navy of regional significance.²² Were either the ROK or a united Korean state to actually become a significant regional naval power comparable to Japan, then one also must face the prospect of circumstances between the two neighbors calling for some type of naval arms control between them.²³ These are clearly the sorts of conditions that today's advocates of both naval arms control and of non-military maritime CBMs hope to preempt through their policy recommendations.

Notes

¹ See, for example, Colin S. Gray "Arms Control Doesn't Control Arms," Orbis, Summer 1993, pp. 333-348.

² The best survey of that perceived need is Andrew Mack and Paul Keal, Editors, Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1988). See also UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, Disarmament, Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Asia (New York: United Nations, 1990), especially Mutiah Alagappa, "Confidence and Security-Building Measures in Northeast Asia," pp. 154-169; and Disarmament, Topical Papers & Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region (New York: United Nations, 1991).

³ For a survey of Japanese perceptions, see Asada Masahiko, "Confidence-Building Measures in East Asia: A Japanese Perspective," Asian Survey, May 1988, pp. 489-508. Solid illustrative examples of Korean research on this field are Ahn Byung-joon, "Arms Control and Confidence Building on the Korean Peninsula: A South Korean Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Summer 1993, pp. 117-139; Cha Young-koo and Choi Kang, "Land-Based Confidence-Building Measures in Northeast Asia: A South Korean Perspective," presented at the Conference on Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue, co-sponsored by the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation and the National Institute for Research Advancement, Tokyo, May 16-17, 1994; Heo Man-ho, "Confidence Building and Arms Control Negotiations in South-North High Level Talks: Issues and Prospects," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1993, pp. 69-95; Lee Seo-hang, "Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula: Current Situation and Future Prospects," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Vol. 23, 1992, pp. 71-86; and Park Tong-whan, "America's Role in Korean Arms Control: Some Policy Options in the New Triangular Relationship," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 5, 1993, pp. 119-133.

Although the South Koreans have been far more prolific, North Korea also has expressed some interest in the concept of CBMs, see the DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace paper on "Korean Perspective on Confidence and Security-Building" at the UN Regional Meeting on Confidence-Building Measures in the Asia-Pacific Region, Kathmandu, Nepal, January 29-31, 1990.

⁴ Cha and Choi, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Although the authors cite a Westerner's analysis in support of their observation (Mark Valencia, "Northeast Asian Perspectives on the Security Enhancing Value of CBMs," Disarmament: Confidence and Security Building Measures in Asia [New York: United Nations, 1990], pp. 12-13). This actually is circular evidence, since the latter analysis reflects realities in the Asia-Pacific region.

⁵ For a balanced assessment of that issue, see Norman P. Palmer, The New Regionalism in Asia and the Pacific (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991). For a sympathetic overview of that issue, see Michael Haas, The Asian Way to Peace: A Story of Regional Cooperation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989). A more pointed critique and careful assessment of likely CBM priorities is provided in Desmond Ball, "Tasks for Security Cooperation in Asia," in D. Ball, Richard L. Grant and Jusuf Wanandi, Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 18-35.

⁶ Among the more authoritative analyses of North Korea's nuclear prospects are Oh Kong-dan (Katie Oh), Background and Options for Nuclear Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula, Rand Note, 1992 (N-3475-USDP); North Korea Working Group, North Korea's Nuclear Program: Challenge and Opportunity for American Policy, Special Report, (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1994); Paik, Jin-hyun, "Nuclear Conundrum: Analysis and Assessment of Two Koreas' Policy Regarding the Nuclear Issue," IFANS Review, December 1993, pp. 1-25; and Takesada Hideshi, "North Korea: NPT Issues," paper presented at a conference co-sponsored by MITI and the American Enterprise Institute, Kyoto, April 1994. For a useful survey of North Korea's delivery system, see David Wright and Timur Kadyshev, "The North Korean Missile Program: How Advanced Is It?" Breakthroughs (MITDACS), Spring 1994, pp. 23-28.

⁷ For a hardline assessment of North Korea's nuclear threat, see Yosef Bodansky, "The North Korean Nuclear Arsenal is Deployed, Despite Face-Saving Agreements with the US," Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, July 31, 1994, pp. 7-10. For a succinct explanation of the sanction problems, see Alexander T. Lennon, "UN Sanctions Against North Korea Won't Work," The Christian Science Monitor, March 25, 1994, p. 23.

⁸ One of the more graphic manifestations of Pyongyang's gamesmanship during the prolonged nuclear crisis was a photo-montage blending a portrait of Kim Il-sung with a hand in the foreground holding up playing cards, one of which bore a nuclear power symbol, on the cover of the South Korean news-weekly Jugan Josun (Weekly Chosun), June 30, 1994.

⁹ For coverage of that stockpile and of political controversy in Japan about Tokyo's past plans to ensure it would have the capability to pursue a nuclear option if circumstances made it necessary, see The Christian Science Monitor.

May 11, 1994, pp. 1 & 18; June 22, 1994, p. 3; and August 2, 1994, p. 6; and The Korea Herald, August 2, 1994, p. 1.

¹⁰ Press Release No. 25, April 12, 1994, DPRK Permanent Mission to the UN summarizes that White Paper under the title, "Japan's Nuclear Armament Has Reached Danger Line." See also DPRK Press Release No. 30, May 16, 1994, "Nuclear Culprit Caught Red-Handed."

¹¹ Some Western analysts do ascribe greater credence to suspicions about Japanese (and South Korean) nuclear ambitions. See Eric Nadler, "North Korea's Nuclear Neighbors," The Nation, July 4, 1994, pp. 17-19. See also the charges by Greenpeace that the US has been supplying nuclear technology to Japan since 1978, in violation of non-proliferation agreements and the US Energy Department's admission that it is true, but that it will phase out these assignments, Hanguok Ilbo, September 10, 1994, p. 7C.

¹² The Korea Herald, June 12, 1994, p. 1. "The Roses of Sharon" in the title is a reference to Korea's national flower, *mugungwha* called the "rose of Sharon" in English.

¹³ Kim Tae-woo and Kim Min-seok, "The Nuclear Issue of the Korean Peninsula," Korea Focus, Vol. 1, No. 6, pp. 47-70, (translated from North Korean Studies, Fall 1993).

¹⁴ Interview with Dr. Ji Man-won, Seoul, June 29, 1994. Dr. Ji is a prominent author on Korean security issues whose writings have been influential in ROK defense circles. They include: Chil shipman kyung yung chae hangook gun uhdiro ka ya hana (Where are the 700,00 Korean military headed?) and Gun chook shi dae ui han gook gun uttuh kae talla chu ya hana (The Korean Military in an Arms Reduction Era: How Should It Change?).

¹⁵ Andrew Mack stresses this constraint. See Andrew Mack and Paul Keal, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁶ Izumi Hajime, "Japan's Role in the New Asia-Pacific Era," Korea and World Affairs, Fall 1993, p. 502.

¹⁷ Illustrative examples of post-cold war thinking about naval arms control in the region are: Andrew Mack, "Naval Arms Control and Confidence-Building for Northeast Asian Waters," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1993, pp. 135-164; Charles A. Meconis, "Naval Arms Control in the Asia-Pacific Region After the Cold War," paper presented at the ISA/West Regional Conference, October 29, 1993 (also in Ocean Yearbook 11 (International Ocean Institute, 1994); and Capt. Alexander S. Skaridov, RFN, CDR Daniel D. Thompson, USN, and LCDR Yang Zhiqun, PLA (N), Asian-Pacific Maritime Security: New Possibilities for Naval Cooperation? (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, February 1994). See also the personal views of a US Navy strategist: James J. Tritten, "A New Look at Naval Arms Control," Security Dialogue, September 1993, pp. 338-340.

¹⁸ Many substantive examples in these two areas will be cited below, but there are two interesting examples of naval security experts extending their horizons to new agendas. One is Charles A. Meconis, Proceedings of a Conference on "Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Maritime Security and Confidence Building Measures"

(Institute for Global Security Studies/University of Washington, School of Marine Affairs) Seattle, September 11-13, 1993, who, after outlining naval security CBMs, incorporated "to bring in the broader concern, one proposed CBM is more cooperation in the region on environmental security. Might there be some way to construct an environmental security regime?" p. 54. Another is Ji Guoxing (Director of the Asian-Pacific Department, Shanghai Institute for International Studies) whose study on naval cooperation, Maritime Security Mechanisms for the Asian-Pacific Region, (Stanford: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, February 1994), included an aside on "Maritime Non-Conventional Cooperation" that called for, *inter alia*, "agreements for handling...environmentally damaging activities, including marine pollution and the depletion of marine mammal stocks," p. 8.

¹⁹ See Kim Dal-choong, Editor, Hanguok gwa haeryag anbo (Korea and Maritime Strategy Security: Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, 1989), which includes the author's chapter "Ilbon hae ui anbo" (The Security of the Japan Sea); Kim Dal-choong and Cho Doug-woon, Editors, Korean Sea Power and the Pacific Era (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1990); and Lee Choon-kun, Editor, Sea Power and Korea in the 21st Century (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994). See also the author's Prospects for an Increased Naval Role for the Republic of Korea in Northeast Asian Security, Naval Postgraduate School Technical Report #56-89-007, 1989.

²⁰ The Korea Herald, October 14, 1993, p. 2.

²¹ Kim Hyun-ki, "The Possibility of Naval Cooperation Between Korea and Japan," in Lee Choon-kun, op. cit., pp. 179-199.

²² Kang Young-o, Tong il han gook ui hae gun jun ryak (Naval Strategy for a United Korea: Seoul: Yon Kyong Publishing Co., 1992).

²³ Few in Japan seem remotely concerned with that possibility. However, Japanese security specialists have considered naval arms control versus the Soviet Union in the past, and such ideas could presumably be recycled for use in Japan-Korea relations. See, for example, Momoi Makoto, "The Emerging Strategic Environment and Prospects of Naval Arms Control in the Far East," The Korea Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1989, pp. 59-76.

III

Although it is impossible to completely separate the military CBMs from the non-military functional CBMs or from the bilateral CBM contexts in the region, it is nonetheless useful to analytically divide them to provide a sense of historical context. Accordingly, the inter-Korean and Japan-Korea situations are worth assessing to provide further background for evaluating the non-military CBMs.

This is not the place to review the long and sometimes contentious history of Japan-Korea relations or the short and almost always fractious history of North-South Korean relations. Instead, the focus here shall be on major contemporary sources of bilateral frictions (other than the nuclear issue) and particular conditions that may facilitate CBMs. The roots of inter-Korean tension are well known. A divided nation as a result of the cold war, torn by a devastating war that remains unresolved, and strained by radically different developmental experiences, the two Koreas find themselves in the post-cold war period grossly out of step with global trends. This situation is exacerbated by the growing gap between the ROK's economic and political progress versus the DPRK's economic and political stagnation.

In contrast to South Korea's diplomatic creativity that has greatly improved its international standing since the mid-1980s by

deft manipulation of its Olympic agenda, followed by equally skillful adaptation to the unfolding post-cold war circumstances, North Korea generally has stumbled along. The only genuine skill Pyongyang has displayed has been with regard to its nuclear card. The Kim Il-sung regime was masterful in manipulating other countries' fears and getting them to deal with North Korea essentially on Pyongyang's terms.

On balance, however, South Korea today confronts a counterpart that has major domestic problems.¹ The two Koreas were in a real "horse race" into the early 1970s, but thereafter the ROK began to take the lead in ways that the DPRK was unable to surmount. Until the end of the cold war and the related development of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Pyongyang's two erstwhile allies, the Soviet Union and China, North Korea was able to conceal its most extreme problems. However, in retrospect there were signs that the DPRK was preparing to make adjustments to new circumstances, albeit reluctantly, such as the creation of its Institute of Peace and Disarmament in 1988.² While it also was designed to counter Seoul's Olympic diplomacy, it helped position North Korea to cope with the need to deal with an array of foreign problems and fora. That Institute became North Korea's main interface with the outside world that Kim Il-sung had tried to keep at arms length through his *juche* policy, underscoring the importance to North Korea of its sovereignty.

The end of the cold war was devastating to North Korea because it changed the rules of the game without any consultations with Pyongyang. New realities were thrust upon the North Koreans, ready or not. Clearly they were not prepared for such changes. The loss of the Soviet Union was a major setback to North Korea as was its inability to exert leverage over China in the latter's ideological competition with Moscow for Pyongyang's attention. Moreover, the PRC's strategic influence in the post-cold war era was markedly reduced, since it could no longer play the balancer in Eurasian geopolitics. Those strategic losses were more than matched by cumulative economic setbacks. While foreign trade was never supposed to be a crucial factor in North Korea's well being, in keeping with its *juche* philosophy, in reality it did matter at the margins. Consequently, serious declines in its foreign trade since 1989 onward have hurt North Korea's economy.³ By 1991 these economic reverses, after North Korea's third annual decline (7.6%), yielded an estimated GNP of \$21.1 billion which was far smaller than South Korea's \$294.5 billion. Its per capita GNP was only \$943 compared to South Korea's \$6,749.⁴ The latest data for North Korea show continued slippage to a GNP of \$20.5 billion in 1992 versus South Korea's \$328.7 billion. The per capita GNP figures for 1992 were \$904 for the North and \$7466 for the South.⁵ While data for 1993 are not yet available, they almost certainly will perpetuate the down trend. North Korea's experimentation with means to open up to larger markets will be examined in a later section, but so far they are not achieving much for the North Korean economy.

Hard evidence of how bad conditions might be in North Korea is difficult to obtain, but circumstantial evidence suggests serious deterioration. For example, observers have widely noted the food shortages which led to the slogan *doo ki mok jah* ("Let's eat two meals!").⁶ North Korea's own propaganda English-language newspaper clearly confirms the problems it is having: "The material and cultural standards of living of the Korean people have reached a high level. But their long-cherished desire to eat rice and meat soup regularly in a tile-roofed house, dressed in silks, has not come true."⁷ On a scholarly level, North Korean economists from its Social Sciences Institute and its *Juche* Sciences Institute also have indicated in public that their economy has serious problems.⁸

As a consequence of these economic problems, North Korea today is confronting the dilemma of how thoroughly it can permit reforms, probably modeled on the PRC's reforms, without losing control of the process and whether its domestic weaknesses are so serious that it could not effectively emulate Chinese-style reforms. Defectors from North Korea have confirmed domestic support for reform, but Seoul's Korea Development Institute has cautioned that reforms in North Korea could be very difficult even with the best of intentions.⁹ Nonetheless, all of North Korea's domestic problems make it simultaneously vulnerable to collapse and to overtures from abroad that might help sustain the society. The latter amount to a broad opportunity to pursue non-military CBMs. This is an opportunity that South Korea is availing itself of.

As part of its contemporary multilateralist campaign, South Korea is expanding its connections with diverse Third World countries. This is not a totally new effort since it has roots that extend back to President Chun Du-hwan's Third World foreign policy initiatives,¹⁰ but the new multilateral spin is in keeping with post-cold war pluralism and is not necessarily a zero-sum game with North Korea.¹¹ This puts South Korea in an excellent position to approach global "North-South" (i.e., "haves" vs. "have-nots") developmental and environmental issues from a perspective that can be harmonious with the positions taken by the DPRK as it identifies with the global "South." By this means the ROK is creating a milieu into which its overall foreign, defense, human rights,¹² economic assistance and environmental policies can be applied to its own sub-region of Asia in a consistent and impartial manner. Seoul thereby creates opportunities to cultivate CBMs aimed at both North Korea and Japan.

This broader, multilateral approach may prove more successful than past North-South Korean efforts at CBMs that were most notable for their propaganda value. Those exercises could be understood in their cold war context, but the post-cold war circumstances are radically different. South Korea's shift toward greater multilateralism demonstrates Seoul's appreciation for the new ground rules. North Korea's nuclear policies make some observers question whether Pyongyang really is ready to adjust peacefully to the new situation. While it is clearly possible that Pyongyang still envisions a military solution to its self-imposed mandate to unify the Korean nation

under its control, there are numerous signals that North Korea may be ready to adapt by responding to regional CBMs. The economic and environmental prospects for those CBMs shall be explored below. Before turning to a brief review of the context in which Japan-Korea CBMs must be conducted, it is useful to note a couple of relatively candid comments by North Korean representatives at a 1991 scholarly conference designed to explore areas in which a U.S.-DPRK dialogue might lead to CBMs. Dr. Suk Chang-sik (Korean Association of Social Scientists [KASS], DPRK), said, "the United States is the only super power remaining in the world" and, "everybody knows well that there is no match for the US armed forces."¹³ Dr. Suk reflects an unambiguous recognition of radically-changed circumstances for North Korea. A colleague of his, Dr. Kim Yong-son (KASS), underlined what remains central to North Korean attitudes toward CBMs: "It is a day-dream of a stupid person to ask the other side to show him a trust while the former keeps dagger in bosom. Only when he throws away the dagger which is a direct threat to life, the other side can fully trust him and trade with each other."(sic.)¹⁴ These thoughts have been reflected in North Korean policy adaptations to the post-cold war era. There is a relatively open admission that the world has changed around them and that the DPRK must adjust to the changes, but that it will adjust on its own terms in ways that do not endanger its survival.

Seoul appears to be incorporating that revised North Korean position within South Korea's multilateralist approach. This new overall flexibility and sophistication by the ROK permits it the

latitude to explore a greater array of CBMs toward the North within the context of the Northeast Asia region which they share on the Korean peninsula. Since they also share the region with Japan, it is necessary to examine Tokyo's relations with the two Koreas before evaluating in greater detail some specifics of regional non-military CBMs.

Japan-Korea relations date from murky antiquity. The ways in which Korea influenced the origins of Japan remain a source of controversy and exacerbate nationalist sensibilities in contemporary Japan and Korea.¹⁵ Over the centuries since, Japanese aggression against Korea during Hideyoshi's rule and its harsh 20th century colonialism with overtones of cultural genocide and repeated examples of economic exploitation, left a bitter legacy among the Koreans after they were liberated from Imperial Japan in August 1945. For the first twenty years of the postwar era, Japan had no formal relations with either Korean state. In 1965 Tokyo normalized relations with the ROK, but kept its distance from North Korea. This greatly complicated Japan's domestic situation because its large Korean minority is split in its loyalties between North and South Korea. Despite gradually improving relations with South Korea, especially in economic affairs, the 1970s, '80s, and '90s have witnessed many strains in Japan's relations with both Koreas. This is not the place to chronicle that complex history, but it is worthwhile outlining some of the facets of the relationships that bear on contemporary efforts to foster regional CBMs.

To start with a basic issue that provides the milieu for Japan's military and non-military (economic and environmental) CBMs, the three countries have major problems with names. The body of water that divides them is called *Nihon* [or *Nipon*] *kai* (Japan Sea) in Japanese, and *Dong hae* (East Sea) in Korean. There is little room for compromise so they have essentially agreed to disagree. Because most of the world refers to it as the Japan Sea, the Japanese tolerate what they consider the Koreans' eccentricity. For Koreans, however, what to call that water matters a great deal and they regularly seek proof that they are correct. The South Korean Navy publicized an Italian map from 1777 that labeled it *Mare di Corea* (Korean Sea). Shortly thereafter another map, made in the United States in 1835, also labeled it Sea of Korea. Such usage led to the ROK and DPRK jointly recommending to the Sixth UN Conference on the Standardization of Geographical Names that this label be adopted.¹⁶ Similarly South Korea took notice when a Russian government newspaper (*Rossiiskiy Vestnik*) for the first time contained a map of Korea that labeled the waters on its east the *Vostochnoye More* (East Sea) instead of *Yaponskoye More* (Japan Sea). Koreans also were pleased when the UN Environment Programme's Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP) meeting in Seoul in September 1994 advocated elimination of the name "Japan Sea" in favor of a more neutral term. Seoul also decided to boycott future international meetings that use the phrase "Sea of Japan."¹⁷ This semantic dispute may seem somewhat petty to outsiders, but it is quite serious to nationalists on both sides of the issue. So, too, are rival territorial claims over a small islet (*Tokto/Takeshima*) under ROK control. That

issue shall be addressed below in a section on ocean policy. One perverse consequence of these controversies is the inadvertent creation of a successful CBM between the two Koreas as they coalesced against Japan.

There have been several other contentious issues between Japan and South Korea. They include trade disputes, friction over Tokyo's policy toward a divided Korea and the prospect of unification, the most appropriate form of security relations, and the status of Koreans in Japan. Trade issues shall be addressed in the next section, dealing with economic cooperation as a non-military CBM. Suffice it to say that South Korea shares many of the complaints of other countries with regard to market access in Japan. More important for present purposes, these complaints are being raised and dealt with through regional economic cooperation measures.

Much less progress has been made vis-à-vis tensions over Japan's policies toward the two Koreas and their future as a divided nation. Although Japanese and South Koreans who are knowledgeable about the other country's policies can be relatively objective about these policies,¹⁸ the ebbs and flows of shifts in those policies often stir up new frictions. At the core of this problem is Japan's tendency to try to balance the two Koreas against each other, thereby causing anxiety in each, doubts about its willingness to welcome unification, fears of ulterior Japanese motives, and more problems among the Korean minority in Japan. Because Japan has had diplomatic relations with the ROK since 1965, Seoul tends to be

the most agitated by Tokyo's policies in this arena while Pyongyang seeks opportunities. Tokyo's strategy and the pressures it is under are complex.¹⁹

Tokyo's serious experimentation with a North Korean option started in the Ohira administration in 1980 and was partially influenced by negative popular reactions to the Park government in Seoul (especially its involvement in Kim Dae-jung's kidnapping from Japan) and to the seizure of power by Chun Du-hwan. Although sporadic contacts with the North were made, not much progress occurred because Japan seemed to be following a *defacto* "two Koreas" policy that alienated both of them. Nonetheless, North Korea sent periodic signals that it was open to Japanese initiatives. For example, in an interview in 1985 DPRK former Foreign Minister Ho Dam said, "we desire to establish good neighborly relations with Japan."²⁰ During 1986 Japan once more stepped up its overtures under Prime Minister Nakasone, but again little progress was made.²¹ Three years later, in 1989, the Takeshita government put new emphasis on improving Japan-DPRK ties.²² That government's collapse in May 1990 stalled the nascent dialogue. This process was revived, eventually bore some fruit, and by late 1990, Japan's ruling party -- the LDP -- sent a delegation to Pyongyang under Kanemaru Shin which created party-to-party ties and began the process of state-to-state normalization.²³ For better or worse, Tokyo was openly engaging in a bold diplomatic initiative designed to produce a political CBM that held promise of transforming the post-cold war face of Northeast Asia. Primarily because of its economic and

strategic liabilities in the new era, North Korea appeared to be anxious to enter into this new relationship with Japan.

South Korea was uneasy over these developments. Although Seoul had had past expressions of Japanese support for reduced inter-Korean tensions, an improved inter-Korean dialogue, and dual entry into the United Nations well before it occurred,²⁴ South Korea remained suspicious of Japan's purposes in 1990 and feared that Tokyo might play into Pyongyang's hand.²⁵ The United States also intervened with Tokyo on Seoul's behalf by demonstrating via sensitive data that North Korea's nuclear program endangered regional peace and that this was the wrong time to be making CBM overtures to Pyongyang.²⁶ These concerns and arguments caused Tokyo to back away from its North Korean CBMs and rethink what it was doing. With the nuclear question looming in the shadows, and plagued by both domestic political upheaval and uncertainty about the consistency of US policy toward North Korea, Japan has struggled to develop an appropriate policy. A major consequence of that struggle has been an uneven mixture of CBMs aimed at its South Korean neighbor and toward multilateral regionalism. The latter will be addressed in subsequent sections of this analysis, but the former constitutes the contemporary context of Japan-Korea relations. Tokyo's efforts to better coordinate its policies toward the Korean peninsula with Seoul so that they can be most helpful in reducing inter-Korean and regional tensions have received close attention from scholars²⁷ and each government, including the creation of a Korea-Japan Forum that was a result of an agreement between ROK

President Kim Young-sam and Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa at a November 1993 summit in Kyongju.²⁸ That Forum holds promise of being a major instrument for realizing bilateral CBMs and for enhancing regional CBMs.

Along these positive lines the reconsideration of Japan's regional policy also stimulated tentative efforts to foster closer military-to-military ties as another form of CBM. There is a long history of extraordinary caution in these matters that made it almost a taboo issue for much of the cold war period. Japanese feared entanglements, South Koreans feared Japan's ulterior motives, and North Koreans feared an "imperialist" plot. The post-cold war era's altered threat perceptions, the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and a new focus on North Korea, caused Tokyo to revise its thinking. Some Japanese long have wanted their country to recognize the dangers posed by North Korea.²⁹ The North Korean nuclear crisis tilted the balance in favor of a new focus. In an ambiguous comment on the situation Japan's Defense Agency head, Aichi Kazuo, said, "If managed well [it] is a wonderful opportunity...to expand Japan's role."³⁰ In due course Tokyo seized that opportunity and made North Korea a far greater focus of its annual defense white paper.³¹ In keeping with that move, Tokyo and Seoul had already achieved some progress toward military and naval cooperation, made easier by South Korea's diversified security posture already noted.³²

Behind the scenes some defense officials on each side had been thinking along those lines. For example, one of Japan's more

innovative military strategists, Col. Nakamura Yoshihisa (GSDF), suggested in 1987 that in a "global conventional war scenario, Hokkaido and South Korea would stand as gateposts, guarding the Pacific region. The implication of the gatepost analogy for South Korea is that the security of the Japan Sea should be emphasized in the defense strategy of South Korea."³³ On the other hand, in South Korea -- despite long-standing anxieties about Japanese strategic ambitions regarding Korea -- the Korean government was slow in creating a Japan-oriented section in the Defense Ministry's think tank, the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis (KIDA). That section began operation in 1990-91 and still only has a small staff of about six researchers. Nonetheless, it did produce an internal study on Japan's capabilities and intentions that presumably will be influential as the ROK and Japan develop closer security ties.³⁴ These steps, plus the cautious Japan-ROK agreement to cooperate more closely, are modest at most. Nonetheless, they arouse deep suspicions in North Korea that cloud the future.³⁵

The prospects for Japan-Korea cooperation in military and other matters are subject to both sides' plans and to the unanticipated. The latter, by definition, cannot be projected, but they are likely to be similar to Japan's being taken by surprise when Jimmy Carter nudged US policy in the direction of a renewed dialogue with the DPRK.³⁶ Another instance was the flap over intemperate remarks about Asians from a Japanese politician who said Koreans and others should be grateful for all the assistance Imperial Japan provided before the Second World War.³⁷ Unfortunately, these kinds of

episodes have occurred previously and probably will occur again. Even more unfortunate for the main category of CBM this study shall analyze, this case involved Japan's Minister for the Environment, Sakurai Shin.

In terms of creative proposals for the future, a number of Japanese have raised ideas that could be the basis of CBMs. Among Japanese specialists in Korean affairs suggestions have been made that Japan and other concerned countries put a positive spin on North Korea's insistence on its "independent" diplomacy,³⁸ and that Japan take an active role in creating a "Northeast Asia Nuclear Non-Proliferation Zone."³⁹ A Japanese military strategist advocated for Northeast Asia regional arms control supported by the Self-Defense Forces through "active pacifism."⁴⁰ These and other innovative measures that are likely to emerge as Japan asserts a more focused foreign policy in the coming years warrant considerable optimism that the foundation for Japan-Korea CBMs is being created.

As the two Koreas and Japan face the future, one issue threatens to cause problems even if the nuclear question and divided nation question are resolved -- the presence of a large minority of Koreans in Japan. That is a thorny issue with many ramifications that are far beyond the scope of this analysis.⁴¹ For present purposes the main problem is the way the divided loyalties of the Korean minority impedes prospects for a range of CBMs. The most visible facet of this is the role the pro-DPRK members of *Chosensoren* (*chosun chongryon* in Korean) play in helping to sustain the North Korean economy by

repatriating money from Pachinko bars that appear to escape normal taxation in Japan. These remittances may exceed North Korea's annual budget of 35 billion NK won.⁴² Clearly funds of that magnitude play some role in perpetuating the Pyongyang regime and probably contribute to its ability to sustain a nuclear option. In the same vein, a Japanese report suggests that a branch of the main pro-DPRK group, called the *Zainichi chosonjin kagaku gijutsu kyokai* (The Association for Science and Technology of Koreans in Japan), helps to transmit scientific and technological know-how to North Korea through its membership who work in Japan. Its intent is to build up North Korean capabilities in various fields, some of which are relevant to North Korea's nuclear option.⁴³

As a result of these activities in the midst of the nuclear tensions and consequent re-evaluation of Japan's policies toward Korea, Tokyo became wary of the impact of imposing cooperative economic sanctions as a coercive measure against Pyongyang. Japan was torn between alliance pressures, domestic pacifism, hopes for a more peaceful post-cold war form of Northeast Asian regionalism, and the disruptive potentials of the Korean minority, some of whom appear to be close to Kim Jong-il.⁴⁴ As of this writing, Tokyo remains strained by these competing influences. As important, the Japanese public often is irritated by the need to face these complications. A handful among that public have taken out their frustrations by attacking a visible segment of the pro-DPRK group -- young school girls who wear traditional Korean dresses.⁴⁵ Curiously, these attacks have caused both South and North Korea to protest the violence.⁴⁶

In a perverse way these events constitute another instrument for a *defacto* CBM between the two Koreas. It is also possible that the financial remittances to North Korea and the transfer of scientific and technological know-how from Japan to the DPRK, which now aggravate Japan-ROK relations (and are poorly received in the United States), may -- in time -- be interpreted as yet another perverse CBM. Since both help the North Korean economy, in a way they serve South Korea's interests in not allowing the DPRK economy to collapse precipitously and to raise its standards high enough so that the eventual reunification of the two Koreas will be a smoother process. On that admittedly optimistic note regarding the context for Japan-Korea CBMs, this is an appropriate juncture to shift to an evaluation of functional CBMs.

Notes

¹ There are numerous South Korean, Japanese, and Western critiques of the regime's domestic problems. North Koreans discount such criticisms on the basis of the authors' allegiances. It is important to note, therefore, that even some self-proclaimed leftists are equally critical of North Korea's problems. See Gavan McCormack, "Kim Country: Hard Times in North Korea," New Left Review, March/April 1993, pp. 21-48.

² Date is cited in Ahn Byung-joon, "Prospects for North Korean Relations with Countries with Regional Interests; North Korea's Foreign Relations After the Cold War," paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, November 20-21, 1992, Seoul, p. 11.

³ FEER, August 23, 1990, pp. 54-55 and May 30, 1991, pp. 38-40.

⁴ The Korea Herald, October 21, 1993, p. 8, citing ROK Ministry of Trade and Industry data.

⁵ The Korea Herald, June 11, 1994, p. 9, citing Bank of Korea data. For interpretive analysis of North Korea's domestic conditions, see Bradley K. Martin, "Intruding on the Hermit: Glimpses of North Korea," East-West Center Special Reports, No. 1, July 1993; and Lee Chong-shik, "The Political Economy of North Korea," NBR Analysis (Seattle), Vol. 5, No. 2, September 1994.

⁶ Nicholas D. Kristof, "North Korea is facing growing economic crisis," The Korea Herald, February 19, 1992, p. 1 and 5. See also Kato Masao, "*Shin koko na kita chosen no shoku ryo nan*," (Serious North Korean Food Difficulty), Gendai Koriya, (Modern Korea), February-March 1994, p. 34-37, and "*Keizai no hakkyoku ka to nirosen dairitsu*," (Economic collapse and a two-way stance), Gendai Koriya (Modern Korea), May 1994, pp. 12-13.

⁷ Pak Jong-gu, "Economic Strategy, Adjustment Period," Pyongyang Times, April 30, 1994, p. 4.

⁸ FBIS-EAS-90-197 (Foreign Broadcast Information System), October 11, 1990, pp. 17-22 contains lengthy references to the North Korean economists' papers presented in Osaka.

⁹ The Korea Herald, December 21, 1993, p. 2 and July 17, 1994, p. 8.

¹⁰ The author examined these developments in "The Evolution of the ROK's Foreign Policy," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1984, pp. 69-76.

¹¹ The Korea Herald, May 18, 1994, p. 2.

¹² Although beyond the scope of this study, it is interesting to note that the ROK is taking the lead in this area by proposing a UN-backed "human rights forum for the Asia-Pacific region." From a speech by Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo at a UN Workshop on human rights in Seoul, July 18, 1994. The Korea Herald, July 19, 1994, p. 2.

¹³ Suk Chang-sik, "On the Role of Scholars in the Improvement of DPRK-US Relations and Academic Exchange," paper presented at the "First Binational Conference" (US-DPRK), Center for Korean Studies, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, June 3, 1991, pp. 2 and 6.

¹⁴ Kim Yong-son, "Disarmament in the Korean Peninsula is a Precondition for Korea's Reunification and Peace in Asia and the World," presented at the "First Binational Conference," op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁵ Two illustrative publications that portray the evolution in ways that are anathema to hard-core Japanese nationalists who revere their supposedly divine origins, are: Jon Carter Covell and Alan Covell, Japan's Hidden History, (Seoul: Hollym International, 1984,) and Hong Won-tack, Paekche of Korea and the Origin of Yamato Japan, (Seoul: Kudara International, 1994).

¹⁶ The Korea Herald, September 8, 1992, p. 3 and September 20, 1992, p.3.

¹⁷ The Korea Herald, June 2, 1994, p. 2, September 10, 1994, p. 2, September 13, 1994, p. 2, September 24, 1994, p. 2; and Hanguok Ilbo, September 13, 1994, p. 20.

¹⁸ Two individual examples of prudent, balanced assessments are: Shin Kak-soo, "Japan's Regional Role in Asia; A Korean Perspective," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 276-297; and Takesada Hideshi, "Korean Reunification in the Post-Cold War Era: A Japanese Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1992, pp. 245-257; "Korean Unification: Impact on Security in Northeast Asia and the Pacific Rim - A Japanese View," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, Seoul, November 20-21, 1992; and "*Kankoku no nippon keikai ron*," (South Korea's Japan warning theory), Gendai Koriya (Modern Korea), August-September 1991, pp. 20-23, in which he is very candid about the low level of real interest in Japan about Korea. These

private views are nonetheless important because the former is a ROK Foreign Service Officer and the latter is a researcher for the Japan Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense Studies.

¹⁹ For a balanced explanation of them, see Okonogi Masao, "Japan's Diplomatic Negotiations with North Korea: Background and Future Prospects," in Lee Chae-jin and Sato Hideo, Editors, US-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management - The Case of Korea (Claremont: Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 111-124. Essentially the same piece also appeared as "Japan-North Korean Negotiations for Normalization: An Overview," Lee Man-woo and Richard W. Mansbach, Editors, The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula (Seoul: Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1993), pp. 195-215.

²⁰ Asahi Shimbun, May 14, 1985, p. 4.

²¹ The Korea Herald, January 14, 1986, p. 1, and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, January 30, 1986, p. 2.

²² Nihon Keizai Shimbun, March 5, 1989, p. 2.

²³ Japan Times (Weekly), July 30-August 5, 1990, pp. 1 and 3, and October 8-14, 1990, pp. 1 and 4; and The Christian Science Monitor, September 24, 1990, p. 6 and October 12, 1990, p. 4.

²⁴ The Korea Herald, September 11, 1984, p. 3, and May 23, 1987, p. 3.

²⁵ The Korea Herald, September 30, 1990, p. 1 and The Christian Science Monitor, November 30, 1990, p. 6. These suspicions persist in South Korea as suggested by a poll of South Korean and Japanese university students that found that 64.7% of South Korean students thought that Japan would pose a threat to Korea in the future, while 29.8% of Japanese students thought that Korea would become a threat to Japan. All the Korean students expressed some degree of hatred for Japan while 74.4% of Japanese students said they felt no hatred toward Korea. The Korea Herald, August 11, 1994, p. 3.

²⁶ For a Japanese expert's assessment of that process, see Sato Katsumi, "*Kaku sasatsu judaku kangei to iu nich-i-bei-kan no tosaku*," (Distortion of US-Japan-Korea that welcomes the acceptance of nuclear inspections), Shokun, April 1994, p. 123.

²⁷ Useful overviews are: Shin Kak-soo, "North Korea-Japan Normalization Talks: Where They Stand and Will be Headed," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Winter 1993, pp. 579-603, and a conference report, "*Hokuto ajia no heiwa to anzen hosho ni mukete; kita chosen jo sei to kakkoko no tai o*," (Toward Northeast Asian peace and security; the North Korean situation and various countries' attitudes) Tokyo: *Heiwa anzen hosho kenkyujo* (Research Institute for Peace and Security), July 1993.

²⁸ For coverage of Japan-ROK summitry and its results, see Lee Dong-kwan, "Will Korea-Japan Relations Ever Change to Open a 'New Era'?" Korea Focus, January-February, 1994, pp. 83-85; and The Korea Herald, March 27, 1994, p. 2.

²⁹ Perhaps the leading proponent of that perspective is a former pro-North Korea specialist in Korean affairs, Sato Katsumi, who switched his orientation to a critic and is the head of Japan's most prominent center for Korea-oriented research, the Modern Korea Institute. For representative analysis, see his, "North Korea and

its Japanese Pawns," Japan Echo, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1988, pp. 32-36; and "Jiminto wa tero kokka o shien suru no ka," (Will LDP support a terrorist nation?), Gendai koriya (Modern Korea), April 1991, pp. 20-25.

³⁰ Quoted in David P. Hamilton, "Pyongyang's Polemics Fire Military Debate in Japan," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, March 28, 1994, p. 1.

³¹ The Korea Herald, July 16, 1994, p. 1 and July 26, 1994, p. 4.

³² The Korea Herald, April 27, 1994, p. 3. For a forward-looking assessment of those relations, see Takesada Hideshi, "Japan as a Military Superpower: Implications for the Korean Peninsula" / "Japan's Defense Role: A Change in Defense Policy," Lee and Mansbach, op. cit., pp. 173-194. The first title is in the volume's contents; the second on the chapter heading.

³³ Nakamura Yoshihisa, "The New Perspective of Japanese Security Policy: Its Implication for South Korea," US-Korean Security Relations: New Challenges and Opportunities, Proceedings of the Third Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, November 29-December 2, 1987, Seoul, pp. 58-59.

³⁴ The author was informed of its existence during interviews at KIDA in June 1994. Evidently it was created in late 1993-early 1994. Presumably it is classified.

³⁵ See, for example, Song Chul, "Military tie-up - for what purpose?" Pyongyang Times, May 21, 1994, p. 6.

³⁶ For a sample of Japan's reaction, see Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 22, 1994, p. 8. For full background on the trip, see Jimmy Carter, Report of Our Trip to Korea, June 1994, The Carter Center, Atlanta.

³⁷ Hanguok Ilbo (US Edition), August 13, 1994, p. 1C. For related analyses, see Tanaka Akira and Sato Katsumi, "Shazai suru hodo warukunaru nikkkan kankei," (The more we apologize, the worse Japan-Korea relations become), Bungei Shunju, March 1992, pp. 134-142.

³⁸ Okonogi Masao, "The Korean Peninsula: The Revival of the Old Equilibrium and the Role of Japan," presented at East Asia Conference at Pusan National University, May 7, 1988, p. 22.

³⁹ Izumi Hajime, "Japan and the Korean Peninsula; An Idea of 'Northeast Asia Nuclear Non-Proliferation Zone,'" presented at the First Northeast Asia Defense Forum, Seoul, November 3-5, 1993, co-sponsored by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo).

⁴⁰ Col. Nakamura Yoshihisa (GSDF), "The Future of Japan's Defense Policy and Regional Arms Control: How to Cope with the North Korean Nuclear Arms Development," presented at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Washington, DC, March 29, 1994, pp. 16-19.

⁴¹ For a solid overview of the issue, see Kim Hong-nak, "The Korean Minority in Japan," Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1990, pp. 111-136.

⁴² See FEER, July 7, 1994, p. 20. See also Sato Katsumi, "Japan: Stop Funding Kim Il Sung," FEER, July 29, 1993, p. 23; and his Kita chosen "han" no kaku senryaku (The "Resentment" Bomb: North Korea's Nuclear Strategy) Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1993.

⁴³ Aso Soichiro, "Nippon ga sasaeru kitachosen no genpatsu keikaku," (North Korea's Atomic Plan that Japan Supports), Shokun, May 1990, pp. 84-87.

⁴⁴ The Korea Herald, June 11, 1994, p. 3, FEER, June 16, 1994, p. 16; and Hanguok Ilbo, July 13, 1994, p. 1.

⁴⁵ The Korea Herald, June 23, 1994, p. 5.

⁴⁶ The Korea Times, June 27, 1994, p. 2; and The Pyongyang Times, June 18, 1994, p. 2.

IV

Against this general background of Northeast Asian efforts to devise broader multilateralist approaches to outstanding issues and to create CBMs in state-to-state relations, and before moving on to an evaluation of environmental CBMs, it is worth expanding upon the non-military CBM milieu shaped via regional economic cooperation. In addition to its intrinsic importance, this topic broaches some of the spatial and substantive concerns (i.e., resources) that are central to regional environmental CBMs. Moreover, economic cooperation is far more advanced and may constitute a precedent for environmental CBMs.

Contemporary regional security specialists often treat economic cooperative CBMs as though they had invented the idea. That is far from the truth. Trade and security have had a symbiotic relationship throughout history. Peoples sometimes fight over economic interests, sometimes use economic interaction as the basis for mutual trust and, perhaps, alliances. There is nothing new about this kind of "CBM" except the jargon. In addition, the strength or weakness of a state almost always is dependent upon its economic viability. All these truisms apply to Asia where there is an enormous history of such interactions. Asian developmental slogans ranging from Meiji Japan's *fukoku kyohei* (rich country; strong army) to Kim Il-sung's *juche*, all reflect a recognition of that relationship.

Those basic interactions of international relations and economics have given rise to numerous regulatory schemes over the centuries to try to control frictions and induce harmony. This is not the place to offer even a brief history of the complex efforts to create an alphabet soup hodge-podge of international organizations intended to serve these purposes. Post-World War Two Asia has been part of the global effort to provide some sense of order in international trade and finance. It also has spawned several regional counterparts. For present purposes, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group are paramount. The most recent Uruguay Round (UR) of the GATT will, when fully ratified, move the world toward greater market opening and freer trade. The same promise is held out for APEC's future. Nonetheless, there is anxiety in Asia about the impact of the UR/GATT and about American motives.¹

In Northeast Asia all three countries harbor a mercantilist strain in their societies, but for varying reasons all three also are interested in significant change. For one of them, North Korea, the reasons are radically different and will be examined below. Japan and South Korea are part of the overall regional pattern of movement toward openness and cooperation. Tokyo² and Seoul³ have well-established positions and supporting bureaucracies that favor this trend. Both are strongly committed to moving into a post-cold war era economic world order that will require greater multilateral cooperation globally among nation-states, through bodies such as the United Nations,⁴ and regionally.

Although Japan and the ROK are trying to be steadfast in pursuit of those goals, there remain significant bilateral problems stemming from a nagging trade gap, complaints about market access, friction over the pace and quality of Japanese technology transfers to South Korea, and Japanese apprehensions about the ROK's ability to catch up with Japan.⁵ In recognition of these problems and in order to prepare for means to resolve their differences and create a more harmonious future, Tokyo and Seoul have engaged in a series of talks that constitute an ongoing bilateral CBM. As of mid-1994 the official forum for these talks was called the Korea-Japan New Initiative for Economic Partnership (NIEP).⁶ As important as these bilateral economic CBMs are, they could be only the foundation for a much larger regional economic entity.

Dr. Robert Scalapino coined the expression "natural economic territories" (NET) and included the Japan Sea/East Sea among them.⁷ There are a number of articulate advocates for carving out a distinct identity for this sub-region within the East Asian "economic miracle."⁸ These views should be kept in perspective. There has been a great deal of serious research on the issue of regional economic cooperation in overall Northeast Asia that tends to emphasize Japan, China, Russia, and South Korea.⁹ The latter has been particularly active as a proponent of the notion, although most observers concede that Japan is the natural leader of any such endeavors.¹⁰ The main problem for Japan in that regard is its well-known legacy from the pre-war Imperial era that still causes much resentment in Asia, precipitates anxiety over the prospect of a renewed "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere," and generates a corresponding reluctance to permit Japan to become the leader -- Japanese notions of

Japan leading a formation of flying geese notwithstanding. Less known, but also a cause of problems for Japan's potential leadership of an economic coalition is its legacy of economic and techno-nationalism.¹¹ On balance, however, it is highly probable that Japan is destined to lead any agenda for regional economic cooperation.¹²

Assuming Japan and South Korea can keep their bilateral economic frictions under control and not allow them to get in the way of larger regional economic cooperation,¹³ the main task for those two neighbors is to integrate North Korea into cooperative schemes that will then allow all of Korea and Japan to turn their joint attention to opportunities to interact with China and Russia. This task entails three issues: improving North-South Korean economic cooperation; enhancing Japan-North Korea economic cooperation; and furthering the only existing vehicle for cooperation between both of them -- namely the United Nation's Tumen River project. Each shall be examined here.

Inter-Korean economic cooperation is a core non-military CBM in Northeast Asia. Many observers perceive it as an ideal means to engender routine levels of trust on the part of each Korea in the other's reliability. Many experts have addressed the problems and opportunities inherent in that agenda.¹⁴ Contacts between North and South Korea over trade have a long, convoluted, and politically sensitive history. Because economic CBMs seem so logical to so many people, they repeatedly try to make them work. So far the main obstacle remains what it has been since Korea's division -- ideological and strategic roadblocks that get in the way of logic. Frustration over that impasse was high in the past among South Korean

business leaders who saw profits and patriotism converging nicely if given half a chance. Eventually the founder of one of South Korea's *chaebol* (conglomerates), Hyundai Corporation's Chung Ju-yung, was the first major figure to openly cut a significant economic deal with North Korea. Although it eventually foundered, it did help generate a degree of North-South mutual confidence.¹⁵ Relatively modest levels of trade persist, much of it routed through third countries. Its importance is both economic¹⁶ and symbolic.

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of these efforts to sustain North-South economic CBMs is that fact that they persisted, albeit fitfully, throughout the emergence of the crisis over North Korea's nuclear option in 1993-94. Despite Seoul's periodic announcements that trade was back in limbo,¹⁷ South Korean companies consistently demonstrated an interest in trade and investment in North Korea¹⁸ and regularly followed through to the best of their ability. Despite the political atmosphere of international tension over the nuclear issue, private South Korean firms were making plans for trade over the Chinese-North Korean border and for possible South Korean tourism to the DPRK.¹⁹ The ROK government encouraged South Korean companies to prepare for these opportunities so they could move quickly when political conditions permitted and suggested that those conditions would be achieved.²⁰ The fact that this was occurring during a period when many outsiders feared Korea was slipping toward war is an indication of how powerful the appeal of non-military CBMs is among Koreans. It should be noted that the North Koreans were showing comparable interest as the following section illustrates, but also through an interest in inter-Third World ("South-South") cooperation²¹ that could

be an instrument for ROK-DPRK cooperation. In more concrete terms it surprised many when a shipment of North Korean clothing arrived in Inchon, near the apex of the nuclear crisis, having been shipped directly from Nampo.²²

With some geopolitical luck, the prospects for North-South Korean economic CBMs could improve markedly. It is even possible that US firms operating in South Korea could discover the appeal which South Koreans discern in the DPRK despite the scorn that is commonly heaped on the North's ability to attract outside investment. Presumably the American Chamber of Commerce in Seoul has sound reasons to want to dispatch "a trade mission to visit Pyongyang."²³ Nonetheless, barring bumbling responses from North Korea (which actually is not a safe assumption), there are still some latent problems contained within North-South economic CBMs. The ROK has consistently stated that inter-Korean trade should be free, without tariffs, because that is the best way to cultivate these CBMs and because eventually this trade will become part of domestic trade among Koreans within one nation-state. Consequently, this trade is not perceived by Seoul as a matter subject to the GATT. This has caused problems with other countries which disagree with that interpretation.²⁴ In addition to the possible complication of GATT provisions, South Korean efforts to join the OECD by 1996 (that appears certain²⁵) could be confounded were a sudden forced merger to occur with a relatively backward North Korea; along the lines of the German solution. While that is highly problematical, there is little doubt about the difficulties North Korea is experiencing as it attempts to react to economic CBMs from the South and abroad.

Despite the DPRK's harsh image and the political reality that justifies that image, for some time North Korea has been awkwardly trying to adjust to the economic situation in a rapidly changing world. Knowledge of this effort to adapt by modifying its economic system clearly has reached audiences in the US-ROK network.²⁶ Those audiences can be forgiven, however, for feeling confused. Not only is Pyongyang sending mixed signals on the economic versus nuclear fronts, it also displays considerable ambivalence within its external economic policies. Furthermore, this is not new. North Korea has partially opened up previously. When energy and infrastructure problems caused the DPRK economy heartburn in the early 1980s it shifted gears toward a more open door-like policy and experimented with Yellow Sea off shore oil exploration contracts with foreign firms.²⁷ That phase passed by the mid-1980s as the DPRK experienced a bureaucratic shake-up and reverted to its more autonomous ways.²⁸

As noted earlier, the end of the cold war had severe repercussions for North Korea, costing it allies and trading partners in the "socialist" world. The 1990s have shown a consistent pattern of decline in North Korea's traditional foreign trade.²⁹ To compensate for the loss of that trade and the overall stagnation of its economy, Pyongyang has attempted to change directions again as the sources cited above noted. Its current version of an open door has been overshadowed by the nuclear controversy and plagued with uncertainties, but it does constitute a genuine economic CBM aimed at bilateral and multilateral contexts. This approach has been reflected in many statements from North Korean officials and by their actions in

certain specific endeavors. A few examples illustrate the spin they now put on *juche*. A DPRK economist explained, "Countries building and developing an independent economy...should import from other countries such things as are needed in a small quantity, are insufficient or cannot be produced by themselves"..."The building of an independent economy urgently demands the development of economic and technical cooperation between countries."³⁰ While that may represent a move toward something that seems to be thinly disguised mercantilism, it is a step toward a more open economy. The Deputy Director of the DPRK Institute of Disarmament and Peace, at a conference in support of the Tumen River project (which will be evaluated below), made a more sweeping observation about North Korea's economic openness: "It has been a consistent foreign economic policy for the Government of our country to develop economic relations and to further economic and technological cooperation and exchange with other countries, under the principle of initiative, equality, and mutual benefits."³¹

Such statements in public, the open admission that South Korea was ahead of the DPRK, and a candid quest for foreign economic partners made it clear that the DPRK was being compelled to try new approaches.³² The cornerstone of that approach is a cluster of free trade zones. The oldest are in the Tumen River delta area, at Rajin and Sonbong, and the established port of Chongjin to their south. They are part of the UN Development Programme's project there. Pyongyang places great hopes that they will successfully attract investors, including from Japan and South Korea. As such this represents a very concrete CBM.³³ Pyongyang also is reported to be ready to open the doors even wider by including the

ports of Nampo, Wonsan, and Sinuiju that are not in the remote Tumen area and would make more economic sense.³⁴ In keeping with those projects, Pyongyang has implemented a series of legal reforms aimed at reassuring outside investors that tax breaks, foreign exchange regulations, leasing of property, immigration procedures, and wholly-owned enterprises will be facilitated.³⁵ These, too, represent concrete CBMs. Overall, however, the track record of responses is not very upbeat. The best real world prospects for those CBMs appears to be on the northwestern border with China. That area already has cross-border trade, an ethnic Korean minority in China to facilitate contacts, and extensive PRC-ROK seaborne trade.³⁶ So it may have the critical mass to become a "natural" CBM. Therefore it would be logical for Pyongyang to claim it as a more formal CBM. Another live prospect for North Korea may be its relations with Taiwan. In the wake of the ROK's severing diplomatic relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing, Taiwan and North Korea gradually have developed closer ties that now may produce economic benefits for Pyongyang.³⁷

Beyond such bold, but relatively narrow, approaches to an open door, North Korea's prime economic CBM agenda entails enticing Japanese and US partners into its arena. Although for Korean nationalistic reasons, Pyongyang almost certainly prefers to pursue an American option, it has little choice other than making Japan its prime candidate, given its wealth and proximity. Nonetheless, Japan is a formidable challenge for the DPRK. Japanese have a long-standing appreciation of northern Korea's economic value since the Japanese Empire chose to make it the centerpiece of their Korean colony. During the

postwar years there has been an ongoing economic relationship between Japan and the DPRK. Mostly that was at the margins of the Japanese economy. Except for the annoying problems it stirred up amongst the Korean minority in Japan, that sort of trade was not of great concern to either Tokyo or Seoul. Gradually, however, the Japanese economic stake in North Korea inched upward. By the mid- to late-1980s quasi-official trade relations had emerged.³⁸ This trade probably helped create the precedent for Chongjin's current role as a free trade port because Japan and the PRC experimented with its use as a transshipment point.³⁹ These relations soon experienced problems with North Korea's inability to pay its debts. This put Japan-DPRK economic relations under a cloud that remains to this day and has hampered Japanese interests in the DPRK's free trade zones.⁴⁰

North Korea's ability to induce Japanese cooperation was handicapped by that issue. It was also troubled by intermittent controversies over sales of questionable products to North Korea that could have military use. Earlier examples were relatively low-tech, but more recent instances involved hi-tech dual use items that could facilitate the DPRK's missile development program.⁴¹ Against the background of US-ROK pressure on Japan to cooperate with them versus North Korea's nuclear position, such reports soured Tokyo's readiness to respond to North Korean economic CBMs. Criticism of North Korea as a terrorist enemy state was not helped by reports that Japanese radicals who defected to North Korea were now in business there.⁴² Furthermore, Tokyo has to keep one eye on Seoul's anxieties about Japan getting too cozy with North Korea in ways that undercut the US-ROK and US-Japan alliances.⁴³

Cumulatively these factors have hurt the short run prospects for Japan-DPRK CBMs. As of this writing Japanese exports to North Korea are in sharp decline.⁴⁴ Over the long run, however, the outlook may be considerably brighter -- depending on the status of the nuclear situation. North Korea has expressed interest in being allowed to join APEC, which is a great improvement over its earlier stumble when it extended support to Malaysia's proposal for an exclusionary East Asian Economic Group that would have left the United States on the outside looking in.⁴⁵ Given Japan's overall popular commitment to non-violent alternatives and its manifest interest in maximizing its economic position, the odds are strong that Tokyo will choose to see the case for Northeast Asian economic cooperation very much like an insightful ROK Foreign Ministry official (writing in his private capacity), "Economically, North Korea-Japan normalization will invigorate the subregional integration of Northeast Asia, which remains yet in a primitive stage, such as the Yellow Sea Rim Economic Zone, the Northwestern Pacific Rim Economic Zone (the Sea of Japan Economic Rim Zone in Japan), and the Tumen River Delta Economic Zone."⁴⁶

On that upbeat note, it is appropriate to conclude this section with a brief examination of the Tumen River project, a program that epitomizes regional multilateralism and the convergence of economic and environmental issues. It is conducted under the auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). It is important to note that UNDP activities in North Korea reach back to 1983 when a program began to help the DPRK upgrade its economy and supporting infrastructure. It also is

important that neither the United States nor South Korea objected to these activities.⁴⁷ When the time was propitious -- i.e., the cold war was over and the economic circumstances of China, Russia, and North Korea were conducive to cooperation on their common border at the Tumen River -- the idea of the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP) was born. This project has been the focus of a great deal of intellectual energy and institutional planning. Some solid scholarly analyses have been published,⁴⁸ as have journalistic analyses.⁴⁹ The project has spawned a series of conferences held in Ch'ang Ch'un (PRC), Ulan Bator, Pyongyang, Seoul, Beijing, Vladivostok, New York, and Helsinki that seem to have been quite productive in terms of getting the project off the drawing board.⁵⁰ Perhaps even more important, these conferences have provided platforms for policy and technical experts from both Koreas, China, Russia, Japan, and Mongolia to work closely together and achieve some tangible results. The UNDP's bureaucracy has produced numerous publications on the TRADP.⁵¹ Without impugning the merits of these studies and speeches, or the project's tendency to proliferate an alphabet soup of acronyms in addition to TRADP (the major ones are "TREZ" [Tumen River Economic Zone -- the core region where the river meets the East/Japan Sea], "TEDA" [Tumen Economic Development Area -- the hinterlands of TREZ], and "NEARDA" [North East Asia Regional Development Area -- all of Korea and Mongolia plus adjacent parts of China and Russia]), the program manager's more succinct assessments of TRADP best portray its accomplishments and the ways in which interactions with UNDP personnel and among the member states' representatives have helped to bring North Korea around to a more flexible position on economic cooperation.⁵²

It is clear that the Tumen Project has achieved considerable substance and momentum. Its promotional brochure aimed at attracting investors is as slick and persuasive as those used by South Koreans and Japanese in the past.⁵³ Moreover, it has a number of enthusiastic advocates, one of whom labeled it "the strategic center of Japan Sea rim."⁵⁴ Despite all this, there are reasons to be somewhat cautious about the TRADP. On the face of it, the Tumen River Project is a good idea politically. It is a way to bring together several states divided by the former cold war and other geopolitical tensions around a table to plan for the common good. It is an excellent political CBM for North and South Korea, China, Russia, and Mongolia which hopes to get a piece of the spill-over economic action. Even some Europeans are enthused about the plan's prospects for trans-continental access to the Sea of Japan. As the partial focus of these activities, Japan also benefits. By emphasizing the economic development of a strategically located backwater area where Korea, Russia, and China share a border, the Tumen Project has excellent political credentials. Economically its twenty year scope holds promise of helping to draw North Korea toward a market economy, narrowing the differences between the two Koreas as they try to foster unification, providing an additional transportation outlet for China and Mongolia on the Japan Sea, and reinforcing the Russian Far Eastern region's request for economic assistance. Moreover, there are some signs of Western corporate interest in the project and North Korea even has hopes that it will become a tourist attraction.⁵⁵ In these respects the Tumen Project promises to enhance regional stability.

On the other hand, there are reasons to question whether this is the best place to expend vast energies and sums of money. Although the initial funding for planning was only \$4.5 million, the long run media estimates of the cost run as high as \$30 billion.⁵⁶ It should be noted that Mr. John Whalen, from the Tumen Project, has derided such high-end guesstimates as "silly" and points out that its costs will be flexibly contained.⁵⁷ One can also question the project's wisdom based on the relatively minor status of the Tumen River estuary. This is not the Yangtze. While it possesses environmental value in terms of wetlands and endangered wildlife,⁵⁸ the 324-mile long Tumen is not much more than a large stream and is not navigable very far inland -- about thirty miles for light craft. As important, it does not connect to anything of great importance in the hinterland. Similarly, it does not provide ready access to the key coastal parts of China that are now poised to matter most in the coming years. Furthermore, while it would help Russia somewhat, it would not help as much as focusing on the Vladivostok area would. In this sense, it distracts from the Russian Far East's main agenda. This is especially accurate for those who visualize this form of access to the Japan Sea as a boon to Asian connections with Europe. Why create a trade center rivaling Vladivostok for that purpose? In short, the Tumen area was aptly characterized as "the back of the back of the beyond."⁵⁹ If the TRADP did not encompass these three national borders, not much significance would be ascribed to it.

Despite such questions, the TRADP flows along, building additional momentum. Part of its rationale is developmental economics, but its main driving force clearly is geopolitical. On balance and on the surface, it appears to be a worthwhile endeavor, but there are other future-oriented

reasons that warrant rethinking the value of the project. This is especially true with regard to Korea's future within Northeast Asia.

Since a major part (perhaps *the* major part) of its rationale is as a CBM for the two Koreas, one should bear in mind the long run purpose of inter-Korean CBMs -- namely a unified Korea. In that context the TRADP may have serious flaws. The reunification of Korea is estimated variously to cost somewhere in the range of \$200-500 billion. That is a stupendous amount of money for Korea to bear. The financial costs of unification might be still higher if the North Korean economy deteriorates even more prior to unification. One should compare those cost estimates to Germany's unification costs of about \$800 billion to \$1.25 trillion over ten years. Factoring in the relative populations and GNPs of the two nations, this means the future impact on South Korea could be as much as twenty times as great as that on the former West Germany.⁶⁰ Therefore, one must ask whether a unifying Korea will be able to sustain the Tumen Project's costs (whether they are high or not) along with the other costs of unification? Would not a unifying Korea, in the wake of its cold war, be better served by allocating the funds designated for the TRADP to the larger Korean developmental cause? Clearly this could include other regional non-military CBMs such as those that deal with environmental issues. This question of appropriate trade-offs and what priorities should be set is crucial for Korea and those states that might be expected to subsidize Korean unification.

Beyond that genuine concern, one must ask why a future unified Korean state would want to see so much effort and money devoted to an

economic development zone overlapping the territories of its two northern neighbors? Would that degree of planned interdependence with China and Russia really be compatible with the post-unification national interests of the Korean nation? Perhaps it would be, based on the regional stability interdependence might produce. However, one could also make a case that Korea's history suggests otherwise, and that a unified Korea might fear undue dependence on China and/or Russia more than it would value interdependence. A hint of such sentiments came in 1992 when North Korea displayed reluctance to have its TRADP economic zone integrated with those of China and Russia.⁶¹

Against the background of these questions it is important to recognize that the Tumen Project's real value as a CBM is contingent on the quasi-cold war context that still envelopes the Korean peninsula in a Northeast Asian context. As long as North Korea exists as a state which is seen by South Korea and the United States as a threat to their shared interests, and by extension to the interests of Japan, the threat of war perpetuates a need to diffuse tensions by persuading Pyongyang to become engaged amicably with its neighbors. If one removes that variable from ones calculations through peaceful unification, however, the Tumen project may quickly become much less viable.

There is an inherent dilemma in this situation. As long as inter-Korean tension persists, the TRADP should be -- and probably will be -- pursued. If this and other CBMs really succeed, and Korea reunifies, then the project may not be able to be carried forward financially and it may no longer make as much economic and political sense to the Koreans.

Therefore, it is worth contemplating whether the TRADP can be planned in CBM phases that could be shed when necessary without creating circumstances suggesting that previously spent moneys had been wasted. Perhaps it would even make sense to keep the Tumen Project largely in the planning stages indefinitely so that its political utility as a CBM could be utilized but the contingencies facing the Koreans after they end their version of the cold war also could be taken into account.

All the parties engaged in the Tumen Project should be cautious. In particular, Koreans on both halves of the peninsula should try to perceive the TRADP from the vantage point of the single nation which they are ethnically and want to be politically. Do Koreans really want to use the Tumen Project to reduce their tensions, only to produce results that could vastly complicate their lives after inter-Korean tensions are resolved? This aspect of the TRADP has major relevance for the cluster of environmental non-military CBMs in Northeast Asia that possess many of these dualistic attributes.

Notes

¹ FEER, April 28, 1994, pp. 64-71, and May 12, 1994, p. 72; and The Korea Herald, July 19, 1994, p. 8.

² Japan obviously is a major player in this trend and belongs to many guiding organizations. Representative informational literature on them include: IODC, Tokyo, Japan Overseas Development Corp., update 1993, and Japan International Cooperation Agency, Annual Report, 1993.

³ South Korea's stance is less well-known, but a concise overview was provided by the former ROK Economic Planning Board Minister, Cho Soon, to the United Nation's "World Hearing on the Agenda for Development" that met June 6-10, 1994. A summary of his remarks on "Globalization: Its Impact and Required Action" are in The Korea Herald, June 25, 1994, p. 6.

⁴ For examples of the United Nation's agenda in their region, see: Seiji Naya and Stephen Browne, Editors, Developmental Challenges in Asia and the Pacific in the 1990s (Honolulu: United Nations Development Programme and the East-West Center, 1991).

⁵ These are widely covered in the media. For a cross-section of that coverage, see: The Korea Herald, October 14, 1993, p. 8; The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, November 15, 1993, p. 2B; and The Korea Times, June 29, 1994, p. 8.

⁶ The Korea Herald, August 10, 1993, p. 8 and April 21, 1994, p. 2.

⁷ Robert Scalapino, "Historical Perceptions and Current Realities Regarding Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation," North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, Working Paper No. 20, York University, October 1992.

⁸ One is the Honolulu-based Northeast Asia Economic Forum (NEAEF), chaired by Cho Lee-jay that has sponsored conferences on the topic in China, the Russian Far East, and in North Korea. It has published an informative Newsletter since the Summer of 1992. Two others are the Niigata-based *Kan nippon kai keizai kenkyujo* (Japan Sea Rim Economic Research Institute), that uses the English name Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA) and the Tokyo-based Japan Economic Research Center (JERC), both headed by Kanamori Hisao. See the bilingual brochure published by ERINA, undated, received from Ms. Shiga Junko, Research Division, August 31, 1994. In addition to some of the other references to Dr. Kanamori cited below, see his overview, "The Future Potential of the Japan Sea Rim Economic Region," in Akaha Tsuneo, Editor, Conference Report, US-Japan Cooperation and the Development of Siberia and the Russian Far East, Center for East Asian Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, October 1993, p. 2. See also Ogawa Kazuo and Komaki Teruo, *Kan nippon kai keizaiken; Hokuto ajia, shiberia jidai no makuake* (Japan Sea Rim Economic Zone; Northeast Asia, Siberia Curtain-Opening; Tokyo: *Nihon keizai shimbunsha*, 1991).

⁹ Some recent examples are: Lu Zhongwei, "Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era," Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, Policy Paper No. 6, October 1993, University of California, San Diego; Kim Dong-kun, "Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation: Its Possibility, Problem, and Modality," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Autumn 1993, pp. 309-318; Kim Kyu-ryoon, "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Role of Korea," The Korean Journal of National Unification, Special Edition 1993, pp. 167-177; Chung Won-shik, "Toward a Sharing Community: Multilateral Economic Cooperation Prospects in Northeast Asia," Northeast Asia Economic Forum Newsletter, Fall 1993, pp. 2-6; Cho Young-kyun, "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia and its Security Implications," Evolving Multilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia, Seoul: Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, 1994, pp. 47-62; Hoshino Shunya, "*JIIA-Ajia kyokai kyodo purojyekuto 'Hokuto Ajia ni okeru kokusai kyoryoku no tenbo' kaiji*" (JIIA-Asia Association Joint Project "Prospects of International Cooperation in Northeast Asia"), JIIA Newsletter, March 1994, pp. 3-4; and Whang In-joung, "Prospects of Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century," Korea Focus, July-August 1994, pp. 77-86.

¹⁰ South Korea's former president was not among those willing to concede that point. He gave several speeches that argued for the ROK playing that role. See Roh Tae-woo, Korea in the Pacific Century: Selected Speeches, 1990-1992 (Lanham: University Press of America, 1992), Section VI ("Korea as Leader in the Asia-Pacific Region"), pp. 227-264.

¹¹ For a very thorough study of those problems, see Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan" (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1994), especially pp. 33-78 on the ideology behind technonationalism.

¹² For a convincing argument for that case and some insights into how it may occur, see Kanamori Hisao, "The East Asian Economic Zone and the Role of Japan," Northeast Asian Economic Forum Newsletter, Spring 1993, pp. 2-5. See, also, Carl J. Green, "Japan's Growing Leadership in Global Development," SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1994, pp. 101-118.

¹³ For useful assessments of these efforts to manage tensions, see: Nozoe Shinichi, "The Economies in the Korean Peninsula," presented at the Seventh International Conference of the National Institute of Defense Studies (Tokyo), November, 1991; Sato Hideo, "The Management of Korean Conflicts by Japan and the United States," in Lee Chae-jin and Sato Hideo, US-Japan Partnership in Conflict Management - The Case of Korea (Claremont: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 35-55; and Kim Dal-choong and Kim Eui-soon, Editors, Energy Policies in Korea and Japan: Comparison and Search for Cooperation (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1986).

¹⁴ For some solid examples, see Kim Cae-one, "A Proposal for Inter-Korean Economic Integration and Reunification: With Special Reference to the German Case," The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Summer/Fall 1992, pp. 350-372; Joseph S. Chung, "Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and Integration: The Process, Form, and Prospects" in Jay Speakman and Lee Chae-jin, Editors, The Prospects for Korean Unification (Claremont: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 31-58; Yeon Ha-cheong, "Inter-Korean Economic Relations - Possible Directions," Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1993, pp. 693-716; Lee Hy-sang, "Economic Factors in Korean Reunification," in Kihl Young-whan, Korea and the World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 189-215; and Nicholas Eberstadt, "North-South Economic Cooperation: Rapprochement Through Trade?" presented at RAND-Korea Society Conference on Restarting the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula, Santa Monica, May 26, 1994.

¹⁵ FEER, February 16, 1989, p. 43, and FBIS-EAS-90-096, May 17, 1990, p. 15.

¹⁶ Trade in the first seven months of 1994 (a time of serious tension over the nuclear problem) was \$113 million compared to \$112 million in the same period of 1993, an increase of 0.5 percent. The Korea Herald, August 13, 1994, p. 8.

¹⁷ See, for example, The Korea Herald, March 22, 1994, p. 8 and August 21, 1994, p. 2.

¹⁸ The Korea Herald, February 25, 1994, p. 8; March 2, 1994, p. 8; August 14, 1994, p. 6; August 16, 1994, p. 8, and August 19, 1994, p. 8, and September 28, 1994, p. 8; and FEER, August 4, 1994, p. 50.

¹⁹ The Korea Herald, March 25, 1994, p. 8, and May 20, 1994, p. W4.

²⁰ The Korea Herald, July 6, 1994, p. 8 and July 7, 1994, p. 2.

²¹ The Pyongyang Times, May 7, 1994, p. 8.

²² The Korea Herald, July 21, 1994, p. 8.

²³ The Korea Herald, August 12, 1994, p. 9, August 18, 1994, p. 8, and September 16, 1994, p. 1. For additional optimism regarding the economic opportunities in the

North, see: Korea Countdown, September 1993, No. 1 (a newsletter "preparing business for developments on the Korean peninsula" which does not view North Korea as devoid of opportunities) and Susan V. Lawrence, "Bullish on Pyongyang," US News and World Report, February 21, 1994, pp. 49-51 that, *inter alia*, says "The North Koreans are savy capitalists."

²⁴ The Korea Herald, February 19, 1993, p. 8 and July 8, 1994, p. 2.

²⁵ FEER, June 16, 1994, p. 62.

²⁶ For a thorough analysis in forums where they are difficult to miss, see: Oh Kong-dan, "North Korea's Response to the World: The Door is Ajar," Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, November 15-18, 1989; K.A. Namkung, "Interdependence in Northeast Asia: The Role of North Korea in Regional Economic Integration," Proceedings of the 1994 National Defense University's Pacific Symposium - Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994), pp. 133-146; Gary Klintworth, "Pyongyang Perestroika," FEER, July 12, 1990, p. 21, and "Pyongyang's Scheme for Special Economic Zones," Vantage Point, November 1991, pp. 18-21.

²⁷ The Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 1981, p. 11, and Asahi Evening News, September 14, 1984, p. 5; and the Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, October 15, 1984, pp. 2 and 20.

²⁸ FEER, March 5, 1987, pp. 66-67.

²⁹ The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, September 23, 1991, p. 11; and The Korea Herald, June 16, 1992, p. 2; July 8, 1994, p. 7; and July 23, 1994, p. 8.

³⁰ "Professor and Dr. Hong Sung Om" (sic), in his Economic Development in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1990), p. 11.

³¹ Oh Chang-rim, "The Prospects for the Security and Economic and Technological Cooperation on the Korean Peninsula," Proceedings of a Conference on the Economic Development and Security of the Northwest Pacific Region, co-sponsored by the Institute of Global Concern (PRC) and Georgia Institute of Technology, Beijing, March 23-25, 1992, p. 44.

³² FEER, August 15, 1991, p. 9; and The Korea Herald, April 23, 1992, p. 9 and May 10, 1992, p. 1.

³³ For coverage of the trade and CBM value of that endeavor, see the summary of the April 28-May 4, 1992, NEAFF-sponsored conference on the Tumen area, in "The Pyongyang International Conference and Field Trip," Northeast Asia Economic Forum Newsletter, Summer/Fall 1992, p. 10; FEER, September 30, 1993, p. 72 and March 3, 1994, p. 46; and The Korea Herald, July 28, 1991, p. 1; February 23, 1994, p. 2; and August 5, 1994, p. 2.

³⁴ The Korea Herald, March 18, 1994, p. 8; July 24, 1994, p. 9; and July 27, 1994, p. 2.

³⁵ The Pyongyang Times, July 2, 1994, p. 6 and August 27, 1994, p. 6; and The Korea Herald, August 30, 1992, p. 2; October 21, 1992, p. 1; February 7, 1993, p. 1; September 4, 1993, p. 2; November 18, 1993, p. 2; May 28, 1994, p. 2; and August 21, 1994, p. 8.

³⁶ US News and World Report, February 21, 1994, pp. 49-51; and The Korea Herald, August 3, 1993, p. 8.

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- ³⁷ The Korea Herald, August 21, 1992, p. 2; and May 19, 1994, p. 9; and FEER, July 21, 1994, p. 12.
- ³⁸ FBIS, IV, June 10, 1981, p. C5; July 11, 1983, p. C2-3; and October 30, 1986, p. C2; and The Korea Herald, June 14, 1985, p. 1.
- ³⁹ FBIS, IV, November 23, 1982, p. C1.
- ⁴⁰ FEER, October 23, 1986, p. 151; and July 14, 1988, p. 81; Nihon keizai shimbun, September 8, 1989, p. 10; and The Korea Herald, October 4, 1991, p. 5. For an overview of Japanese assessments of North Korean economic prospects, see Tamaki Motoi and Watanabe Toshio, Kita chosen: Horaku ka sabaibaru ka (North Korea: Collapse or Survival? Tokyo: Simul Press, 1993), especially pp. 157-173.
- ⁴¹ Sankei Shimbun, November 25, 1979, p. 1; The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, January 24, 1994, p. 2; The Korea Herald, January 15, 1994, p. 2 and January 16, 1994, p. 1; and Sato Katsumi, Kita chosen "han" no kaku senryaku (The "Resentment" Bomb: North Korea's Nuclear Strategy; Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1994).
- ⁴² Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 4, 1994, p. 22.
- ⁴³ FBIS-EAS-90-193, October 4, 1990, pp. 40-43; and The Korea Herald, February 14, 1993, p. 2.
- ⁴⁴ The Korea Herald, August 4, 1994, p. 8.
- ⁴⁵ FEER, February 21, 1991, p. 51; and The Korea Herald, February 5, 1994, p. 1.
- ⁴⁶ Shin Kak-soo, "North Korea-Japan Normalization Talks: Where They Stand and Will Be Headed," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Winter 1993, p. 602.
- ⁴⁷ FEER, February 3, 1983, pp. 54-55, and March 3, 1993, p. 84.
- ⁴⁸ The most thorough is Mark J. Valencia, "Economic Cooperation in Northeast Asia: The Proposed Tumen River Scheme," Pacific Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1991, pp. 263-271. Two comprehensive unpublished analyses (aside from official documents and conferences) are Kim Hak-su, "Economic Dimension to Security in Northeast Asia; UNDP's Tumen River Area Development Programme: Its Implication to the Security in Northeast Asia," presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Council on US-Korean Security Studies, November 20-21, 1992, Seoul; and Chung Jin-young, "Domestic Sources of International Cooperation in Northeast Asia: With an Emphasis on the Tumen River Area Development Project," presented at the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 2, 1994.
- ⁴⁹ A particularly comprehensive piece was in FEER, January 16, 1992, pp. 16-20.
- ⁵⁰ A concise chronology of these conferences are provided in "Pyongyang Meeting Discusses UNDP Project for Tumen Basin Development," Vantage Point, May 1993, p. 18; and NEAEF Newsletter, Winter 1993, pp. 10-11. The first meeting where the PRC raised the idea was seminal, see Cho Lee-jay and Mark J. Valencia, "A Summary," International Conference on Cooperation in the Economic Development of the Coastal Zone of Northeast Asia, Ch'ang Ch'un, July 16-18, 1990, (Honolulu: East-West Center, April 1991). Useful brief descriptions of some of the later meetings include: "Vladivostok Conference Discusses Tumen River Development Project," Vantage Point, September 1992, pp. 19-23; "A Tumen River Cooperation and Land Lease for TRADP Agreed at the Pyongyang Meeting," Northeast Asia Economic Forum Meeting, NEAEF Newsletter, Summer 1993, pp.

10-14; and "The Second Workshop on Industry and Resources of the Tumen River Area Development Programme," NEAEF Newsletter, Winter 1993, p. 8.

⁵¹ Short reports reviewed for this study are: TRADP, First Meeting of Programme Management Committee, February 27-28, 1992, Seoul; Conclusions, Statement by Mr. H. Behrstock (of UNDP), "The Koreas and Tumen River Area Development Programme," Hong Kong, February 22-24, 1993; UNDP, China, Press Release of April 30, 1992 on "Joint Action Plan Adopted for Tumen River Development Programme;" and the "Tumen River Development Programme Status Report - May 1994," Vol. 1, No. 1, (New York: UNDP), and "TRADP Status Report - June 1994," Vol. 1, No. 2 (New York: UNDP). Long reports reviewed for this study are: M. Miller, A. Holm, and J. Kelleher, UNDP "Mission Report" on "Tumen River Area Development," based on consultations, Pyongyang, October 16-18, 1991, which was a seminal document in the project's evolution; "Masterplan for Telecommunications in TEDA," UNDP, December 1992, (see also the summary of the January 28-30, 1993, Seoul meeting of TRADP communications experts in NEAEF Newsletter, Spring 1993, pp. 7-8); Peter Reister, Water Resources Advisor to TRADP, "Report on Water Resources Definitional Tasks," UNDP, Helsinki, April 1993; and A.R. Holm Associates, "Master Plan for the Transportation Sector: Tumen River Development Program," UNDP, San Francisco, 1993, (see also Shen Jinsheng, We Ying, and Zhang Guowu, "Strategic Framework of TREDRA Rail Network Planning," NEAEF Newsletter, Summer 1994, pp. 9-11).

⁵² They are: John J. Whalen, "The Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRADP): Progress, Accomplishments and Remaining Tasks," NEAEF Newsletter, Winter 1993, pp. 9-13; and his "The Tumen River Area Development Programme and North Korean Economic Development Aspirations" presented at a Conference on Restarting the Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula, The Korea Society/Los Angeles and RAND, Santa Monica, May 26, 1994.

⁵³ "TRADP," UNDP-TRADP, New York, undated.

⁵⁴ Touma Takeo, "Tumen River: The Strategic Center of Japan Sea Rim," NEAEF Newsletter, Winter 1992, pp. 4-7.

⁵⁵ A cluster appeared in August of 1994, see The Korea Herald, August 20, 1994, p. 8; August 24, 1994, p. 8; and August 26, 1994, p. 1. For a description of Pyongyang's tourism aspirations, see The Korea Herald, September 7, 1994, p. 1 and Ma Jiang, "Tumen River: Environmental and Tourism Guidelines for Development Planning," presented at the Workshop on Trade and Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, the East-West Center, Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.

⁵⁶ The Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1993, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Comments at the Korea Security/RAND Conference cited in note 52. On the other hand, one of the UNDP's consulting engineers from the United States - Aage Holm - who works on TRADP, has been quoted as saying the cost probably would be higher than the \$30 billion estimate. See The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 1, 1992, p. 5.

⁵⁸ Ma Jiang, op. cit, and Han Sun-baek, "Environmental Situation of DPRK," presented at UNDP TRADP Preliminary Environmental Assessment Workshop, Beijing, April 1994.

⁵⁹ Quoted from the Financial Times in James C. Abegglen, Sea Change, Pacific Asia as the New World Industrial Center (New York: The Free Press, 1994), p. 99.

⁶⁰ For an expanded analysis of the costs of unification, see Thomas H. Henriksen and Lho Kyung-soo, Editors, One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Unification (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994).

⁶¹ The Korea Herald, August 29, 1992, p. 2.

V

One of the purposes of the previous review of CBMs in Northeast Asia was to create a sense of context for the newest frontier amongst regional CBMs -- those which address environmental issues. A corollary purpose was to provide a sense of proportionality for environmental CBMs. These CBMs clearly are the least well-established and most innovative instruments in the Northeast Asian region. In the course of previous research on regional security and on CBMs, references to environmental issues had always seemed to be on the fringes of accepted *real politik* or on the horizons of visionaries. As research for this study progressed, some of these assumptions were confirmed, while others were altered by the discovery of significant amounts of serious research by specialists in cognate fields that are often bypassed by practitioners and researchers in military-oriented aspects of security. In many respects this gap is a function of who defines "security" and what they mean by the word. As noted earlier in reference to Japanese and South Korean usage of the concept of broadly-defined "comprehensive security," there is genuine movement within Northeast Asia with regard to strategists' understanding of their terms of reference. The key question in this regard for the efficacy of CBMs in the region is whether environmental issues will become truly prominent instruments.

In order to answer that question, this section shall examine several themes: what has been done previously in the field of Northeast Asian environmental CBMs, what is the reality of environmental issues in Japan

and the two Koreas, and each states' domestic governmental and non-governmental approaches to the issue, and how are the three states cooperating with each other on a regional basis -- especially with regard to the body of water they share, the Japan/East Sea. After that appraisal this study shall offer some concluding remarks on the prospects for environmental CBMs as Northeast Asia confronts likely changes in its circumstances.

As research for this study was initiated, one purpose was to try to discover what experts from the three countries involved have said and done about environmental problems and CBMs that might simultaneously resolve the problems and help build bridges of understanding amongst them. Most of the sources cited below reflect that self-imposed guideline. However, in the course of conducting research on the topic it quickly became evident that a relatively small group of Western scholars have been very active advocates for environmental CBMs in Northeast Asia and have functioned as catalysts for both Western and Asian endeavors in this field. There are some insightful studies that carefully lay out the parameters of the field and its policy options.¹ These studies and most of the other items cited below either explicitly or implicitly treat security in broad terms in which environmental solutions may contribute to the creation of levels of trust that will enhance the prospects for peace in Northeast Asia. Some analysts utilize a different approach in which environmental issues are examined as possible sources of new types of conflict.² This study, while aware of the latter, shall dwell on the former because of its focus on CBMs.

The studies by Hayes/Zarsky and Valencia on the region address the same key issues: the linkage between trade and environment as backers of each compete for policy support and confront the alternatives embodied by the phrases "sustainable development," trans-frontier air pollution, marine pollution, fisheries and marine mammals, and a series of UN-sponsored regional environmental programs designed to alleviate problems and engender cooperation. The latter include the UN Environment Programme's Northwest Pacific Action Plan (UNEP-NOWPAP), the UNDP-ESCAP's Northeast Asian Environment Programme, UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in the Western Pacific (IOC/WESTPAC), the UNDP's programs for environmental cooperation in the Tumen River Project and through its Global Environment Facility (UNDP/GEF) program for Prevention and Management of Marine Pollution in East Asian Seas. There is no need to replicate the analyses done in these excellent studies here, nor is the author qualified to do so. Consequently, both studies are strongly recommended to readers.

Of course the issues they raised are central to the concerns of this study, too, and shall be examined below. Because of the focus of this analysis on CBMs, the emphasis here shall be on how the three regional states deal domestically, politically, bureaucratically, and diplomatically with this range of rather technical issues. Because of its regional prominence, the size of its economy that contributes to environmental problems and solutions, and its international responsibilities, it is appropriate to turn first to the situation prevailing in Japan.

The Japanese people long have been renowned for their aesthetic appreciation for mankind's ability to live in harmony with nature.³ Their art and literature are famous for cultivating these ideals. They are admired widely for that sensitivity. The roots of those cultural traits are complex. Part of them can be traced to mainland Asia where Taoist empathy for a natural "middle way," epitomized by the balance struck by the reciprocal forces of *yin* and *yang*, were juxtaposed to the geomancer's awe for the powerful elements of the natural environment. Buddhism contributed a profoundly ecological appreciation for the cyclical evolution of birth and rebirth, that it inherited from Hinduism, which also found its way to Japan. All these notions are enormously nuanced and are the subject of entire academic and theological fields. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that a combination of those cultural influences contributed to Japan's famed love of harmony between man and nature. These positive mainland Asian factors were reinforced by Japan's indigenous belief system, Shintoism, that is essentially a well-developed mixture of animism, shamanism, and nature-worship that displayed particular reverence for cleanliness and the use of uncontaminated natural materials.

These facets of Japanese tradition help explain the idealized version of Japanese appreciation of nature.⁴ However, there is more to that tradition. Japan also imported from mainland Asia a strongly humanistic value system -- Confucianism -- that it proceeded to modify through the imposition of indigenous militaristic values that distorted the original version, making it even more paternalistically authoritarian. Japanese society became, in the process, very human-centered and -directed. Yet

another impact from mainland Asia was a repugnance for barbarians and their lifestyle that the Chinese perceived as wild and uncivilized. As a consequence, East Asian, including Japanese, notions of what is natural became differentiated from wilderness which was identified with barbarism. One can see this readily in East Asian gardens that represent a stylized version of nature that man can control and shape. Japanese *bonsai* (forced miniaturization of trees) is an extreme example. Many observers recognize the ways that Chinese gardens deviate from the natural state of nature, but are ready to praise the natural qualities of the Japanese versions. There is no denying that the latter are more pleasing to the eye of most observers and seem "natural," but in reality they symbolize a major characteristic of Japanese society's treatment of the natural environment -- namely a preference for the orderliness and controllability of a man-influenced form of nature.

This brief description of man-nature relationships in East Asia, including Japan, is important because so many Western observers of Asia, its environmental problems, and the prospects for resolving those problems through international cooperation do not pay enough attention to the gap that exists across cultures when defining what is desirable. This aspect of the environmental issue was raised for several reasons. It helps explain some of the problems in international communications -- between Asia and the West and among Asians. In the latter instance, there are differences on this level between the visions of nature held by Japanese and Koreans that will be addressed below. It also helps explain why Japan's nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization, its adaptation of capitalism and technology from the West, was accepted by many Japanese

despite the heavy costs inflicted upon its natural environment.⁵ And, it helps explain why they paid that price, even as they took pride and flaunted their supposed harmony with nature.

Against that intellectual and cultural background, it is much easier to understand how Japanese society evolved into a heavily industrialized and equally heavily polluted place. In the pre-war era relatively few people anywhere were alarmed by the damage being caused to the environment by industry and other human activities such as agriculture, mining, fisheries, etc. The Japanese were no exception in that regard. In postwar Japan the prime goal was economic recovery and the re-establishment of Japan as a nation on a par with other major states. As a consequence the Japanese people overwhelmingly devoted themselves to their economic well-being, earning a reputation as single-minded, work-a-holics, or "economic animals." Although a stereotype, it closely resembled reality. In their race to regain prosperity, the Japanese people inflicted upon themselves a heavy price that earlier generations might have accepted, but by the 1960s popular attitudes began to shift as exposés of the effects of mercury poisoning in Minamata (that became the namesake for Minamata disease)⁶ and cadmium poisoning in Yokkaichi (producing *itai-itai* [ouch-ouch] disease), caused the Japanese people to rethink their developmental priorities.

Partly motivated by such concerns and foreign criticism of Japan's situation,⁷ but also by an intensified awareness of Japan's fragile dependencies on imported energy at a time when books like The Limits to Growth⁸ were influential internationally, there was a spurt of Japanese

interest during the early 1970s in addressing issues involving the environment and its relationship to economic progress.⁹ This marked the beginning of a shift in Japanese attitudes. Unfortunately there was an element of faddishness to the wave of attention the environment received. This is common in Japan where one *boomu* (boom) after another sweeps through that society. Despite those qualities, this fad eventually created a foothold for environmentalism in Japan that produced over time a genuine change. That foothold may have been due to the debate over Japan's future that was provoked in the midst of this atmosphere by the publication of then-Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's *Nippon retto kaizoron* (Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago).¹⁰

Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s Japan made what it considered substantial domestic efforts to upgrade its environmental performance and credentials. Interestingly, however, it had serious problems with both realities and images. In 1980 Tokyo ratified the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), but continued to ignore much of that trade, thereby earning a reputation as a notorious violator of that agreement. Similarly, Tokyo's abstention from an international whaling ban in 1981 brought down the wrath of the global environmentalist movement.¹¹ Although the whaling issue remains a source of environmental controversy in Japan, Tokyo moved seriously to clean up its act and its image because of fears that foreign critics could damage Japan's trade relations as a result of popular media descriptions of Japan in mid-1989 such as "one of the world's worst environmental outlaws,"¹² and "environmental terrorists."¹³

The timing of such critiques was no accident. Because Tokyo had made progress, since creating an Environment Agency in 1972, on such matters as air pollution, global warming, and other environmental problems that emanated from within Japan and its economy, there was a sense that Japan should reach out to explain its position to the world and its neighbors in Asia. Accordingly, Prime Minister Takeshita extended an invitation to the UN Environmental Program to hold a global conference in Japan. Instead of basking in praise for making some progress, Japan found its policies toward CITES, whaling, fisheries, logging, and other issues under sharp attack. At the core Japan had an attitude problem that was well summed-up by an Environmental Agency official: "Japanese people are not necessarily concerned with what affects the environment in foreign countries."¹⁴ This was a classic example of a long-standing Japanese trait that is expressed in the phrase *kaigai no kasai* (conflagration on foreign shores) -- in other words, problems of others are not our concern. That kind of insularity and ethnocentrism is widely considered a characteristic of the Japanese people (and their East Asian neighbors too). In economic terms, that facet of Japan has drawn a great deal of criticism and caused the Japanese to react by a campaign to achieve *kokusaika* (internationalization) in their society.

On the environmental front the need for broader perspectives on Japan's role in the world was graphically illustrated when the UNEP's "Tokyo Conference on the Global Environment and Human Response Toward Sustainable Development" was held September 11-14, 1989. Although many constructive items were on that agenda which enabled Japan to put its case before experts, Tokyo's exclusion of some

domestically-sensitive environmental topics and its ham-handed moves to control environmental NGO access to the conference spawned a series of rival conferences, including a large gathering of over one-thousand activists from various countries that labelled itself the "International People's Forum on Japan and the Global Environment."¹⁵ Although this mixture of contrasting sessions was not what Tokyo had anticipated, the combination did serve to focus Japan's attention on the seriousness of the environmental issues it faced and how they would influence Japan's role in the world and its own region.

In the years since, Tokyo has markedly improved its environmental record and has received corresponding praise for its efforts. The improvements that have occurred can best be assessed in three groups: domestic environmental enhancements, international outreach, and the cultivation of a more active environmental movement on the NGO level. Against the background of mounting domestic criticism of the damage caused to Japan's environment by its quest for prosperity, widespread popular complaints about the quality of life enjoyed by the Japanese people as a result of the fruits of their labor compared to the living conditions of their counterparts in economically-advanced states of the West, and frustration over being the object of international ridicule, Japanese government and industry redoubled their efforts to build upon the accomplishments of the 1980s which they had thought would earn them praise at the Tokyo conference. They really did have reason to expect commendation at that time and did possess a record of accomplishment. That base has been used so far in the 1990s to expand Japan's domestic environmental protection and preservation programs to levels that are

comparable to prevailing Western efforts. Tokyo goes to great lengths to communicate its domestic achievements to the international community through the publication and dissemination in English of comprehensive and detailed studies that lay out its track record for all to see.¹⁶ It is clear from these publications that Tokyo believes it is making great strides in reacting to environmental problems and considers Japan to be world class in terms of making a sincere effort. It is also clear that Japan's environmental stance exhibits far more transparency than either of its Northeast Asian neighbors -- especially North Korea. Nonetheless, its image and the reality behind it remain tarnished by issues such as whaling that give Tokyo an international black eye and by continuing international criticism of its performance versus its rhetoric.¹⁷ Despite such criticism, Tokyo enacted a stronger legal foundation for its domestic environmental policies in November 1993.¹⁸ This has been seen in Japan as a major step forward that helps assure Japan's commitment to being a solid environmental citizen of the world.¹⁹

While the level of Japan's domestic environmental achievement has intrinsic importance, for present purposes it is most relevant as the context from which Japan's global and regional environmental policies emanate. There are continuing doubts about the former, but no doubt about Tokyo's ardor for pursuing the latter.²⁰ There is also little doubt that Japan intends to remain a player in setting the global environmental agenda²¹ and to help provide the industrial know-how that will enable diverse countries to meet future environmental challenges.²² For all those good intentions and high hopes, however, Tokyo nonetheless remains somewhat handicapped compared to other advanced societies when it comes to exerting its

leadership. For example, as a senior official in the Environmental Agency, Kato Saburo, noted, "I have anxieties about the language barrier and the lack of political figures who can continuously play an important role on the environment...We lack superstars and are not skillful in rhetoric."²³

One of the ways Tokyo has compensated for that weakness has been to use US-Japan environmental cooperation as a crutch that strengthens Tokyo's ability to have access to the leadership councils on global environmental questions. This is not meant as a suggestion that Japan's relationship with the United States on these issues is subject to the sort of "free rider" criticism Tokyo often hears on defense affairs. Japan holds its own weight in these matters and tries to exert leadership to a degree that seldom is evident in military matters. There are extensive bilateral US-Japan cooperative environmental arrangements, exemplified by an agreement between Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Clinton, July 1993, on a "Common Agenda for Cooperation in Global Perspective," in which Japan performs a full share and asserts its views on topics where US and Japanese interests differ.²⁴ The major difference in approach is Tokyo's preference for a consensual resolution of issues as compared to Washington's legalistic attitude to conflict resolution. As important as that theme is for the United States and Japan bilaterally, and for the direction of the international environmental movement, it is at least as important as a symbol of Japan's position as Asia's *defacto* representative to the top level of international environmental councils.²⁵ In general, Asia acquiesces to Japan's status as its emissary to the West and its special relationship with the United States as a nexus connecting a major power network to an Asian states' network, but acceptance of that role for Japan is tempered by

other nations' readiness to perceive Japan in that light. This is easier for Southeast Asia, but much less tolerable for China and the Koreans. This reluctance shall be raised below in an evaluation of Korea's environmental cooperation.

For present purposes it is more important to note that Japan has been very active in reaching out to Asia. There have been several significant conferences in which Japan hosts multilateral discussions of global or regional environmental issues.²⁶ Japan's environmental relationships with Southeast Asia are beyond the scope of this analysis, but it is important to note some of the efforts Japan has made vis-à-vis China because it influences what Tokyo does in Northeast Asia. Japan has cultivated bilateral environmental contacts with the Peoples Republic of China based on a Science and Technology agreement in 1980 that enabled the two countries to develop a joint "Japan-China Friendship Environmental Protection Center," work jointly on acid rain, and assist China at the national and local level in creating environmental expertise. Both Japan's Environment Agency and its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) are engaged in these activities. MITI plays a special role through Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) channeled through Japan's Green Aid Plan (GAP) that started in 1992.²⁷ These efforts have received some limited attention in the Western media.²⁸ The prospects for increased Japan-PRC environmental cooperation are strong now that a bilateral environmental treaty was created in early 1994 and shall guide future cooperation.²⁹

Japan's policies toward Northeast Asian environmental cooperation are simultaneously part of those larger global and overall Asian agenda and a distinct sub-set applicable to its backyard and the particular situations that prevail in the area. As was discussed at length in previous sections there are many facets of Northeast Asian regionalism that help to shape the geopolitical environment and its impact on the natural environment. As is appropriate for any consideration of the latter there is a strong sense of ecological wholism that ties these diverse strains together. Consequently, anything that Japan does which influences the well-being of Northeast Asia's natural environment assumes the proportions of a CBM vis-à-vis its neighbors on the Korea peninsula whether it was consciously implemented in that manner or not. This nuance is important because Tokyo's counterparts in Korea often are more sensitive to the broader ramifications of *de facto* environmental CBMs for military and economic tension reduction than the Japanese are, or are willing to discuss candidly. While many publications, statements, and policies from Japan pertain to Northeast Asian environmental CBMs, fewer squarely address the topic. These regional CBMs include annual symposia between Japan's Environment Agency and the ROK's Environment Ministry, joint research on the Japan/East Sea's marine pollution from 1990-1992, and looser communications networks linking experts.³⁰ Because of the absence of Japan-DPRK official relations, Tokyo has not engaged North Korean counterparts in the regional environmental conferences it has hosted.³¹ When working level officials of the Environment Agency were asked whether their office ever had exchanges or contacts with North Korea, they looked surprised by the question and said they did not because the lack of diplomatic relations

prevents it. Equally interesting, these officials were just as surprised that the work they were doing might be considered a CBM vis-à-vis either Korea.³²

Also part of the global context against which Northeast Asian environmental CBMs must be measured is the important role of Japan in the United Nation's environmental activities. With one eye on its ambitions to play a larger role in the UN as a permanent member of the Security Council, Japan has been actively expanding its participation in the United Nation's environmental programs and paying a substantial share of the bills. At the June 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) -- [a.k.a. the "Rio Conference"], Prime Minister Miyazawa pledged Japan to pay US\$7-8 billion over a five-year period to support global environmental improvement. Other Japanese officials have confirmed that commitment in subsequent years and operationalized it through Japan's Agenda 21 national action program, created in late 1993. Since the original commitment was made in Yen, the changes in US\$/¥ exchange rates will likely yield a figure in the US\$8-9 billion range.³³ This level of support far exceeds that of its Asian neighbors and helps sustain the various UN-backed programs cited previously from which the other Northeast Asian countries benefit. Clearly this also constitutes a major regional environmental CBM.

The third grouping within which environmental improvements can be discerned is among NGOs. This is a complex issue in two respects. The overall role of NGOs in the Japan-Northeast Asia situation is complicated and the equivalent roles of NGOs in Japan's environmental movement is

similarly complicated. Each will be briefly assessed before evaluating their combination. NGOs have a long track-record in influencing states and international organizations.³⁴ In Japan's overall relations with the two Koreas private contacts have played an important supplementary role. Japan-ROK normalization and diplomatic recognition was finessed by behind-the-scenes arrangements. That experience left a residual aftertaste stemming from widely believed rumors of mutual payoffs and kickbacks that benefitted political and corporate interests in both countries. Over the years since 1965 there have been recurring reports of back-room deals and bribes that grease the wheels of bilateral cooperation.³⁵ Such scandals cloud the relationship, but they nonetheless constitute a perverse form of cooperation between NGOs that produced effective CBMs of a sort.

Much better representatives of the NGO phenomena are private research organizations such as the Research Institute for Peace and Security that host South Korean researchers,³⁶ various bilateral cultural and business groups that foster mutual understanding,³⁷ a small Korea-focused research center like *Gendai Koria Kenkyujo* (Modern Korea Institute) whose journal is very influential over Tokyo's relations with Korea,³⁸ and in the quasi-NGO realm Japanese Government-backed research institutes which sometimes host counterparts from South Korea in a "second track" capacity.³⁹ Japan-North Korea relations also operate on the NGO level. In addition to the roles played by the *Chosen soren* (*Chosun chungryun*) that were evaluated previously, Japan's long-term ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party) cultivated sporadic contacts with North Korea's Workers Party as did the Socialist Party in a sustained

way. There also are blatantly pro-Pyongyang NGOs in Japan that toe the North Korean policy line, and have little credibility.⁴⁰ Party-to-party and legislature-to-legislature contacts were not Tokyo-backed CBMs toward North Korea or its representative in the "Korea-Japan Friendship Association," but they amounted to *defacto* CBMs through these quasi-official NGOs. Because of the aura of controversy surrounding Japan's relations with the two halves of Korea, many of the NGOs dealing with them have had that controversy rub off on them and their positions. Fortunately this is much less true with regard to environmental NGOs that can have regional significance.

In order to discuss the importance of Japanese NGOs in regional environmental affairs it is necessary to briefly note their place domestically in Japan. Compared to the major function of American environmental NGOs as activists who lobby to shape US policy, it has been autoritatively stated that, "The role of NGOs in Japanese policymaking...is relatively minor."⁴¹ Nonetheless, there is an authentic NGO environmentalist movement in Japan that has grown over the years.⁴² A major part of the problem of generating popular enthusiasm for environmental causes is that the international *kaigan no kasai* phenomenon noted earlier is mirrored domestically in a weak sense of public ethics. For example, in 1989 when Japan was experiencing an environmental watershed of sorts, an official of the Nature Conservation Society of Japan lamented that the Japanese love of nature is for "a very private nature"..."we don't feel responsibility for public space, for the wilderness."⁴³ While this attitude has specific relevance for the environmental movement in Japan, it also is a manifestation of a larger social phenomenon that a prominent

contemporary politician, Ozawa Ichiro, severely criticized in a 1993 best-seller. He noted that an emphasis on a politics of harmony produced policies "without anyone's taking responsibility," and that "policy failures lay with everyone and with no one."⁴⁴ Clearly this has relevance for the efforts to strike a balance between economic development and environmental protection and NGO movements to shape that balance. Japanese environmental NGO activists run the gamut from the well-organized to the iconoclastic.

The latter receive considerable publicity in Japan and can be influential. Examples include a woman activist's campaign to save a relatively wild river (the Nagara)⁴⁵ and a group opposed to wasteful Japanese use of land for golf courses which spawned a campaign for "no golf days" and a "no golf year" (1993-94). The anti-golf course group has stymied about four-hundred golf course development projects since its creation in 1988.⁴⁶ On balance, of course, it is the more comprehensive NGOs that are truly effective domestically and internationally. Domestically these groups confront essentially the same sorts of pristine preservation versus wise use of private property alternatives that cause controversy in the United States and other countries. There have been gains by both sides.⁴⁷ More important here are the activities of environmental NGOs that are active in Japan's region. Two examples of conferences illustrate these activities. One, held in Chiba (June 30-July 1, 1993) was backed by Japan's Environment Agency, co-sponsored by mainstream NGOs, and attended by prominent members of Japanese NGOs.⁴⁸ The other, held in Seoul (March 27-28, 1993) seems to have been more grass-roots oriented.⁴⁹ Such Japanese environmental NGOs are

important domestically because they demonstrate an evolution in Japan toward greater citizen involvement in the policymaking which shapes Tokyo's administrative guidance of Japanese society and economy. This is part of a larger political and social process occurring in Japan that is leading that country toward greater pluralism, individual responsibility, and empowerment of grass-roots groups. To be sure, there are many obstacles in the way as this process and its advocates attempt to modify the hierarchical, group-oriented consensus orientation that characterizes Japanese society, but the activities of Japan's environmental NGOs⁵⁰ are positive steps in that direction. They also are positive in the ways that they help Japanese society to reach out to its neighbors and permit international interactions to take place on multiple levels. Such "second track" activists add depth and diversity to regional multilateralism and permit forms of dialogue in the region that the Japanese government would find difficult. In this respect the networking among Japanese environmental NGOs and their counterparts elsewhere in Asia foster communications on the issues they address and help build a foundation for broader CBMs.

All these efforts by various elements of Japanese society are only half of the Northeast Asian environmental CBM equation. Activities in the two Koreas comprise the remainder. Compared to Japan, the situation on the Korean peninsula is an interesting mixture of similarities and striking differences. One glaring difference is a consequence of Korea's division and the relative openness of the ROK versus the DPRK. South Korean society is virtually as open as Japan's. This allows substantial access to the ROK's environmental situation and the policy responses by the government and by NGOs. In contrast, the DPRK is a tightly controlled

society which restricts the flow of information about its inner workings. Because of those constraints, and to provide a sense of perspective, this portion of the present analysis shall focus first on South Korean issues and their regional meaning before expanding to North Korean issues and how they fit into the Northeast Asian situation.

South Korea's post-Korean War developmental experience amounts to a condensed version of the developmental route followed by Japan since the Meiji era. Especially during the 1960s and '70s Seoul and South Korea's industrial leaders were driven to try to catch up with Japan and elevate their country to the ranks of economically viable states. Their successes are often called the "Miracle on the Han." Part of the price paid for those economic achievements were the damaging environmental byproducts of a single-minded rush to get rich. For many Koreans those costs were considered a necessary corollary of prosperity. In the course of its development, however, other Koreans recognized the environmental danger, heard the international criticism of Japan and other advanced countries, and questioned the validity of their society paying a high environmental price for economic prosperity. This was the context in which contemporary South Korea's attitudes and policies toward the competing demands of economic development and environmentalism evolved.

For many observers of Korean society these conflicting demands have not been considered a major factor or they are treated as issues which South Koreans can readily handle.⁵¹ Others acknowledge a small but growing role for environmental factors in South Korean society.⁵² On

balance, those perceptions were warranted. Measured against the economic development agenda of ROK Governments from the 1940s to the 1980s, and recognizing the strategic pressure on Seoul to create a strong economy capable of sustaining South Korean defenses, the relatively low profile of environmental issues was understandable. That situation has been changing during the 1980s and 1990s. The causes of those changes are more complex than in Japan. It is clear that South Korea experienced the same sorts of contextual pressures to become more sensitive to global environmental conditions. The more important environmental issues became in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, the more difficult it became for South Korean leaders to be relatively indifferent to those issues. In these terms South Korean society and politics experienced a process of evolutionary greening.

The roots of that process are deep in Korean society. Like their Chinese and Japanese neighbors, Koreans stress their traditions of living in harmony with nature. Bearing in mind the caveat about Confucian societies' interpretations of what is natural, there is no reason to doubt Korean sincerity or commitment in these matters. It is also important to note the particular strength of Korean ideas about geomancy (*pung su*) in which the natural world is seen as a system guided by spirits (*ki*) which exert determinist forces over mankind's place in the environment. These beliefs inject a web of superstitions, fears, and fatalism that is surprisingly influential in a society that considers itself modern.⁵³ Beyond such value-related factors, Koreans also have been very sensitive to their country's environmental degradation at the hands of the Japanese. During the colonial era the Japanese exploited Korea economically in ways that

exacted a heavy environmental price. Koreans routinely denounce that legacy⁵⁴ and have taken great nationalistic pride in their efforts to reforest their denuded mountains that were partially a by-product of Imperial Japan's policies. Cumulatively these domestic factors have fostered a significant popular movement on behalf of improving Korea's environment that sustains a politically active cluster of NGOs. These shall be examined below.

Also on the political front various ROK Governments from the early 1980s recognized the advantages of pursuing a more environmentally sensitive set of policies. These advantages involved assuaging domestic environmental complaints, distracting domestic critics from more volatile topics (that might have threatened the various regimes), enhancing the image of South Korea's economy at home and abroad, improving South Korea's infrastructure for international events -- especially the 1988 Seoul Olympics, and putting the ROK in the best position to participate in environmentally-oriented opportunities as they might arise. Some of the concrete achievements that were spawned in that era were the inclusion of an article in the 1980 Constitution that established environmental rights and the 1980 creation of the ROK Environment Administration which was upgraded to a cabinet level Ministry in 1989-90. Coupled with the growth of a group of relevant ROK Government research institutes (that shall be surveyed below), this placed Seoul in a relatively enlightened position vis-à-vis environmental issues.

For present purposes the most significant aspect of these developments was the growing interest of the ROK in environmentally-

oriented regional multilateral efforts that were replete with CBMs. Although South Korea did not have the financial or institutional wherewithal possessed by Japan, Seoul clearly was -- and is -- intent upon being as engaged as Tokyo in such affairs. In terms of articulating the connections between environmental CBMs and broader regional security multilateral CBMs, one can make a case that South Korea is ahead of Japan. The clearest example is the policy perspective outlined by Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo within the context of Seoul's "New Diplomacy." In May 1993, Dr. Han noted:

Another economy-related area that merits closer attention of multi-dimensional diplomacy is the environment.

It was at the recent "Rio Summit" that the world was awakened to this important international issue. The preservation of the global environment is increasingly perceived as a life-or-death issue for mankind. In addition, environmental problems can be seen as replacing the Cold War ideological rivalry insofar as they represent a new worldwide concern.⁵⁵

Dr. Han also noted the possibility of a "Green Round" upon the completion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT.⁵⁶ In a later exposition of Seoul's perception of environmental issues, Dr. Han elevated it to on par with the far more visible nuclear controversy, saying, "The dual question, nuclear weapons and the environment, have become critical issues for the world and especially for Korea, which also is arguably the most densely populated country in the world."⁵⁷

The ROK bureaucracy is responding to such calls for action in pursuit of new directions in its security policy. This has provided an opportunity for diverse specialists and activists to bring their expertise to bear on the

newly emerging facets of ROK national security. In one concrete scholarly example a South Korean specialist in ocean politics and arms control, while addressing the ROK armed forces' roles, noted:

Other major reasons to advocate a multilateral security regime in the region, are the need to meet the broadening concept of security itself, and the related growing awareness of the unconventional threats to security in the region. In Northeast Asia, military security is still a key element of regional security, but the concept of regional security has expanded to include economic and environmental security, merely the underpinning of traditional security concerns.

One set of security concerns includes various environmental problems, such as pollution of the atmosphere and the oceans, excessive fishing in the North Pacific, and the dangers of climatic change.⁵⁸

That sort of broader perspective is a healthy development in South Korea. Although there is reason to doubt the pervasiveness of such thinking and the expertise of some individuals in positions of authority,⁵⁹ on balance there seems to be movement in promising directions.

For example, as part of Seoul's long-standing efforts to cultivate a world-class scientific and technological research and development capability that it sees as essential for the development of a thriving economy, a broad array of Government-backed institutes were spawned. In the background of these moves was a nagging sense of frustration that foreigners who were primarily familiar with Korea because of the Korean War thought of it as a backward, impoverished country that lacked the background to be a serious economic contender. A desire to prove to the world that Korea was as good as any country and better than most was a powerful incentive on the economic front. So, too, was the Korean elite's

frustration at being labeled backward when they knew that their history was replete with examples of early Korea being an innovative nation in the area of science and technology.⁶⁰ This is not the place to chronicle the emergence of the various institutes.⁶¹ It is sufficient to note those that are in the forefront in environmental endeavors. These include the Ministry of Science and Technology's "HAN Project." "HAN" is the acronym for "Highly Advanced Nation," and is a clever twist on the word Koreans use to refer to their country -- *Han gook*. This project is a government-backed effort to spur research and development in a variety of fields, but one major sector is the "Development of Environmental Technology" in conservation, air and water pollution control, waste management, recycling, manufacturing green products, depletion of the ozone layer, and global warming. This project is scheduled to run from 1992 to 2001 and will involve three phases: basic research, applied research, and commercial application of the former.⁶² Various agencies are part of that project. These include the well-established Korean Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) that contains in its Division of Environment and Welfare Technology an Environment Research Center whose stated activities involve those cited in the HAN Project plus environmental biotechnology, live stock-oriented technology, acid rain protection, and landfill decontamination.⁶³ There also are several specialized organizations backed by Seoul: the Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute (KORDI) that shall be addressed further below in connection with marine environmental issues,⁶⁴ the Korea Environmental Technology Development Institute,⁶⁵ the Korea Environmental Management Corporation,⁶⁶ the Korea Environmental Preservation Association,⁶⁷ Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology

(KAIST),⁶⁸ the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI),⁶⁹ and the National Institute of Environment.⁷⁰

All of these organizations play an important collective role in South Korea's domestic and international approaches to environmental issues. Given the major role the ROK Government has played in the past in guiding economic policy and tangential fields, this should not be a surprise. While the Government still plays a major role in fostering attention on the environment and in dispatching experts to international conferences,⁷¹ it is also important to recognize that the relative role of Seoul in shaping South Korea's national development has been diminishing for several years as the private sector's voice has increased. The latter takes two forms: the corporate realm and NGOs. These shall be addressed in turn. The corporate sector initially tended to be hostile to pressure for environmental improvements which were perceived as inhibiting growth and profits. Some in South Korea's business community remain laggards and there is ample evidence, to which any casual observer on the streets of South Korean cities can attest, that many enterprises remain environmentally unsound. On balance, however, the South Korean corporate sector has adapted rapidly to a greener world. Both the Foreign Ministry⁷² and the Environment Ministry⁷³ have discreetly encouraged the private sector to adopt and prepare for a "Green Round" (GR) in world trade negotiations. By 1994 that encouragement had sparked open exhortations from both the government and the corporate sector to reinforce each other's efforts to prepare for the "Green Round." One specialist in April 1994 projected its start two years later as either "the GATT's ninth round or WTO's first."⁷⁴ While the timing may be uncertain,

many in South Korea seem convinced it will have a major impact on them and their ability to compete economically. Rhee Shang-hi, Chairman of the ROK's Presidential Council on Science and Technology, contended in early 1994 that the GR "is looming ahead like so many storm clouds" because "our environment industry is still in its infancy" with "technology [that] lags far behind international standards." He argued that Korea must redouble its efforts, expand the number of people working in the environmental technology field (beyond the roughly forty thousand now in it), try to catch up with Japan which he described as an "environmental power," and "regard the current environmental crisis as an opportunity to develop environmental technology and enhance our competitiveness."⁷⁵ In more strident terms a major South Korean newspaper editorialized about an "environmental war" and lamented "our state of preparedness is embarrassing."⁷⁶

In response to such pressures South Koreans are seriously reexamining where the ROK stands versus its environmental competitors,⁷⁷ and are considering a United Nations recommendation that the ROK utilize a Green GNP standard,⁷⁸ including the development of an "Environmental Management System" based on the International Standard Organizations (ISO) "series 14000" that is supposed to enable South Korea to meet restrictions Seoul believes will be a part of a future Green Round. The ruling Democratic Liberal Party also is considering elevating the Environment Ministry to a higher cabinet level that would hold the rank of Deputy Prime Minister.⁷⁹ Looking further into the future one scientist from South Korea's academic elite argued Seoul should simultaneously improve its domestic environmental capabilities and work

closely with North Korea on environmental issues so that foreigners cannot use those themes to attack Korean competition. In short, he argued for "systemic measures for South-North economic cooperation to help prevent the destruction of the North Korean ecosystem" and for the sake of long-term Korean well-being.⁸⁰

That creative proposal is most unusual in that it focuses on ROK-DPRK environmental cooperation for South Korea's sake. However, bold generic environmental ideas are not unusual in South Korea. In fact, the NGO movement in South Korea seems to be flourishing. This, too, is not unusual. In contrast to Japan where conformity is the rule and activist spontaneity is rare, Korean political culture is prone to rampant factionalism. Just as this manifests itself in political parties and dissenting movements across the ideological spectrum, it also is present among South Korea's environmental activists. In fact, there are so many environmental NGOs in South Korea which can most kindly be described as in a state of evolutionary flux that it is difficult to compile a meaningful comprehensive list. Moreover, they merge, separate, and recombine in various coalitions that surround leadership cliques and particular issue themes. Further complicating the situation, the environmental NGOs often evolve from or share an interest in anti-government, anti-nuclear, and anti-American causes. Because of those ramifications, some of the NGOs evince a kind of left-of-center patriotism and nationalism that makes them appear to share sympathies for causes North Korea also supports. Clearly, this is an immensely complicated situation. As of mid-1994, one media estimate stated "around 160 NGOs are staging environment campaigns in Korea."⁸¹

In the 1990s, as environmental issues became more visible in South Korea, a few groups became more prominent than others. The 1992 UNCED led to number of descriptive publications by prominent environmental NGOs. The Korean Anti-Pollution Movement Association (KAPMA) issued three volumes on the history, main environmental and international issues, events, and NGO roles in UNCED, and the status of South Korea's domestic environment.⁸² The Korea NGO-Forum for UNCED issued a volume (in English) summarizing its significance for Korea.⁸³ And, the YMCA issued a volume on NGO alternative treaties.⁸⁴ These and many related groups⁸⁵ seem to be overshadowed in contemporary South Korea by the largest umbrella organization, the Korean Federation for Environment Movement (KFEM). Although it consistently uses the same Korean name (*Hwan kyung undong yun hab*), it sometimes uses the English translation -- Korea Action Federation for Environment. The KFEM was created in 1993 as a successor to KAPMA, which was in the forefront of Korean environmental NGOs from 1988-1992. Its founder, Choi Yul, is a long time anti-government and pro-environment activist who frequently confronted Seoul. The KFEM has twelve regional offices throughout South Korea and over 12,000 members. It publishes a slick monthly magazine *Hwan kyung undong* (Environment Movement) and various studies on the Korean environment.⁸⁶ It received substantial publicity when KFEM joined with Greenpeace in April 1994 to welcome the latter's ship "MV Greenpeace," and co-sponsored an Earth Day campaign that focused on opposition to nuclear power and nuclear waste dumping and pressed for a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.⁸⁷ The KFEM and other anti-nuclear coalitions, such as the Korean Liaison Council of Anti-Nuclear Movements,⁸⁸ may be having some impact on the

ROK government which was forced by public pressure to waver on an effort to build a nuclear waste plant in Ulchin, Kyongsang bukto.⁸⁹

While it is clear that South Korean NGOs are very active, seem to proliferate more rapidly than their Japanese counterparts, and appear to be on a track which, in principle, would lead one to expect substantial convergence with the environmental efforts being waged by government agencies and the corporate sector, there is reason to be skeptical about this prospect. In contrast to Japan's tendency to seek consensus that seems to be helping the creation of a more cohesive national posture on domestic and international environmental issues in that country, in South Korea there is a lot of distrust amongst the government, corporations, and environmental NGOs. There are major gaps over the advisability of sustainable development, the ability of capitalism to shift to a truly "green" perspective, and -- perhaps most debilitating -- a sense of societal competition for control over the future policy options of the ROK. There is too much factional rivalry, turf battles, and "face" at stake for compromises to be readily achieved. These conditions have major consequences for South Korea's ability to forge a coherent domestic approach to environmental problems. Equally important for present purposes, these tendencies impede South Korea's ability to engage in regional environmental cooperation and to use the latter as part of a broader approach to CBMs.

Despite those weaknesses, Seoul has moved ahead with regional environmental CBMs. As just noted, South Korea's NGOs engage frequently in meetings that address regional environmental issues.⁹⁰ Their

genuine impact on Seoul's attitudes and policies, and on those of the ROK corporate sector, is debatable. Nevertheless, they persist as do the more mainstream representatives of the South Korean establishment. Before addressing those efforts, it is important to note one contextual difference between the ROK's posture and Japan's posture toward international environmental cooperation. In contrast to Japan-US environmental cooperation that is extensive and advanced in the governmental and commercial realms, ROK-US counterpart arrangements are very poorly developed. This places South Korea at a relative disadvantage versus Japan because Tokyo can claim a partnership with Washington in this realm, whereas Seoul's voice does not carry much regional weight that is attributable to its ties to the United States. Moreover, while Japan seems to have positioned itself relatively well for a prospective Green Round of trade talks and does not unduly fear the United States' future policies, some in South Korea fear the ROK and the United States could be on a collision-course over "green" economic issues, exacerbated by American efforts to alter the United States' concessions in the GATT process.⁹¹ That complex relationship could be made even more troubled depending upon how the United States and Japan eventually resolve their differences over their respective approaches to environmental cooperation.⁹² The United States' role as a complicating factor in South Korea's regional environmental policies could become exacerbated were the already high level of political criticism of environmental contamination by United States military bases in South Korea⁹³ to be compounded by an acceleration of US force cutbacks in Asia that could leave Seoul with still more environmental problems its hands and inject another controversy into Korean-US relations. Perversely, were the use of regional

environmental CBMs to actually help bring peace to the Korean peninsula, thereby reinforcing the logic of cutting back US forces there, one consequence might well be the revelation of even greater levels of environmental contamination on what would become former US bases. This has occurred elsewhere in the aftermath of US base closures, so it should be anticipated in Korea too.

Setting those differences and concerns aside, Seoul has moved forward with its environmental cooperation efforts in the region. They are extensive with Japan, growing vis-à-vis the Peoples Republic of China, and sparse on the North Korean front. Most of these efforts are linked to Seoul's perception of its economic interests and the ways environmental factors influence them.⁹⁴ With respect to Japan, the South Korean Government has carefully assessed its utility as a partner in regional environmental affairs,⁹⁵ a number of bilateral environmental conferences have been held,⁹⁶ and South Korean scholars have explained Korea's environmental problems to Japanese audiences and have expressed high regard for Japan's domestic environmental achievements and its role in existing regional cooperation.⁹⁷ Clearly the potentials for South Korea to build stronger diplomatic and economic ties with Japan through environmental policy connections is great. The ROK can earn Japan's trust, technology, know-how, and yen by cultivating this network. Over the longer run and in broader terms, the ROK can hope that ROK-Japan environmental cooperation will open broader vistas on the East Sea/Japan Sea regional front that could hold out enormous rewards vis-à-vis Russia. Perhaps most significant for the entire Korean nation and for reducing Korea-Japan enmity, South Korean leaders also can hope

that their aspirations toward Northeast Asian environmental cooperation will eventually constitute a CBM aimed at integrating North Korea within a mode that produces greater overlapping of inter-Korean interests and helps accelerate reunion of the Korean nation. One instrument for achieving that level of mutual confidence would be the creation of a regional or UN-backed permanent institution for environmental cooperation to which all the Northeast Asian states would belong.⁹⁸ Yet another approach might be to adapt the acronym "NET" used by Robert Scalapino for national economic territories⁹⁹ to the Northeast Asia sub-region as what could be considered a Natural Environmental Territory.

As central as Japan is on South Korea's external environmental horizon, Seoul also treats China as a crucial factor environmentally. It could hardly be otherwise in light of China's size, population, location, and capacity to produce environmentally-damaging substances that nature distributes in Korea's direction. Moreover, China's traditional role as a mentor for Korea produces a tendency in the latter country to be sensitive to China's interests. Consequently, it was entirely logical for Seoul to use environmental policy levers to further expand its relationships with China as it normalized diplomatic relations in the waning phase of the cold war. The post-cold war era has permitted ROK-PRC relations to expand greatly. The ROK Environment Agency completed in early 1993 a lengthy (310 page) analysis of how ROK-PRC environmental cooperation could be carried out,¹⁰⁰ the Foreign Ministry announced in late 1993 the creation of a joint ROK-PRC committee to study environmental security,¹⁰¹ and a bilateral Agreement for Environmental Cooperation was prepared in 1993 that was signed in June 1994.¹⁰² These arrangements create the structure

for closer bilateral cooperation on the environment between the ROK and the PRC. Their potential is as great as China's overall potential. Similarly, the problems that China's continued economic development and its population pressures may cause for China's environmental situation threaten to pose obvious problems for both Korean states and Japan. It is prudent for Seoul to be engaging Beijing on these issues before they become too serious. This enables Seoul to broaden its ties with China, addressing environmental questions for their own sake and as regional CBMs. This fits in well with Seoul's diversified foreign policy agenda and -- as important -- provides one more lever for the ROK to use in its complex relations with the DPRK. Because of the proximity of China to Korea, and the direct spill-over of China's environmental problems, these are issues that tend to encourage the ROK and DPRK to share a common perspective. This constitutes a major bilateral (North-South) and regional CBM precipitated by joint concern over the environment. Recognizing that perspective is one thing; incorporating it into the policies of Seoul and Pyongyang is an entirely different matter that has yet to make much progress.

The core obstacle in that regard is the status of North Korea vis-à-vis regional cooperation efforts. While the DPRK is engaged in UN-based regional economic cooperation through TRADP, that program has not been emulated in other areas in which cooperation is possible. This disparity is striking with regard to environmental issues. There is very little published about the environment in North Korea or about the DPRK's environmental policies. As a result North Korea, despite its central location and potential to be a key player in regional cooperative

schemes of all sorts, remains an outsider about which little is known with significant accuracy.

Against that backdrop it is nonetheless possible to piece together a picture of North Korea's place in the regional environment. First, despite the political differences between the two Korean states, the North Koreans remain Koreans in culture, heritage, and roots. Thus, by inference it is probably safe to assume that the North Korean attitudes toward nature, wilderness, and basic man-milieu issues do not differ tremendously from those found among South Koreans and described earlier. If the North Koreans today retain some of the traditional attributes that southern and central Koreans ascribed routinely to residents of the Korean peninsula's northernmost provinces, the overview of Korean perceptions of nature need only be modified by noting the stereotype that the northerners were routinely perceived as more rugged people who lived harsher lives in relatively primitive conditions and -- importantly -- took pride in their ability to cope with nature's challenges. These features were linked to the descendants of the Koryo kingdom, a dynasty with which the DPRK often identifies itself as a way to enhance North Korea's regional legitimacy. Also, given the tenacity of regional stereotypes within South Korea, it probably is safe to assume that they persist within North Korean society too. This could have significant implications for North Korea's environmental situation and policies.

One must also keep in mind the other legacy that North Korea bears from Marxism-Leninism which encouraged a materialist, manipulative approach to exploiting the natural world. That approach clearly caused

problems in the former Soviet Union, in China, and in Vietnam. It could not have helped the North Korean regime as it coped with economic development challenges. Neither did the North Korean ideology of *juche* (self-reliance) predispose North Koreans to think in the interconnected, holistic ways that are synonymous with the fields of environment and ecology. The notion of "*juche* ecology" suggests an oxymoron.

The latter perspective leads many observers to assume that the North Koreans have what one US-Japan security group described as "acute environmental problems that arise out of decaying infrastructure and industrial plants."¹⁰³ On the other hand, the DPRK's economic problems can also lead observers to conclude that "North Korea's air and streams are nearly pollution-free, aside from morning haze from home-cooking and heating fires, because so few plants are running."¹⁰⁴ These divergent views reflect the relative absence of hard information about North Korea which is precisely the way Pyongyang prefers it. The DPRK's secretiveness is based on national defense and regime preservation. The less its adversaries -- real or imagined -- know about the vulnerabilities of North Korea, the safer it feels. Therefore, and in keeping with its self-image as a socialist paradise on earth, North Korea is very reluctant to let others gain real knowledge about its problems.

The DPRK prefers, understandably, to put its best face forward. Therefore, its publications emphasize upbeat treatment of the environment such as tree-planting month (in April) as a symbol that "a green campaign is underway in the DPRK"¹⁰⁵ and the reclamation of shallow water areas for farmland by transporting "tens of millions of tons

of overburden" from a mine to the seashore via conveyor belt under the "wise guidance of Comrade Kim Jong Il."¹⁰⁶ Objective third party assessments of the status of North Korea's environment are rare, but do exist. In addition to the 1988 DPRK Law of Environmental Protection that has been made available through the UNEP, the UNDP Country Programme for the DPRK (1992-1996) includes the following brief description:

Programme 3 - Environment and Industry

The Government attaches the highest priority to the conservation of the environment. DPRK is rapidly expanding its industrial and manufacturing capacities most of which are located in urban areas. Therefore the control of industrial pollution at their source is an urgent pre-requisite to maintain and enhance the quality of living in urban areas. Indeed it is an important aspect of safeguarding the significant achievements in human development. Technology for control of pollution has advanced rapidly and DPRK requires access to information and techniques for their adoption locally.

The objective of the Programme is to stimulate the application of modern technology by industrial enterprises to control emission of pollutants into inland waterways and the surrounding seas. Wastewater treatment plants and recycling systems in the Hungnam Fertilizer Complex and the February 8 Vinalon Complex will be modernized as will the pollution control systems of many old chemical plants in the area which are the source of significant offshore pollution. The Sinuiju Chemical Fibre Complex, situated near the mouth of the Yalu River will be modernized to improve dust control and waste treatment facilities and to prevent the emission of sulfuric acid and to recycle caustic soda and lead. Environmental protection measures in the Taedong River Basin area will be strengthened.

In programmes dealing with energy efficiency as well as in this programme, the Global Environment Facility is expected to be a source of financing for both technical and capital assistance.¹⁰⁷

Clearly the DPRK's State Environment Commission has a record of some achievement. Also under UNDP auspices, a "Preliminary Environmental

Study" of the TRADP was completed in 1994 by the PRC's Research Academy of Environmental Sciences.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, in contrast to the South Koreans who are regulars on the international conference circuit, the DPRK has a spotty record. Virtually all of the previously cited conferences lacked participants from the DPRK. Although efforts have been made to induce their participation and cooperation,¹⁰⁹ successes have been limited.¹¹⁰ The reasons for that irregular record include Pyongyang's reluctance to say too much in public about issues that could be strategically sensitive, the DPRK's financial constraints on sending its representatives abroad, the diplomatic restrictions on where the DPRK's representatives are welcome, and the periodic crises in which North Korea finds itself engulfed that either tighten external restraints on North Koreans, restrict self-imposed access to North Koreans by foreigners, or both. In short, the situation around North Korea's place in the world has not been conducive to the communications that might foster CBMs.¹¹¹

The key question in this regard is what are the best avenues that might help lead North Korea toward greater regional environmental cooperation. One obvious option that others have noted is to try to broaden the DPRK's involvement with UN operations. For example, the comprehensive agenda of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) on Northeast Asian Environmental Cooperation in 1993 involved every pertinent country except North Korea and dealt with serious yet relatively benign issues that should have been perfect for enticing Pyongyang into the discussion. Yet they did not participate.¹¹²

Another option could be greater international backing for South Korea's efforts to expand its overtures toward North Korea to include inter-Korean scientific and technical exchange through the creation of a joint research institute. Seoul's proposal visualizes a number of areas that include an ecological study of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), meteorological cooperation, and joint research on the Yellow Sea. Sponsored by the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology, Seoul's purpose is to use this instrument to make the Korean nation "the world's seventh-largest technological superpower by the year 2010."¹¹³ A plan of that sort is entirely consistent with the purposes of the 1991 ROK-DPRK Nonaggression Agreement's Article 16 that calls for cooperation, *inter alia*, in science, technology, and the environment.¹¹⁴ Seoul also has launched a research team tasked with evaluating the DPRK's environmental status that will use data from a formerly East German institution, Humboldt University.¹¹⁵

Furthermore, it is compatible with North Korea's long-standing quest for technology from abroad. Some observations by Kim Jong-il in the mid-1980s are pertinent here:

[The] wrong attitude towards science and technology are prevalent in our society because officials ignore science and technology. At present everybody is talking about the rapid development of science and technology but there are few people who are making any serious effort to develop them...

In order to develop science and technology quickly you should introduce advanced science and technology from abroad...

The introduction of advanced science and technology from abroad does not go against the requirement of developing the country's science and technology in a *Juche*-oriented manner...

In order to introduce advanced science and technology you should work actively to establish scientific and technical exchange with the developed countries.¹¹⁶

Given the stagnation in North Korea's economy, and his new-found powers, it is likely that Kim Jong-il's words are even more applicable a decade after they were uttered. One concrete indicator of the level of North Korea's environmental scientific and technological base may be gleaned from the response made to an inquiry at the Asian Institute of Technology (Bangkok) about Northeast Asian participation in its School of Environment, Resources, and Development. As of the end of 1993, fifty-two Japanese and ninety-nine South Koreans had graduated in relevant fields and in recent years ten Japanese and three South Korean faculty at the AIT had been sponsored by their governments. On the other hand, there had been "none from North Korea" in either category.¹¹⁷ It is quite possible, therefore, that one of the reasons why North Korea holds back from engaging in environmental cooperation is that it is reluctant to admit how poorly-developed its expertise in these fields is. That relative backwardness is also suggested by the DPRK's use of the *Zainichi chosonjin kagaku gijutsu kyokai* (Association for Science and Technology of Koreans in Japan) that amounts to a pro-Pyongyang NGO in Japan which transmits knowledge, books, and personnel from Japan to North Korea in order to build-up the sort of expertise referred to by Kim Jong-il.¹¹⁸ Although regularly criticized in connection with North Korea's nuclear ambitions,¹¹⁹ these efforts also may serve a useful purpose -- and act as a CBM -- if they help narrow the gap between the DPRK and ROK that would facilitate regional cooperation.

In all likelihood the organization with the greatest long-run potential for facilitating North Korea's cooperation with its South Korean and Japanese neighbors in Northeast Asia (as well as the Chinese and Russians) remains the United Nations. As of April 1994, the UNDP had prepared a draft program for technical cooperation on the Korean peninsula that was presented to both Koreas by the UN Secretary General for their consideration. This focused on "coordinated parallel or joint bilateral" approaches and included proposals to harmonize the two Koreas' legal and regulatory handling of environment issues, to develop a common model of global climatic changes that would foster a convergence of appreciation for the problems they share, to enhance their participation in controlling pollution of shared seas, and to coordinate their mapping and inventory taking of biodiversity.¹²⁰ In the shorter run, the greatest force for inducing North Korean cooperation in Northeast Asia may well be its controversial nuclear policies. Because that entire set of relationships is so visible and demands a resolution, there is a reasonable chance that -- when a lasting resolution is achieved -- it will spill over into other aspects of North Korea's foreign relations. In turn, because so many of the NGO anti-nuclear activists in Japan and South Korea also are involved in environmental causes, there is strong likelihood of linkages being created. An excellent example of that interaction was evident when the Greenpeace ship visited Korea in April 1994 to protest nuclear energy and proliferation policies. South Korea called attention to its efforts to sail near North Korean waters and North Korea called attention to its port visit in the ROK.¹²¹ In the subsequent months North Korea presumably backed a group of eighty North Korean medical doctors who constituted themselves as the "North Korean Physicians for the Prevention

of Nuclear War" and tried to join the International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War -- a group that won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985.¹²² Notwithstanding the propagandistic overtones of such a move, it is important anyway because it is a North Korean response to circumstances which draws the DPRK into a broader dialogue -- in this case via what passes for an NGO in a society where governmental control is so thorough that it is difficult to conceive of an authentic NGO. In that regard one Asia-Pacific NGO umbrella organization that might be able to incorporate the government-backed NGOs of North Korea is the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) that now links a series of quasi-government "NGOs" in various countries and tends to blur that line.¹²³

Precisely how North Korea shall cope with its neighbors through environmental and other non-military CBMs remains, of course, to be seen. That is *the* major stumbling block in the Northeast Asian region. While that question cannot be answered here, there is one remaining realm in which cooperation and CBMs are occurring -- fishery interaction. Because of their many distinct characteristics the issues of ocean policy have been left for the last. After reviewing developments in Northeast Asia, focusing on the Japan/East Sea proper, the comprehensive question of prospects for the future shall be addressed in conclusion.

Notes

¹ Two studies stand out. One is Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky, "Regional Cooperation and Environmental Issues in Northeast Asia," Policy Paper No. 5, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, University of California, San Diego, October 1993. The other is Mark Valencia, "Involving the DPRK in Northeast Asian Regional Economic and Environmental Cooperation," Nautilus Institute for

Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, January 1994. See also Hayes and Zarsky's "Regional Environmental Cooperation in Asia," Report to the Indian Ocean Peace Research Center, in draft format as of June 24, 1994, and Valencia's "Preparing for the Best: Involving North Korea in the New Pacific Community," NEAEF Newsletter, Fall 1994, pp. 1-5.

² The clearest example with regional relevance is James A. Winnefeld and Mary E. Morris, Where Environmental Concerns and Security Strategies Meet: Green Conflict in Asia and the Middle East, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1994), especially pp. 61-94.

³ For an early and influential example of a Japanese portrayal of that balance for Westerners, see Anesaki Masaharu, Art, Life, and Nature in Japan, (Boston: Marshal Jones Company, Inc., 1933), reprinted by Greenwood Press, 1971.

⁴ For an interesting evaluation of why Westerners often perceive non-Westerners through rose-colored glasses, see Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth, Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

⁵ For a seminal study on that and related issues, see Joseph Needham, The Grand Titration: Science and Society in East and West, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969). See also his "Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 12, 1951, pp. 3-33.

⁶ This disease became synonymous with popular revulsion over environmental change in Japan and its surrounding waters. It was the focus of many publications. One of them is a best-seller by Mishima Akio in 1977 (under the title Nake, shianui no umi: minamata ni sasageta chinkon no tataikai), translated as Bitter Sea; The Human Cost of Minamata Disease, (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Co., 1992).

⁷ For a prominent example, see Peter Smith, "Japan: Economic Dream, Ecological Nightmare," Ecologist, December 1971, pp. 16-19.

⁸ Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III, The Limits to Growth, (New York: Potomac Associates/Universe Books, 1972).

⁹ A cross-section includes: Kato Tadoru, Kogai no miraizo (Future State of Pollution), (Tokyo: Nihon seisansai honbu, 1970); Kaji Koji, Kogai gyosei no sotenken (Total Review of Pollution Administration), (Tokyo: Kodo shuppan, 1971); Aono Tadao, Kigyo to kankyo (Business and the Environment), (Tokyo: Sangyo noritsu tankidaigaku shuppanbu, 1971); Goto Kunio, Bunmei, Gijutsu, Ningen (Culture, Technology, Mankind), (Kyoto: Horitsu Bunkasha, 1972); Kankyo horei kenkyukai (Environmental Law Research Society), Kogai gairon (Outline of Pollution), (Tokyo: Zeimu keiri kyokai, 1972); Matsumoto Shoetsu, Kogai to kihonteki jinken (Pollution and Fundamental Human Rights), (Tokyo: Keibundo, 1972); Taketani Mitsuo, Kogai anzensei jinken (Safeguarding Human Rights [from] Pollution), (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1972); Ui Jun, Kogai retto, 70 nendai (Pollution Archipelago, 1970s), (Tokyo: Akishobo, 1972); and Hoshino Yoshiro, Hankogai no ronri (Logic of Anti-Pollution), (Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 1972).

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- ¹⁰ Published by the *Okurasho*, 1972. See, also, the opposition parties' reactions in *Nippon retto kaizoron hihan* (Criticisms of Remodeling the Japanese Archipelago), (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1972).
- ¹¹ For overviews of those issues as of the mid-1980s, see TIME, December 3, 1984, p. 65 and FEER, April 25, 1985, p. 20.
- ¹² Newsweek, May 1, 1989, p. 68.
- ¹³ A quote from Roger McManus of the Center for Marine Conservation in TIME, July 10, 1989, p. 50.
- ¹⁴ The Christian Science Monitor, July 11, 1989, p. 2.
- ¹⁵ The Christian Science Monitor, September 15, 1989, p. 6.
- ¹⁶ Recent examples of these include the lengthy (658 pages) Quality of the Environment in Japan, 1992 (Tokyo: Environmental Agency, 1992); and the more concise (37 pages) Quality of the Environment in Japan, 1993 (Tokyo: Environment Agency, 1993). The Japanese Government also disseminates technically-oriented materials such as the bilingual publication *Nippon no sui shitsu hozen taisaku no genjo/Water Quality Management in Japan* (Tokyo: Kankyocho suishitsu hozenkyoku/Water Quality Bureau, Environment Agency of Japan, October 1993), and Outline of Air Pollution Control in Japan (Tokyo: Air Pollution Control Division, Air Quality Bureau, Environment Agency, December, 1993). Lastly, Tokyo also circulates slick yet informative "PR" for its environmental image such as the brochure, "The Forefront of the Environmental Movement in Japan," (which briefly profiles some of Japan's prominent environmentalists), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 1992.
- ¹⁷ Two examples in pertinent journals are: Raymond Vernon, "Behind the Scenes: How Policymaking in the European Community, Japan, and the United States Affects Global Negotiations," Environment, June 1993, pp. 12-29; and David Swinbanks, "OECD Gives Japan Mixed Score on Environment," Nature, May 5, 1994, p. 5.
- ¹⁸ "The Basic Environmental Law (Law No. 91 of 1993, effective on November 19, 1993)" English translation supplied by the Environment Agency, June 1994.
- ¹⁹ For background on the law and its meaning in Japan, see Imura Hidefume, "Japan's Environmental Balancing Act: Accomodating Sustained Development," Asian Survey, April 1994, pp. 355-369. For further background in this field see: Morishima Akio, Environmental Law in Japan, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981).
- ²⁰ For a useful overview of this, see Alan S. Miller and Curtis Moore, "Japan and the Global Environment," Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, Vol. 1-2, 1991-92, pp. 35-56. This was also published as a booklet by The Center for Global Change at the University of Maryland, January 1991.
- ²¹ See for example Ishida Yasuhiko, "Regreening the Earth: Japan's 100-Year Plan," The Futurist, July-August 1993, pp. 20-25; and Kosugi Takashi, "Reflections on the Prospects for Japanese Environmental Leadership," Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs Japan Program, Occasional Paper, No. 2, 1993.
- ²² See, for example, "Environmental Developments Offer Opportunities for Japan," Japan Economic Institute (JEI) Report, January 10, 1992, pp. 1-16; Frederick S. Myers, "Japan Bids for Global Leadership in Clean Industry," Science, May 22, 1992, pp. 1144-

1146; and Jim Jubak and Marie D'Amico, "Mighty MITI," The Amicus Journal, Summer 1993, pp. 38-44 which assesses Tokyo's hopes for an environmentally-oriented industrial policy.

²³ Quoted in Andy Coughlan, "Green Dreams in Japan," World Press Review, February 1994, p. 47.

²⁴ For a concise outline of these themes, see: Pat Murdo, "Cooperation, Conflict in US-Japan Environmental Relations," IEI Report, May 28, 1993, pp. 1-17; and The Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 1994, p. 9.

²⁵ For further background on that delicate representational role, see Joanne Bauer, The Politics and Ethics of Global Environmental Leadership (New York: The Carnegie Council, US-Japan Task Force on the Environment, 1993).

²⁶ In addition to the UNEP Conference noted previously, see for example the following bilingual conference reports: Chikyu kankyo kenjin kaigi to Tokyo sengen/ Eminent Person's Meeting on Financing Global Environment and Development and Tokyo Declaration, Earth Summit Secretariat (April 1994); Ajia-taiheiyo kankyo kaigi (eko ajia '93)/Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (Eco Asia '93), June 30-July 1, 1993, Chiba; and Higashi ajia sanseiu monitaringu nettowa-ku ni kan suru semmonka kaigo/The Expert Meeting on Acid Precipitation Monitoring Network in East Asia, October 26-28, 1993, Toyama.

²⁷ For an insider's insights into those arrangements, see Onogawa Kazunobu, "Environmental Cooperation of Japan with Russia, Eastern Europe, and China," November 18, 1993, pp. 15-21, supplied by Mr. Onogawa, June 1994. Mr. Onogawa is Director, Air Quality Bureau, Sensory Pollution Control Division, Environment Agency. See, also, Yamamoto Wataru, "Japanese Official Development Assistance and Industrial Environmental Management in Asia," presented at the Workshop on Trade and Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, the East-West Center, Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.

²⁸ For example, see FEER, February 4, 1993, p. 16, and The Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1994, p. 3.

²⁹ Kankyo no hogo no bunya ni okeru kyoryoku ni kansuru Nippon koku seifu to Chuka jinmin kyowa koku seifu to no aida no kyotei (An Agreement on Cooperation in the Environmental Protection Field Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China), signed in Beijing, March 20, 1994.

³⁰ For an example of one which did, see Kato Saburo, "Environmental Policies of Japan and its Roles in Preserving the Environment in Northeast Asia," presented at a "Symposium on UNCED and Prospect on the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century" (sic), September 2-5, 1992, Seoul. Mr. Kato was Director General of the Global Environment Department of the Environment Agency.

³¹ For example, the two Asia-oriented conferences cited in note 26 were well attended, but listed no participants from the DPRK.

³² Interviews in Tokyo, June 21, 1994, with Mr. Deguchi Teruyuki and Ms. Iwakami Naoko, of the Air Quality Bureau, who were most helpful in providing publications.

³³ Speech by Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi at UNCED, June 13, 1992; speech by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro at UN General Assembly, New York, September 27, 1993; and statement by the Delegation of Japan on Implementation of Decisions and Recommendations of UNCED, UN General Assembly Second Committee, November 1993. See, also, Yamamoto Wataru, *op. cit.*

³⁴ For an overview of the roles NGOs play internationally today, see "The UN System and NGOs: New Relationships for a New Era?" The Stanley Foundation, February 18-20, 1994; and The Christian Science Monitor, September 21, 1994, p. 7.

³⁵ As this is written yet another scandal is unfolding, involving a Korean businessman in Japan massively bribing ROK officials, The Korea Herald, August 6, 1994, p. 3.

³⁶ The author interviewed one, Mr. Park Kwon-sang, a visiting journalism professor at RIPS, June 20, 1994.

³⁷ One example is Nikkan bunka kyokai (The Japan-Korea Culture Association), Dr. Murao Jiro, Chairman, which sponsors Korean students in Japan and publishes a journal, Nikkan bunka.

³⁸ Despite its stature, this Institute has a remarkably small full-time staff that is supplemented by adjunct researchers.

³⁹ One example is the Defense Ministry's National Institute of Defense Studies that was in mid-1994 starting a military-to-military scholarly dialogue. As of June 1994, NIDS was hosting Col. Chang Moon-sug (ROK Army).

⁴⁰ For a sample of party interaction, see: Nihon keizai shimbun, April 5, 1989, p. 2, FEER, April 13, 1989, p. 30; Asahi Evening News, October 5, 1989, p. 7; The Japan Times Weekly (International), March 4-10, 1991, p. 3; and The Korea Herald, July 26, 1991, p. 1. For an example of pro-Pyongyang NGOs in Japan, see The Pyongyang Times, August 27, 1994, p. 1.

⁴¹ Pat Murdo, "Cooperation, Conflict in US-Japan Environmental Relations," IEI Report, May 28, 1993, p. 7.

⁴² For an evaluation of the formative years, see Margaret McKean, Environmental Protest and Citizen Politics in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

⁴³ Yoshida Masahito, quoted in The Christian Science Monitor, July 12, 1989, p. 3.

⁴⁴ Ozawa Ichiro, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994), translated from Nihon kaizo keikaku (Japan Improvement Plan), pp. 24-27.

⁴⁵ Lucille Craft, "The Woman Who's Shocking Japan," International Wildlife, July-August 1993, pp. 12-18, on Amano Reiko's effort to halt a dam on the Nagara River.

⁴⁶ Earth Island Journal, Spring 1993, p. 17, and FEER, May 5, 1994, pp. 40-41.

⁴⁷ For an example of preservationist victories, see "Japan's Protected Wetlands Grow Under NGO Pressure," Nature, June 24, 1993, p. 662. For examples of "wise use" successes, see Nakada Kosaku, "The Environment: From Protection to Management," Japan Echo, Autumn 1992, pp. 78-82.

⁴⁸ Ajia-taiheiyo kankyo kaigi (eko ajia '93)/Environment Congress for Asia and the Pacific (Eco Asia '93); Hokokusho/Report (Tokyo: Kankyocho/Environment Agency, 1993). The mainstream NGOs that supported the conference were:

- 1) Mr. Yasuhara Tadashi

-
- The Japan Committee for Global Environment
Environmental Information Center
Toranomom No. 1 Bldg.
5-8, Toranomom, 1-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo 105
- 2) Dr. Hashimoto Michio
Overseas Environmental Cooperation Center
16-2, Hiroo 5-chome
Shibuya-ku
Tokyo, 150
- 3) Mr. Okazaki Hiroshi
Global Environment Forum
3rd Floor, Iikura Bldg.
9-7, Azabu-dai, 1-chome
Minato-ku
Tokyo, 106

Prominent NGO leaders who participated included:

- 1) Abiru Takeshi
Chairman, Subcommittee on Global Environment
- 2) Anzai Kunio
Chairman, Committee on Environment and Energy
- 3) Mori Yukio
President
Earth, Water, and Green Foundation.

⁴⁹ For coverage of it, see Miyamoto Kenichi, "Dai ni kai ajia taiheiyō NGO kankyō kaigi," (Second Asia Pacific NGO Environmental Conference), *Kankyō to kogai* (Environment and Pollution), Vol. 23, No.1, July 1993, pp. 2-6; and Kim Jung-hyun, "Ajia no kankyō hozon to NGO no yakuwari," (Asian Environmental Security and the Role of NGOs) in *Ibid.*, pp. 7-11. The former evaluates Asian environmental issues, the responsibilities of government and industry, the roles of Asian NGOs, the importance of the conference, and prospects for "APNEC" (Asia Pacific NGO Environmental Conferences). The latter builds on those issues and explores likely tasks for environmental policy in Asia, how to coordinate those tasks, and the roles of NGOs in sustainable development and in environmental security.

⁵⁰ Solid coverage of this activism is contained in Japan Environment Monitor (published by Friends of the Earth - Japan) and Friends of the Earth Japan Newsletter.

⁵¹ Although those views are widespread in analyses of modern South Korea, two contemporary examples will suffice, both of which represent very solid scholarship. Yang Sung-chul, The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis (Boulder/Seoul: Westview Press and Seoul Press, 1994), is a very comprehensive tome (of almost a thousand pages), yet environmental concerns scarcely surface, even in its treatment of "quality of life" issues. Similarly, Pae Sung-moon, Korea, Leading Developing Nations: Economy, Democracy, and Welfare

(Lanham: University Press of America, 1992), is upbeat about South Korea's ability to cope with such competing pressures.

⁵² A succinct example is the two-page survey in the widely-used text of Donald S. MacDonald, The Koreans; Contemporary Politics and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 106-107.

⁵³ For an analysis of these factors, see: Choi Chang-jo, "Study of How Koreans View and Utilize Nature," Korea Journal, Winter 1992, pp. 26-45.

⁵⁴ For a particularly strong version of that perception, see Kim Jung-wk (sic), "Brief History of Environmental Pollution and the Transnational Corporations in Korea," Environment and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korea NGO Forum for UNCED, June, 1992), pp. 1-2.

⁵⁵ Han Sung-joo, "Fundamentals of Korea's New Diplomacy," Korea and World Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 236. (Text of a speech presented to the Korean Council on Foreign Relations at the Korean Chamber of Commerce, May 31, 1993, in Seoul).

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Quote from a speech to an International Media Conference on Environmental Development, June 14, 1994, The Korea Herald, June 15, 1994, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Lee Seo-hang, "Korean Military Forces: Searching for Peace and Stability Through Multilateral Security Regimes," in Michael D. Bellows, Editor, Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994, p. 195.

⁵⁹ While in Seoul during June, 1994, conducting interviews for this research, some scholarly and bureaucratic experts whose qualifications are impeccable expressed to the author -- in non-attribution settings -- their skepticism about whether high-level policymakers are really serious about listening to functional specialists on environmental issues. They also were dismissive about the value of interviewing bureaucrats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (who work on the environment) and in the Environment Ministry because they supposedly rely very heavily on functional specialists in research institutes who are more or less permanently dealing with these issues while the others shift from job to job and have little genuine expertise or commitment.

⁶⁰ See for example Jeon Sang-woon, Science and Technology in Korea: Traditional Instruments and Techniques (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1973).

⁶¹ For an overview of these organizations, see: Science and Technology in Korea (Seoul: Ministry of Science and Technology, 1993).

⁶² "Highly Advanced National Project: A Plan Towards the 21st Century," is the title of both a booklet and information packet provided by the ROK Ministry of Science and Technology.

⁶³ This is only a partial list drawn from KIST's publicity booklet: Korea Institute of Science and Technology (Seoul: KIST, undated). Received in August 1994, but contains data from January 1993, p. 14.

⁶⁴ An overview of the organization is provided in KORDI (Seoul: *Hanguk haeyang yungu so*, 1992). It split from KIST in 1990 and is located in Ansan, Kyonggi-do. Its mailing address is: Ansan P.O. Box 29, Seoul 425-600, Korea.

⁶⁵ Location: Samsung Bldg No. 3, 9-2 Samsung-dong, Kangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea.

⁶⁶ Location: Kangwon Bldg, 1024-4 Daechi-dong, Kangnam-gu, Seoul, Korea.

⁶⁷ Location: Korea Chamber of Commerce Building, 12th Floor, 45 Namdaemoon-ro, Chung-gu, Seoul, Korea.

⁶⁸ Location: 373-1 Koosung-dong, Yusong-gu, Taejon, Korea.

⁶⁹ Location: 150 Duckjin-dong, Yusong-gu, Taejon, Korea.

⁷⁰ Location: 280-17, Bookwang-dong, Eunpyong-gu, Seoul, Korea.

⁷¹ Seoul intends to make environmental issues a core element in secondary education as a way to cultivate an environmental consciousness among the South Korean masses (The Korea Herald, July 9, 1994, p. 3). On the international conference circuit the government's representatives face competition from NGO activists, as subsequent notes indicate, but Seoul regularly sends extremely solid technocratic experts from its think tank cadres to these meetings. For example, see Dr. Oh Jin-gyu (Senior Researcher of the Korean Energy Economics Institute), "Preparations of Korea for the Climate Change Convention," presented at the Symposium on UNCED and Prospects for the Environmental Regime in the 21st Century, Seoul, September 2-5, 1992.

⁷² This was advocated at a Foreign Ministry Chiefs of Mission Conference, April 15, 1993 and described in the International Economic Bureau's Jigu hwan gyung non ui dong hyang (Global Environment Discussion Movement). It also was advocated at the Foreign Ministry's January 18, 1994, Jigu hwan gyung shilmu dae chek hwae ui (Global Environment Practical Business Countermeasures Conference) under the title ''94 Hwan gyung waegyo chujin bang hyang mit gye hwak' ('94 Environmental Diplomacy Promotional Direction and Planning).

⁷³ Korea Newsreview, May 21, 1994, p. 7.

⁷⁴ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy's Han Taek-whan in The Korea Herald, April 22, 1994, p. 1. For additional background on a prospective Green Round and its meaning for Asia, see Greening World Trade, Greenpeace International, April 1994; and Achieving the APEC Union: Free and Open Trade in the Asia Pacific, Second Report of the Eminent Persons Group, August 1994, pp. 27-29.

⁷⁵ Rhee Shang-hi, "Strategies to Survive Green Round," Korea Focus, May-June 1994, pp. 32-40 (translated from Shin Dong - A Monthly, February 1994).

⁷⁶ "Time to Prepare for Environmental War," Kyunghyang Shinmun editorial, January 19, 1994, in Korea Focus, March-April 1994, pp. 129-130.

⁷⁷ For coverage of a Korea Development Bank report on how far behind South Korea is relative to industrialized nations, see The Korea Herald, July 10, 1994, p. 8.

⁷⁸ The Korea Herald, June 12, 1994, p. 8 and September 3, 1994, p. 8.

⁷⁹ The Korea Herald, June 19, 1994, p. 2.

⁸⁰ Kim Song-jong (Professor of Microbiology at Seoul National University), "South-North Cooperation Vital to Ecological Protection," Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 5, 1992, in Korea Focus, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1993, pp. 102-104.

⁸¹ Citing data from Konkuk University, The Korea Herald, June 1, 1994, p. 2. For further background on the complex background of South Korea's environmental NGOs, see Nishina Kenichi, "Saikin kankoku jijo, orimpikku to rodosha" (Recent Korean Situation, the Olympics and Labor) in Toku shu / Kankoku no han kaku

han kogai undo (Special Edition / The Anti-Nuclear, Anti-Pollution Movement of South Korea) - Gijutsu to ningen (Technology and Humans) Vol. 17, No. 9, September 1988, pp. 10-17.

⁸² Yu aen hwan kyung kaebal jigu hwankyung hwae ui (UN Global Forum). Seoul: Konghae chu bang undong yun hab (Anti-Pollution Movement Association), April, 1992; Yu aen hwan kyung kaebal hwae ui (UNCED) wa gook jae hwan kyung hyup yak yungu (UN Environment and Development Conference [UNCED] and International Environment Treaty Research), Seoul: Kong hae chu bang undong yun hab yungu ui won hui hwan kyung kwa hak bun kwa (Anti-Pollution Movement Association, Research Committee, Environmental Science Department, May 1992; Jun gook hwan kyung o yum hyun hwang, Seoul: Kong hae chu bang undong yun hab yungu ui won hui hwan kyung kwa hak bun kwa (Anti-Pollution Movement Association, Research Committee, Environmental Science Department, September 1992.

⁸³ Yoo Jae-hyun, Editor, Environment and Development in Korea (Seoul: Korea NGO Forum for UNCED, June 1992).

⁸⁴ Jigu hwan kyung hwae ui; sae gyae mingan dan chae hwan kyung hyub yak (Global Environment Forum; Global NGO Alternative Treaties), Seoul: Dae han YMCA yun maeng bu sul hwan kyung kyo yook, jung bu saen ta, (Korea YMCA League Annex, Environmental Education, Information Center), September 1992.

⁸⁵ Yoo Jae-hyun, Environment and Development in Korea, op. cit., provides an extensive list of NGOs that participated in UNCED. From that list, those which are most clearly focused on the environment are: Korea Economic Justice Institute, Kwangjoo Citizen's Association for Environmental Conservation, Environmental Research Institute for Tomorrow, Greenpeace Citizen's Movement Coalition, Taegu Association of Anti-Pollution Movement, Masan-Changwon Citizen's League for Anti-Pollution Movement, Mokpo Green Research Institute, Paedal Environmental Institute, Pusan Citizen's Council for Anti-Pollution Movement, Yonsei Environment and Pollution Research Institute, Research Institute for Environmental Pollution, along with numerous local anti-pollution, anti-nuclear, women's and religious organizations. Given the fluidity with which such groups rearrange themselves, there is no guarantee that Dr. Yoo's list remains valid, but his book does provide names, addresses, and phone numbers for a diverse group as of 1992.

⁸⁶ For background on the KFEM, see its English brochure entitled Korean Federation for Environment and Movement, undated, but probably 1993. For more complete information on its membership, see Hwan kyung un saeng myung ipnida (Environment is Life), Seoul: Hwankyung undong yunhab, undated, but probably 1994. The latter also comprises a cross-section of Korean NGOs, although it does not provide addresses. For examples of its occasional publications that try to cultivate environmental awareness, see: Shimin hwan kyung hak gyo ja ryo jip (Citizens Environmental School Data Collection), Seoul: Hwan kyung undong yun hab (KFEM), 1993; and Mul un saeng myung ipnida (Water is Life), Seoul: Hwan kyung undong yun hab (KFEM), 1994.

⁸⁷ For coverage of Greenpeace in South Korea, see: The Korea Herald, February 16, 1994, p. 3; April 13, 1994, p. 3; and April 23, 1994, p. 3. For a KFEM diary of the Greenpeace ship's trip to Korea and an interview with its captain, see Lee Kun-heng (KFEM Executive Secretary), "*In ryu choi hu ui jun sun ul ji ki nun sarram dul*" (People who guard the frontline of last humankind), Hwan kyung undong, May 1994, pp. 44-51.

⁸⁸ The Korea Herald, February 6, 1994, p. 3.

⁸⁹ The Korea Herald, June 2, 1994, p. 3; and June 6, 1994, p. 3.

⁹⁰ For a concise statement of their aspirations, see, "Seoul Declaration Towards Cooperation of Environmental NGOs in Asia-Pacific Region," Kankyo to kogai, Vol. 23, No. 1, July 1993, pp. 18-19.

⁹¹ The Korea Herald, April 24, 1994, p. 8, and FEER, August 18, 1994, pp. 42-44. For additional background on that issue, see Richard A. Johnson, "Trade Measures and the Environment: New Challenges for Pacific Rim Trade and Investment," presented at the American Bar Association and Inter-Pacific Bar Association Conference on Trade and the Environment in Pacific Rim Nations, (Hong Kong: February, 1992); and Lyuba Zarsky, "Lessons of Liberalization in Asia: From Structural Adjustment to Sustainable Development," Nautilus Institute Report to the Asian Development Bank Office of the Environment, July 1993.

⁹² For a review of those differences, see Pat Murdo, "Cooperation, Conflict in US-Japan Environmental Relations," IEI Report, May 28, 1993.

⁹³ For an opposition Democratic Party Assemblyman's (Lim Bok-jin) criticism of that issue, see The Korea Herald, February 22, 1994, pp. 2-3.

⁹⁴ For a survey of those linkages, see: Lee Hae-sung, "The Effects of Economic Development on the Environment in the Northeast Asian Region," The Korean Journal of International Studies, Spring 1994, pp. 95-113. See, also, Han Taek-whan (of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy), "Northeast Asia Environmental Cooperation: Progress and Prospects," presented at Workshop on Trade and Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, East-West Center, Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.

⁹⁵ The following ROK Government statements indicate Seoul's interest in Northeast Asian environmental cooperation: Prime Minister Chung Won-shik, ligu hwan kyung bojun ul wihan tongbuk ah juyuk hyup ryuk (Northeast Asia Regional Cooperation for the Global Environment) presented at the opening of the Hangook paljun yun gu won (Korea Development Research Center) July 10, 1992; Dong buk ah hwan kyung hyup ryuk gae yo (Northeast Asia Environment Cooperation, Summary), Seoul: Hwan kyung chuh (Environment Agency), undated but approximately late 1993 or early 1994, based on description of completed and prospective meetings; and "Dong buk ah hwan kyung hyub ryuk," (Northeast Asian Environment Cooperation), Seoul: Kyung jae ki hwaek won (Economic Planning Agency) excerpt from larger previous study, updated January 1994.

⁹⁶ A series of bilateral Korea-Japan Environment Science and Technology Symposia have been held. Papers from these have appeared in various places. For a relevant example, see: Lee Sang-don, "Environmental Protection in the Northeast Asian Region," The Korean Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 19, 1991, pp. 117-133 from

the Third Korea-Japan Symposium May 13-15, 1991, held in Seoul. In addition, a number of multilateral environmental conferences sponsored by South Korean agencies have had heavy representation from the ROK and Japan. For example, see: The Second Northeast Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation; Proceedings (September 15-17, 1993) Seoul: Ministry of Environment.

⁹⁷ For example, Lee Sang-don, op. cit., offers a very positive interpretation of Japan's environmental record and the desirability of innovative cooperative measures, pp. 129-132. For a Japanese readership, Rho Chae-shik, "Kankoku ni okeru kankyo osen mondai" (Environment Pollution Problems in South Korea), Kogai kenkyu (Pollution Research), Vol. 20, No. 2, October 1990, pp. 30-36, offers a survey of Korean conditions.

⁹⁸ This has been suggested by Korean scholars. See, for example, Rhee Seung-keun, "The Role of Northeast Asian Security Cooperation and Future Global Peace," presented at The First Northeast Asia Defense Forum, November 3-5, 1993, Seoul, co-sponsored by the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis and the Research Institute for Peace and Security (Tokyo); and Lee Sang-kyu, "Dong buk ah ji yuk ui hwan kyung bojun ul wihan hyub ryuk bang an susul" (An Introduction of a Cooperative Plan for Environmental Security in the Northeast Asia Region), Hwan kyung bub yungu (Environmental Law Research) Vol. 13, 1991, pp. 9-15.

⁹⁹ Robert Scalapino, "Historical Perception and Current Realities Regarding Northeast Asian Regional Cooperation," North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue Research Programme, Working Paper Number 20, October 1992, p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Han joong hwankyung hyup ryuk choojin su rip yun gu (ROK-PRC Environmental Cooperation Promotional Plan Research Establishment), Seoul: Tae wae kyung jae jung chek yun gu won (Foreign Economic Policy Research Institute), Hwan kyung chuh (Environment Agency), April 27, 1993.

¹⁰¹ "Han joong hwan kyung hyup ryuk hyup jung su myung" (ROK-PRC Environmental Cooperation Agreement), Wae mu bu bo do ja ryo (Foreign Ministry Information Material [Press Release]), October 28, 1993.

¹⁰² Text of Dae han min gook jung bu wa joong hwa in min kong hwa gook jung bu kan ui hwan kyung hyup ryuk ae kwan han hyup jung (Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the Peoples Republic of China), prepared by the ROK in 1993 and obtained in June 1994. See also coverage of the talks leading to the agreement, The Korea Herald, May 28, 1994, p. 2 and June 5, 1994, p. 2.

¹⁰³ Report of the Second Meeting of the Council for US-Japan Security Relations, San Francisco, March 30-April 1, 1994 (Sponsored by the Center for International Strategy, Technology, and Policy, Georgia Institute of Technology), p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Damon Darlin, "North Korean Economy Appears to Stay Afloat Despite Shortages," The Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, June 1, 1992, p. 6.

¹⁰⁵ Sin Jae-chol, "Tree planting in full swing," The Pyongyang Times, April 9, 1994, p. 5. See, also, the comments about Kim Jong-il's "green campaign" for Pyongyang, Pyongyang Times, September 24, 1994, p. 5.

¹⁰⁶ Cha Myong-chol, "The sea into arable land," The Pyongyang Times, June 11, 1994, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Status Report/DPRK Country Programme, received from UNDP/New York, August 8, 1994. An outline of the DPRK's Law of Environmental Protection is in Joseph Morgan and Mark Valencia, Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 138-139.

¹⁰⁸ Tumen River Area Development Programme Status Report - June 1994, p. 3. See, also, Han Sung-baek, "Environmental Situation of DPRK," presented at UNDP-TRADP Preliminary Environmental Assessment Workshop, Beijing, April 1994; and Ma Jiang, "Tumen River: Environmental and Tourism Guidelines for Development Planning," presented at Workshop on Trade and Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, East-West Center, Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.

¹⁰⁹ The most pointed argument on that behalf was Mark Valencia, "Involving the DPRK in Northeast Asia Regional Economic and Environmental Cooperation," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development (Berkeley: January 1994). Along the same lines, the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation did engage the DPRK in the July 1993 planning stage of a "Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue," but they did not participate in the actual Dialogue, October 8-9, 1993, IGCC Newsletter, Spring 1994, p. 10.

¹¹⁰ Two examples of such successes that are relevant to environmental issues were an "International Conference on Cooperation in the Economic Development of the Coastal Zone of Northeast Asia," Ch'ang ch'un, China, July 16-18, 1990 for which A Summary was prepared by Cho Lee-jay and Mark J. Valencia, for the East-West Center, April 1991. Among the participants cited were experts from the Commission of Science and Technology Cooperation between the DPRK and PRC (Pyongyang), the DPRK Institute of Geology (Pyongyang), the DPRK Central Bureau of Mineral Investigation (Pyongseong), the DPRK Academy of Science (Pyongyang), and the DPRK Institute of Zoology (Pyongyang); and a UNIDIR "Conference on Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia," May 25-27, 1994, Seoul, at which a Senior Researcher, Pae Sang-hak, from the DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace (Pyongyang), presented a paper on "The Nuclear Issue in Northeast Asia and the Ways to Resolve the Issue," that addressed nuclear dumping as an environmental threat.

¹¹¹ For example, in the course of research for this study, an attempt was made to secure North Korea's perspective on the UNEP's NOWPAP plans. The UNEP's Regional Seas Programme's Oceans and Coastal Areas Programme Activity Centre (Nairobi), which coordinates these efforts in Northeast Asia, could not provide them because, "in the current sensitive atmosphere surrounding the DPRK, we are unable to say when we will have their views and therefore be free to publish." Correspondence, June 21, 1994.

¹¹² For details on that session, see: the various papers compiled (January 29, 1993) for ESCAP's "Meeting of Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-East Asia," February 8-11, 1993, Seoul; and the "Report of the Meeting," compiled September 30, 1993. Prepared by, and received from, ESCAP, Bangkok.

¹¹³ The Korea Herald, July 16, 1994, p. 3; and August 14, 1994, p. 15.

114 Text of "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North, Signed by South and North Korean Prime Ministers at the Fifth Round of the Inter-Korean High-Level Talks, Seoul, December 13, 1991." Korea and World Affairs, Winter 1991, pp. 768-771.

115 Hanguok Ilbo, July 14, 1994, p. 11C.

116 Kim Jong-il. On the Further Development of Science and Technology (Speech to the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea, August 3, 1985). Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, 1989, pp. 8-12.

117 Correspondence from the Vice President for Academic Affairs, Asian Institute of Technology, July 21, 1994.

118 Aso Soichiro, "*Nippon ga sasaeru kita chosen no genpatsu keikaku*," Shokun, May 1990, pp. 84-87.

119 Sato Katsumi, Kita chosen "han" no kaku senryaku (The "Resentment" Bomb: North Korea's Nuclear Strategy), Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1993.

120 Draft sections on the environment, UNDP, April 1994.

121 The Korea Herald, April 30, 1994, p. 2, and May 3, 1994, p. 4; and The Pyongyang Times, April 23, 1994, p. 7.

122 This occurred at the IPPNW's Asia-Pacific conference in Kuala Lumpur. The Korea Herald, August 10, 1994, p. 2.

123 For a brief overview of CSCAP, see FEER, June 30, 1994, p. 29.

VI

Compared to regional environmental CBMs that seem somewhat arcane to many policy makers who constitute the target audience, or regional economic CBMs that are well studied and so widely understood that they sometimes do not seem to qualify for the label CBM any longer (except vis-à-vis the DPRK), ocean policy cooperation -- in all its manifestations -- has elements of both sets of attributes. As will be shown here, this is an area that has received considerable attention from experts, is acknowledged to be important by big-picture grand strategists and foreign policy makers, yet remains remarkably arcane from the latter group's vantage point.

An excellent example of this perspective is the following section of a 1990 APEC pronouncement on that organization's plans in which the members agreed:

...to establish a dialogue on the Pacific marine environment which recognizes the economic benefits of sustainable development. The initial focus of this dialogue would be the maritime transport of hazardous substances, the discharge of marine pollutants, and the problem of marine debris.¹

Clearly, the Ministers were being advised that it was important to include such an item, but just as clearly this is not the stuff of headlines in the world's press. Nonetheless, it does not require much investigation to discover that there are many highly qualified experts in all the cognate disciplines that deal with the oceans who have focused on East Asian

waters, including those of Northeast Asia. An outstanding result of that expertise is the Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (1992), that is simultaneously a tool for specialists in all the aspects of that issue and an accessible survey for non-experts.² This analysis will not attempt to replicate the store of knowledge embodied in that volume which is strongly recommended to readers. Instead, the focus here shall be on the ways the ocean policy issues it (and other expert studies cited here) covers help to shape CBMs in Northeast Asia.

As the quote from APEC indicates, there is genuine political concern about the status of the Asia-Pacific region's waters. In the forefront of that concern are anxieties over naval capabilities and rivalries. As noted early in this analysis, that important issue which constrains the possibilities for regional CBMs is beyond this study's scope yet provides its context. Nearly as visible, and a cause of considerable anxiety because of its implications for food supplies and potentials for national conflict, is the question of fisheries maintenance.³ This shall be addressed below with reference to the three countries of Northeast Asia. These and other concerns have provoked growing interest⁴ and activism on behalf of stabilizing the region's seas. Much of the activism occurs against a backdrop of UNEP programs entitled Coordinating Body on the Seas of East Asia (COBSEA), and the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), and UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Sub-Commission for the Western Pacific (IOC/WESTPAC).⁵ These specialists' gatherings receive considerable attention and praise within the community of experts they address, but the results of their activities seem constrained by their relatively arcane attributes. These, too, are not the stuff of press

headlines. This does not diminish their intrinsic importance, nor reduce their potential utility as CBMs. In fact, they clearly are CBMs among specialists. A question remains, however, about how broad the political appeal of such CBMs may ever be.

There have been (and are still) efforts to use these themes for broader purposes. In Northeast Asia it is best to focus on the Japan/East Sea that is fully within the region and this shall be the scope of the remainder of this section. However, it is worth noting that a series of ROK-PRC conferences on the Yellow Sea, in which specialists presented papers likely to appeal primarily to other experts, and to strike national policy makers as arcane,⁶ nonetheless constituted the building-blocks in the CBM process that eventually led the way to genuine tension-reduction and diplomatic normalization between the two countries. What is much less certain is whether the presence of these ocean-oriented CBMs made much difference to the improvement in ROK-PRC relations when compared to the end of the cold war and all its corollaries. It seems doubtful that it did, yet this cannot be proven. Also, it is important to note for future reference to developments in the Japan/East Sea that the North Koreans were conspicuously absent from those Yellow Sea conferences. Regardless of all that, now that the cold war is history, and the ROK and PRC enjoy formal relations and growing economic ties, it has become much easier for the two countries to cooperate with each other on issues such as pollution and resource management in the Yellow Sea area.⁷

Turning to the Japan/East Sea, it is first important to underline the conflicting claims to that body of water. As the dual names indicate, this is

a matter of genuine significance politically and culturally. It influences the nationalist drives in Japan and both Koreas, and is a "hot button" issue that politicians know they can push for manipulative effect. Beyond the name, there are genuine rivalries over conflicting claims to the waters, an island within it (*Tokto / Takeshima*), resources beneath the water, fish in the water, transit rights, and the legitimacy of dumping in the water.⁸ To be sure, the Russians also are a major factor in those claims and remain a powerful player in the region despite the demise of the Soviet Union. Their role shall be addressed indirectly only, because the focus here is on the Asian states of Northeast Asia.

There have been a number of attempts to generate international cooperation regarding the Japan/East Sea with an emphasis on the maritime aspects of the sea⁹ (as compared to its economic and environmental facets that were cited earlier). Subjectively, it would be reasonable to guess that Japan would be far in the forefront in any regional effort to cooperate in the care and management of the body of water that (for most people) bears its name. This is especially so because Japan is a deservedly renowned maritime state that clearly is among the world's leaders when it comes to the study, preservation, and exploitation of the sea.¹⁰ Partly because Japan's maritime interests and capabilities are global, making it a superpower in this realm in ways that no other Asian state even approximates, the Sea of Japan does not loom so large on its horizon. There are other, equally important, reasons for the moderate level of Japanese attention to the Sea of Japan. In terms of national development priorities, climate, population centers, access to the main oceanic transportation routes, and -- during the cold war -- proximity to two hostile

states (North Korea and the Soviet Union), the portion of Japan that faced the Japan Sea evolved into a relative backwater. Its Japanese name, *ura nippon* (back of Japan), was descriptive in multiple respects. Due to domestic political pressures, the end of the cold war, and interest in Japan -- and abroad -- in trying to convert this somewhat neglected region into a vehicle for CBMs amongst the adjoining countries, Japanese relative indifference toward the area was rectified.

The foundation for this shift was Japan's adjustment to changing international attitudes on Law of the Sea matters.¹¹ Reinforcing that foundation was Japanese recognition that its global concerns over sustainable fisheries, which were succinctly expressed by the Japanese Delegation at the United Nations in 1993:

As a nation surrounded by the sea, Japan has been dependent on marine resources since the earliest of times. It is acutely aware of the danger posed by over-exploitation of fisheries and degradation of marine habitats around the world, and of the pressing need for long-term and sustainable conservation and management measures, particularly for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks...¹²

are vividly expressed in its own backyard. This has led Japan to place particular emphasis on fisheries cooperation with its three neighbors on the Japan Sea rim -- Russia and the two Koreas.¹³ It is interesting that the cited studies on those cooperative efforts indicate that there is also modest concrete cooperation by Japan with North Korea on the NGO level. These signs suggest that the DPRK can be brought into cooperative environmental arrangements when its national interests dictate. Of course, Japan-ROK fisheries cooperation at the state-to-state level where

negotiations have been conducted since the 1965 signing of a Fisheries Accord, marking their 28th round in April 1994,¹⁴ and on a private industry-to-industry level,¹⁵ are an even more impressive illustration of two neighbors with sometimes tense relations being compelled by the need to reconcile their interests to achieve remarkable progress through a series of CBMs.

Such fisheries cooperation in the Japan/East Sea is a promising indicator of the possibilities inherent in other environmental CBMs in the region. Just as Japan was led from a general interest in international fisheries concerns to a localized version in its backyard, there may be similar prospects for Japan to apply its overall concern for oceanic pollution and its impact on Japan's interests¹⁶ to a localized focus on the Japan/East Sea.¹⁷ So far, the problem is that these focused concerns remain insufficiently structured in the eyes of experts. For example, as Mizukami Chiyuki, a specialist from Hiroshima University, noted in 1993, "In the East Asia region there is no regional arrangement to protect the marine environment" and, "in the Sea of Japan region, there is no regional arrangement to protect the marine environment," but, "the bases for international cooperation in the protection of the marine environment are being developed," and therefore, "the conclusion of a regional convention for the protection of the marine environment and the establishment of a regional commission like the Baltic Marine Environment Commission may be appropriate future steps for the Sea of Japan region."¹⁸ It may also be important that Japan's *Shakaito* (Socialist Party), or -- as it prefers to be known in English since the end of the cold war -- the Social Democratic Party of Japan, held an International Forum on the Japan Sea Rim in

Kanagawa that issued a "Declaration on the Environment of the Japan Sea Rim," November 30, 1992. It calls for a "consensus among the concerned parties" based on an "equal partnership."¹⁹ This detailed declaration's credibility is enhanced by the accession to the prime ministership of Socialist leader Murayama Tomiichi, as part of the ruling coalition in 1994, and the past record of the JSP/SDPJ in cultivating contacts with North Korea -- always the most intractable party in regional cooperation schemes. Efforts and aspirations of this sort are the most promising venue for expanding Japan's marine environmental role in the Japan/East Sea.

Compared to Japan, South Korea's approach to the marine environment of the East/Japan Sea is based on a different perspective. South Korean experts share with their Japanese counterparts the global holism that anyone working on environmental issues accepts as an axiom. South Korean rhetoric reflects that similarity. When it comes to implementing environmental policy, however, South Koreans do not have the capacities of their Japanese counterparts to spread their activities globally. The reach of South Korean theory is global and some activities are far flung, as will be noted below, but -- relative to Japan -- South Korean experts are often constrained by necessity to the "act locally" portion of the bumper sticker slogan. Consequently, despite the smaller capabilities of the ROK's marine institutions,²⁰ they appear to be comparable to their Japanese counterparts because they devote so much of their attention to local waters compared to the more globalist agendas of the Japanese institutions. Moreover, in contrast to Japan which has no confusion over its maritime identity, enabling its maritime specialists to easily present their

arguments for research or policy prescriptions, South Korean experts do not enjoy that advantage.

Historically Korea had a continentalist orientation in political, economic, and strategic affairs. As a coastal society, water-borne trade and fisheries played roles, but -- on balance -- they were relatively minor ones. It was not until Korea's division and the creation of the ROK, denying South Korea land access to the continent, that it started to function like an island. As South Korea's economy prospered via an export-led development plan modeled on Meiji Japan's, as its merchant and fisheries fleets grew, and as its ship-building industry was encouraged by Seoul for economic and strategic reasons, the ROK increasingly assumed characteristics that warrant the label maritime state. Nonetheless, its non-maritime heritage remained politically and culturally entrenched in government circles. Consequently, those South Koreans who appreciated the shift toward a maritime orientation have had to be far more activist, assertive, and lobby-like in their statements and writings. Compared to their Japanese counterparts, therefore, the South Koreans have had a harder sell and have approached the tasks of marine development, protection, and preservation with a kind of zeal that is akin to a proselytizer. Some of that hard-sell approach exists in other countries, too, because they have to convince a multilateral audience of diverse interests. South Koreans face that task, but also must convince their own government that maritime issues are as important as South Korean experts assert they are.

Against that institutional background, and given the security interests of South Korea vis-à-vis North Korea, and strategic anxieties about Japan and the United States in the future, it is logical that one of the major thrusts of contemporary ROK maritime innovation is driven by naval motives. This does not detract from the ROK's advocacy of broader, more comprehensive, perspectives in security. For a country in which politics, the bureaucracy, and the budget have been so strongly influenced by the ROK Army's clout in the Ministry of Defense, an expansion into the naval realm is a bold departure. Equally important for present purposes, it has consequences for broader marine policy. As the ROK Navy begins to assume a broader mandate and be seen in Seoul as an instrument with which the ROK can enhance its multilateralist credentials, all those environmental issues that matter to navies elsewhere start to gain credibility in Seoul.²¹

The leading advocate for both the stronger naval and broader maritime perspective in South Korea is "The SLOC Study Group - Korea." This organization started in 1981 with a function reflected in its name, the examination of ROK options vis-à-vis Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) that then was becoming a prime issue for the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, particularly in the channels between Japan and Korea and Japan and the Soviet Union. Over the years the SLOC Study Group's self-imposed mandate expanded to a much broader range of maritime issues, its membership broadened to become a veritable "who's who" of maritime experts plus policy analysts, and it created a special niche as the preeminent South Korean NGO advocating a stronger ROK Navy, expanded marine science capabilities, and an altered identity for South

Korea (and for a united Korea in the future) as a full-fledged maritime state able to hold its own in regional alliance relations as well as regional maritime scientific and technological cooperation.²² Because of the weak Korean maritime legacy noted above, this activist role makes this group more important in South Korea than any comparable entity in Japan. Its entrepreneurial Director, Dr. Kim Dal-choong, is an articulate advocate of Northeast Asian Maritime Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (MCSBMs) that incorporate reduction of naval and commercial shipping incidents at sea, naval transparency efforts to minimize mutual fears, and a full range of marine environmental cooperation.²³ As upbeat as Dr. Kim is about the merits of these endeavors and the high caliber of South Korean expertise in relevant functional areas, as of mid-1994 he remained cautious in his prognosis because of inadequate governmental policy-level enthusiasm and found the SLOC Study Group's challenges to be formidable.²⁴

South Korea's interest in the marine environment appears to be genuine if somewhat stratified. In terms of expertise there is a base of full-fledged scientific and technological specialists, notably concentrated at the *Hanguk hae yang yungu so* (Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute - KORDI) on the outskirts of Seoul. It conducts a full range of oceanographic, marine geological, ocean engineering and policy, and polar research activities. The latter is a clear example of South Korean global interests, but much of its marine studies seem to be focused closer to home. KORDI acts as the key coordinator for South Korea's university-based marine research, international marine cooperation, and marine publications.²⁵ It clearly is a valuable resource for the various advocates of

an enhanced maritime and marine role for the ROK. Scholars interviewed for this analysis often referred to two acknowledged experts on the various aspects of ROK maritime and marine policy, Dr. Lee Seo-hang and Dr. Park Jin-hyun at the Foreign Ministry's Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, as a kind of "brain trust" for that Ministry and the Environment Ministry. This appears accurate, but their personal backgrounds are in law and political science and they rely on KORDI and other agencies (i.e. the nuclear-related offices for dumping matters) for their technical information.²⁶ Beyond such bureaucratic layering, Seoul also deals with marine issues on discretely domestic, multilateralist, and bilateral bases.

The ROK has gradually evolved a body of national laws to cope with its marine environment²⁷ which provides a framework upon which to enter into international arrangements. Many of the latter are connected to the United Nations. Although the commitment of various states to the UN arrangements is sometimes questioned, Seoul does appear to engage in these regional CBMs with serious intent.²⁸ Bilaterally, the ROK is involved in a number of projects that affect the marine environment. One which has caught the public's attention is the fear of Russian nuclear waste dumping at sea that has caused Seoul to join with Russia and with Japan to try to control or eliminate it, and to measure its impact on the East/Japan Sea.²⁹ As noted in connection with ROK-Japan fisheries cooperation, Seoul has a long-standing interest in South Korea's fisheries. Coupled with international pressures to fully open its domestic fisheries market that is now planned for 1997,³⁰ South Korea has been cooperating with Russia to regulate their share of fisheries catches so the resource can remain sustainable.³¹ South Korea also has worked closely with Russia, Japan, and

China on the development of sea bed fiber-optic cable networks, some starting in 1994, and others in 1995.³²

Also on the sea-bed, but much further afield, is South Korea's unilateral effort to join the ranks of some technologically sophisticated countries in the business of mining the sea-bed for manganese, cobalt, copper, and nickel. Seoul has applied to the United Nations for the right to develop an area southwest of Hawaii and has created a group for that purpose, composed of government agencies, state-backed research institutes, and corporations.³³ Launching an endeavor of that magnitude is a sign of how much South Korea's thinking and aspirations vis-à-vis its status as a maritime state have evolved. Although it is not yet on a par with Japan, it clearly wants to play in the same game. For all of the sincere efforts by South Koreans to cooperate with Japan on marine issues in which they share a common stake,³⁴ there are many maritime issues in which the ROK and Japan clearly are competitive. Some, like fisheries, are amenable to cooperation, but others such as naval affairs, commercial shipping, or ship-building,³⁵ are less likely candidates for workable CBMs.

The situation for North Korea is strikingly different. In terms of public pronouncements and references to DPRK marine environment policy or institutions, there is a virtual vacuum. In contrast to Japan's thirty-seven listings and South Korea's thirteen listings, the comprehensively researched Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas cites only one North Korean marine research center -- the Hydrometeorological Service in Pyongyang.³⁶ Similarly, the Atlas states succinctly that:

There are no known North Korean laws regulating marine scientific research in its Territorial Sea or EEZ. In a decree of 1 August 1977 that proclaimed a 200-nmi EEZ, North Korea appeared to prohibit most foreign activities without the express consent of the government. The military zone further restricts possible marine scientific research by prohibiting virtually all navigation and overflight.³⁷

The UNDP also refers to another set of relevant organizations in the DPRK -- the East and West Sea Ocean Institutes.³⁸

In this situation, it is no surprise that those analysts who have ventured to assess North Korean maritime- or marine-related themes, have had to do without substantial or any access to North Korean materials.³⁹ When South Korean maritime specialists were queried about their North Korean counterparts, who they were and where they worked, answers varied slightly. One policy expert noted that the DPRK sends the same small group of representatives to UN environment conferences, but did not believe they were authentic experts, merely spokesmen. This ROK expert admitted he wondered whether the DPRK actually had real substantive experts. Other ROK maritime experts shared that skepticism and also expressed puzzlement about the quality, size, and scope of counterpart institutions in the DPRK. A couple of maritime policy experts thought that KORDI might have had contacts with the DPRK's equivalent, but its public information material (see note 25) does not mention any kind of cooperation with North Korean institutions. On balance, South Korean specialists in maritime issues appear to be as disadvantaged regarding access to North Korean materials as Western experts.⁴⁰

Despite those information handicaps, there are two realms from which some information flows about North Korean marine issues. The main source is through the United Nations' agencies which deal with the marine environment. Just as South Korea reacted promptly to changes in the Law of the Sea in the early 1980s, North Korea did too. One notable statement from the DPRK came in 1983, from Yi Chun-ok, then the Deputy Director of the Law Institute of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences, who explained his reasons for participating in the Japanese Foreign Ministry's "Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee" as a response to the agenda's focus on the Law of the Sea issues. He said, "Being surrounded by seas, our country has particular interest in the Law of the Sea."⁴¹ On marine issues, the UNEP's NOWPAP has been most productive of North Korean positions. Preparatory meetings were held three times (1991, '92, and '93) in Vladivostok, Beijing, and Bangkok and attended by North Koreans. The First Intergovernmental Conference of NOWPAP was held in Seoul, September 13-15, 1994, but North Korea did not participate.⁴² The most detailed, relevant document to emerge from the DPRK was a result of this process -- the National Report of the DPRK on the Marine Environment (1992).⁴³ These talks clearly are the most effective marine environmental CBMs that enable the two Koreas to participate in a multilateral forum, present their positions, and be part of consensus-building processes on matters that are substantively important to Koreans on both sides of the divisive border yet are politically fairly benign. While that relative innocuousness is part of the reason these talks have progressed as far as they have, it also is the reason the NOWPAP process is virtually unknown to regional political and security leaders and specialists. Although it is a CBM, it scarcely registers as such in the minds

of high-level officials. Nonetheless, in the strained geopolitical circumstances that envelop Korea and its region even a small step in the direction of harmony is a significant incremental chip in the edifice of Korea's cold war.

In a related area, the United Nations also has allowed North Korea a platform for presenting its views on nuclear issues. Much of what it says is intended to distract attention from fears of the DPRK's nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, such presentations also can have broader significance. A 1994 UN-backed conference elicited the following portion of a paper that bears on North Korea's marine policies:

The nuclear danger in Northeast Asia lies in the terrible destruction of the ecological environment in this region resulting from the uncontrolled dumping of nuclear wastes, which leaves human life exposed to serious threat.

It is a gross violation of the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping Wastes and Other Matter (or the London Dumping Convention). This Convention prohibits dumping of high-level nuclear wastes at sea. In case of any dumping of nuclear wastes at the open seas, it requires "special permit" or "approval" from the International Atomic Energy Agency, and last year the Agency adopted another resolution calling for a total ban of the dumping of radioactive wastes at sea.

At present, however, there are actions underway gravely violating the provisions of the London Dumping Convention in the waters of Northeast Asia. According to the data available, in 1991 South Korea is said to have dumped at sea 142 trillion (U.S. unit) Bq. of radioactive wastes from its 9 atomic power stations in operation, while Japan dumped 36 trillion Bq. of radioactive wastes from all its 41 atomic power stations, and on October 17 of 1993, Russia dumped about 900 tons of radioactive wastes at a location nearly 500 kilometers west of Hokkaido. Particularly, the dumping of nuclear wastes by South Korea is responsible for worldwide concern and misgivings. The nuclear wastes dumped at sea by South Korea for the period seven years from 1986 to 1992 amounted to as much as 11,000 trillion Bq. (about 100,000 Ci.).

Tremendous is the aftereffect from the dumping of nuclear wastes by South Korea. The marine resources in the southern part of the East Sea

of Korea are drastically diminishing and the ecological environment is in jeopardy.⁴⁴

If one discounts the patent efforts to shift the focus of the nuclear debate toward an area in which North Korea's hands are comparatively clean, it is nonetheless an important perspective because it lays out a North Korean position which could be the basis for the ROK and Japan to channel their anti-dumping campaign aimed at Russia into a regional CBM that would permit the three Asian states in Northeast Asia to move toward a convergence of views.

The other realm from which some information about North Korea's marine policies flows is the DPRK-Japan fisheries connection noted briefly above. While the DPRK's official fisheries arrangements with Japan, the ROK, and Russia are ill-defined compared to the well-developed relationships amongst the latter three countries, North Korea nonetheless is a defacto participant in regional fisheries arrangements.⁴⁵ While much remains to be done in terms of bringing the DPRK into some more formal arrangement, the necessity of dealing with the real world interactions of the Northeast Asian countries' fishing fleets has, as a by-product, elicited a long-term exchange of views that often reflect tensions amongst the parties. Most of those views have been political in nature and do not bear directly on fisheries or other marine interests. They are still important as CBMs, however, because they represent moves to use maritime instruments to resolve broader tensions.

An excellent example was the series of DPRK-Japan negotiations that led to North Korea's 1990 release of two Japanese seamen from a frozen fish freighter (Fujisan Maru No. 18) who had been held for seven years and became a major controversy.⁴⁶ As important as that episode was for overall DPRK-Japan relations, it was not really an example of a marine CBM. However, a controversy that received less attention did suggest a perverse sort of maritime CBM. Also in 1990, twelve Japanese fishing boats were discovered to have been engaged in a privately arranged joint venture with North Korea that was considered legal in the DPRK but not in Japan. These boats carried about 170 Japanese crewmen, but operated in the guise of a North Korean fishing fleet using DPRK fish quotas in Soviet zones. These boats had North Korean captains, markings, and official papers.⁴⁷ While controversial at the time, these arrangements actually were a logical extension of the "private" fisheries arrangements that date from initiatives taken by the "Dietmen's League for Japan-Korea Friendship" in 1984 and the ostensibly NGO responses by North Korea.⁴⁸ These have aggravated ROK-Japan relations, but they also have amounted to a defacto NGO-level CBM involving the maritime fisheries interests of North Korea and Japan. To the extent they reflect an effort to cooperate to the mutual advantage of both countries, and to the extent they represent a measure to help draw out North Korea into broader economic relations, there may well be reason to encourage such joint ventures rather than block them. Also, virtually any measure that may help create authentic private interests in North Korea would seem to warrant the support of Japan and South Korea for inherent reasons and for their potential to foster genuine NGOs in the DPRK. The fisheries field holds some promise in that regard.

On balance, however, there is little reason for optimism regarding North Korea's maritime and marine cooperative potential. The threat perceptions of the DPRK that leads Pyongyang to be extraordinarily wary of enemies -- real or imagined -- leads North Korea to be inordinately prudent and suspicious about outsiders' intentions. A classic example of Pyongyang's over-reactions that relates to marine affairs was its strong condemnation of a purported plan to build a seabed tunnel from Japan to South Korea.⁴⁹ Any plan of that sort would be far more difficult to sell to Japanese and South Koreans than the "chunnel" was to Britain and France, not to mention the difficulties of actually building it. Nonetheless, North Korea's endemic suspicions caused it to leap to paranoid conclusions. Barring a major change for the better in the geopolitics of Northeastern Asia, North Korea and its suspicions are likely to remain out of step with its neighbors and their perceptions.

Notes

¹ Joint Statement 6, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Ministerial Meeting, Singapore, July 29-30, 1990.

² Joseph Morgan and Mark J. Valencia, Editors, Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

³ For press coverage of the ease with which tensions over fisheries depletion can escalate to modern "gunboat diplomacy," see The Christian Science Monitor, August 24, 1994, p. 7. For scholarly background on the issue, see: Joseph R. Morgan, "Large Marine Ecosystems of the Pacific Rim," in Kenneth Sherman, Lewis M. Alexander, and Barry D. Gold, Editors, Marine Ecosystems; Stress, Mitigation, and Sustainability (Washington, DC: AAAS Press, 1993), pp. 292-298.

⁴ This includes the inauguration in June 1994 of a highly specialized (and highly priced -- \$880 per year for a fortnightly four-page item) Asian Seas Newsletter that focuses on "Naval Intelligence and Strategy, Shipping, Trade and Industry, Oceanography, and Sea Resources," published by *La Lettre d'Asie Sarl* in Brest, France.

⁵ In addition to many of the other citations here which refer to these bodies, see: The official coverage of their activities in "Experience of Regional Environmental Cooperation Programmes," ESCAP/UNEP/UNDP, report prepared for a Meeting of

Senior Officials on Environmental Cooperation in North-East Asia, February 8-11, 1993, issued January 29, 1993; and the IOC/WESTPAC conference report: IOC Sub-Commission for the Western Pacific, Second Session, Bangkok, Thailand, January 25-29, 1993, and UNESCO's newsletter: WESTPAC INFORMATION, produced by the IOC/WESTPAC Project Coordinator, Mr. Li Haiqing, IOC Secretariat, 1 rue Miollis, 75732 Paris, France.

⁶ See Mark J. Valencia, International Conference on the Yellow Sea: Transnational Ocean Resource Management Issues and Options for Cooperation (A summary report of a conference held at the East-West Center, June 23-27, 1987), Honolulu: East-West Environment and Policy Institute, Occasional Paper No. 3, 1987; and Park Choon-ho, Kim Dal-choong, and Lee Seo-hang, Editors, The Regime of the Yellow Sea: Issues and Policy Options for Cooperation in the Changing Environment (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1990), based on a conference of the same name held June 20-21, 1989. See also, Huh Hyung-tack and Chung Sung-chul, "Natural Environmental Marine Resource Management Issues in the Yellow Sea" and Park Choon-ho, "Legal and Political Issues in the Yellow Sea," in Kim Dal-choong, Park Choon-ho, and Lee Seo-hang, Editors, Global Ocean Politics: Major Issues and Areas (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1989), pp. 193-217 and 219-227.

⁷ Chung-ang Ilbo, November 11, 1993, and The Korea Herald, March 29, 1994, p. 3. See also Lee Sang-don, "A Framework for Cooperation for the Protection of Marine Environment in the Yellow Sea," in Kim Dal-choong, Park Choon-ho, Lee Seo-hang, and Paik Jin-hyun, Editors, Exploring Maritime Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1993), pp. 59-77.

⁸ For overall coverage of those claims, see JRV Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas (Honolulu: East-West Environment and Policy Institute, Occasional Paper No. 4, 1987); and Douglas M. Johnston and Mark J. Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), pp. 113-115. For analysis by the region's preeminent legal scholar on those issues, see Park Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1983), especially chapter 1 on seabed claims, chapter 2 on fisheries, chapter 3 on economic zones, and chapters 4 and 5 on South and North Korean boundaries; "Central Pacific and East Asian Maritime Boundaries," in Jonathan I. Charney and Lewis M. Alexander, Editors, International Maritime Boundaries, Vol. 1 (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), pp. 297-302; and "River and Maritime Boundary Problems Between North Korea and Russia in the Tumen River and Sea of Japan," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Winter 1993, pp. 65-98. For specific analysis of regional continental shelf disputes, see Kim Byung-chin, "The Northeast Asian Continental Shelf Controversy: A Case Study in Conflict Resolution Among South Korea, Japan, and China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC)," Florida State University Ph.D., 1980, University Microfilms No. 8016669; and Lee Seo-hang, "South Korea and the Continental Shelf Issue: Agreements and Disagreements Between South Korea, Japan, and China," Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 55-71.

⁹ Notable examples include: Mark J. Valencia, Editor, International Conference on the Sea of Japan: Transnational Ocean Resource Management Issues and Options for

Cooperation, report of a conference in Niigata, Japan, October 11-14, 1988 (Honolulu: East-West Environment and Policy Institute, 1989); a "Working Group for Resource Management of the Sea of Japan" was sponsored by the International University of Japan in Niigata, September 24-26, 1992, and briefly described in the NEAEF Newsletter, Summer/Fall 1992, p. 12; Kim Dal-choong, Park Choon-ho, Lee Seo-hang, and Paik Jin-hyun, Editors, Exploring Maritime Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Possibility and Prospects (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1993), based on a conference of the same name held in Seoul, September 1-2, 1992, especially Mizukami Chiyuki's "A Framework for Cooperation for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Sea of Japan," pp. 79-93; and Daniel J. Dzurek, "An Analytical Model of Regional Seas Management: The Sea of Japan," in Elizabeth Mann Borgese, Norton Ginsburg, and Joseph R. Morgan, Editors, Ocean Yearbook 10 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 248-276, that calls for "cooperative management" of the Sea of Japan. See also Mark Valencia, "*Hokuto ajia no 'Umi no angen hosho,'*" ("Security of the Sea" of Northeast Asia), Foresight, May 1994, pp. 76-79.

¹⁰ For example, The Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas, op. cit., lists thirty-seven major research institutes in cognate sciences, p. 20. Japan's prowess as a naval power needs no elaboration here. Clearly, its contemporary Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is a world-class navy that other countries in Asia perceive as the region's best. Less well-known or publicized is the MSDF's expertise in, and utilization of, for defense and intelligence purposes, the sciences and technologies relevant to oceans. For a brief popularized survey of that issue, see Richard Deacon, Kempei Tai: The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1990), pp. 243-245.

¹¹ An excellent volume on that situation is Robert L. Friedheim, George O. Totten III, Fukui Haruhiro, Akaha Tsuneo, Takeyama Masayuki, Koga Mamoru, and Nakahara Hiroyuki, Japan and the New Ocean Regime (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984). See also Akaha Tsuneo, "Internalizing International Law: Japan and the Regime of Navigation Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea," Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1989, pp. 113-139.

¹² Statement by the Delegation of Japan on Implementation of Decisions and Recommendations of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development before the UN General Assembly, November 23, 1993, Press Release from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations, p. 5.

¹³ For detailed analysis of that focus, see Akaha Tsuneo, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Fishery Relations in the Sea of Japan," Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, Summer 1992, pp. 225-280; "The Postwar Japan-Soviet Fisheries Regime and Future Prospects," Norton Ginsberg and Joseph Morgan, Editors, Ocean Yearbook 9 (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1992), pp. 27-56; and "Japanese-Russian Fishery Joint Ventures and Operations: Opportunities and Problems," Marine Policy, May 1993, pp. 199-212. For additional background on Japanese thinking about the context for that focus, see: Hayashi Moritaka, "Fisheries in the North Pacific: Japan at a Turning Point," Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1991, pp. 343-364.

¹⁴ The Korea Herald, April 20, 1994, p. 21.

¹⁵ See the text of Nippon koku no dainippon suisankai to daikan minkoku no suisangyo kyodo kumiai chuokai to no aida ni okeru ryogoku no gyosenkan no sogyo no anzen oyobi chitsujo no iji

ni kansuru minkan torikime (NGO Decision Regarding Maintenance of Security and Order of Both Nation's Fishing Vessels' Operations Between the Japan Fisheries Association and the Republic of Korea Fisheries Central Cooperative Association), signed December 17, 1965 in Seoul. Text provided July 20, 1994 by Nishimura Masashi, International Division, Japan Fisheries Association.

¹⁶ For example, see: Kumamoto Nobuo, "Ocean Resources and Pollution in Japan," Hogaku kenkyu (Law Research), April 1989, pp. 584-563 (page numbering is accurate because it is an English language text in a Japanese language journal with page sequencing from the reader's right to left), published by Hokkai gaku en daigaku hogaku kai hen (Hokkai gaku en University Law Society Publication); and Motomura Shigeru, Konnichi no kaiyo kankyo mondai, "Today's Maritime Environmental Problems" Zen ei, October 1989, pp. 226-239.

¹⁷ See for example Ikeda Saburo and Kataoka Masaaki, "[Shi no umi] no kiken haramu 'kan nipponkai keizai ken netsu,'" (Dangerous "Sea of Death," Japan Sea Rim Economic Zone Fever), Ekonomisuto (Economist), September 21, 1993, pp. 79-85.

¹⁸ Mizukami Chiyuki, "A Framework for Cooperation for the Protection of the Marine Environment in the Sea of Japan," in Kim Dal-choong, Park Choon-ho, Lee Seo-hang, and Paik Jin-hyun, Editors, Exploring Maritime Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Possibilities and Prospects (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1993), p. 92.

¹⁹ Kan nihon kai kan kyo sen gen (Declaration on the Environment of the Japan Sea Rim) Gekkan Shakaito (Socialist Party Monthly), January 1993, pp. 170-171, includes both the Japanese and the English texts.

²⁰ Morgan and Valencia, Atlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas, op. cit., p. 20, notes thirteen research facilities compared to thirty-seven for Japan.

²¹ For a cutting-edge illustration of those linkages, see Park Song-hui and Cho Woon-hyun (both from the ROK's Agency for Defense Development), "Underwater Environmental Data Base for ASW Weapon System Development," in Lee Choon-kun, Editor, Sea Power and Korea in the 21st Century: Proceedings of the 3rd International Sea Power Symposium, co-sponsored by the ROK Navy and the Sejong Institute, (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1994), pp. 263-278.

²² For background on the organization, including a full list of its membership, see "1993 nyun do yun cha oon yun bo ko" (1993 Annual Report), Hanguok hae ro yun gu hoi (SLOC Study Group - Korea; Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1994).

²³ In addition to his contribution to several edited volumes cited in this analysis, see his "Tong buk ah ji yuk ui haeyang anbo hwan kyung: jeng jum mit jun mang" (The Maritime Security Environment in the Northeast Asia Region: Disputes and Prospects) presented at a May 27-28, 1994, conference at Hae gun bon bu (ROK Navy Headquarters).

²⁴ Interview with Dr. Kim Dal-choong at Yonsei University, Seoul, June 27, 1994.

²⁵ Han gook hae yang yungu so/Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute (Seoul: KORDI, 1992), a bi-lingual volume on its activities.

²⁶ Interviews with Drs. Lee and Paik at IFANS, June 28, 1994.

²⁷ See Lee Sang-don, "National Legislation for Marine Environmental Protection: The Korean Experience," in Kim Dal-choong, Park Choon-ho, Lee Seo-hang, and Paik Jin-

hyun, Maritime Issues in the 1990s: Antarctica, Law of the Sea and Marine Environment (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1992), pp. 197-210.

²⁸ For example, see the Economic planning Agency's Book suh tae pyung yang hae yang bojun kae kwek (Northwest Pacific Marine Safety Plan), January 1994, a planning document preparing for the UNEP's NOWPAP.

²⁹ For representative press coverage, see The Korea Herald, February 13, 1994, p. 2; March 1, 1994, p. 3; March 16, 1994, p. 1; March 25, 1994, p. 2; and April 7, 1994, p. 4. For a detailed analysis of South Korea's interests in Russian nuclear waste dumping, see: Kim Kye-hoon, Kim Chang-gyu, and Yi Mo-sung, "Rushia ui bang sa sung pae gi mul tugi kwan ryun tong hae bang sa nung chosa" (East Sea Radioactivity Investigation About Russian Radioactive Waste Dumping) (Seoul: Hanguk won ja ryuk an jun gi sool won (ROK Institute of Nuclear Safety), 1994, a study conducted in conjunction with KORDI and the Ministry of Science and Technology.

³⁰ The Korea Herald, April 27, 1994, p. 9.

³¹ The Korea Herald, May 10, 1994, p. 8; and June 16, 1994, p. 8.

³² The Korea Herald, May 13, 1994, p. 8; and June 11, 1994, p. 1.

³³ The Korea Herald, February 5, 1994, p. 2; and June 15, 1994, p. 8.

³⁴ These are best illustrated by the many instances in which Japanese and South Korean scientists collaborate on objective marine research. For an example that is likely to leave politically oriented policy makers in both countries glassy-eyed, see: H.R. Shin, Y. Michida, and Y. Nagata, "The Structure of the Kuroshiro Front in the Vicinity of Separation Point Where the Kuroshiro Leaves the Japanese Coast," Nippon kaiyo gaku kaishi (Journal of the Oceanographical Society of Japan), Vol. 47, No. 4, August 1991, pp. 111-125. These three researchers respectively represent the KORDI, Japan's Maritime Safety Agency, and Tokyo University.

³⁵ It is interesting to note, as many in Japan already have, that in 1993 South Korea ranked ahead of Japan and is likely to be in a horse race with its neighbor for some time to come. FEER, August 4, 1994, p. 61.

³⁶ Morgan and Valencia, op. cit., p. 20.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 24.

³⁸ UNDP draft program for technical cooperation on the Korean peninsula (UNDP, April 1994), p. 21.

³⁹ See for example Chough Sung-kwun, Marine Geology of Korean Seas (Boston: International Human Resources Development Corporation, 1983), who notes (on p. xii): "Because of the lack of our knowledge on the northern part of the peninsula (north of the 38th parallel; DMZ), this synthesis stresses only the sea floor off the Republic of Korea." See also, Daniel J. Dzurek, "Deciphering the North Korean-Soviet (Russian) Maritime Boundary Agreements," Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 23, No. 1, 1992, pp. 31-49; and Hal F. Olson and Joseph Morgan, "Chinese Access to the Sea of Japan and Integrated Economic Development in Northeast Asia," Ocean and Coastal Management 17, 1992, pp. 5-79, both of which do an admirable job despite their data handicap. Lastly, one of these analysts surmounted the absence of data problem by hypothesizing it through guesstimates, and then prepared a series of tables using a model that produced numbers for the DPRK to the third decimal point: Daniel Dzurek, "An Analytical Model of Regional Seas Management: The Sea of Japan," in Elizabeth

Borgese, Norton Ginsburg, and Joseph R. Morgan, Editors, Ocean Yearbook 10 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993), pp. 260-275. While the model may be excellent and the use of admittedly speculative data necessary in the circumstances, there is a genuine risk that readers may misinterpret such numbers. In fact, most analysts who follow North Korea closely are suspicious of the accuracy of authentic DPRK data and reluctant to extrapolate from it.

⁴⁰ These South Korean perceptions of their North Korean counterparts were gleaned in the course of a series of interviews by the author in late June 1994. Individual attribution is not cited so as to not damage their possible future contacts with their DPRK counterparts.

⁴¹ Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 1983, p. 2.

⁴² The Korea Herald, February 8, 1994, p. 2; September 13, 1994, p. 2, and September 15, 1994, p. 2; and Correspondence from Cheong Hae-wook, Director, Science and Environmental Division, ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 28, 1994.

⁴³ National Report of the DPRK on the Marine Environment, Second Meeting of Experts and National Focal Points on the Development of the North-West Pacific Action Plan, Beijing, October 26-30, 1992, UNEP (OCA)/NOWPAP.WG.2/4; Distribution RESTRICTED.

⁴⁴ Pae Sang-hak, (Senior Researcher, Institute for Disarmament and Peace), "The Nuclear Issue in Northeast Asia and the Ways to Resolve the Issue," UNIDIR Conference (co-sponsored by IFANS) on Nuclear Policies in Northeast Asia, Seoul, May 25-27, 1994, pp. 5-6.

⁴⁵ See Atlas, op. cit., pp. 121-123.

⁴⁶ For an overview of that controversy and how it was resolved, see The Japan Times Weekly (International), October 22-28, 1990, pp. 1 and 3.

⁴⁷ FBIS-EAS-90-111, June 8, 1990, p. 5, and FEER, August 2, 1990, p. 19.

⁴⁸ Mainichi Shimbun, July 17, 1984, p. 2.

⁴⁹ Nodong sinmun commentary in FBIS-EAS, June 4, 1987, p. C1.

VII: CONCLUSIONS

In the short-run the key issue for Northeast Asian CBMs to address is how to best engage North Korea in productive ways that lead it to join what often is called the international community. Clearly the nuclear problem looms largest in the minds of decision-makers as this is written in 1994. As this analysis has attempted to demonstrate, there are myriad other issues that make themselves known by their presence, albeit not as strongly as Pyongyang's nuclear potentials. With the advent of the cold war era, altered circumstances made Northeast Asian issues -- focusing on Korea -- appear to be more pressing when put into the new era's context. In turn, this accentuates the quest for peaceful resolution of the region's problems and enhances the arguments of those scholars and policy makers who advocate a range of CBMs, including the non-military categories addressed here. The post-cold war geopolitical mindset seems to reinforce the prospect that these CBMs may now work.

Many of the analysts that have been cited in these pages subscribe to that optimistic perspective. They may yet be proven prescient, but it is important to be prudent and take careful note of the factors which are likely to inhibit the efficacy of these CBMs. The most important reason to be skeptical, if not downright pessimistic, about the real world utility of non-military CBMs in creating the conditions that will facilitate tension-reduction and peace is to keep one's mind focused on the sequence of cause and effect. As a saying in the Talmud points out, the Messiah will arrive when there is no longer a need for the Messiah. That ancient insight is

integrally related to what many consider to be the paradox of arms control, namely that arms control is far easier to achieve after the threat is gone. The sequence of events that terminated the cold war may be partially attributable to arms control, but in the final analysis it was easiest to really control armaments when one superpower could no longer sustain its share. In a similar fashion it is quite likely that the goals of non-military CBMs in Northeast Asia will be easier to attain when the underlying military tensions are being addressed in an effective manner. Clearly, these are not -- and cannot be treated as -- either/or sets of alternatives. They will evolve in tandem, but there are legitimate reasons to be wary of the "chicken and egg" sequencing factor. It is uncertain whether the non-military CBMs can be sufficiently effective to cause a shift in attitudes that will lead to peace and harmony.

Moreover, as one of South Korea's leading specialists in non-military marine CBMs, Dr. Paik Jin-hyun has pointed out,¹ the end of the superpower cold war has created new uncertainties that alter the context of those CBMs. It was the very real dangers of the cold war that made non-military CBMs, especially the seemingly arcane marine CBMs, appear so benign in comparison to nuclear war. Now that the superpower cold war is history, continuing economic, fisheries, territorial, and other frictions in East Asia are perceived as of relatively larger stature. In these respects many non-military CBMs appear to be losing their supposedly benign characteristics as the theories behind them clash with the harsh real world context of the post-cold war era.

The major factor which seems to prevent that clash from having greater impact than it has had so far is the persistence of the inter-Korean cold war which perpetuates a geopolitical aura in Northeast Asia redolent of the main cold war that spawned it. There is an artificial, brittle quality to this relic of the old world order. Yet the inter-Korean cold war is sufficiently structured like the original to create momentum for an array of CBMs that have at their core the reduction of the threat posed by North Korea to its region. As long as the DPRK exists as a state that is perceived as dangerous by its neighbors, there will be a need for CBMs aimed at Pyongyang. However, since many of those CBMs will necessarily call for cooperation among Japan, South Korea, China, Russia, and perhaps the United States, it will be very difficult to prevent emerging post-cold war friction amongst the latter group from effecting the efficacy of CBMs that are aimed at North Korea. Consequently, the persistence of the inter-Korean cold war context may not be adequate to compensate for the elimination of the superpower cold war context that allowed such CBMs to be considered relatively benign. Furthermore, the elimination of this local surrogate for the cold war would eradicate the systemic context that calls for CBMs and could undermine the usually unspoken assumption behind CBMs (an indefinite US commitment to the region) if post-Korean cold war changes cause a revision in American priorities.

Further complicating this situation are a network of other factors. The most obvious one is the strain caused by competing drives to develop versus preserve. This is axiomatic among developmental specialists and is at the root of the quest for sustainable development. These competing drives helped produce the popular environmental movements in Japan and

South Korea. Despite the long history associated with the effort to strike an appropriate balance between the environment and its exploitation economically, there is no clear answer when these choices are raised anew.² China's economic modernization experiences that today and North Korea may in the future if its economy really starts to blossom. This poses a serious problem for Northeast Asia because the two broad categories of non-military CBMs -- economic and environmental -- may be seen as either complementary or rivals. For advocates of sustainable development the choice is a clear one, but for many who operate in the real world there is nothing self-evident about that option. It is very easy to visualize circumstances in which the appeal of economic development -- whether guided by someone's CBM or by economists' "invisible hand" -- would overwhelm the aspirations of environmentalists. In fact, were North Korea to cease to exist as a threat in the region, and either become a national candidate for regional development or be incorporated into the ROK's development program, economic pressures for development are likely to overcome the environmental ethic. Despite the overlapping roots of the words *economy* and *ecology*, the forces driving specialists in these two fields are often at odds with each other. In Northeast Asia, the dangers are strong that the *-nomy* will prevail over the *-logy*, vis-à-vis the shared *eco*.

The status of Korea as a divided or unified nation also will play a major role in how CBMs evolve. While CBMs may help Korea unify, they may also be overtaken by events. For example, were a collapse model for North Korea to prevail, Northeast Asia would suddenly confront an entirely new balance of power and the complete fulfillment of the region's portion of the global cold war. The contextual imperatives would be

completely altered. There are enormous uncertainties inherent in that prospective development.³ There is, of course, no certainty that the two Koreas will move steadily toward unity or that the countries with an interest in Korea will cooperate with each other in reducing tensions. On the contrary, as Tokyo's manipulation of its relations with Seoul and Pyongyang, Beijing and Washington's ambivalent support for the unification dialogue, and -- most of all -- the periodic efforts by Seoul and Pyongyang to introduce "Catch 22" components in their respective offers and each's desire to exert a veto over the options of each's supporters demonstrate, the CBM arena also harbors what might be considered reverse CBMs. Normally a CBM is considered a constructive proposal designed to generate positive incentives to cooperate. Instead of being a constructive CBM, reverse CBMs are proposed to slow down, impede, block, or derail a process that is going too fast, in the wrong direction, or at the wrong time from one party's perspective. They are used as deconstructive CBMs to create obstacles while seeming to foster progress. The problem, of course, is how to discern the varieties, for on the surface they are all intended to appear constructive.

That difficulty merely underscores the basic issue that all CBMs are ostensibly designed to address -- how to engender trust. If the motives behind CBMs can be distrusted, and clearly North Korea distrusts many if not all of them, CBMs always face credibility challenges. That can be magnified when the parties engaged in CBMs continually second-guess each other's motives. While this is inevitable, and in the long run helps to build confidence as doubts are resolved and trust grows, it accentuates the dilemmas posed by pursuing CBMs without the constant structures the

cold war once seemed to provide. As the states of Northeast Asia second-guess each other's post-cold war purposes and ponder the United States' durability as a regional linchpin, they also must try to calculate the impact their second-guessing and pondering may have upon American decision-makers who may legitimately question the degree to which Asian CBMs also are calculated to control, guide, and manipulate the United States' presence and influence in the region. Cumulatively, these mirror-in-a-mirror perceptions vastly complicate post-cold war regional CBMs and do not enhance their prospects.

Assuming for the sake of this analysis' conclusion that such generic problems with post-cold war non-military CBMs can be overcome, there are other factors which bear on the prospects for environmental CBMs. One also relates to the potential unification of Korea. As noted in the discussion of South Korea's maritime interests, the ROK during the cold war increasingly adopted an island-nation's outlook. Were the two Koreas to reunite, it is problematical whether that perspective would persist. It is possible that Korean unification also would constitute the "re-peninsularization" of Korea with consequent political, economic, and strategic overtones.⁴ This also would weigh heavily on the environmental attitudes and commitments of a unitary Korean state regarding the environment of Northeast Asia. Were Korea's economy and politics to shift toward a more traditional mainland Asian orientation, this would not mean it would forego its maritime-oriented trade, or its relatively new-found interests in naval and marine issues, but it would likely underline the problems interest groups in Korea would face in pushing these causes. The bureaucratic enemies of a large Korean navy are powerful and may

doom its prospects. More important for present purposes, the priority likely to be attached to environmental issues in Korea is problematical. While a Green Round of trade talks may boost environmental prospects, that strengthening will be motivated by a desire to compete, not cooperate. With regard to environmental CBMs, Korea's prospects seem mixed.

The main reason for this ambivalence is the disparity between Japanese and South Korean capacities to be a serious player in this field. As noted earlier, environmentalists and ecologists from both societies fully grasp the reality that the earth is an organic whole. Despite their *juche* dogma and stress on the DPRK's sovereignty, presumably North Korean scientists also share that perception. Aside from that ideological peculiarity in North Korea, there is no gap between Japan and Korea when it comes to knowing what they would like to do, how to do it, or the desire to succeed. There is a genuine gap between Japan and Korea when it comes to practical application. Although South Korea is attempting to catch up, it has a long way to go and -- given Japan's head start -- it may never close the gap. Korean scientists will do their best, and as part of a global scientific effort they may be content to play an important part of a larger campaign in which national boundaries and identity should not matter. In terms of the Northeast Asian environment, that augers well. In terms of politically-driven CBMs that are intended to use environmental policy as an instrument, it is a different matter. Scientific and technological cooperation in the Northeast Asian environmental field can be a defacto CBM among scientists but yet not truly count as a full-fledged geopolitical CBM if the political leadership of the countries concerned do not understand the significance of the issues at stake well enough to elevate

them to authentic CBM status. Although the potential for environmental CBMs in Northeast Asia is great in principle, in practice it is diminished by the generic factors noted earlier, the higher visibility of economic CBMs, and the continuing tendency among policy makers to see many environmental issues as too arcane to deserve a higher priority. Despite the best efforts of environmental activists, there is a tendency for their message to cause a "MEGO" (my eyes glaze over) reaction among the target audience of politically oriented decision-makers who usually lack the background to understand what is being presented to them. That situation could be exacerbated by Japan's lead, South Korea's gap, and North Korea's chasm.

Once again, North Korea looms as the key to whether or not non-military CBMs, especially environmental CBMs, can be made effective. Perhaps the best way to deal with this formidable obstacle is to take more seriously the nuances of Kim Il-sung's "*juche* thought" that the North Koreans esteem so highly. A detour into its details would be inappropriate here. Suffice it to say that North Koreans treat it as the essence of their approach to sovereignty. A DPRK diplomat drew an analogy in 1994 to the Revolutionary War flag of Americans that portrays a snake and the slogan "Don't tread on me" and expressed the hope that other countries would perceive that as symbolic of North Korean feelings.⁵ Generally North Korea's fear of infringement on the DPRK's sovereignty, which is at the core of the *juche* idea, has effectively blocked the incrementalist approach favored by advocates of non-military CBMs who contend it is best to build from small steps to larger agendas. Thus, a case can be made that *juche* thought has impeded economic and environmental CBMs precisely

because they are intended to broaden North Korea's interdependence. In the wake of Kim Il-sung's death it is uncertain how North Korea will be guided politically, but -- if Kim-ism remains the framework for the state -- there is some prospect that the easiest way to perpetuate the regime would be to adapt *juche* thought to the post-cold war circumstances with which the DPRK must contend.

Were this evolution to permit any relaxation of the DPRK's rigid support of its sovereignty, it would in effect be nudging North Korea toward a broader vision of state security that would be more compatible with the versions of comprehensive security practiced in Japan and South Korea. This interpretation is speculative, but clearly a realistic possibility. The reason it is worth raising in conclusion is that the possibility of a reinterpretation of *juche* by North Korea in the 1990s creates significant short-term opportunities for environmental and economic CBMs versus that country. For example, now that once heavily classified US military/naval warning and detection systems are being converted to post-cold war environmental uses⁶ -- thereby creating a kind of unilateral transparency by the only remaining superpower which has such a central role in Northeast Asia -- it may become far easier for the United States' allies in Northeast Asia to try to engage the DPRK in an environmental dialogue.

Whether such overtures are bilateral, multilateral, state-to-state, or on the NGO level, there is continuing reason to try to foster environmental CBMs. As these avenues are pursued, and bearing in mind the generic inhibitors cited at the start of this conclusion, the best approach to take

toward the issue and the region is to rely on a concept common to China, Japan, and Korea. Using the ideograms 危機, pronounced *ki ki* in Japanese, and *ui gi* in Korean, this concept means an instance in which both "danger" and "opportunity" are simultaneously present. This concept is a paradigm for Northeast Asian non-military CBMs that will require skillful management to assure that one makes them an opportunity and prevents them from becoming a danger. The dilemma is, as always, differentiation between the two and controlling the dynamics that link them. As a general question the Asian way to approach such a situation is to try to be as far-sighted as one can, using the logic of the game board *go* (in Japanese) or *padook* (in Korean) to evaluate opportunities, anticipate contingencies, and engage in a kind of strategic thinking and planning that many in East Asia consider to be beyond the ken of Westerners. That is not true, of course, but it is uncommon.

That point permits one final issue to be raised in the form of a recommendation. As the countries of Northeast Asia contend with the evolution of the post-cold war era and try to maintain peace and harmony in a more deeply nuanced situation, their leaders and the leaders' functional advisors necessarily interact with Western governments' and scholars' efforts to help through non-military CBMs. The United States, and Americans, are especially visible in that regard. One overall criticism that Asians level against the West's experts is that their Asian language skills are too deficient to deal with Asian issues in a thorough and timely fashion. That is a fair accusation. With regard to security and economic specialists the West is somewhat better served. However, as a number of Asian specialists in environmental issues noted in private conversation, the

West's specialists in Asia's environment include few who are language-qualified. There is little likelihood of most such Western experts either retooling, or gaining such skills as part of their education. The field is too small and the rewards too sparse to justify such efforts. Therefore, it behooves the governments and NGOs of Asia to disseminate as much information as they possibly can, and for the governments of the West to fill in the gaps through a concerted effort to translate a greater volume of the now virtually inaccessible vernacular environmental literature that could be increasingly valuable to a variety of bureaucrats and specialists.

Whether that is done or not, however, the role of non-military CBMs is likely to remain important and fairly predictable in Northeast Asia at least through the end of the region's version of the cold war. Whether that resolution occurs because of CBMs (military or non-military) or despite them, the region's equivalent of a post-cold war situation may be upon us in the not-so-distant future. At that point it will be necessary to reassess most of the major points made in this analysis. It will also be necessary to evaluate the prospects for reconfigured regional threat perceptions and what role(s) CBMs may be able to play in the future.

Notes

¹ In an interview at IFANS, June 28, 1994.

² For insights into that question, see Bunn Nagara, "The Trade-Environment Nexus: Whence, Whither, Why, and Wherefore," presented at The Workshop on Trade and Environment in Asia-Pacific: Prospects for Regional Cooperation, East-West Center, Honolulu, September 23-25, 1994.

³ For insights into that future, see Thomas H. Henriksen and Lho Kyong-soo, Editors, One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1994). See also Thomas L. McNaugher, "Reforging Northeast Asia's Dagger?" The

Brookings Review, Summer 1993, pp. 12-17; and the monthly newsletter, Korea Countdown.

⁴ The author examines those in his "Korea's Reunification: Implications for the US-ROK Alliance," in Henriksen and Lho, op. cit., pp. 108-122.

⁵ Interview with Ambassador Kim Song-ju, DPRK Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, at the DPRK Mission, September 2, 1994.

⁶ See the discussion of the underwater Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) and others for environmental purposes, in The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1994, pp. 11-13.

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