AirLand Battle Tactics: An Analysis of Doctrine and Experience.
Abstract
This monograph examines whether US Army doctrine and US Air Force doctrine are compatible. In particular, this study assesses the current Air/Ground Operating System and the offensive air support it provides to U.S. Army corps commanders. The research covers Joint, Air Force, and Army doctrine. Problems which came to light as a result of Operation DESERT STORM are also considered. Finally, the Air Force and Army positions on effective air support to the ground force are compared. Ultimately, the monograph considers whether or not the system in place provides air support which allows the Army to conduct corps level actions characterized by depth, agility, synchronization, and initiative. The analysis of US Air Force doctrine shows that the service emphasized centralized control and decentralized execution. The study finds that the doctrine promotes maximum top-down planning with a focus on continuous operations which are directly controlled by the Joint Force Air Component Commander. The Air Force recommends executing interdiction as a single operation rather than allocating sorties as Battlefield Air Interdiction. The study does find that the air doctrine is supportive of Close Air Support.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 20, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA289070
Entities
People
- Charles W. Robinson
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College