Incorporating Enemy Psychological Vulnerability Into US Army Heavy Division IPB Doctrine.

Abstract

This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of US Army Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield doctrine to identify and target enemy psychological vulnerabilities. The focus is on the heavy division. First, the monograph evaluates US Army heavy division doctrine in effect at the time of Operation Desert Storm (January 17, 1991 through February 28, 1991). Next the monograph assesses the battlefield's effect on human psychology, concentrating on combat experiences since World War I. This assessment discusses factors that contribute to unit cohesion and fighting ability as well as forces that destroy combat effectiveness. The monograph concludes the second section by identifying specific aspects of an armed force that are targetable psychological vulnerabilities.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 17, 1993
Accession Number
ADA289071

Entities

People

  • Peter J. Schifferle

Organizations

  • United States Army Command and General Staff College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Electronic Warfare
  • Engineered Resilient Systems
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Civil War
  • Combat Areas
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • Intelligence Collection
  • Intergovernmental Organizations
  • International Organizations
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Organizations
  • National Security
  • Personnel Management
  • Psychological Operations
  • Psychology
  • United States
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies