Expeditionary Warfare and Conflict Deterrence.
Abstract
Deterrence of strategic warfare has long been a major U.S. national security objective. With the end of the Cold War, the international security environment has evolved sufficiently to cause rethinking of how the United States will apply its deterrent capability. The relationship between conflict deterrence and expeditionary warfare-marrying them into a single conceptual package-is explored. A review of deterrence theory and the historical underpinnings of expeditionary warfare is provided, to argue the hypothesis that expeditionary warfare, as defined within this project, is relevant as an effective deterrent. There are three principal conclusions: first, that effective deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost; second, that deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict; and third, forward military presence does not necessarily deter.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 10, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA290012
Entities
People
- Christopher A. Melhuish
- Jack A. Federoff
Organizations
- Naval War College