A Policy Analysis of Alternative Military Retirement Systems,
Abstract
In fiscal year (FY) 1990 total military compensation costs exceeded 45 billion dollars. Given the size of these costs, it is no wonder that the adequacy and efficiency of military compensation have been topics of constant debate. These debates have become particularly active when changes have occurred in the military and the environment in which it operates. For example, the recent drawdown has raised the issue of whether the military compensation system, especially its retirement system, has hampered the Department of Defense's (DoD's) ability to reduce the size of its personnel force. Past study groups and commissions have advanced numerous proposals to alter the military's compensation system. But to address questions about the appropriateness of the size and structure of the military system, a theory or model is needed that recognizes the military's manpower goals, incorporates the essential features of the military organization, and predicts the behavioral responses of personnel to alternative compensation and personnel policies. Unfortunately, past studies that have developed such models have narrowly focused on the relationship between compensation and retention behavior and the resulting experience structure of the force and have ignored the other consequences of the military's personnel and compensation system. In particular, less attention has been paid to questions of productivity and specifically the issues of (1) whether the system induces the most able personnel to stay and seek advancement to the highest ranks and (2) whether the system encourages personnel to work hard and effectively.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA290699
Entities
People
- Beth J. Asch
- John T. Warner
Organizations
- RAND Corporation