Heart of the Storm, The Genesis of the Air Campaign against Iraq,
Abstract
Airmen all over the world felt relief and exhilaration as the Gulf War reached its conclusion on 28 February 1991. Many nonairmen experienced those emotions as well-but for a variety of different reasons. Airmen, long uneasy about the lingering inconclusiveness of past applications of their form of military power, now had what they believed to be an indisputably decisive example of air power victory. Within the United States Air Force, among those who thought about the uses of air power, there were two basic groups of airmen. The smaller and less influential group held to the view that air power was best applied in a comprehensive, unitary way to achieve strategic results. The second, more dominant group had come to think of air power in its tactical applications as a supportive element of a larger surface (land or maritime) campaign. Thinking in terms of strategic air campaigns, members of the first group found their inclinations reinforced by Col John Warden's book, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, published in 1988. Over the years, the second group increasingly concentrated on refining specific mission capabilities, that could be offered to a joint force commander for his allocation decisions. Members of this group rarely thought in terms of comprehensive air campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. In the end, the Gulf War did include a Strategic Air Campaign. It is the purpose of this report to record the history of that air campaign as quickly and honestly as possible.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA292091
Entities
People
- Richard T. Reynolds
Organizations
- Air University