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SOURCES OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory theories for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against one another to determine their explanatory power. This thesis investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues, the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute, and the current Bosnian conflict, by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently developed concept of "strategic culture."

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SOURCES OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against one another to determine their relative explanatory power. This thesis investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues, the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute, and the current Bosnian conflict, by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently developed concept of "strategic culture."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis systematically employs two explanatory theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and tests the two theories against one another to determine their relative explanatory power. It investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently developed concept of "strategic culture."

To test these theories, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy statements and documents which address three contemporary Russian foreign policy issues: the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan, and the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Policy statements made regarding these issues are examined first using a strategic culture approach, considering the history, traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, and symbols, determining which of these factors would most likely influence policy decisions, and what course of action such factors would most likely indicate. Then, the same issues are examined using an acultural, ahistorical perspective based on *Realpolitik* and the balance of power theory that emerges from it.

Chapter I postulates the central questions of the thesis and introduces the three test cases. Chapter II discusses the candidate theories and the hypotheses derived from those explanatory theories that predict foreign policy behavior based upon those theories. Chapters III, IV, and V each examine one of the three test cases and conclude with an evaluation of the hypotheses based upon the Russian foreign policy statements made regarding the test case issues examined. Chapter VI evaluates the validity and the utility of the two theories as foundations for the analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy decisions in the future, and weighs

the relative explanatory power of each theory based on how well these respective hypotheses "performed" in the three test cases. These theories often predict different outcomes with respect to the nature and direction of foreign policy, so these test cases should be suggestive of the power of each theory.

The results of the evaluation of the hypotheses in the three test cases indicate that balance of power theory is the clear "winner" when compared with strategic cultural theory. The hypotheses derived from the two explanatory theories (four from each) were evaluated across the three test cases, yielding a total of twelve evaluation points for the two theories. In the case of strategic culture, the hypotheses were upheld in six of twelve opportunities. By comparison, in the balance of power case the hypotheses were upheld in ten of twelve opportunities. The utility of balance of power theory, and to a lesser extent, strategic culture theory, as bases for such analysis have been confirmed by this thesis, which has focused largely on prediction and explanation. Additionally, from this study one may also draw a general conclusion regarding a characteristic of contemporary Russian foreign policy.

The Russian Federation appears to be returning to the tsarist strategy of pursuing interests on both the *Realpolitik* and cultural level. Russian policy regarding Bosnia serves as an example of this type of "two-pronged" attack. Russian imperial foreign policy before 1917 pursued both great power interests of prestige enhancement and power aggrandizement, and yet at the same time cultivated cultural and historical interests in the region, on the basis of ethnic and religious ties. Today, Russia continues to emphasize its ethnic and religious connections with Serbia, and likewise asserts that the conflict in Bosnia simply cannot be resolved, and action cannot be taken, without consultation with Russia. Given the opportunity, Russia will pursue the achievement of its national interests in terms of both cultural/historical interests and *Realpolitik*-based calculations.

However, the strong performance of the balance of power theory relative to strategic culture theory suggests the possibility that if Russian balance of power-

based interests and strategic culture-based interests are in conflict, then Russia will sacrifice its cultural interests for the betterment of its balance of power interests. This was true in tsarist foreign policies, when in many instances Russia "traded" away the Serbs in treaties and negotiations in order to strengthen their position with respect to gaining control of the Turkish Straits and Constantinople. In contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia has maintained that it must play a special role as the guardian-sponsor of Serbia, but its voting record in the U.N. and the C.S.C.E. regarding sanctions against Serbia indicate a tendency to follow Western policy and thereby enhance its standing in the international community. Prestige is not so well-defined as an attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits, but it is nevertheless an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy in the Russian Federation -- more so than any culturally- or historically-based factor. The United States would do well to keep this in mind as it strives to understand Russian behavior in the post-Soviet era.

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I. INTRODUCTION

In the past three years there have been astounding changes in the international order. Nowhere have these changes been more profound and more fundamental than in the former Soviet Union, and in its principal successor state, the Russian Federation. For the first time in Russia's long history, the country is taking meaningful steps toward the establishment of a democratic government founded on the precepts of Western liberal philosophy.[1]

The purpose of this thesis is to systematically employ two explanatory theories as tools for the study of foreign policy and to test the two theories against one another to determine their relative explanatory power. In particular, it investigates Russian Federation foreign policy regarding three contemporary issues by conducting an analysis of Russian policy statements and doctrine in the period from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Russian Federation on 1 January 1992 until August 1994. The analysis is based on hypotheses that seek to explain Russian foreign policy decisions, with reference to two theories: the concept of balance of power that emerges from political realism and the more recently developed concept of "strategic culture."

The potential utility of this latter concept, and on a more functional level, the influence that Russian domestic politics play on Russian foreign policy, are the compelling forces of this study. A number of international relations specialists and historians have applied this "unit-level" approach and have discussed strategic culture in their studies of Russian, and in particular, Soviet history.[2] But in light of

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[1]The word "meaningful" is in this instance chosen with great care. There are analysts who argue that Russia has previously engaged in democratic reform, specifically in the first years of the 20th century. This notion will be considered in Chapter II. See discussion on page 18.

[2]There are, for example, the following examinations of Soviet strategic culture: David R. Jones, "Soviet Strategic Culture," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) and Yitzhak Klein, "The

recent monumental developments -- the stunning demise of the Soviet Union -- it is appropriate to pose the question again: is this unit-level approach useful in the post-Soviet era? Strategic culture provided an important and useful foundation for analysis of Soviet foreign policy. This thesis examines whether or not strategic culture is useful in analyzing post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. To test this notion, this thesis includes a comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy statements and documents which address three contemporary Russian foreign policy issues: the "near abroad," the Kuril Islands dispute with Japan, and the ethnic conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Policy statements made regarding these issues will be examined first using a strategic culture approach, considering the history, traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, and symbols and determining which of these factors would most likely influence policy decisions, and what course of action such factors would most likely indicate. Then, the same issues will be examined using an acultural, ahistorical perspective based on *Realpolitik* and the balance of power theory that emerges from it.[3]

The study of cultural development and the lessons of history of a particular state can often yield a clearer understanding of the foreign policies of that state. But how does the understanding developed through the study of a state's strategic culture compare with an examination of state foreign policy based on a more abstract theory? More to the point, would the study of Russian strategic culture shed

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Sources of Soviet Strategic Culture," The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, vol. 2 (December 1989). For studies of domestic factors of Soviet foreign policy, see Morton Schwartz, The Foreign Policy of the USSR: Domestic Factors (Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1975); sections from Erik P. Hoffman and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., eds., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980). Remarkably, there are even pertinent sections in the venerable but still relevant Ivo Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

[3]The organization of this thesis is based upon a similar approach used by Barry S. Posen in The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).

significant light on contemporary Russian foreign policy, or would a reliance on a theory derived from classical realism, namely balance of power theory, provide a better explanation of Russian foreign policy than theories derived from strategic culture? In examining Russian foreign policy statements in recent months regarding these three issues, which perspective provides better insight into the process of Russian foreign policy formation? This comparison is, at a basic level, between unit-level theories that have been developed in an effort to understand the nature of policy determination. Specifically, this is a comparison of strategic culture and balance of power in an effort to determine the utility of using this recently-developed concept, strategic culture, as a foundation for analyzing Russian foreign policy. There are other theories at the unit-level and the system level which could provide a basis for analysis of Russian foreign policy. These candidate theories are discussed in Chapter II.

A comprehensive evaluation of Russian foreign policy using all available theories is well beyond the scope of this thesis.[4] Setting aside the large number of theories available, the main focus of this thesis remains the examination of the utility of strategic culture and balance of power as bases for analysis. These two theories are expansive in nature and provide ample foundations for the development of testable hypotheses which attempt to explain Russian foreign policy decisions. This work is not an exhaustive study of all contemporary Russian foreign policy issues. Rather, it is <u>illustrative</u> in nature, with the hope that it sparks interest in further examination and application of the comparative analysis of the two theories utilized here.

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[4]Available theories that can be used to evaluate foreign policy include the following: strategic culture, balance of power, organizational process, government (bureaucratic) politics, and domestic politics. Certain systemic theories -- structural realism (or neorealism), hegemonic power, and cycles of domination must also be taken into account.

The confusion and ambiguity that encompasses the term *Realpolitik* must be acknowledged; it is fraught with contradicting definitions and applications. This concept is discussed and defined in Chapter II.

The term strategic culture is of fairly recent origin; as with *Realpolitik* there is considerable disagreement concerning the definition and the applicability of the term. The extended application of the concept of strategic culture may, however, be useful in examining the foreign policy decisions of a state, and in many cases provide a better explanation for the conduct of foreign policy than does a direct realist interpretation. Discussion and definition of this term likewise follows in Chapter II.

In the process of analyzing Russian foreign policy, it may well be that these two concepts are complementary rather than contradictory. Both may provide insight that will contribute to a greater understanding of the subject. It is very possible that in some cases, the *Realpolitik* factors may provide greater understanding, while in other cases the strategic culture factors may prove of greater utility. Nevertheless, in the interest of evaluating the usefulness of strategic culture in studying Russian foreign policy, this analysis is comparative. As Barry Posen states,

> The competitive application of the two theories is analogous to the use of different lenses, tools for the apprehension of reality. By using two explicit theories, each of which highlights the influence of different causes, we can gain a more focused understanding of [foreign policy]. Each theory allows us to view some aspects of the same phenomenon more clearly (albeit at the cost of reducing the visibility of other aspects.)[5]

In setting up a competitive relationship between strategic culture and balance of power, the analysis follows Alexander L. George's "method of structured, focused

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[5]Posen, p. 8.

comparison."[6] In this method, George demonstrates how the standpoint of the political scientist can be combined with that of the historian in employing a strategy of controlled comparison for the development of theory. Aspects of the historian's intensive, detailed explanation of a particular case study is combined with the political scientist's ability to conceptualize the requirements of theory and procedure in scientific inquiry: George's method represents a rejoining of the two disciplines.[7]

Regarding the period in question, a comparative analysis of Russian foreign policy using balance of power and strategic culture was chosen for the following reasons. First, this period is one in which Russia underwent dramatic changes at the political, social and economic levels, which produced changes in the fundamental structure and organization of government. In a relatively brief period of time, Russia abandoned socialist ideology and embraced the precepts of Western liberal thought, and instituted genuine democratic reform. Yet, in this period of dramatic transformation in which the old political ideology was swept away, the new government was still in its formative state. All the assumptions of generations of Soviet citizens and ruling elite were rendered invalid; in such a period of traumatic transition and uncertainty, the only remaining foundation by which old Soviets, now "new" Russians, could gain a frame of reference would be the "near-constants of culture."[8] Thus this period provides an excellent test for determining the validity of strategic culture as a basis for foreign policy formation and analysis.

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[6]Alexander George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), pp. 43-68.

[7]Ibid., p. 61.

[8]This is a potentially difficult term. The point must be made, however: strategic culture does not claim to predict an unchanging, monolithic foundation for policy formulation. Cultures do change, but these changes are very gradual, and there is a predilection to avoid change that makes it fairly easy to predict what sort of foreign policy a nation might pursue on the basis of its unique historical experience.

Second, the collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the end of the Cold War and the bi-polar superpower structure that dominated the international system in the four decades that followed World War II. Stripped of this superpower status and with all its former allies in a similar state of upheaval, the question of whether the Russian Federation would pursue a balance of power-based policy, with a goal of building new alliances and regaining lost prestige, is a valid one. This situation, then, also serves to test the validity of applying balance of power theory analysis to the post-Soviet era of Russian foreign policy.

The "near abroad" is appropriate as a subject of Russian contemporary foreign policy analysis because of its expansiveness and preeminence. It is the most complex test case in this analysis, and in all of Russian foreign policy. It dominates discussion of Russian national interests in the realm of foreign policy. By addressing this expansive issue a great deal of the smaller, regional issues may be better understood: the Baltics, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia. Analyses of any of these regional issues must be understood in light of broader Russian perspectives, and would therefore necessarily require analysis of the "near abroad" policies. In the eyes of Russians, the "near abroad" represents a previously inconceivable loss of territory, and with that a loss of power and prestige. Historically, Russian policy in these regions has included important elements of both strategic culture and *Realpolitik*. The purpose in this test case is to understand which application of these theories have a more profound impact on contemporary Russian foreign policy. This case provides a specific test for several of the hypotheses: Hypothesis 1, which concerns security and a loss of strategic depth; Hypothesis 2, which concerns the pursuit of secure borders by expansion; Hypothesis 3, which considers the appeal to nationalistic sentiments as a means of garnering support for a certain policy; and Hypothesis 7, which concerns the reaction of a state to territorial loss.

The Kuril Islands dispute with Japan is a much smaller scale issue than the "near abroad"; that alone makes it attractive for analysis. The Kuril dispute is also completely distinct from the "near abroad" issue; there is no overlap between the

two issues. Having tested the application of these theories on a grand scale (the "near abroad"), it is interesting to see how they perform in a relatively small, regional issue. Additionally, the "near abroad" concerns territory won by the Russians by guile or by conquest in the centuries before 1989, and then lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast, the Kurils are territory obtained in the recent past, relatively speaking, and which are still held by the Russians. Thus at issue in the Kurils is the Russian attempt to maintain territory in their possession, rather than an attempt to regain lost territory. This case provides a specific test for Hypothesis 6 regarding the "conditionally expansionist" tendency of foreign policy, with regard to maintaining access to the sea.

Lastly, the Kurils are an issue completely outside the European sphere. Volumes have been written debating the place of Russia within or without the European system; the purpose of this thesis is not to join that debate. However, in the interest of avoiding charges of a Eurocentric study, analysis of the Kurils provides an important indication of the applicability of these theories in areas outside traditional European interests.

While Russian claims to interests in the Kurils on the basis of "prior discovery, prior settlement and prior development"[9] may be viewed as an attempt to justify a recently developed interests in resource exploitation and strategy, are therefore open to debate, there can be no disputing that Russia has maintained a longstanding interest in the Balkans. There are strategic culture and *Realpolitik* elements to this interest. In light of the revolutionary changes in the political and governmental structure in Russia, it is interesting to consider which of these elements have a stronger influence on contemporary Russian policy regarding the ethnic strife in Bosnia-Hercegovina. It can be argued that the Russians have had a long term interest in cultivating close ties with the South Slavic peoples for cultural reasons: the sense of ethnic and spiritual kinship, and the quest for Slavic unity. Likewise, it can also be argued that Russian interest is based principally on the desire

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[9]See discussion in Chapter IV.

to cultivate prestige by the development of alliances or the exertion of influence, and to gain access to the Turkish straits by gaining control of the adjacent territory. The current Bosnian conflict provides a tough test of strategic culture (which explains Russia's pro-Serbian position) versus *Realpolitik* (which would explain Russia's attempts to accommodate the Western demands for punitive actions against the Serbs).

This case serves as a test for specific hypotheses as well: Hypothesis 3, concerning the appeal of nationalistic sentiment; Hypothesis 5, concerning prestige; and Hypothesis 8, concerning the pursuit of "balance" in the international order.

Chapter II will offer brief surveys of balance of power theory and strategic culture theory, and will develop hypotheses from these theories about the nature of foreign policy. Other theories will be discussed in this chapter as well. The next three chapters examine the three test cases used in this analysis to examine contemporary Russian foreign policy: the "near abroad" in Chapter III, the Kuril Islands dispute in Chapter IV, and the conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina in Chapter V. Each of these chapters opens with a historical survey of the subject foreign policy issue as it has related to Russian and Soviet foreign policy up to the collapse of the Soviet Union, then the current Russian Federation foreign policy position on the subject issue is examined in greater detail, using foreign policy-related statements by Russian officials and documents pertinent to the issue. At the close of each of these three chapters the hypotheses developed in Chapter II are evaluated to determine if they were upheld or not upheld, based upon the determined foreign policy position of the Russian Federation.

Chapter VI evaluates the validity and the utility of the theories as foundations for the analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy decisions in the future, and weighs the relative explanatory power of each theory based on how well two families of hypotheses "performed" in the three test cases. These theories frequently predict different outcomes with respect to the nature and direction of foreign policy, so these test cases are suggestive of the power of each theory. It is

hoped that this thesis will demonstrate the utility of at least one, and possibly both, explanatory theories in evaluating contemporary Russian foreign policy regarding a wide variety of issues.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: THE COMPETING THEORIES AND THE DERIVED HYPOTHESES

Before proceeding with an examination of recent Russian foreign policy regarding the near abroad, certain terms and concepts must be defined.

A. STRATEGIC CULTURE

1. Theory Discussion and Definition

In the absence of knowledge concerning an adversary or potential adversary, and in the face of the demand for a decision based upon the predicted actions of that adversary, the easiest and indeed the most likely approach to deductive reasoning is to project one's own belief system, value system, logic, knowledge -- in short one's own cultural biases -- on the adversary. Such an conceptualization, the so-called process of "mirror imaging," was evident when American strategists and academics conducted studies of Cold War strategies under the assumption that the Soviets thought in the same way as Americans.[1] In the course of the 1970's it became obvious that the Soviets had devised a nuclear strategy that was very different from the corresponding U.S. strategy. Western students of Soviet nuclear strategy eventually discovered that the Soviets had a different understanding of deterrence. The Soviets rejected the notion of self-restraint in deploying counter-force weapons, and were instead determined to try to fight and win a nuclear war. American doctrine counted on the feasibility of fighting a limited nuclear war in a way that the

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[1]Examples of prominent works that advocate this position are Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1971); Roman Kolkowicz, et al., The Soviet Union and Arms Control -- A Superpower Dilemma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1970); and, Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U. S. Strategic Arms Policy (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1975). These latter two works, and the underlying premise of similar American and Soviet nuclear strategies, are discussed in Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986). See pp. 137-138.

Soviet approach rejected.[2] This led to the introduction of the concept of "strategic culture," which sought to account for the difference in American and Soviet strategies in the field of nuclear war and deterrence. Its application was subsequently expanded and has since been widely debated. The question of whether strategic culture is useful in a broader analysis of foreign policy is at the heart of this thesis.

The term "strategic culture" was first used by Jack Snyder in a RAND Corporation paper published in 1977. In this paper, Snyder stated:

> It is useful to look at the Soviet approach to strategic thinking as a unique "strategic culture." Individuals are socialized into a distinctly Soviet mode of strategic thinking. As a result of this socialization process, a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioral patterns with regard to nuclear strategy has achieved a state of semi-permanence that places them on the level of "culture" rather than mere "policy." Of course, attitudes may change as a result of changes in technology and the international environment. However, new problems are not assessed objectively. Rather, they are seen through the perceptual lens provided by the strategic culture.[3]

Ironically, in the years since he introduced this concept, Snyder has joined some of his critics and has turned on theorists who have expanded the concept of strategic culture and the application of the term. Snyder argues that the concept was valid only within the realm of an examination of the difference between Soviet and American approaches to nuclear strategy. The concept serves as a "warning of the danger of ethnocentrism." Snyder has decried theorists such as Ken Booth who underrate the prospects for change in Soviet strategy by exaggerating the differences between American and Soviet strategic thinking and ignoring the potential for

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[2]Jack Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London, Macmillan, 1990), p. 3.

[3]Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica, CA: Rand R-2154-AF, September 1977), p. v.

changes in the objective internal or external environment of the Soviet Union.[4] Booth is one theorist who has greatly expanded the application of the concept, and his definition of strategic culture is notably broader than Snyder's:

> The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. [It is] persistent over time . . . [it is derived from that nation's] history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices: these may be . . . the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion [and including domestic politics]. . . Strategic culture helps shape behavior in such issues as the use of force, international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine.[5]

Concerning the definition of strategic culture, Alistair I. Johnston addressed the subject as follows: different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the "early" or "formative" military experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and the state elites as these develop through time. Strategic culture does not reject rationality; rather, it rejects the ahistorical, acultural structural or neo-realist framework for analyzing strategic choices. Included in this concept of strategic culture is the notion that strategic preferences of a state are rooted in history and culture.[6]

Yitzak Klein gave the following definition of strategic culture: "the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political

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[4]Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," p. 8.

[5]Ken Booth, "The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed," in Carl G. Jacobsen, ed., Strategic Power: USA/USSR (London: Macmillan,1990), p. 121. Parenthetical phrase regarding domestic politics added.

[6]Alastair I. Johnston, unpublished ms., December 1993, pp. 1-3.

objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it."[7] This may serve as a starting point, but it is nonetheless unnecessarily limited in its scope. For Klein, the concept is only valid in the realm of military thought, but this is not a foregone conclusion. There is much to be said for the inclusion of other elements of a society as influential forces in the formulation of a strategic culture. The most notable of these elements is the political elite, which was addressed to some extent by Johnston and Booth; another is the mass public, especially the informed portion of it. These latter concepts, the political elite and the mass (or general) public, are important categories in the study of influential elements in a society and are defined and explored at length by Herbert McClosky and John Zaller.[8] McClosky and Zaller define the political elite as a body of people from within the mass public who are able exert a disproportionate influence on public opinion by virtue of their political activity or knowledge. The political elite are also known as "opinion leaders" or "influentials."[9]

Regarding the analysis of Russian foreign policy, the broader application of the concept of strategic culture appears more useful, although the limitations of this thesis require a corresponding limitation in the bounds of the definition. This study makes the admittedly artificial simplifying assumption that the impact of strategic culture is homogeneous across the spectrum of society. Under this assumption, therefore, the political elite, the military establishment, the informed public, and the general public all experience the same influence produced by that society's strategic culture. For the purpose of this analysis, therefore, the following definition of strategic culture is employed, drawing primarily from Booth's definition:

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[7]Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," Comparative Strategy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1991, p. 5.

[8]Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[9]Ibid., p. 13.

> Strategic culture is a sum total of a state's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, and particular ways of adapting to the geopolitical environment and solving problems. All of these factors must persist over time, and are derived from the state's history, geography, and political culture.

Before examining the nature of Russian strategic culture today and given the close relationship between strategic culture and historical experience, it would be useful to consider some general observations regarding tsarist and Soviet foreign policy.

The following summary of tsarist foreign policy emerges from a review of the period from the rise of Ivan the Terrible in 1533 to the abdication of Nicholas II in 1917. Obviously, these observations are necessarily broad and general in their scope.

(1) As a result of Russia's particular geographic borders and constraints, the first and preeminent goal of tsarist foreign policy was the security of the empire. The term "security" is somewhat elusive, but in this particular application, national security will be defined as a set of policies pursued by a nation in order to "protect itself from the possibility of attack."[10] Russia had been invaded numerous times, and was particularly vulnerable to attack from the southeastern steppes, from what is presently Poland, and -- early on -- from a Swedish threat to the west. This led to a heightened sense of vulnerability and a corresponding quest for strategic borders. That is to say, the geographic extent of Russian influence was characterized by a lack of natural geographic boundaries -- physical features that were conducive to defense. Given this lack of natural physical boundaries, as Russia grew in power and influence it sought to expand its borders, thereby pressing the frontiers away from the heartland and gaining control of "natural borders." Such geographic characteristics included mountain ranges (as in the Caucasus), large and unfordable

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[10]Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations (London: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 1.

rivers (such as the Pruth or the Danube), and seas (such as the Black, Baltic, and Caspian Seas).

(2) In its quest for those strategic borders, Russia pursued a policy of territorial expansion. Russia's first step in stabilizing its periphery was to acquire defendable borders, a process that was achieved by the political or military reduction of states surrounding the empire.[11] Consequently, successive tsars came to comprehend the defensive concept of security based upon the notion of territorial depth.[12] Subsequently, some argue, the Russian quest for security evolved into expansion for its own sake.[13]

(3) The drive for territory was often rationalized by dynastic, religious or national claims of Russian messianism or superiority.[14] Initially, ideology provided a key motivational factor in the establishment of foreign policy objectives. However, as the tsarist state became more institutionalized, these objectives became more pragmatic and more closely resembled a traditional foreign policy.

(4) As the Russian Empire expanded, its multi-national character reenforced the need for a strong, centralized, authoritarian rule.[15] Additionally, as the empire expanded, the newly acquired lands were saturated with Russian settlers who

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[11]Cyril E. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives" in Ivo J. Lederer, ed., Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 3-38.

[12]Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since War II: Imperial and Global (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1989), p. 10.

[13]Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 140.

[14]Ibid., p. 18.

[15]For examples of the development of the pattern of authoritarian rule in the Russia Empire, see the descriptions of institutional development in each of the tsarist regimes in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 66.

upheld tsarist rule and prevented other nationalities from gaining strength enough to overthrow or conquer the empire.[16]

(5) Survival of the state was tantamount to survival of the individual, a notion quite different from the Western society, in which the ideals of individual rights and responsibility emerged paramount.

Russia developed as an empire because of its fundamental need to expand in order to become secure. This expansionist argument is not a argument unique to Russian history: Napoleon and Hitler used a similar line of reasoning. But France and Germany were well-established nation-states prior to the rise of these charismatic, messianic leaders. What makes the Russian case unique is that the expansionist approach to security developed coincident with the foundation of the modern Russian political entity that threw off the "Tatar yoke" under the leadership of the first Tsar of united Russia, Ivan IV, in 1533.[17] The bottom line of tsarist foreign policy as it developed was the need to preserve and strengthen the empire. Strategic considerations were always preeminent; economic development and expansion were secondary;[18] individual considerations were tertiary, at best.

Turning to a summary of Soviet foreign policy that emerges from studies of the period from 1917 until 1991, the following conclusions can be drawn:

(1) Security was the first objective in Soviet foreign policy. In tsarist days the risk of threat was predominantly a threat of invasion by military force. While that threat remained a possibility after the Bolshevik Revolution, the Bolsheviks

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[16]For an account of the migratory trends and the methods of colonizations used by Russians in their expanding empire, see Alexandre Benningsen, "The Muslims of European Russia and the Caucasus," in Wayne S. Vukovich, ed., Russia and Asia (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), pp. 138-139.

[17]The date of the end of Mongol or Tatar domination has been set at various dates, based upon the assent to the Muscovite throne of various leaders from Ivan III (1462), to Basil III (1505), to Ivan IV. See Riasanovsky, p. 66.

[18]Rubenstein, p. 10.

introduced an ideological aspect to the definition through ideology -- the competition of socialism and capitalism. After 1917, security included both military and ideological considerations. This leads to a second point.

(2) Ideology played a crucial role in the development of foreign policy, at least in the formative years of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet state became more institutionalized, these objectives became more pragmatic and more closely resembled a traditional foreign policy. Nonetheless, an ideological element remained in the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy throughout its history. George F. Kennan described it as an "innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism."[19] There was always a sense of rivalry, and the Soviets never got over the siege mentality that was spawned by notions of "capitalist encirclement."

(3) In its quest for security and ideological supremacy, the Soviet Union pursued an expansionist policy. It engaged in a perpetual drive for influence and global recognition,[20] and the basis for this drive to expand was ideology -- the rise of socialism on the heels of the anticipated collapse of capitalism. Initially, ideology provided a key motivational factor in the establishment of foreign policy objectives.

(4) As was the case with its tsarist predecessor, as the Soviet empire expanded, its increasingly multi-national character reenforced the need for a strong, centralized, authoritarian rule. As the processes of collectivization and industrialization were initiated, took hold and developed, the recently acquired territory in Central Asia and the Caucasus was saturated with Russians who

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[19]X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., The Foreign Affairs Reader (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 465-483.

[20]Rubenstein, p. 14.

prevented other nationalities from gaining strength enough to overthrow the Soviet regime.[21]

(5) The Soviet foreign policy formation process was highly centralized. Policy decisions were made by very few men, and largely without regard to the interests of the general population as a whole. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions were relegated to support status.

(6) The Soviet system was committed to the preservation of the imperial system and its sole regard for the outside world was the significance it had in preserving, strengthening and expanding its own system.[22]

The summary of Soviet foreign policy is remarkably similar to that of tsarist foreign policy: ideology aside, the primary purpose of Soviet foreign policy was to preserve and strengthen the Soviet system;[23] and again, secondary considerations were the protection and strengthening of the economy, and expansion, while individual rights and responsibilities were suppressed outright.

Based on the discussion of tsarist and Soviet foreign policy and the assumption that a "new" Russian foreign policy will be heavily influenced by historical precedents, the following foreign policy objectives may be appropriate for the Russian Federation:

(1) As in previous eras, security remains the first and preeminent goal of Russian foreign policy. In this context it is important to realize that Russia's geopolitical parameters have been reduced and its strategic situation has changed. Russia still occupies borders that are contiguous with China, but only in the vast open regions of the Russian Far East. In Europe, Russia no longer occupies states or

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[21]Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961). See in particular Chapter 17, "Stalin as a Statesman," pp. 241-259.

[22]Ibid., p. 253 et passim.

[23]Kennan, Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1960). See the discussion of Stalin's "divide and rule" tactics.

territories that are adjacent to territories protected by the United States (which is to say, Western Europe).[24] In the Soviet period the Red Army directly controlled the regions abutting territory occupied by its greatest rival. Today, there are "grey zones" of uncertain power and stability surrounding Russia, separating it from the other major powers.

(2) In the past, Russia pursued an expansionist policy in a quest for strategic frontiers. As a first step toward stabilizing its periphery, Russia acquired defendable borders through the political or military reduction of states surrounding the empire. Russia has not yet undertaken so bold a course of action as outright re-annexation, but there are observers who believe that Russia will use a revitalized Commonwealth of Independent States for the same function.

Likewise, there are concerns regarding the potential for unilateral Russian actions in the periphery. The new Russian military doctrine has been as a source of considerable concern to the other former Soviet republics. The first draft of this document appeared in the Russian press in May 1992, and key provisions of this draft included the continued placement of Moscow at the center of a unified CIS defense space, the justification of force to defend ethnic Russians in the "near abroad," and a suggestion that Eastern Europe and the other former Soviet states remained in a distinctly Russian sphere of influence.[25] The final draft of the new defense policy was approved by the Russian Federation Security Council on 2 November 1993, but has not been published.[26] Additional aspects of this new defense policy are discussed in Chapter III.

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[24]Alexei G. Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 6.

[25]The text of this draft document appeared in *Voennaya mysl* (special issue), May 1992. See Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Affairs," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report (hereafter, RFE/RL Research Report), Vol. 2, No. 46, 19 November 1993, pp. 44-50.

[26]Ibid., p. 48.

(3) In the past, ambition reenforced the drive for security and the subsequent attachment to empire, and the drive for territory was often pursued on the basis of Russian dynastic, religious or nationalistic claims. Today's preoccupation with Russia's status as a "great power" and its claims of "special interests" in these regions indicate a continuing Russian ambition.

(4) In previous eras, ideology provided the initial motivation in the establishment of foreign policy objectives. Today, nationalism could easily serve as the ideological driving force behind the development of foreign policy objectives.

Here is necessary to pause and very briefly discuss the nature of nationalism in general, and Russian nationalism in particular. Nationalism, by Gellner's account, is a political principle which holds that a political unit (state) and its corresponding national (ethnic) unit must be congruent; nationalism is the belief that nation and state are destined to unite.[27] Joy or anger results when this destiny is correspondingly fulfilled or thwarted. It is important to note that in this broad definition nationalism it is not necessarily an expansionist phenomena. However, George F. Kennan has enumerated *two* separate and distinct forms of Russian nationalism: a "traditional" nationalism that developed relatively early in the formation of the Russian nation and was firmly embedded in the teachings of the Russian Orthodox Church, and a newer "linguistic" nationalism, which was secular

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[27]Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991). This is, of course, but one definition of nationalism. Walker Connor considers the identification of nationalism with the state to be imprecise and preemptive. His argument is that nations and states frequently do not coincide; the nation-state is not the universal form of polity. Connor's definition of nationalism is the identification with and loyalty to a group of people who believe that they are ancestrally related. See Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). pp. xi, 40 *et passim*. Eric Hobsbawm contends that nationalities are "imagined communities" "invented traditions" which are for the most part "conscious and deliberate" creations designed for ideological purposes, "exercises in social engineering" intended to create a continuity with the past that is largely factious. See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 2-3, 13, 263.

and romantic in spirit and of Western origin.[28] It was from this second variety of nationalism that a particularly strong Russian nationalist sentiment emerged, the "patronizing attitude" of Panslavism. It was this version of Russian nationalism that was expansionistic in nature, and is still.

A basic question arises from Kennan's approach, however. Is it correct to refer to Panslavism as the outward manifestation of Russian nationalism, or is it merely the outward manifestation of a Russian appetite for expansion? Adhering, for the moment, to a strict interpretation of Gellner's definition, Panslavism was not a form of Russian nationalism, because it sought far more than the formation of a Russian nation-state. But one must step beyond the simple definition and take into account Russian history. From 1533 to 1992 Russia had existed exclusively as an empire, and Panslavs sought to expand Russian control, or at a minimum to expand the Russian sphere of influence. Gellner describes nationalism as an act of self-worship, and this is an accurate description of the Panslavic view of Russia as motherland and destined protector of all Slavic peoples. Kennan described the sentiment well: Panslavs possessed "an almost pathologic intensity of national feeling."[29]

As the contemporary period of transformation within Russia continues and the process of foreign policy formation becomes institutionalized, the objectives of this policy will most likely mellow. But for the time it is well that analysts keep in mind the potential power behind Russian nationalism, particularly the "linguistic" strain of nationalism described by Kennan, which could provoke a resumption of Russian expansionist tendencies. As Kissinger has noted, Russian nationalism has historically been "missionary and imperial" in nature.[30]

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[28]Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press 1979).

[29]Ibid., p. 39.

[30]Kissinger, p. 817.

(5) As the Russian and Soviet empires expanded, the multi-national character of these empires reinforced the need for strong, centralized, authoritarian rule. The new constitution ratified in the December 1993 national election provides for a very strong executive, along the same lines as the French system. Within this document there are provisions which allow the president to assume emergency powers, and Boris Yeltsin has already shown a propensity for strong, decisive action, provided he perceives that he has the support of the general public, and more importantly, the armed forces.

The compelling force behind this need for a strong, highly centralized form of government remains essentially unchanged: while the territory controlled by the Russian Federation is greatly reduced when compared to the territory controlled by the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation nonetheless retains a strong multi-national character. It is the perception of many within and without the Russian Federation that unless the central government retains sufficient power to maintain control over several wayward regions within the Federation, this new, democratic Russian Federation could go the way of the Soviet Union.

Ironically, the current ethnic dilemma is largely a self-inflicted problem. While many of the national groups within the Russian Federation were for centuries the unwilling subjects of the Russian and Soviet central authorities, at times they were allowed to maintain (or in some cases develop) an ethnic identity and a national heritage distinct from the Russian and Soviet heritage. The Soviet policy of *korenizatsiia*, the "flourishing of nations," serves as the foremost example of this policy, and is the subject of an expansive work by Gerhard Simon.[31] Combined with the systematic movement of whole ethnic groups and occasional attempts at outright extermination, several of these ethnic groups have serious grievances with past Russian and Soviet regimes.

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[31]Gerhard Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. Translated by Karen Forster and Oswald Forster. (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991).

These could be elements of a Russian strategic culture that influence contemporary Russian foreign policy.

2. Hypotheses Drawn From Strategic Culture Theory

Based on the definition of strategic culture and the tenets of tsarist and Soviet strategic culture discussed above, the following hypotheses can be derived:

Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space between the frontiers and the heartland.

Hypothesis 2. States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining secure borders.

Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering public support for foreign policy objectives.

Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a support function.

B. *REALPOLITIK* AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

1. Theory Discussion and Definition

In the theory of political realism, politics and society in general are governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. It follows in this theory that there is a possibility of distinguishing between truth and opinion, "between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are

informed by prejudice and wishful thinking."[32] Within this assumption of objective truth, there is the implication that all states make decisions based on the same underlying principles: that this objective truth is universal, and that through the determination of these fundamental principles, one may deduce and thence understand the policies and the decisions that follow. As Hans J. Morgenthau states, "we assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power."[33] We also assume, therefore, that statesmen of all powers use the same rationale in their foreign policy calculus. Other factors, aside from these underlying principles, are irrelevant.

At the outset, this seems a logical assumption and it is familiar ground in light of the previous discussion on the Soviet approach to nuclear strategy. As noted in this discussion, this is especially true when the internal factors of a state cannot be known, either because that state closely guards its foreign policy machinations, or because the state has undergone a dramatic institutional transformation, and the effects and extent of that change are not yet fully understood. The latter case applies in the case of the Russian Federation today. Notwithstanding the trappings of Soviet government, the December 1993 Russian constitution represents the Russian state's first attempt at democracy.

There are analysts who point to the early years of this century as an example of an earlier Russian move toward democratization. That assertion, however, does not stand up under close scrutiny. The period in question is the immediate aftermath of the Revolution of 1905, when Nicholas II issued the October Manifesto, in which civil liberties were guaranteed, a Duma with real legislative functions was created, and further expansions of this new order were promised.[34] This move split

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[32]Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), p. 4.

[33]Ibid., p. 5.

[34]Riasanovsky, pp. 407-408.

the opposition and quelled the fighting. Then, immediately prior to the convening of the first session of the Duma, the Tsar issued the first of the Fundamental Laws, which provided the framework for the new political system, "filling in the blanks" created by the October Manifesto. According to the Fundamental Laws the Tsar retained -- with the title of autocrat -- an incredible array of powers: complete control of the executive branch, the armed forces, foreign policy, succession to the throne, the imperial court, imperial domains, and the continued domination of the Russian Orthodox Church. And while the Duma received some legislative and budgetary rights, those rights were largely circumscribed.[35] At first glance, the 1905 government reforms appear to the start of a process of democratization in the Russian Empire. In retrospect, however, these reforms were in reality an imperial effort to placate the revolutionary opposition by placing them in a largely ineffective governmental process.

Western analysts are still examining the 1993 constitution, and evaluating the Russian government in action. In the absence of knowledge concerning the process by which Russian foreign policy is formulated, Western observers may tend to assume that Russians follow the same single, universal strategic rationality that the West uses. As Graham Allison notes, "[t]he less the information about the internal affairs of a nation or government, the greater the tendency to rely on the classical model [the "Rational Actor Model"].[36]

This is political realism: internal factors are essentially irrelevant, and are overwhelmed by the imperatives of the logic of *Realpolitik*. In this realm, the term *Realpolitik*, though not a new one, nonetheless has a variety of definitions associated with it. There does not seem to be one standard, accepted definition, and it is therefore important to review important key definitions, in order to determine

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[35]Ibid., pp. 408-409.

[36]Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1971), p. 24.

which one best applies to the current discussion. Students of *Realpolitik* generally focus on how the general constraints and incentives of the international system combine with the unique situations of individual states to lead them to foreign policies.[37] Some consider *Realpolitik* to mean not "power politics" (see below discussion), but rather a state's ability to accept its existing limits and then to use them to the fullest extent in order to maximize its position in the international order.[38] To others, *Realpolitik* is amoral and ahistorical, and according to this definition, the multiplicity of sovereign states acknowledge no political superior, and there is an element of anarchy in international relations. In this state of relations, therefore, power is anterior to society, law, and justice.[39] The term "power politics" is a translation of the German *Machtpolitik*, which meant the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force, without consideration of right and justice. This phrase, in turn, supplanted the older and more elegant term *raison d'état*, which inferred that statesmen were not bound in public affairs by the morality they subscribe to in private life; there is a vague 'reason of state' which justifies unscrupulous action, if it is conducted in the public's interest.[40]

Martin Wight asserts that the most conspicuous theme in international history is the series of efforts, by one power after another, to gain mastery of the states-system. In a system of power politics the chief duty of each government to preserve the interests of the people it rules and represents against the competing interests of other peoples. There are, therefore, certain interests which are vital to

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[37]Posen, p. 35.

[38]Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism: 1852-1871 (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), pp. 28-29. This book was one of the series entitled The Rise of Modern Europe, and edited by William L. Langer.

[39]Martin Wight, in Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, eds., Power Politics, (New York: Homes & Meier Publishers, Inc.,1978), pp. 221-222.

[40]Ibid., p. 29.

the continued existence of a given people. When powers agree to submit to arbitration or judicial process as a means of settling a dispute, they nearly always expressly exclude vital interests from the dispute settlement process.[41]

Prestige is a principal focus of governments engaged in power politics.[42] Wight further contends that it is in the nature of powers to expand. The energies of their members radiate culturally, economically, and politically, and unless there are strong obstacles these tendencies will be summed up in territorial expansion. This expansion is the product of two causes: internal pressure and the weakness of surrounding powers. When equilibrium is reached between outward pressure and the external resistance, expansion stops. One of the basic kinds of expansion discussed by Wight is the quest for access to the sea, and according to Wight, Russian history has been interpreted as a territorial movement towards warm-water ports.[43] Cyril E. Black similarly described a primary aim of Russian territorial expansion as " . . . the acquisition and maintenance of direct commercial outlets to the sea . . ."[44] Black avoids any direct reference to *warm water* ports, but his point stands: Russian, the continental power, is constantly driving to gain direct access to sea-based trade routes. There has been, however, at least one recent attempt to disprove this notion of the Russian drive for warm-water ports. William C. Green asserts that "[t]he claim that Russians possess a historic drive for a warm water port must be rejected as a dangerous geopolitical myth."[45] Green does provide a caveat in his thesis

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[41]Ibid., pp. 30, 95.

[42]Ibid., p. 99.

[43]Ibid., pp. 144, 149.

[44]Black, p. 14.

[45]William C. Green, "The Historic Russian Drive for a Warm Water Port," Naval War College Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 80-102.

which states that the absence of such a drive in Russia's past may not necessarily preclude future attempts by Russia to gain additional outlets to the sea.

A corollary of the expansiveness of powers is their general refusal to suffer territorial loss without a struggle.[46]

There are two exceptions to the rule of tenacity in a state's pursuit of territorial expansion: territorial exchange, and when a power had attained the capacity for being content with an economic or moral equivalent of dominion. Prudence will often make a power limit its liabilities, in accordance with its assessment of its special interests.[47] There are also examples, however, of powers abandoning sovereignty over possessions, for motives in which calculation of interest may be mixed with considerations of justice. It is something that has been done by great powers at their zenith.[48]

Kenneth Waltz provides an excellent discussion of the concept of *Realpolitik*. He identifies the following elements of *Realpolitik* as the term applies to the modern nation-state: the state's interest provides the spring for action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state's interests; success is ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state. *Realpolitik* indicates the methods by which foreign policy is conducted, and provides a rationale for them. And from this description there arises a theory that seeks to explain the results that such methods produce. Waltz calls balance of power a "distinctively political theory of international politics," but then notes that, as is the case with *Realpolitik*, that there is not a generally accepted

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[46]Wight, p. 151.

[47]Ibid., pp. 152-153.

[48]Ibid., p. 153.

statement which defines the term.[49] This much can be said: balance of power theory assumes that states are unitary actors, and that these states pursue an objective from among various options that range from self-preservation, to relative power gain (as Waltz conceptualizes balance of power), to maximum power and universal domination. Furthermore, states rely on the rational means at their disposal to achieve their goals. These means can be either internal (focusing on economic development, military strength, or strategy) or external (alliance formation, maintenance, or in the case of an opposing alliance, alliance weakening or deterrence).[50]

Morgenthau identifies four different meanings for the term "balance of power: (1) a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs; (2) an actual state of affairs; (3) an approximately equal distribution of power; and, (4) any distribution of power.[51] Wight describes two definitions of the term: it is both a system of foreign policy, as well as a historical law or theoretical principle of analysis in which spectators of international politics, including journalists, publicists and students, derive from or apply their observations.[52] He then demonstrates that the term balance of power has several distinct meanings within international politics:

1. An even distribution of power.
2. The principle that power ought to be evenly distributed.

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[49]Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and the Balance of Power, in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press,1987), pp. 115-116.

[50]Ibid., p. 117.

[51]Morgenthau, p. 167ff.

[52]Wight, "The Balance of Power," in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1966), p. 150.

3. The existing distribution of power. Hence, any possible distribution of power.
4. The principle of equal aggrandizement of the Great Powers at the expense of the weak.
5. The principle that "our" side ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger of power becoming unevenly distributed.
6. (When governed by the verb "to hold":) A special role in maintaining an even distribution of power.
7. (Also when governed by the verb "to hold":) A special advantage in the existing distribution of power.[53]

Balance of power as a principal characteristic of international relations is the oldest and perhaps best known paradigm. Its origins can be traced to Thucydides' History of the Peloponnisian War and an example of his description of the concept can be found in Sparta's decision to fight the Athenians because Sparta feared the "growing power" of Athens.[54] David Hume, starting with the aforementioned Thuycidides, offers historical evidence that balance of power was "the prevailing notion of ancient times."[55] In discussing the Grecian wars, Hume states the following:

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[53]Wight, "The Balance of Power," p. 151.

[54]Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnisian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 357. In an interesting argument, Laurie M. Bagby Johnson contends that Thuycidides is often incorrectly interpreted, and that neither realists or neorealists draw proper conclusions. In Johnson's opinion, Thuycidides was neither a realist nor a neorealist, and the "Thuycididean perspective" is best considered as an alternative or supplement to realism. See Johnson, "The Use and Abuse of Thuycidides in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 313-314.

[55]David Hume, "Of the Balance of Power," Essays and Treatises on Various Subjects, 1770, p. 89.

> . . . whether we can ascribe the shifting of sides in all the Grecian republics to jealous emulation or cautious politics, the effects were alike, and every prevailing power was sure to meet with a confederacy against it, and that often composed of its former friends and allies.[56]

Of more recent vintage are essays on the balance of power written by Wight, which provide perhaps the most lucid and compact discussion of this conception.[57] Hans J. Morgenthau demonstrates that balance of power is a universally understood and accepted concept, and it is commonly used in a variety of fields outside of international affairs, including physics, biology, economics, and sociology.[58]

According to Morgenthau, there are four methods of applying this balance of power concept in the conduct of foreign policy. These methods, if successful, would result in diminishing the power on one side of a balance of power, or increasing the power on the other side of the balance. These four methods are as follows: divide and rule, which means keeping competitors weak by dividing them or keeping them divided; compensation, in which territorial exchanges are used to maintain a balance; armament, which Morgenthau calls the principal means by which a nation endeavors to use its power to maintain or reestablish a balance; and finally, alliances, which have been historically the most important manifestation of the balance of power.[59]

It is important to discuss, briefly, another important concept involving alliances: collective defense. The two terms are not the same. Balance of power

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[56]Ibid., p. 90.

[57]See Wight, "The Balance of Power," previously cited; and Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," in Alain James, ed., The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C. A. W. Manning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 85-115.

[58]Morgenthau, p. 168.

[59]Ibid., pp. 178-181.

alliances are formed by individual states, or groups of individual states, on the basis of what each individual state regards as its national interests. Collective defense, on the other hand, is founded on a respect for a moral or legal obligation to regard an attack on any member of the alliance as an attack upon all members of the alliance.[60]

For the purpose of this limited exercise, the following definition of balance of power, based primarily upon the works of Morgenthau and Wight, will be used:

> **Balance of power is a foreign policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, namely that there will exist an equal aggrandizement among the various great powers of the world (with the assumption that Russia is such a power); and that Russia ought to have a margin of strength in order to avert the danger of another power gaining dominance over her.**

2. Hypotheses Drawn From Balance of Power Theory

Based on this definition of balance of power, the following hypotheses concerning foreign policy behavior can be derived:

Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance of prestige, both at home and abroad.

Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea.

Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic or moral equivalence of territorial domination.

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[60]Ibid., p. 193.

Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, compensation, armament, alliance.

C. OTHER THEORIES

By examining the strategic culture of a particular state in an effort to understand the foreign policy decision-making process of that state, or by assuming that the state is using the precepts of *Realpolitik*/balance of power calculations in the formulation of foreign policy, this thesis adopts a unit-level perspective. Before proceeding with an analysis of the test cases according to this perspective, it is useful to consider the alternative perspectives: the systemic approach. According to Waltz, unit-level analyses that attempt to explain international outcomes through elements and combinations of elements located at the national or subnational levels amount to reductionism.[61] Waltz summarily dismissed the utility of what he calls a "reductionist" approach in understanding the whole of world politics for years following his introduction of a neorealist approach, in which states are portrayed as functioning as undifferentiated units acting within a system. In Waltz's view, it is the character of the system as a whole that is critical to understanding international relations; history and culture are irrelevant.[62] But it is difficult to use Waltz's approach as a model for developing theories for analyzing foreign policy; Waltz himself avoids any attempt at using structural realism as a foundation for predicting or analyzing foreign policy:

> A theory of international politics will . . . explain why war occurs, and it will indicate some of the contradictions that make war

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[61]Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," in Neorealism and Its Critics, previously cited, p. 47.

[62]Johnston, p. 2.

more or less likely; but it will not predict the outbreak of particular wars. Within a system, a theory explains continuities. It tells one what to expect and why to expect it. Within a system, a theory explains recurrences and repetitions, not change.[63]

To pursue the analysis of foreign policy using Waltz's structural realism would mean the use of the proverbial straw man; one would expend great effort to prop up and defend an approach that is easily defeated to begin with.

There are other systemic models from which theories on foreign policy may be formulated. As one example, Robert Gilpin offers a cyclic system of hegemony and war. In this system,

> . . . the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline. The law of uneven growth continues to redistribute power, thus undermining the status quo established by the last hegemonic struggle. Disequilibrium replaces equilibrium, and the world moves toward a new round of hegemonic conflict. It has always been thus and always will be . . .[64]

As in the case with Waltz, Gilpin concentrates on the character of the international system, not the elements within that system. While his cyclic approach to history is engaging, it cannot serve as a satisfactory explanation for the nature of foreign policy conducted by actors within that system.

In contrast to these systemic approaches, there are other unit-level analyses aside from strategic culture and balance of power. For example, a number of scholars in recent years have embraced the study of domestic factors of nations as the significant variable in the calculus of foreign policy. In his popular analysis of American foreign policy formulation in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Allison offers two developments along the lines of unit-level analysis. In his second and third

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[63]Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," p. 57.

[64]Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 210.

conceptual lenses, Allison presents the paradigms of "organizational process" and "governmental (bureaucratic) politics." (His first lens is, of course, the rational actor model.) In the former, organizational process, the finished product of a decision-making process is the output of an organization that functions in accordance with a regular and well-established pattern of behavior. In the latter, the end product results from bargaining that takes place between the various individuals and institutions within the government. Morton H. Halperin greatly expands this second concept with a detailed review of the nature of the American bureaucratic system in the post-World War II era, as that system approached issues involving national security.[65] While being careful to avoid a wholesale denial of the validity of realism, Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein assert that domestic factors, including groups, social ideas, the character of constitutions, economic constraints, historical social tendencies, and domestic political pressures all play a role in the formation of a foreign policy.[66]

Miroslav Nincic examines the unique domestic influences over foreign policy that are associated with democracies and argues that, contrary to what is generally accepted, foreign policy can be conducted successfully on the basis of the application of domestic principles in the realm of foreign policy.[67] In brief, Nincic's "Principled Pragmatism" form of foreign policy lists the following domestic elements necessary for the conduct of a successful foreign policy founded on domestic (by which Nincic means "democratic") principles:

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[65]Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

[66]Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[67]Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).

- a congressional or other elected voice that is heard on matters of general national import in foreign affairs
- a public that is considered to be the repository of valid interests and opinions
- governmental candor
- the public and the legislative are accepted as legitimate participants in the determination of national objectives
- foreign policy is closely tethered to the preferences of the national community.[68]

The main virtues of such a relationship are that a country's foreign policy is closely aligned with national interest; there is a combination of ethical concerns, parochial concerns and commitment to national power and security, but no dominating class of concern; the resulting policy is neither particularly moralistic or ideological; such a system is conducive to pluralistic international order; this policy is tied to values at the heart of U. S. political culture -- human rights, liberties, free markets; and lastly, it is "anchored in a society's interests and beliefs, which rarely change in an abrupt and discontinuous manner, principles pragmatism should be more stable and coherent."[69]

These alternative explanations may ultimately provide satisfactory foundations for analysis of the "new" Russian foreign policy. However, they each require a level of understanding of the institutions and mechanisms of the emerging democratic system of government in Moscow that is presently unavailable, or more simply unknown. The Russian government created by the December 1993 constitution has not yet developed the "regular and well-established patterns of behavior" predicted by Allison's organizational process. Analysis on the basis of Allison's governmental (bureaucratic) political process, or Halperin's bureaucratic model requires detailed knowledge of the individuals and institutions that comprise the foreign policy establishment within the Russian government. While the contemporary Russian government is far more transparent than its

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[68]Ibid., pp. 168-169.

[69]Ibid., pp. 169-170.

Soviet predecessor, there is still much concerning the nature of the decision-making process and the individuals that comprise the system that is not understood.

Elements of Rosecrance and Stein's study of the influence of domestic factors of foreign policy are contained in the concept of strategic culture, including the "social ideas" and the "historical social tendencies" elements. Nonetheless, an analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy on the basis of Rosecrance and Stein would require more detailed information regarding the still-evolving post-Soviet society from which the new political system is emerging. That system not yet stable, thereby making analysis of foreign policy decisions on its basis difficult, if not haphazard.

A similar argument can be made regarding Nincic's approach, which assumes a firmly established, democratic form of government. Whether or not Russia is engaged in a true democratic transformation is still open to debate. Even if this development is genuine, it remains in its formative stages. One of the essential elements of a stable democracy is time -- its proven stability is a principle source of its legitimacy. And again, the processes and institutions established by the latest constitution are not yet fully realized: the Duma is still finding its voice and is not yet accepted as a legitimate participant in the determination of national objectives; the role of public opinion is still undetermined.

Given the need for greater knowledge of the nature of Russian government, which in turn requires more time to allow the democratic process to continue, the best foundation for analysis of contemporary Russian foreign policy are strategic culture, which can be determined from history, and balance of power, which requires only an assumption of Russia as a rational actor seeking to maximize its position in the international order.

III. TEST CASE: THE "NEAR ABROAD"

A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION

The dissolution of the Soviet Union has created a new term in the lexicon of Russian foreign policy: the *blizhnii rubezhe*, or "near abroad."[1] Initially, the term developed somewhat ambiguously. Some used the phrase to describe former Soviet bloc countries of Eastern Europe; but there has developed a general acceptance of the definition of "near abroad" as all of the countries of the former Soviet Union, except Russia.[2] A comprehensive study of the history of ethnic Russian migration into these regions is beyond the purview of this thesis. However, as an illustration of the impact of Russian expansion and domination on local nationals, consider the case of the Volga Tatars. Though the Tatars do not inhabit the "near abroad," Russian treatment of these descendants of Ghengis Khan -- and the people who maintained the "Tatar yoke" over Muscovy for three centuries -- demonstrates the contempt with which Russians have traditionally held "lesser" nationalities. It also indicates the source of suspicion, bitterness and fear that colors the various nationalities of the former Soviet republics.

Russian conquest was the most important event in Tatar history. In October of 1552 the armies of Ivan IV marched on Kazan. On the fifteenth of that month the city fell following a Russian siege. Kazan was the first non-Russian conquest for the newly-unified Russian state, and historians mark that conquest as the beginning of the Russian Empire -- an empire that would continue until 1991. After the conquest, Ivan pursued an expansive policy of colonization, with an aim of

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[1]Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, "The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the 'Near Abroad,'" The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, pp. 75-90.

[2]In truth, the "near abroad" has never been defined in terms of a precise geographic area. The term is nonetheless widely accepted and used within the Russian Federation and without. See John Lough, "The Place of the Near Abroad in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 11, 12 March 1993, pp. 21-22ff.

completely integrating the Tatars into his emerging empire.[3] Tatars became second-class citizens of Russia, were held responsible for obeying the law, and yet enjoyed none of the privileges associated with citizenship.

After the conquest, the Russians immediately expelled all Muslims from Kazan.[4] The tradition of religious tolerance observed by Russians and Tatars over the previous three centuries was shattered. In the second half of the fifteenth century, around 1498, the Russian Orthodox Church had acknowledged the Kazan ruler's mandate from heaven, but after the conquest the Church changed its tune completely. In the late sixteenth century Metropolitan Makarij compared Russians and Tatars in the following description of the basic characteristics of the two ethnic groups[5]:

Russians	*Tatars*
believers	nonbelievers
religious	godless
Christians	pagans
pious	impious
pure	unclean
peaceful	warlike
good	bad

[3]Azade-ayse Rohrlich, The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 38.

[4]Alexandre Benningsen, "The Muslims of European Russia and the Caucasus," in Wayne S. Vucinich, ed., Russia and Asia (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 138.

[5]Jaroslaw Pelenski, Russia and Kazan: Conquest and Imperial Ideology (1438 - 1560's) (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1974), pp. 302-303.

Land was confiscated and turned over to Russian landed gentry and various factions of the Russian Orthodox Church. A massive influx of peasants from European Russia, seeking to escape from the practice of serfdom, migrated to the Middle Volga and occupied the most fertile lands.[6] A series of fortresses was constructed throughout the region, populated exclusively by Russians.[7] Forced conversions to Christianity were sanctioned by the tsars, and force, propaganda, education and economic coercion were employed as incentives. Muslims were deported from any village with converts, and Muslim proselytism was banned on pain of death.[8] Russian assimilation efforts focused on the Tatar nobility and Muslim clergy, who were the leaders of resistance to the Russians. The end result of this long and intense attack on the leading elements of Tatar society was the decline of clergy and nobility influence. In their place a dynamic merchant and manufacturing class developed and became a leading force in Tatar society.[9] Conversion efforts achieved some success. In the sixteenth century a community of Christian Tatars, called *Staro-Kriashens* ("Old Converts," as distinguished from the *Novo-Kriashens* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), emerged, though some converted merely to avoid persecution. By and large, however, the Russians failed to break the faith of Tatar Muslims, which was deeply rooted in the rural masses.[10]

In the typical imperial pattern, Russians dominated the cities and large towns, but could not penetrate Tatar rural society. While Russian peasants settled in close proximity to Tatar rural communities, making active resistance extremely difficult,

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[6]Benningsen, p. 138.

[7]Ibid., p. 139.

[8]Ibid., p. 141.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., p. 144.

Tatars clung to their cultural identity. Islam was especially strong in the countryside. Russian missionary policies waxed and waned in their intensity over the next four centuries.[11] Though the activities and methods varied, the goal remained unchanged until the Revolution of 1917. That goal was the conversion of Tatars to Christianity, which in turn was a means of assimilating Tatar culture and integrating the Tatar nation.[12] These policies of forced conversion were a source of Tatar bitterness toward their Russian overlords throughout the period of 1552-1917.

Throughout the Empire, ethnic Russians arrived on the crest of tsarist expansion, and following the Russian Revolution of 1917, the form but not the substance of empire and imperial control was altered.[13] Only in December 1991 did the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. finally bring about this change in substance.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of fifteen sovereign republics in the place of the monolithic Soviet state, twenty-five million ethnic Russians found themselves living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.[14] Of these twenty-five million, the vast majority were permanent

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[11]Rohrlich defines six major shifts in Russian missionary policies during the period between 1552 and 1917. These periods were distinguished as follows: (1) The time of Archbishop Gurii, (2) the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the reign of Empress Anna Ivanova, (3) the period of the Kontora Novokriashenskikh Del, (4) the reign of Catherine II, (5) the nineteenth century policies of Il'minskii, and (6) the Il'minskii era. See Rohrlich, pp. 38 et passim.

[12]Rohrlich, p. 38.

[13]William D. Jackson, "Russia After the Crisis - Imperial Temptations: Ethnics Abroad," Orbis, vol 38, No. 1, Winter 1994, p. 3.

[14]Ibid., p. 1. This figure is based on 1989 Soviet census, and is the most common number associated with the Russian population in the "near abroad." Figures do range as high as thirty million, however. See also Daniel S. Papp, "The Former Soviet Republics and the Commonwealth of Independent States," in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, eds., The Defense of Nations: A Comparative Study (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 208.

residents of the then titular republics at the time the union fell apart. Over fifty percent had been born in non-Russian union republics; many had married titular nationals.[15] This vast population, the product of centuries of imperial expansion and domination, were frequently disliked for exactly this reason: they were the symbol and ever-present reminder of centuries of domination, first under the tsars, then under the Bolsheviks. This vast Russian diaspora has prompted anxious speculation within Russia regarding their fate in the new political order. Russian officials took up this cause and, in the name of human rights, proclaimed that the treatment of these ethnic Russians is a vital national interest of the Russia Federation. Moreover, beginning in 1993 Yeltsin and other Russian officials increasingly emphasized that Russia would act to protect Russians living outside the Federation, using military force, if necessary.[16] At that time the military establishment clearly wanted the option of stationing troops in the territory of the "near abroad".[17] The first draft of Russia's new military doctrine, published in May 1992, continued to place Moscow at the center of a unified Commonwealth of Independent States defense space, named the defense of Russians in the "near abroad" as a legitimate *casus belli*, and suggested that Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics remained a part of Russia's sphere of influence.[18] Additionally, there was included in this draft a list of existing and potential sources of military danger for Russia. Several of the items on this list could be directly applied to the "near abroad": existing and potential local wars and armed conflicts, particularly those in the immediate vicinity of the Russian borders; the suppression of rights,

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[15]Jackson, p. 2.

[16]Papp, p. 208.

[17]Stephen Sestanovich, "Russia Turns The Corner," Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994, p. 96.

[18]Stephen Foye, "Updating Russian Civil-Military Affairs," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 46, 19 November 1993, p. 46.

freedoms, and legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states; the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of interests of the Russian Federation's military security (which is later expanded to specify the introduction of foreign troops in the territory of neighboring states of the Russian Federation).[19]

The final draft of the Russian defense doctrine was approved by the Russian Federation Security Council on 2 November 1993; this time the text was not published. However, on the day after the doctrine was approved, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev held a press conference in which the main tenets of the new policy were openly discussed;[20] The document itself remains classified.[21]

Most press attention centered on the renunciation of the Soviet "first use" clause regarding the employment of nuclear weapons. However, there were items of considerable significance to Russia's "near abroad" policy:

> "Russia's new military doctrine envisions [a new] mission -- conducting peacekeeping operations. Such operations can be carried out with the C.I.S. and, by decision of the U. N. Security Council and other international bodies outside the Commonwealth . . ., provided they are not in conflict with Russia's interests and Russian law."[22]

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[19]The first reported draft of the new Russian military doctrine appeared in *Voennaya mysl* (a special issue), in May 1992. *Rossiyskiye Vesti*, 18 November 1993, p. 1-2, as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter, FBIS). See also the discussion in Scott McMichael, "Russia's New Military Doctrine," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 49, 9 October 1992, pp. 45-50.

[20]Foye, pp. 47-48.

[21]Pavel Felgengauer, "Ministry of Defense is Winning a Sub-Rosa Contest," Sevodnya, 9 October 1994, p. 1, as reported in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, No. 41,1993, p. 27.

[22] "'Basic Provisions' of Military Doctrine Adopted," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLV, No. 44, 1993, pp. 11, which included portions of two items from *Izvestia*, 4 November 1993.

And, a second item:

> "Russia does not rule out the possibility of maintaining Russian troops, bases and installations on the territory of other countries -- on the basis . . . of bilateral and multilateral agreements with the countries in which they would be located."[23]

In April 1994 Boris Yeltsin allegedly signed a presidential directive that made a nearly-identical statement. It was supposedly an endorsement of a Russian Defense Ministry proposal to establish military bases in C.I.S. states and in Latvia (not a C.I.S. member-state) for the purpose of maintaining Russian security.[24] The Russian government first denied, then retracted the directive on the following day, and issued an apology to the Latvian government.

In Article 61 of the new Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was approved in the 12 December 1993 election, there is the stipulation that the Russian Federation guarantees protection to Russian citizens who live beyond the borders of the Russian Federation.[25] Under this constitution, the requirements for Russian citizenship are defined separately, under federal law. That Russia has included the 25 million expatriate Russians in its definition of citizens is to many an ominous sign of Russian attempts to regain influence in the "near abroad". .[26]

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[23]Ibid.

[24]RFE/RL Daily Report, 7 April 1994. The complete text of the alleged document was printed in *Rossiiskiye vesti*, 7 April 1994, p. 7 under the title, "Directive of the President of the Russian Federation." See The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. XLVI, No. 14, 1994, p. 1.

[25] "The Text of the Draft Constitution," The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, XLV, No. 45, 8 December 1993, pp. 4-16.

[26]Mikhail S. Tsypkin, Trip Report [regarding 6-19 April 1994 visit to Moscow, Russia], April 1994, p. 6.

Some of the newly independent republics have aggravated the situation by adopting laws that discriminate (at least in the Russian view) against ethnic Russians, who often constitute a sizable minority of the republic's population. Of course, these republics justify nationalistic legislation as a necessary step in correcting the injustices perpetrated by seventy years of Soviet (read: Russian) rule. Their indigenous nationalities must be preserved and strengthened after enduring generations of Russification. Consider the case of Russian-Estonian relations, as an example of the complexity of this issue.

When Estonia declared its independence from the Soviet Union on 21 August 1991, there were between 20,000 and 25,000 Soviet Army troops on Estonian territory. To the Russians' credit, when it became clear that the Soviet Union was crumbling and that Estonia had no intention of joining the Commonwealth of Independent States, they implemented a plan for the complete withdrawal of all military forces from Estonia, without a written, negotiated agreement. The Russians promised to complete the withdrawal before 31 August 1994. In return for this apparent "gentleman's agreement," Estonia would take control of all military installations but would not press for any compensation due to ecological damage. Furthermore, Estonia agreed to allocate 23 [m]illion (U.S.) dollars for housing facilities for the Russian troops that were being withdrawn from the republic.[27]

This final concession of the part of Estonia highlighted a serious problem facing the Russians, which would obviously affect any timetable for withdrawal: what could be done with the hundreds of thousands of troops returning from Central Europe and the former Soviet republics. Despite this obstacle, the withdrawal began and as of 5 April 1994; there were only 2,500 officers and men awaiting return to the Russian Federation. At this point, negotiations between Estonia and Russia designed to solidify these agreements bogged down, created

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[27]Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report (hereafter, FBIS), 5 April 1994.

tension in the bilateral relations and jeopardized the withdrawal of forces by the August deadline.

At the heart of this disagreement was the fate of 11,000 Russian military pensioners and their families -- a total of 44,000 people. In its Foreigners Act, Estonia had imposed stringent citizenship requirements, and Russia wanted assurances that the pensioners will receive permanent residence permits and guaranteed social benefits, and they wanted these provisions included as part of the troop withdrawal agreement. Russia was using a similar agreement negotiated with Latvia as precedence, but Estonia flatly refused to follow the Latvian model.[28] Estonia refused to link the two issues, and would negotiate a resolution of the pensioner conflict as a separate matter only after a written withdrawal agreement was signed.[29] The two sides even disagreed over the demographics of the pensioner group. Estonia maintained that a larger number of the retired personnel are quite young and had served in the K.G.B. or special forces, thereby considering them to be an unacceptable internal security threat. Russia countered with statistics that show that only 1,600 of the 11,000 pensioners are under fifty years of age.[30]

Bilateral negotiations deteriorated to the point that on 6 April 1994, Russian negotiators withdrew the article of the draft document which guaranteed removal of all Russian troops by 31 August. According to Russia's chief negotiator, the 31 August deadline was "no longer actual."[31] Estonia began pleading its case in every

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[28]Estonian Foreign Minister Juri Luik stated the Estonian position succinctly: "Estonia is not obliged to follow the Latvian example in the issue of retired Russian servicemen. Estonia has no intention of engaging in any compromise in the issue of granting social protection to Russian military pensioners residing in the republic." FBIS, 31 March 1994.

[29]FBIS, 8 April 1994.

[30]FBIS, 6 April 1994.

[31]FBIS, 6 April 1994.

available venue in the international arena. The Estonian foreign ministry reiterated statements of support for Russian withdrawal that had been made by NATO, the European Union, the Conference for Secuity and Cooperation in Europe (C.S.C.E.), the Nordic prime ministers, and the United States.[32] Estonia secured the support of the Baltic Assembly.[33]

On 7 April 1994, one day after the breakdown of negotiations, members of the 114th Motorized Rifle Division of the Russian Army stationed in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, conducted a live fire exercise at a Russian practice range on the outskirts of the city without seeking permission from Estonian authorities, and without inviting Estonian officials to observe the exercise.[34] The timing could hardly be called coincidental, and if the Estonians had missed the point at the negotiations table, they surely understood this heavy-handed reminder of the important difference between political power and military power: the troops would stay until Russia was satisfied with the agreement. An agreement was reached and the Russian Army completed its withdrawal prior to 31 September.

The aforementioned military pensioners represent part of a much larger security dilemma for Estonia: the presence of a significant Russian minority among the population. Of a total population of 1,583,000 people in Estonia, only 61 percent are ethnic Estonians. A full 30 percent of the residents are Russian, while another three percent are Ukrainian. And the concern that Russia demonstrates for its pensioners is reflective of its overall concern for all ethnic Russians living outside

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[32]FBIS, 6 April 1994 and 15 April 1994.

[33]RFE/RL Daily Report, 16 May 1994.

[34]FBIS, 13 April 1994.

the boundaries of the Russian Federation. These areas figure prominently in the increasingly aggressive scheme of Russian national interests.[35]

At the heart of the matter in Estonia is the establishment of strict requirements for determining citizenship, including mandatory language proficiency, under the auspices of the Foreigners Act passed by the Estonian parliament in 1993.[36] Sergei Stankevich, policy advisor to President Boris Yeltsin, has characterized Estonian policy as an attempt to create a "mono-ethnic state," and declared that the Foreigners Act creates socially intolerable conditions for the Russian-speaking population, and simultaneously all the essential conditions for mass deportation.[37] While Stankevich may have engaged in some hyperbole, as a result of the Act almost half a million Russians living in Estonia have yet to be granted Estonian citizenship.[38] Russian language higher education is no longer offered in the country[39]; the application process for receiving a permanent residence permit is complicated, and includes compulsory AIDS and psychiatric tests; Russians claim they face dismissal from jobs, loss of property, and direct deportation sorely on the basis of ethnicity.[40]

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[35]For an analysis of this trend, see John Lough, "The Place of the 'Near Abroad' in Russian Foreign Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, 12 March 1993, pp. 21-29.

[36]For an in-depth look at the legislation, see Ann Sheehy, "The Estonian Law on Aliens," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 38, 28 September 1993, pp. 7-11.

[37]Vladimir Prokhavatilov, "How Are We To Reconstitute the Near Abroad?" *Novaya Yezhednevnaya Gazeta*, No. 14, 7 July 1994, p. 2, as reported in FBIS, 26 July 1994.

[38]FBIS, 9 February 1994.

[39]FBIS, 9 March 1994.

[40]RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 April 1994.

As an indication of the degree of restlessness among the Russian minority in Estonia, over half of them (some 300,000 people) voted for ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovskiy in the 12 December Russian parliamentary election.[41] Russia passed a law on 6 February 1992 in which Russian citizenship was offered to all former Soviet citizens who had not yet declared an intent to seek citizenship from another state.[42] Consequently, polling stations were established in Estonia to allow Russian citizens living there to vote in the December 1993 elections. As an aside, since the elections there have been charges of election fraud. According to Russian press reports, "gross mistakes or deliberate falsification of election results took place in Estonia, and a number of other places."[43]

In Estonia, the Russian minority issue and a border dispute with Russia have merged in the northeastern town of Narva, where Russians enjoy a sizable local majority. In 1991, after the Estonian declaration of independence, the local Russian-controlled government opted to follow Soviet laws instead of Estonian laws. When the Estonian government dissolved the government and staged new elections, the same delegates were chosen. This time the local government held a referendum in which 96 percent of the voters supported territorial autonomy. The Russian government appears willing to use this restive Russian population as a trump card in bilateral negotiations. Stankevich implied that, if Estonia does not ensure that the Russian minority is afforded the full protection of their rights under the law, the Russian Federation would support attempts of the local Russian minority in Estonia to establish "territorial autonomy."[44]

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[41]FBIS, 9 March 1994.

[42]Martin Klatt, "Russians in the 'Near Abroad,'" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 32, 19 August 1994, p. 33.

[43]Vera Tolz and Julia Wishnevsky, "Election Queries Make Russians Doubt Democratic Process," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 13, 1 April 1994, p. 2.

[44]FBIS, 26 July 1994.

Heavy-handed Russian foreign policy toward Estonia is indicative of Russia's increased involvement in many of the former Soviet republics. Russia has sought the approval of the United Nations and the C.S.C.E. for the designation of the "near abroad" as an area of Russian special interests, and with that endorsement the assurance that Russia would be granted exclusive rights to engage in any peacekeeping operations in the region. Aside from an obvious play for financial support from the United Nations, many see this as an attempt to reassert control over area lost in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In fact, even without U. N. approval, since mid-1992 about 15,000 Russian troops have been engaged in peacekeeping operations in the "near abroad".[45] Among the more notable areas of operations are the following regions. First, the Transdniester region in Moldova, in which the Russian 14th Army, under the command of Lt-General Alexander Lebed, was tasked in July 1992 to restore order to the left bank of the Dniestr River. Lebed has declared that the end result of his operations should be the incorporation of the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic into the Russian Federation.[46] Second, operations in the separatist Abkhazia region of Georgia, in which Russia successfully bartered for Georgian consent for the deployment of Russian forces to enforce a peacekeeping force.[47] These negotiations completed Eduard Schevardnadze's and Georgia's return to the Russian sphere of influence; Schevardnadze is now completely dependent on Russian forces for the maintenance of Georgian security. Third, Russian peacekeeping observers are deployed along the front of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the Armenian enclave of Nagornyy-Karabakh. Russian attempts to bring both parties to the negotiating table have thus

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[45]MAJ Mark T. Davis, USA, "Russian 'Peacekeeping Operations:' An Issue of National Security?" unpublished ms., 3 September 1993, p. 3.

[46]Ibid., p. 4.

[47]Ibid., pp. 4-5.

far failed.[48] There are indications, however, that Russia is supplying both sides in the conflict. If true, this might be an attempt to force one or both sides into dependence on Russia for their security, much in the way Georgian submission has been gained. In Tadjikistan, since the March 1993 declaration that a Commonwealth of Independent States peacekeeping operation had failed, operations have been undertaken almost exclusively by the Russian Army, and have included armed raids of rebel positions across the Afghan border.[49]

There are issues related to the "near abroad" within Russian borders. For instance, there is growing concern over the immigration trends. In 1992, over 356,000 Russians returned from the "near abroad", with the greatest influx originating from Tadjikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova.[50]

In November 1993, Foreign Minister Kozyrev stated that "the day of the Brezhnev Doctrine had passed." The Brezhnev Doctrine grew from the Soviet response to the 1968 "Prague Spring," which was first established in a *Pravda* article, dated 26 September 1968. The key passage stated the following:

> There is no doubt that the peoples of the socialist countries and the Communist Parties have and must have freedom to determine their country's path to development. However, any decision of theirs must damage neither socialism in their country not the worldwide workers' movement, which is waging a struggle for socialism. This means that every Communist Party is responsible not only for its own people but also to all the socialist countries and to the entire Communist movement. Whoever forgets this in placing sole

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[48] Ibid., p. 5.

[49] Ibid., p. 6.

[50] "Migration Status in Russia, CIS: 2-4 Million Could Return to the Russian Federation by the Year 2000," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 13 July 1994, p. 2, as reported in FBIS, 13 July 1994.

emphasis on the autonomy and independence of Communist Parties lapses into one-sidedness, shirking his internationalist obligations.[51]

Essentially, the Brezhnev Doctrine stated that no socialist country may leave the Warsaw Pact, that the Communist Party must maintain a monopoly of power, and that no party can have a leadership that is completely independent of Moscow.[52]

Despite Kozyrev's proclamation of the end of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Russia's foreign policy has grown steadily more assertive. Two months after his statement, Kozyrev asserted that the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from other former Soviet republics was an extremist idea.[53] As long ago as December 1992 the foreign minister was hinting that the use of military force for the protection of Russians in the "near abroad" would not be ruled out. In an article discussing the role and direction of Russian foreign policy, Kozyrev identified one of the principal tasks as creating "a zone of goodneighborliness along Russia's periphery," which connoted "establishing equal yet special relations with the ex-Soviet republics" and yet in the following paragraph he listed the defense of the rights, lives and dignity of the Russian citizens in the "near abroad"as a critical issue and indicated that Russia

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51S. Kovalev, "Sovereignty and the Internationalist Obligations of Socialist Countries," *Pravda*, 26 September 1968, p. 4, as reported in the The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XX, No. 39, October 1968, p. 10.

52Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), p. 227.

53 "Enter Yet Another Yeltsin," The Economist, 22 January 1994, p. 51. It must be acknowledged that not all former Soviet republics want the Russian Army to withdraw from their territory. Perhaps the most unsettling part of Kozyrev's statement was its vagueness; he did not specifically mention any of the former territories, and thereby made it all-inclusive.

"may have to use economic and military power" to achieve this.[54] In February 1993 Yevgeny Ambartsumov, then Chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations made this same point even more forcefully: "We cannot rule out the possibility of using forcible methods to solve such [human rights] problems, including the problem of protecting the lives of our compatriots as well as other people who now die [in the 'near abroad']." That same month Kozyrev stated the need to establish a belt of goodneighborliness because "we need first-class relations inside the C.I.S. if Russia is to become a first-class power. I reject the notion of a 'post-imperial' area. Nor can I accept attempts to limit cooperation among C.I.S. countries."[55] In an article published in the summer of 1992 and fraught with references to Russia's historical destiny, Stankevich identifies Russia's "mission in the world" as follows: "Russia the conciliator, Russia connecting, Russia combining."[56] He ends the article by stating his belief that Russia is in a position "to obtain propitious geopolitical positions in key regions, and to rank, in time, among the world leaders."[57] A year later, in January 1993, the Acamedian Konstantin Pleshakov followed the Stankevich's theme with an article in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs journal International Affairs entitled, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch." In this article, Pleshakov asserts that it has been Russia's mission in the past to save Europe by serving as a giant buffer, first against the Mongol invasion, then against Napoleon, and finally against Hitler. Russia also served as the means of uniting

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[54]Andrei V. Kozyrev, "To the Readers," International Affairs [Moscow], December 1992, pp. 3-4.

[55]Kozyrev, "What Foreign Policy Should Russia Pursue?" International Affairs [Moscow], February 1993, p. 4.

[56]Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," The National Interest, Summer 1992, p. 47.

[57]Ibid., p. 51.

Eastern and Western civilization. Pleshakov maintains that Russia's mission today is to serve as a basic component for Eurasian stability: "Russia remains the mainstay of stability and a great Eurasian power."[58]

This entire discussion fails to adequately explain the general Russian lack of resistance to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the corresponding pursuit of independence on the part of all fourteen other Soviet constituent republics back in 1991-92. Why didn't Russia move to prevent the breakup of the Soviet Union more decisively? To understand this apparent disregard for the loss of empire, one must understand the fundamental nature of the events of 1991, when Soviet central authority eroded and crumbled in the wake of the unsuccessful August coup. The plotters effort failed miserably and Boris Yeltsin and his supporters were able to turn the situation into a genuine revolution which resulted in the end of communism in both the periphery, Eastern European, and the center, the Soviet Union.[59] But in so doing they were confronted with the "problem of dismantling,"[60] as Martin Malia called it. Post-Soviet political and constitutional order had to be completely re-invented. No where was that need more evident than in the Russian Federation, where the end of communism had a more profound impact than in the other former Soviet republics. The communist regime had attempted to link Russian national identity and interests with Soviet identity and interests, to a greater degree than in any other republic. That linkage was reenforced at the structural level: unlike the other republics, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic had not been given some of the institutions, the trappings of state, granted to all other republics: no Russian K.G.B., no Russian M.V.D., no Russian Academy

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[58]Konstantin Pleshakov, "Russia's Mission: The Third Epoch," International Affairs [Moscow], January 1993, pp. 17-26.

[59]Martin Malia, "From Under the Rubble, What?" Problems of Communism, Jan-Apr 1992, p. 90.

[60]Z [Martin Malia], "To the Stalin Mausoleum," Daedalus,Winter 1990, p. 337.

of Sciences, no television or radio programming geared toward ethnic Russian interests, and -- incredibly -- no Russian Communist Party.[61] Russians were grappling with the collapse of their only identifiable state structures; they were in no position to deal with the loss of the Baltics, Ukraine, Belarus or any of the other republics.

Moreover, the dissolution of all ties between Russia and the other fourteen republics was necessary in order to eliminate any connection between Russian traditional interests in these areas and the decades of Soviet domination. The Russians had to disentangle themselves from the party organization, and distance themselves from the domination that the party held over the other republics. Again, Malia: "[T]he revolts of national liberation, beginning with Lithuania and culmination with Russia itself, were essential to destroying the hold of the party over all its subjects."[62] Any attempt on the part of Russia to claim a legitimate right to domination over the other former Soviet republics would have tainted their claim at the outset.

Neither of these points refute the notion that Russia harbored an interest in perpetuating control over these territories in 1991-92, when the Soviet Union crumbled. Rather, they indicate that Russian preoccupation with the political vacuum created by the end of communism and the collapse of the Soviet center, coupled with the need to distance Russia from the Soviet legacy, presented an opportunity for the other former Soviet republics to "make a break" for independence and left Russia to pursue lost territories rather than retain territories still under their control. Willingness to tolerate the loss of significant territories of the U.S.S.R. could be viewed as an effort to shore up Russian national power by divesting the state of peripheral assets that served as a drain on scarce resources.

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[61]John Dunlop, "Russia" Confronting a Loss of Empire," in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras, eds., Nations & Politics in the Soviet Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 43.

[62]Malia, "From Under the Rubble, What?" p. 92.

B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

1. Strategic Culture

Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space between the frontiers and the heartland.

This hypothesis appears to be upheld. In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian Federation, despite its self-proclaimed designation as the successor state of the Soviet Union, essentially "gave up" the other former Soviet republics and allowed them to pursue independence. Strategic culture cannot explain this retreat from empire; it seems that the only plausible explanation is that the decision by Russia not to resist the independence movements of the other fifteen republics was a difficult choice made by necessity and not preference. However, since mid- to late-1992 Russia has demonstrated considerable concern for stability on its frontiers. It has also demonstrated a strong desire to prevent the deployment of forces from the West, particularly from well-organized alliances such as NATO, to the "near abroad". Regardless of statements that acknowledge the sovereignty of the states in the "near abroad", Russian military doctrine identifies the area of operations of the Russian armed forces to be the entire region of the former Soviet Union. Though they have lost political ground, they refuse to surrender strategic ground.

Hypothesis 2. States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining secure borders.

This hypothesis is upheld. This hypothesis would not hold true if the definition of expansion were limited to territorial aggrandizement in the traditional sense of placing land directly under Moscow's sovereignty, as opposed to Moscow's control and/or influence. To date, the Russian Federation has not engaged in direct

military operations, foreign policy, or political maneuvering to reincorporate areas of the former Soviet Union into its territory.

However, Moscow has been able to expand its control over events in the "near abroad" by pursuing a policy aimed at gaining influence instead of direct sovereignty. Some have seen the effort to strengthen the institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States as a thinly veiled attempt to reintroduce Russian hegemony. Konstantin Pleshakov sees the primary means of stabilizing the Eurasian geopolitical situation is by consolidating and strengthening the C.I.S.[63] Others point to Yeltsin's proclamation earlier this year that Russia will seek to deploy its armed forces to bases in the C.I.S. states and Latvia as an indication of Russian expansionist designs. There is also the matter of Russian peacekeeping operations throughout the "near abroad". Proponents of the view that these peacekeeping forces are a means of forcing the reintegration of former Soviet republics into a new Russian-dominated empire point to the actions of the aforementioned Lt-Gen. Lebed of the 14th Army in Moldova.

Lebed's goals and interests appear to extend well beyond the successful completion of his assigned tasks. Lebed correctly perceived that in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, while the political leadership was engaged in the project of building liberal institutions, the Russian center was weak, poorly controlled, and in no position to formulate substantive foreign policy. This lack of policy determination processes at the center left enterprising on-scene commanders such as Lebed with a great deal of autonomy and power. They were free to formulate and execute a *de facto* Russian foreign policy that best suited their professional missions and personal interests. Lebed's 14th Army has functioned essentially as the armed forces of the separatist Dniester Republic, in operations against Moldovan forces, and in so doing Lebed has gained considerable power and influence. In August 1994 Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev attempted to remove Lebed from his command and transfer him to the post of Defense Minister

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[63]Pleshakov.

of Tadjikistan (Note the level of influence in Central Asia; a Russian Army general serving as defense minister of an independent, "sovereign" Tadjikistan.) Grachev also ordered the reduction of forces assigned to the 14th Army.[64] A clear indication of Lebed's power is that President Yeltsin rescinded Grachev's orders and a subsequent "campaign" by the government to praise Lebed and his achievements in Moldova, despite Lebed's searing criticism of Yeltsin.[65]

Clearly Moscow has demonstrated a keen interest in influencing, if not outright controlling, events in key areas of the "near abroad". Alternately, at a minimum Moscow has tolerated without reproach the efforts of Russian forces to achieve the same ends.

Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering public support for foreign policy objectives.

This hypothesis is upheld. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev is a master of political maneuver, and has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to shift deftly between pro-Western statements and a more nationalistic tone, depending on his audience. Upon the fall of the Soviet Union, Kozyrev quickly proclaimed a staunchly pro-Western policy, but then he at time he appeared to acquiesce in the face of heavy criticism from the old Supreme Soviet, a highly conservative body, shifting the emphasis of his policy statements to more conservative lines of thought.[66]

Kozyrev's December 14, 1992, speech to a meeting of the C.S.C.E. in Stockholm, Sweden stands as a prime example of his ability to shift positions. Kozyrev began his speech by announcing a shift in Russian foreign policy, and then

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[64]RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 August 1994.

[65]RFE/RL Daily Reports, 30 and 31 August 1994.

[66]FBIS, 16 February 1993, pp. 33-38.

he warned against Western intervention in the successor states of the Soviet Union (i.e. the "near abroad"), and further declared that Moscow might use military force and economic pressure to reassert control over the former Soviet republics. With respect to the Balkan conflict, Kozyrev proclaimed Slavic solidarity with Serbia and demanded an end to sanctions against that nation. He promised that the Serbs would have the full support of "Great Russia." The speech was vintage Cold War material.[67]

The conference was stunned. Delegations conferred frantically; the Ukrainian foreign minister went so far as to phone his government in Kiev to determine whether hard-liners in Moscow had staged a successful coup. After thirty minutes, Kozyrev returned to the podium and declared that his entire speech was a ruse, intended to illustrate the position held by political opponents to President Boris N. Yeltsin, and the dangers to European security that these opponents represent.[68]

Studied alone, Kozyrev's "Shockholm" speech was little more than a blatant attempt at shock diplomacy. But considering the events that immediately followed his address in Stockholm, the speech took on added significance. On 15 December, the day after Kozyrev's speech, Viktor Chernomyrdin, at the time perceived to be a political conservative, succeeded committed reformer Yegor Gaidar as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Then, on 16 December, the Security Council assumed responsibility for formulating Russian foreign policy, a move that isolated Kozyrev and, given the swing of the Prime Minister's chair in the Council of Ministers, gave conservatives considerably more power in implementing their foreign policy agenda. Kozyrev's speech was a thinly veiled warning of the

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[67]The full content of Kozyrev's brief but pointed remarks are in Suzanne Crow, "Why Has Russian Foreign Policy Changed?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 18, 6 May 1994, pp. 1-6.

[68]Craig R. Whitney, "Russian Carries On Like Bad Old Days, Then Says It Was All a Ruse," New York Times, 15 December 1992, p. A-4.

consequences of the shift in government power in Moscow, and demonstrated a deep rift within the government.

As recently as 11 November 1993, Andrei Kozyrev was pronouncing the death of the Brezhnev doctrine. And yet, just two months later in January 1994 he seemingly developed a new appreciation for the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine. TASS quoted him as saying that a complete withdrawal of Russian troops from other former Soviet republics was an "extremist idea." Since late 1993, Kozyrev has advocated every concept contained in his Stockholm speech. Russia has denounced talk of bringing the Baltic states into NATO, restated Russia's claims to "special rights" and to a special peacekeeping responsibility in the states of the former Soviet Union, and called for the lifting of international sanctions against Serbia. Kozyrev now espouses the need to consider "historic ties" in the area of the former Soviet Union that was achieved over the centuries "by the common history and culture of the multi-million Russian-speaking population." To Kozyrev, this is not imperialism, just reality.[69]

Alarmists maintain that the difference between Kozyrev and Zhirinovsky is diminishing daily,[70] and the historian Yuri N. Afanasyev has observed that Kozyrev is learning how to "talk tough foreign policy [in order] to out-Zhirinovsky . . . Zhirinovsky."[71] It seems that Kozyrev is somewhat of a political chameleon, changing his thinking to conform with public opinion, pressure from the elite or the rising legislative voice, or some unseen influence. Whatever the source, in 1994 it means he's taking a more nationalistic line.

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[69]Crow, pp. 1-6.

[70]"Enter yet another Yeltsin," p. 51.

[71]Yuri N. Afanasyev, "Russia's Vicious Circle," The New York Times, 28 February 1994, p. A-11.

Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a support function.

This hypothesis is inconclusive, and cannot be properly evaluated at this point in time. Nonetheless, some commentary is appropriate. Russia's process for the formation of security policy is fragmented.[72] On the inter-governmental level, the new constitution grants the executive branch extensive power over the formulation of foreign policy, compared to the limited powers of the legislative branch. Within the executive branch, where most of the power resides, there is a second source of fragmentation. The Russian Federation Security Council was created in March 1992 as a support mechanism for the presidential decision-making process. What began was a very small organization has quickly grown in size and its scope of responsibility has greatly increased. After the first year of its existence, however, there was tremendous uncertainty surrounding the role of the Council.[73] When Marshal Evgenii Shaposhnikov resigned his post as Chairman of the Council on 10 August 1993, speculation began concerning its future role. This speculation ranged from the elimination of the Council[74] to a widening of responsibilities.[75]

There is no longer any doubt about the vitality of the Security Council. Today, its staff prepares all paperwork for the Council, provides analysis, and controls the implementation of Presidential decisions. Perhaps most importantly,

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[72]Mikhail Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," unpublished ms., October 1994.

[73]One of the few truly informative discussions of the purpose, organization, and composition of the Russian Federation Security Council is found in FBIS, 5 January 1994, in which there is the translation of an interview with the Deputy Secretary of the Security Council, Valeriy L. Manilov.

[74]RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 August 1993.

[75]RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 August 1993.

the Council oversees ten inter-agency commissions,[76] which establish priorities for policy-making, in which the Council is aided by the Research Council of the Security Council. Its members are known, but its role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy remains vague. However, it seems that this body serves as a focal point for several important policy decisions. As previously noted, for example, Russia's new military doctrine was considered in effect once it was approved by the Security Council.

There are other factors in the process of foreign policy formation that appear to be gaining in influence. For the first time in history there is a legitimate, democratically elected legislative body operating within well-defined powers. Foreign policy committees have been established, but there is no provision for the inclusion of legislative representation on the Russian Federation Security Council.[77] The influence of the Duma on foreign policy is unknown at this point in time, but is likely very slight.

Discerning the role the Duma in the formation of Russian contemporary foreign policy will be a critical part of determining the role that overall Russian domestic politics play in the formation and influence of Russian foreign policy. Recalling Miroslav Nincic's work discussed in Chapter II, there are necessary elements in a foreign policy that is based upon domestic (read: democratic) principles: an elected legislative voice, with a public that is considered to be the repository of valid interests and opinions, and governmental candor. The elements listed do not yet exist in the Russian Federation, at least in a mature and stable form. For now, the influence of Russian domestic politics on foreign policy is unknown.

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[76]These commissions are as follows: foreign policy, defense, interregional affairs (within Russia), public security, information security, scientific and technological aspects of the defense industry, environment, economy, health, and crime. Tsypkin, "The Politics of Russian Security Policy," p. 13.

[77]See FBIS, 26 November 1993, which listed the current members of the Council at that time. FBIS, 5 January 1994, includes a list of council members, by portfolio.

The role of the military is also unknown. During the first two years of the Russian Federation, while debates raged in Moscow over foreign policy and national interests, the Red Army was taking matters into their own hands in the neighboring nations of the former Soviet Union. With a lack of clear direction from Moscow, Russian armed forces were the policymakers, at least in parts of the "near abroad."[78] Russian armed forces in Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Tadjikistan were enforcing a *de facto* foreign policy by their actions in support of various factions in these regions. Forces are still deployed in these areas. After the attacks on the White House last October, it was generally believed that the Russian Army completely backed Yeltsin. That is not at all clear today, and despite the historical tendency of Russian armed forces to stay detached from politics, the Russian military may yet emerge as the ultimate power broker and thus have tremendous influence in the realm of foreign policy.

Recent comments made by the ubiquitous Lt. General Alexander Lebed demonstrate the level of domestic political influence held and sometimes used by the military. Lebed has stated in interviews with the Russian press that there was no putsch (against Mikhail Gorbachev) in August 1991; rather, it was a "brilliantly planned and executed, large-scale, unprecedented provocation, in which the roles were scripted . . ." This provocation made possible the destruction of the Communist Party and the liquidation of the U.S.S.R. Lebed, who switched loyalties in mid-crisis and thereafter backed Yeltsin, now says he does not consider himself a defender of the Russian White House (the parliament and then seat of Yeltsin's resistance effort) and regards that event as "the most shameful page in the Russian state's history." Lebed made this statement after Yeltsin prevented Defense Minister Grachev from removing Lebed from his command in Moldova and transferring him to Tadjikistan.[79]

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[78]Lough, p. 22.

[79]RFE/RL Daily Report, 22 August 1994.

Lebed has also been quoted as saying that he may be a candidate in the 1996 Russian presidential campaign[80]; that the Russian troop withdrawal from Germany was "idiotic"[81]; that there was a fifty-fifty chance that discontented elements of the Russian armed forces would rebel[82]. Still he retains in command of the 14th Army.

Given all of these uncertainties, there is as of yet no basis for stating that foreign policy is exclusively in the hands of Boris Yeltsin and his closest advisors.[83]

Thus, three of the four strategic culture-oriented hypotheses are supported by the "near abroad" test case, and the fourth hypothesis may yet prove true.

2. Balance of Power

Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance of prestige, both at home and abroad.

This hypothesis is upheld. Every discussion of Russian foreign policy, regardless of the official and the position they espouse, begins with the assertion that Russia is a great power. This "great power ideology"[84] has been a fundamental

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[80]RFE/RL Daily Report, 22 August 1994.

[81]RFE/RL Daily Report, 12 September 1994.

[82]RFE/RL Daily Report, 15 September 1994.

[83]For an more in-depth analysis of the various factors involved in the Russian foreign policy formation process, see Jeff Checkel, "Russian Foreign Policy: Back to the Future," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 41, 16 October 1992, pp. 15-29. Also, for speculation on the relationship between the executive and legislative branches vis-á-vis foreign policy in light of constitutional changes that strengthened Yeltsin's hand, see Jan S. Adams, "Who Will Make Russia's Foreign Policy in 1994?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 6, 11 February 1994, pp. 36-40.

[84]Afanasyev.

element of Russian Federation foreign policy from the outset of independence in January 1992. This is contrary to a common Western belief that the Russian hard line in foreign policy is a recent development, as of late 1993 or early 1994 and which grew as a result of the strong showing of nationalist factions in the December 1993 parliamentary elections.[85]

Consider the following statements. made throughout the period in consideration, from January 1992 until mid-1994, as examples of this fixation "great power" status:

In October 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin spoke to senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and made the following comments:

> "The only ideology that can be underlying Russian foreign policy is the ideology of the interests of the Russian Federation . . . Russia is still a great power. Of course, it is living through temporary difficulties. But while so are the United States, Britain, Italy, Spain and other countries, they don't feel inferior and are free from any complex . . . Russia is not a country that can be kept waiting in the anteroom."[86]

In December 1992, Kozyrev declared that "[w]hat is good for Russia and consonant with its material and spiritual potential is an effort to help itself join the club of first-class European, Asian and American powers . . ."[87] The following month, in January 1993, the journal International Affairs, published by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided a summary of the draft foreign policy concept developed by Kozyrev and the Ministry. One of the basic tenets established at the outset of the article was that "Russia is to exercise responsibility as a great power for

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[85]See, for example, Celestine Bohlen, "Nationalist Vote Toughens Russian Foreign Policy," The New York Times, 25 January 1994, p. A-4.

[86]International Affairs [Moscow], November 1992, inside jacket.

[87]Andrei V. Kozyrev, "To the Readers," International Affairs [Moscow], December 1992, p. 4.

the maintenance of global and regional stability, the prevention of conflicts, the steady promotion of international relations on the principle of the supremacy of law, democracy, and human rights."[88] In February 1993 Kozyrev began using the term "normal great power" to describe Russia's position in the international community.[89] In September Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, former Chairman of the Security Council, published an article in which he outlined the fundamental precepts of the security concept of the Security Council. The first "key module" or parameter of this concept is devoted to Russia's place and role in the world today, and included in this section is the illustration and demonstration of the geopolitical status of Russia as a great power.[90]

In March 1994, Andrei Kozyrev wrote a piece for the op-ed page of The New York Times under the title, "Don't Threaten Us."[91] In this article he asserted that "pragmatic politicians" in both the East and West must proceed with the premise that,

> "Russia is destined to be a great power, not a junior one. Under Communist or nationalist regimes, it would be aggressive and threatening power, while under democratic rule it would be peaceful and prosperous. But in either case it would be a great power."[92]

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[88]"Russia's Foreign Policy Concept," International Affairs [Moscow], January 1993, p. 14.

[89]"What Foreign Policy Russia Should Pursue," International Affairs [Moscow], February 1933, p. 3.

[90]Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, "A Security Concept for Russia," International Affairs [Moscow], October 1993, p. 11.

[91]Andrei V. Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us," editorial in The New York Times, 18 March 1994, p. A-11. A nearly identical version of this article appeared in the Amsterdam newspaper *De Volkskrant* (in Dutch) on 22 March 1994 under the heading "Russia Is Predestined To Be a Great Power." See FBIS, 22 March 1994.

[92]Kozyrev, "Don't Threaten Us."

Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea.

This hypothesis appears to be upheld. Russia has not engaged in any territorial aggrandizement in an effort to assume control of former ports and littoral areas. However, there are known operations in Moldova (the aforementioned 14th Army, under Lt-Gen. Lebed), an ongoing dispute with Ukraine over the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, allegations of Russian operations in the Caucasus, and alleged Russian support for the Crimean independence movement. The alleged actions, if proven, could all serve as indications of Russia's desire to regain greater access to the sea, especially when considered in conjunction with the known activities previously mentioned. Of particular interest, the Crimean (and ostensibly the Ukrainian) port of Sevastapol declared itself to be a Russian port; Ukrainians were quick to spot Russian duplicity in this action, but that claim has thus far been unfounded.

As in the Black Sea, there are indications of continued Russian interest in maintaining forces and influence in the Baltic Sea region as well. Russia still has access to the sea, at St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad,[93] and the Russians are pursuing a foreign policy that could be interpreted as an attempt to re-exert Russian influence over the region -- the Baltic states, in particular. For example, consider remarks by Kozyrev at a meeting with the Russian ambassadors serving in the C.I.S. and Baltic states concerning Russian interests in those countries:

> The C.I.S. countries and the Baltic are the area in which Russia's main vital interests are concentrated. The main threats to these interests come from there . . . In my view, the framing of the

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[93]For further discussion of Russia's perspective on the importance of Kaliningrad, see Magdalene Hoff and Heinz Timmerman, "Kaliningrad: Russia's Future Gateway to Europe?" RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 36, 10 September 1993, pp. 37-43.

> question of the total departure and removal of any military presence of Russia in the states of the "near abroad" is just as extreme, if not extremist, an approach as the idea of the dispatch of tanks to all the republics and the establishment of some imperial order in there . . . [94]

All three of the Baltic states successfully concluded agreements with Russia for the removal of forces; those agreements were implemented before the end of September 1994. During the aforementioned negotiations between Russia and Estonia on the Russian troop withdrawal and the treatment of ethnic Russians in Estonia, the Russian heavy-handed tactics could be interpreted as an effort to regain influence in the Baltics, thereby maintaining access to the sea, particularly at the former Soviet naval facility at Tallinn, Estonia.

Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic or moral equivalence of territorial domination.

This hypothesis is upheld. Russia has not engaged in a military struggle for lost territory, in stark contrast, for example, with the efforts of the Yugoslav National Army to suppress Slovene and Croatian independence movements at the outset of Yugoslav dissolution. Confronted by a fundamental crisis of identity brought on by the collapse of the Communist Party and Soviet central authority, Russia had to first establish political legitimacy at home and separate itself from the poisoned legacy of the Soviet system, particularly in relations with the other fourteen former Soviet republics. In the end Russia could not recover from this revolutionary process before the independence of the other republics was established and recognized by the world community. The Russian Army has been removed from many of these states, but Russian interest in reestablishing control remains. Russia now seems interested in the pursuit of domination on the basis of

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[94]FBIS, 24 February 1994.

economic and moral bases. Hence the general consensus in Moscow and noted above, which holds that the eventual return of the "near abroad" to Russian control is inevitable. For example, Russians cannot conceive of an independent Ukraine, but then again they don't worry too much because from their perspective it is only a matter of time before Ukraine "comes home."

Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, compensation, armament, alliance.

This hypothesis is upheld, and Russia is principally using the methods of divide and rule, and alliance. Moscow is using its peacekeeping role as the means of dividing and ruling, in some cases by supporting both sides of a regional conflict, as in Nagornyy-Karabakh. The alliance method refers to the development of the C.I.S., coupled with efforts to discourage NATO (i.e. Partnership for Peace) involvement in the "near abroad" states. This development of the C.I.S. and discouragement of NATO enlargement is evident at the time of this writing (December 1994). On 1 December Russia formally deferred its participation in the Partnership for Peace Program and denounced NATO's decision to pursue enlargement as announced in a communique signed (on 1 December) by NATO foreign ministers. On that day Andrei Kozyrev charged NATO with undo haste in the admission of new members and the placement of enlargement ahead of the Partnership for Peace program.[95] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev warned that Russia would "take security measures if NATO admits new members" and Belarusian Foreign Minister Valerii Tsepkalo that in the event of NATO emergence on Belarus' western border (i.e., in Poland) Belarus would refuse NATO cooperation, and that "integration within the C.I.S. would then assume a confrontational character toward the West."[96] At the 5

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[95]RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 December 1994.

[96]Ibid.

December C.S.C.E. summit in Budapest, Boris Yeltsin denounced plans for NATO expansion, and warned that Europe was plunging into a "cold peace" through the enlargement of NATO. He then spoke on behalf of the "peoples of the C.I.S." and claimed that the peoples' desire is "that the C.I.S. continue to grow stronger."[97]

All four balance of power-based hypotheses are valid in the "near abroad" test case. To summarize, in the examination of Russia's "near abroad" foreign policy based upon strategic culture and balance of power, there was not a clear "win" for either explanatory theory.

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[97]RFE/RL Daily Report, 6 December 1994.

IV. TEST CASE: THE KURIL ISLANDS

A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION

The Kuril Islands lie in a line between the Kamchatka Peninsula in the Russian Federation and the Japanese main island of Hokkaido. This position as "stepping stones between Kamchatka and Hokkaido[1]", and as guardian of the approaches to the Sea of Okhotsk, has ensured their importance in relations between Japan and Russia since initial contact was established between the two powers in the eighteenth century. An ongoing dispute between the two states since the Soviet occupation of the islands at the close of World War II and centered on territory in the southern portion of the island chain, has prevented them from concluding a peace treaty following the war. The islands remain strategically, economically and politically sensitive to both sides.[2]

The Kurils consist of thirty-six islands. Shikotan and the Habomai Islands are considered by the Japanese to be an extension of Hokkaido rather than a part of the Kuril archipelago. The Russians, however, refer to Shikotan and the Habomais as the "little Kurils." The Southern Kurils consist of Kunashir and Iturup. Together with Shikotan and the Habomai group, Iturup and Kunashir compose what the Japanese commonly call the Northern Territories.[3] These four islands are also collectively and somewhat ambiguously called the South Kurils, and they are at the heart of on ongoing dispute between the Japan and the Russian Federation. The terms Central and Northern Kurils are less well defined and have little relevance in the discussion of this dispute.

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[1]John J. Stephen, The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), p. 2.

[2]Ibid., p. 171.

[3]David Rees, The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles (New York: Praeger, 1985), p. x.

A comprehensive historical survey of the discovery, exploration and development of the Kuril Islands is beyond the purview of this chapter. Nonetheless, the long-standing dispute between Japan and Russia over possession of the islands is rooted in deeply held convictions based on the historical interplay between the two countries, as well as the less concrete myths and perceptions that arose from their common interest in the Kurils. It is therefore appropriate to begin a discussion of the present Kuril dispute by surveying the history of Russo-Japanese relations in the region.

Soviet and Russian historians claimed that the Kurils were an integral part of Russia since the mid-eighteenth century, as the result of "prior discovery, prior settlement, and prior development." In this interpretation, Kuril history is a series of Russian feats, undermined by Japanese aggression and tsarist appeasement (this last concept was obviously a Communist construct designed to discredit any concessions made to Japan by the tsars).[4] In contrast, the Japanese counter-claim stresses the antiquity of Japanese association with the islands. Russian incursions fall collectively under the rubric of territorial encroachment.[5]

In the interest of accuracy, it is important to note that neither the Japanese nor the Russians were the first inhabitants. The aboriginal culture of the Kuril Ainu predated both Japanese and Russian presence. However, the detailed history of Ainu associations with Russians and Japanese, while interesting, is of no consequence to the current dispute. It is sufficient to state that as the result of intrusions and influence by the Japanese and Russians, the Ainu culture itself diverged into northern and southern parts. Ultimately, smallpox destroyed the southern Ainu while the northern Ainu were all deported to the island of Shikotan. These events effectively destroyed Ainu culture as a separate entity.[6]

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[4]Ibid., p. 5.

[5]Ibid., p. 6.

[6]Ibid., pp. 25-28.

There were also European claims to the Kurils. The European quest for the Kurils dates to the days of Marco Polo, who brought back to the West a description of islands to the north of Japan that had so much gold they "do not know what to do with it." This myth was perpetuated by the tale of the Portuguese ship that was blown off course, where it encountered an island with inhabitants who had so much silver and gold that they used them for common utensils. That incident reportedly occurred in the year 1582. Maerten Gerritsen Vries, under the auspices of the Dutch East Indies Company, was the first European to "discover" the Kurils, in 1643. He sighted Kunashir, but mistook it for an extension of Hokkaido. He then sighted Iturup, which he named *Staten Eylandt*. He then landed at Urup, which he mistook for a western extension of North America. This he claimed for the Dutch East Indies Company, and he named it accordingly.[7] Those claims were subsequently repudiated, however, and other powers aside from Japan and Russia have pressed no claim on the islands; the current dispute is a bilateral affair.

Russians appeared in the region in the seventeenth century. Cossacks, in search of pelts, pushed across Siberia, then to the Sea of Okhotsk. Once established in this inhospitable region, the lack of resources drove the Russians south in search of more fertile land and more temperate climes. Peter the Great's voracious appetite for scientific knowledge and discovery inspired imperial patronage for exploration of the region and the search for mineral wealth, and the continued search for fur.[8] In 1702, Tsar Peter issued an *ukase* ordering the subjugation of Kamchatka and the collection of information regarding Japan in preparation for opening trade relations; the Tsar clearly saw the Kurils as the key to Japan, and his *ukase* meant that Russians would have to advance south from Kamchatka. Exploration began in 1711

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[7]Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[8]George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 161.

and was essentially completed with Lieutenant Commander Martin Spanberg's survey of the entire island chain in 1739.[9]

As for the Japanese, they point to a stone in northern Honshu which bears the inscription *Nippon chuo* (center of Japan). This monument is believed to have been erected by an eighth century warrior and, according to the Japanese, proves that the Kurils and Kamchatka Peninsula fall within a sphere of Japanese influence defined by the distance between this monument and Okinawa, which determines the radius of this sphere.[10] Thus, the Kurils are clearly a Japanese territory.

The bottom line of the historical debate over the primacy of claims to the Kurils is this: both Russians and Japanese claim preeminence in the Kuril Islands, and without agreement even on the fundamental point of discovery, there is no hope for peaceful settlement without compromise. Soviet (and now Russian) and Japanese historians did agree that Russians and Japanese first encountered each other in the arc during the eighteenth century. It is also clear, however, that at the time of initial exploration, neither side had a clear concept of how far north or south in the chain their respective sovereignty fell.[11]

After 1780 the importance of the Kurils as the key to trade with Japan diminished because traders sought routes from the Maritime Provinces in the Russian Far East directly to Japanese ports. Though the Kurils were no longer the exclusive gateway to Japan, they began to grow in terms of perceived economic potential: there was an obvious abundance of maritime resources, and a belief that the islands possessed large tracts of arable land (mistaken, as it turned out). Colonial ventures failed in the harsh environment. Urup was colonized in 1795, then abandoned in 1805. But while the Russians saw economic potential in the islands, they did not yet appreciate the strategic importance of the chain. Japan still

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[9]Ibid., pp. 40-41, 47.

[10]Ibid., p. 51.

[11]Ibid., pp. 59, 61.

maintained a policy of isolation and was no threat. It was not until American and English traders extended their reach across the North Pacific that Russia began to see the vulnerability of Siberia to incursions from the East.[12]

In the initial phase of relations with Russia, Japan appeared willing to open up and enter into trade relations. This interest in economic openness raised concerns regarding national security in the xenophobic Japanese society of the eighteenth century. Increasingly frequent Russian missions to Japan, and the presence of the Russian colony at Urup (until 1805) increased Japanese sensitivities and led the shogunate to turn away from trade relations and instead to press for greater exploration and development of the islands. From 1799 to 1807 there were two principle objectives of Japanese activity in the islands: (1) turn Iturup into an impregnable bastion against Russian encroachment; and (2) eliminate the Russian colony at Urup. Clearly the Japanese regarded the development of the Kurils as a strategic matter: the Kurils were to serve as the buffer between their empire and the expanding Russian influence. Japanese wariness regarding Russian intentions persisted for the first half of the nineteenth century.

Russians sent an expedition to Japan in 1853, which was led by Admiral Putiatin. He had three goals: open regular diplomatic relations, establish commercial relations, and settle the frontier questions in the Kurils and on Sakhalin Island.[13] As a result of Putiatin's efforts, the Treaty of Shimoda was signed on 7 February 1855. This document provided the first demarcation of a frontier between Russia and Japan, at least in the Kurils. The boundary was fixed between Iturup and Urup, and the question of Sakhalin territorial settlement was left open to further negotiations.[14]

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[12]Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[13]Stephen, p. 86.

[14]Ibid., p. 88.

The Treaty of Shimoda remained in effect until the Treaty of St. Petersburg was signed on 7 May 1875. This treaty stated that in return for Russian acquisition of the entire island of Sakhalin, Japan would receive full title to "the group of the Kuril Islands" then possessed by the Tsar. These islands were then enumerated, from Urup north to Shumshu (which is the northernmost island in the archipelago, and is situated across the First Kuril Strait from Cape Lopatka, a mere seven miles from Kamchatka Peninsula). Additionally, the Japanese were granted fishing and commercial privileges around the Sea of Okhotsk littoral, including Kamchatka.[15] Today, it seems incredible that the Russians would so readily relinquish all claims to the islands. The 1870's witnessed the continued rise of nationalism as a force of change, and that decade marked the beginning of the age of European imperialism, when several of the great powers were preoccupied with the acquisition and protection of territory as a source of both prestige and economic gain. This treaty between Tsar and Emperor is perhaps best understood as one of the last agreements concluded between absolute rulers exercising their authority granted by mandate from heaven. The exchange of territory was a gesture of goodwill that only absolute sovereigns could conclude. The spread of nationalism to Japan and Russia would prevent the settlement of future agreements on similar terms.

Nonetheless, the Treaty of St. Petersburg kept the peace for the next twenty-nine years, and it remained in effect for a total of seventy years. Although there were no territorial concessions in the Kurils as a result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, in the Treaty of Portsmouth Japan received additional fishing concessions of the coast of Kamchatka Peninsula, and this access to rich fishing grounds fueled a remarkable growth in the Japanese fishing industry in the Kuril Islands in the

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[15]Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 390.

decades that followed.[16] Russia, and consequently the Soviet Union, and Japan then entered a period characterized by fairly benign relations, although Japanese expansion on the Asiatic mainland contributed to an increase in tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union. This tension climaxed in 1938 and 1939 when fighting between their armies erupted in the Chang-Kuping hills near Lake Hasan, in the region of the Mogolian border. The Soviets gained the upper hand in these conflicts, but they ended as abruptly as they began.[17] No general settlement was ever concluded and the two sides resumed a wary peace.[18] Perhaps the best explanation of Soviet disinterest in the region after 1905 is that they were otherwise occupied in the years after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War. These distractions took many forms: first, with social unrest and attempted domestic reform; then the First World War; the revolutions of 1917; the Russian Civil War; the great social reforms of collectivization and industrialization; and finally the rise of Hitler. In short, the Russians and their Soviet successors had to deal with several threats that were closer to the heartland before turning their attention to the Far East.

The Soviets first expressed irredentist claims to the islands in 1940. Significantly, these claims included not only the northern and central Kurils, but the Southern Kurils and the "little Kurils" as well -- the first time Russia pressed claims so far south.[19] This demand was first expressed in negotiations between the Soviet Union and Japan designed to ensure Soviet neutrality in the event of a

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[16]Rees, p. 23.

[17]Berhard Pares, A History of Russia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), p. 524.

[18]The Soviets worked hard to carefully maintain this delicate neutrality with Japan during the course of the war. It was not until February 1945 that Stalin finally pledged to break the neutrality with Japan -- ninety days after Germany was defeated. Vernadsky, p. 449.

[19]Ibid., p. 152.

second general war. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov hinted very directly that the Soviets expected a "present" in return for such an agreement -- that present being the Kurils.[20] At the time the Japanese were negotiating from a position of strength and could afford to refuse such an overture. Japan and the Soviet Union signed a Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941 without reference to the Kurils.[21] This arrangement remained in place until the Soviets declared war on Japan in the final three weeks of the war.

After April 1941, the issue was next raised by the Soviets in a very different context, this time in conferences among the Allied powers in which the post-war disposition of Japan was discussed. The Cairo Declaration, issued in 1942 at the conclusion of that conference made a passing reference that " . . . Japan will [] be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed."[22] At the Teheran Conference of November 1943 Stalin first hinted that the Soviet Union was interested in acquiring Sakhalin and the Kurils to order to gain unrestricted access to the Pacific, and to provide a layer of defense for the Far East. On two other occasions Stalin mentioned this interest, including a December 1943 meeting with presidential envoy Averell Harriman, in which Stalin specified that the Kurils should be "returned" to the Russians -- with the obvious implication that the islands had been previously owned by them.[23]

U. S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt apparently had little knowledge of the Kurils, and even less interest. Possibly the Soviet rhetoric regarding the "return" of the Kurils had its desired effect, because Roosevelt believed that Japan had been

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[20]Rees, p. 33.

[21]Ibid., p. 36.

[22]United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, the Conferences of Cairo and Teheran, Washington, 1961, pp. 448-9.

[23]Stephen, p. 153.

awarded the islands as a result of the 1904-05 war; he believed this at Teheran, and apparently no one had corrected him by the time he reached Yalta. However, despite Roosevelt's lack of accurate information concerning the historical disposition of the Kuril Islands, there is little evidence to suggest that the facts would have changed his approach to negotiating for Soviet participation in the war against Japan. Roosevelt wanted the Soviet Union in the Pacific war; if the Kurils were the key to securing Soviet participation, then Roosevelt was probably more than willing to award the islands to the Soviets. He certainly wasted no time in endorsing Stalin's proposal. At Yalta he quickly agreed with Stalin's request that the Soviets take back the Kurils and southern Sakhalin as a fair way of "get[ting] back that which [was] taken from them." All of this was covered quickly during a fifteen minute closed meeting on 8 February 1944.[24] The 26 July 1945 Postdam Declaration remained ambiguous regarding the Kurils, but could be interpreted as an endorsement of the Yalta Declaration, which was not specifically referred to: " the terms of the Cairo Declaration will be carried out and Japanese sovereignty will be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine."[25]

The Japanese did consider offering concessions to the Soviet Union in 1944, which would have included the transfer of titles to the Central and Northern Kurils to the Soviets as a means of maintaining Soviet neutrality.[26] And in July 1945 Japan undertook to send a special envoy to Moscow to negotiate the end of war, and to include in a list of proposed concessions to the Soviets the Central and Northern Kurils. The Southern Kurils, however, remained "inalienable."[27] The Soviets

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[24]Ibid., pp. 153-155.

[25]Rees, p. 72.

[26]Ibid., p. 55.

[27]Ibid., p. 71.

refused this last offer, and the following month the extent of their interest in the Kurils was made clear. On 18 August 1945, three days after the Emperor of Japan declared Japan's unconditional surrender, Soviet forces invaded Shumshu and Paramuchir. The Japanese forces initially resisted and inflicted heavy casualties, but after they were ordered to effect an unconditional surrender (which they did on 23 August), the Soviets occupied all the Kurils, including Shikotan and the Habomai group.[28] The Soviets cut all communications between Japan and the islands, and soon thereafter annexed the territory into the Soviet Union.

At the San Francisco Peace Conference on 4-8 September 1951, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida signed a treaty which renounced all Japanese claims to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. The Japanese subsequently argued that the term "Kuril Islands" meant only the islands north of and including Urup; Iturup and Kunashir were excluded from this agreement.[29]

A Peace Declaration was signed by Japan and the Soviet Union in October 1956, but in this document territorial matters were deferred until a full-fledged peace treaty could be negotiated. As part of that agreement, the Soviet Union pledged to return Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan upon the conclusion of a general peace treaty.[30] In January 1960, still without a peace treaty, the Soviets added the stipulation that Shikotan and the Habomais would be returned to Japan only after all foreign bases and troops were withdrawn from Japan and a peace treaty was signed between Tokyo and Moscow. This was an obvious reaction to the U.S.-Japanese Security Agreement of January 1960.[31]

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[28]Stephen, pp. 167-168.

[29]Ibid., p. 199.

[30]Ibid., p. 201.

[31]Rees, p. 120.

Concerning fishing rights, throughout the entire period from the conclusion of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, until the signing of the Peace Declaration in 1956, Japan consistently maintained that it had monopoly use of the crab and fish resources in the seas adjacent to the Russian Far East, as well as in coastal waters. This was expressed in the treaties of 1875 and 1905, the 1907 and 1928 fishing conventions, and the 1956 convention.[32]

In the seventies the Soviet Union claimed the application of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975, commonly known as the Helsinki Accords, to the dispute.[33] Among many other points, this document endorsed the principle of the inviolability of post-war borders.[34] That argument conveniently ignored the fact that the Helsinki agreement was a strictly European document and did not apply to this Asian case. In 1976-77 both the Soviet Union and Japan claimed Exclusive Economic Zones (E.E.Z.'s) around the disputed islands. In practice, however, Russia controlled the waters and Japanese fishermen were required to obtain licenses, or risk the consequences of poaching, if caught.[35] The extension of Exclusive Economic Zones to two hundred miles only served to aggravate the dispute, because both Japan and the Soviet Union claimed a 200 mile E.E.Z. around the South Kuril Islands.

Near the end of Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure, the "Kuril problem" became a source of contention within the Soviet Union. It was used by members of the

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[32]Vyacheslav Zilanov, "Has the Kurils Trap Snapped Shut? Or, Where B. Yeltsin Lost to M. Gorbachev." Moscow *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 24 June 1994, pp. 1,4 as reported in FBIS, 28 June 1994.

[33]Rees, p. xii.

[34]The Final Act is reproduced in its entirety in John J. Maresca, To Helsinki: The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 1973-1975 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).

[35]J. R. V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Methuen & Co., 1985), p. 248.

"democratic" opposition -- including Boris Yeltsin -- as a political instrument in the struggle for power. Yeltsin made a series of statements in September and October of 1988 in which he proposed the return of the South Kurils to Japan. His proposal would more accurately be called a joint use venture as a symbol of a new era of cooperation between the two countries. Later proposals included the sale of the islands by Russia to Japan for some twenty to fifty billion dollars. Then, as chairman of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin proposed a five step plan for the peaceful settlement of the dispute with Japan:

1. Official recognition of a territorial dispute
2. Demilitarization of the islands
3. Declaration of the islands as free economic zone
4. Signing a formal peace treaty
5. Establishment of a joint protectorate over the islands[36]

Despite these promising proposals by Yeltsin, however, the official policy of the Russian Federation remains identical to Soviet policy: the issue was settled at Yalta; the Kurils were awarded to the Soviet Union at Yalta, and the Kurils are the spoils of war. Russia is the successor state of the Soviet Union and the Kurils are therefore rightfully and legally sovereign Russian territory.[37]

Marine industries continue to be the mainstay of Russian economic activity in the Far East. One-third of the Russian Pacific catch is processed in the Kurils. Several whaling factories are located there, and Malokurilsk on Shikotan is the main base for the Russian Pacific whaling fleet. The mineral wealth of the region has been of increasing interest of late: bauxite, zirconium, gold, zinc, mercury, tin,

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[36]FBIS, 28 June 1994.

[37]For additional commentary on the on-going dispute, see Stephen Foye, "Russo-Japanese Relations: Still Traveling a Rocky Road," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 44, 5 November 1993, pp. 27-34.

tungsten, lead, copper, sulphur, pumice, perlite are all mined in the islands. Of note, titanium-magnetite -- a vital component in the construction of naval combatants, space craft, and heavy industrial equipment -- is mined from sand deposits off Iturup -- one of the disputed southern islands.[38]

Over a third of Japan's catch also comes from the North Pacific, near the Kurils. Prior to 1945, the Japanese could fish Soviet waters with impunity, but in the decades since the Soviets have stepped up efforts to deter encroachment increasing border guard patrols, seizing boats and detaining fishermen.[39] Nevertheless, Japan continues to ply its fishing trade in disputed waters. Japan relies more heavily on its harvest from Russian waters than does Russia rely on Japanese maritime products. The countries signed an interim accord on fishing in 1977, but Moscow still possesses the leverage of occupation. Some Japanese businesses are opposing the Japanese government official stand on the territorial dispute because it will negate informal concessions now in effect that benefit Japanese fishermen.[40] It is Japan's hope that its fishing industry can make up for the loss in total catch production that came as a result of the E.E.Z. extension policies by gaining additional territorial seas and E.E.Z.'s by the reclamation of the South Kurils. This additional catch would represent an additional two million tons of fish annually.[41]

In April 1994 Russia announced its intention to tighten law enforcement efforts against poaching boats under the auspices of an operation code-named "Putina 94." This operation includes the mobilization of the Border Patrol, local government authorities, the Russian Pacific Fleet, and even the use of

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[38]Stephen, p. 175.

[39]Rees, p. xvii.

[40]Ibid., p. xvii.

[41]FBIS, 28 June 1994.

reconnaissance space satellites. Russia took this step with the stated purpose of protecting its economic interests "as an economic major power."[42] In information released in conjunction with "Putina 94," Russian border guards estimated that more than 7,000 incursions by Japanese vessels in the Russian waters were registered last year,and they also acknowledged that poachers are apprehended only infrequently.[43] According to official statements, "Putina 94" is not aimed at a cohersive resolution of the unlawful fishing; rather, it is mainly an attempt to deter Japanese poachers from entering Russian territorial seas.[44]

The Russians show no signs of pulling back from the Kurils, at least not in the sense of relinquishing sovereignty over the islands. In the Russian 1994 Federal Budget, 85 billion rubles were allocated to a federal program titled "The Social and Economic Development of the Kuril Islands for 1994, 1995, and Through 2000." Included in this allocation is funding for the construction or modernization of airports, seaports, as well as developments in the power industry, air transportation, and communications.[45] The Russians have recently published reports detailing plans to exploit the geothermal energy of the region.[46]

Russians emphasize the developed sense of pride among the island inhabitants; two generations have now lived in the settlements; they consider

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[42]Tokyo *Asahi Shimbun*, 20 April 1994, p. 3, as reported in FBIS, 20 April 1994.

[43]"Fish: The Japanese Are Asking Us Not To Fire. Tokyo Advises Its Fishermen Not To Mess With 'Putina 94,'" Moscow *Segodnya*, 22 April 1994, p. 2 as reported in FBIS, 22 April 1994.

[44]Ibid.

[45]"Government Is Allocating 85 Billion Rubles to South Kurils," Moscow *Izvestiya*, 12 May 1994, p. II, as reported in FBIS, 12 May 1994.

[46]Moscow *Teploenergetika*, Number 2, 1994, pp. 15-22 as reported in FBIS, 9 August 1994.

themselves hearty, frontier stock.[47] This year, however, there have been signs that pride is cracking. In June, 1994, a group of Kuril Islands citizens appealed to the Russian President, the Federal Assembly and the oblast governor describing their "disastrous economic situation."[48] It has been reported in the Russian press that residents in the Kurils have requested aid from the Japanese government to finance their return to the Russian mainland. And there is rising concern in Moscow over the number of Russians migrating off the islands.[49] Emigration off Shikotan and Kunashir (in the South Kurils) have reached "massive" proportions, with 800 residents having left in the first six months of 1994. Reasons cited for leaving include worsening economic and social conditions, and rising unemployment.[50]

In March 1994, the Chairman of the State Duma Security Committee reported to the Duma that the executive branch has prepared an instruction directing the Defense Ministry to prepare plans for the withdrawal of forces from the South Kurils.[51] The Defense Ministry denied receiving any such directive.[52] It appears that the chairman was engaged in political maneuvering rather than exposing executive duplicity. As in Japan, in the Russian Federation the Kurils have developed into a powerful and complex political symbol. In March 1994 Prime

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[47]Stephen, p. 181.

[48]Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks, 0600 GMT I June 1994 as reported in FBIS, 1 June 1994.

[49]RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 August 1994.

[50]RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 August 1994.

[51]Moscow *Interfax*, 1129 GMT, 23 March 1994 as reported in FBIS, 23 March 1994.

[52]"Border Guards Have Not Left the Kurils Yet. Russia Intends to Guard 'All That Coincides With ex-USSR Borders.'" Moscow *Segodnya*, 23 March 1994, p. 2 as reported in FBIS, 23 March 1994.

Minister Victor Chernomyrdin stated that there is no territorial problem with Japan[53] -- this the continuation of the Soviet "the problem was solved at Yalta" line. The governor of Primorsky Krai in the Russian Far East has proposed that the Kuril Islands be transferred to his jurisdiction, and has emphatically opposed any concession of any Russian territory to neighboring states (a veiled reference to the Kurils).[54] The ubiquitous ultra-nationalist legislator Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated on 28 July 1994 that Russia would never give up the Kurils, and threatened to invade Tokyo if Japan did not renounce its claim.[55] Ivan Rybkin, speaker of the State Duma, and a member of one of the opposition parties, has stated that the "Kurils are our own Russian islands . . . We cannot afford to lose such beauty."[56] Gennadi Burbulis, a former Yeltsin aide and now a member of the Liberal Democratic opposition party (which is neither), has stated that the Soviet seizure of the Kurils was an aggression by Stalin and that Russia would eventually have to come to terms with returning the islands.[57] It is difficult to take the hyperbole of Zhirinovskiy and Rybkin seriously, but these statements clearly indicate that the Kuril Islands issue has become deeply politicized in the developing Russian political environment.

In August 1994 new complications arose. Russia and Japan exchanged diplomatic protests on 16 August 1994 following an incident the previous day in which a Russian border guard vessel opened fire on two Japanese boats fishing in waters off of the Southern Kurils. One vessel was hit and subsequently detained;

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[53]Moscow Russian Television Network, 1700 GMT, 20 March 1994 as reported in FBIS, 20 March 1994.

[54]RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 August 1994.

[55]RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 July 1994.

[56]RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 June 1994.

[57]RFE/RL Daily Report, 14 April 1994.

one Japanese crew member was wounded. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Panov told the Japanese ambassador in Moscow that he wanted "an end to illegal fishing activities in the waters off the disputed islands," then refused to hear a Japanese reciprocal protest.[58]

Geography has predisposed the Kurils to play a strategic role in Russo-Japanese affairs. During the eighteenth century, Russia saw the islands as the gateway to Japan. In turn, the Japanese have viewed the islands as a "springboard aimed at the Russian Far East.[59] That geostrategic importance continues today. Several strategically significant straits pass between the islands. The Kuril Strait, which separates Lopatka Peninsula and Shimshu Island, is only seven miles wide. The three mile wide channel is only 50-100 feet deep, with dangerous reefs extending from Lopatka Peninsula and the northeast point of Shimshu. This narrow and treacherous body was the frontier between Japan and Russia and the U.S.S.R. from 1875-1945. There are other passes in the archipelago. Paramushir Strait, which separates Paramushir and Shimshu, is one mile wide at its narrowest. Shimushir Strait, between Shimushir and Ketoi, is eleven miles wide and very deep. Iturup Strait, between Iturup and Urup, is 24 miles wide and deep. In the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda, this strait served as the frontier. The final strait, between Kunashir and Hokkaido, is twelve miles wide and very deep.[60]

Ironically, the Russians began to appreciate the strategic value of the islands in about 1875, at the time they signed over possession of all the islands to the Japanese in the Treaty of St. Petersburg. This was largely due to the influence of Admiral Stepan Makarov, who pointed to the Kurils as the key to communication between the Russian Far East and the Pacific Ocean. Short of possession, Makarov

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[58]RFE/RL Daily Report, 17 August 1994.

[59]Stephen, p. 127.

[60]"Kuril Islands," United States Navy Handbook, 1943, as quoted in Rees, pp. 156-165.

recognized the need for detailed information of the entire chain, especially the passages. His emphasis lead to the detailed exploration and charting of the islands and passages.[61] This is not to say that Russians were completely insensitive to strategic considerations before Makarov. In 1746 a member of Bering's second expedition first proposed the placement of a naval base as a means of protecting the eastern approaches to Siberia.[62] The strategic significance of the islands assumed new importance in the middle of the nineteenth century for several reasons. The most prominent of these reasons were the expansion of American influence into the Pacific region, Russian absorption the Amur-Maritime region and penetration into Manchuria, and deepening Japanese involvements in Asian and Pacific affairs.[63]

It was not until 1885 that the Japanese truly began to appreciate the strategic importance of the Kurils. In that year a Cabinet official toured the islands and articulated the vulnerability of the exposed, undeveloped lands to Russian encroachment. He saw that the northernmost islands abutted Russian territory, and remained unprotected. Poachers frequented the islands. Russian naval vessels routinely patrolled the territorial waters, conducting topographic and oceanographic surveys.[64] It was in this period, when the Japanese controlled the entire archipelago, that they began to build a military presence in the region. More importantly, their access to the rich fishing grounds along the Russian littoral caused them to develop the Kurils as a commercial base for their growing industry. By the 1910's - 1920's the Japanese were brazenly operating in Russian territorial waters. However, the Russians were in a period of weakness in the years bracketing

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[61]Stephen, p. 129.

[62]Ibid., p. 185.

[63]Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[64]Ibid., p. 111.

the Russian Revolution. As a result, the Japanese fished openly in Russian waters, often under the watchful protection of Japanese naval vessels. Warships cut towlines as Russian attempted to tow poachers into custody.[65]

Throughout World War II, the Soviets had one overriding strategic goal in the Pacific-- acquisition of the Kurils. This grew from the realization, based on historical experience, of the strategic importance of the islands.[66] During the war, in order to reach Vladivostok, American lend-lease vessels had to sail through either the Tartary or the La Pérouse Strait, between Sakhalin and the Russian mainland. In either case, the ships had to proceed via the Kuril Island passages, all of which were controlled by the Japanese. The Russians, however, were desperate and therefore took their chances. Particularly during the early stages of the war, Japanese patrols frequently stopped, searched, detained and confiscated several shipments. They also required advance notice and daytime passage. The Kuril Strait, between Kamchatka and Shumshu, was on the shortest route from the U.S., but it was narrow and was rimmed on the northern side by the aforementioned reef. Shipping was required, therefore, to pass through Japanese waters on the south side of the channel. After August 1943, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters ordered a halt to all harassment (most likely in observation of the Neutrality Pact.)[67] This wartime experience reenforced Admiral Makarov's emphasis on the strategic importance of the Kurils in providing unrestricted access to the Pacific Basin. Japanese use of the islands during the war demonstrated the military significance of the islands themselves to the Russians. Hitokappu Bay, at Iturup, served as the rendezvous point for the strike fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor. It later served as the launching point for the expeditionary force that occupied the western Aleutians, on

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[65]Ibid., p. 130.

[66]Ibid., p. 133.

[67]Ibid., pp. 145-146.

8 June 1942.[68] After World War II, Badger and Bear air bases were constructed on Iturup and Paramushir. Submarine facilities were constructed at Buroton Bay.[69] The Sea of Okhotsk is widely believed to have served as a SSBN bastion, which would make the Kurils and the straits central to Soviet and thence Russian nuclear and strategic objectives.[70]

Western diplomats have typically granted only grudging acknowledgement of the strategic importance of the Kurils to the Russians and Soviets. Henry Kissinger stated that Stalin's claim to the southern Kurils "did bear a certain, albeit vague, relationship to Soviet security and Russian history."[71] A statement in Stalin's victory speech perhaps best sums the weight that Russians place on the Kurils as a strategically vital piece of territory: "Henceforth, the Kuril Islands shall not serve as a means to cut off the Soviet Union from the ocean or as a base for a Japanese attack on our Far East, but as a means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean and as a defensive base against Japanese aggression."[72] The strategic significance of these islands has not diminished today, and Stalin's quote is still applicable by simply substituting the word "any" for "Japanese."

Today, Moscow ultimately values the islands for their strategic importance as a protective shield for the Russian Far East, although it is unclear what threat the Russians are concerned about. The Kurils also serve as an outpost to support presence in the Pacific Basin.[73] Kunashir and Iturup offer a proximity to Japan that

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[68]Ibid., p. 138.

[69]Ibid., p. 186.

[70]Ibid., p. xvii.

[71]Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 415.

[72]Stephen, p. 170.

[73]Ibid., p. 4.

gives them a base for advance airfields and intelligence operations. Buroton Bay on Shimushir is a "natural" submarine base. The islands lie along the air route between North America and the Far East. Of fourteen major eastern Russian ports, eleven are separated from the Pacific by the Kurils. While the Tsushima Strait is closely guarded by South Korea, Japan, and with an American naval base in close proximity at Sasebo, the Kuril gateways are vital to Russian Pacific Fleet access to the open Pacific. In the broader context of Russian state security, there is a vital issue of economic integrity -- that is, the protection of Russian sea expanses, including the 200 mile E.E.Z. and the continental shelf.[74]

Captain Boris Makeev, Russian Navy (retired) listed the main tenets of Russian naval strategy in the Pacific Region (as of the fall of 1994). These tenets included the following:

1. Provide for combat stability of SSBN's
2. Prevent amphibious landings in the Russian Far East
3. Provide air cover for Kamchatka, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the northern Sea of Japan
4. Protect Russian economic interests in the region
5. Deter territorial claims in the region.[75]

Each of these tenets provides an indication of the Russian resolve to maintain control over the Kurils, because in each case possession of the Kurils and the surrounding waters is critical to the achievement of these goals. Provision for the combat stability of ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific theater dictates the necessity of protecting the bastion in which they operate, the Sea of Okhotsk.[76] The best method of protecting this area is by controlling the approaches to the sea, that is,

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[74]FBIS, 28 June 1994.

[75]Captain Boris Makeev, Russian Navy (Retired), in a lecture at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 5 October 1994.

[76]Ibid.

the Kuril straits, and the Tartary and La Pérouse Straits. Prevention of the landing of enemy amphibious forces in the Russian Far East is likewise best achieved by controlling the approaches to the Russian coast, and much of the Russian Far East is accessible via the Kurils straits or the Tsushima Strait. The air cover mission is the weakest argument for maintaining Russian presence in and control of the Kurils; nonetheless, it provides a convenient reason, albeit a questionable one, for the maintenance of Russian air bases in the Kurils. The need to protect Russian economic interests in the region is currently a high priority; hence the use of Russian naval forces in the recent "Putina 94" exercises designed to deter poaching by Japanese fishermen. The goal of deterring territorial claims is obvious. The explicit purpose of using the defense of Russian territorial claims as a justification for maintaining naval force levels indicates the importance of the issue.

B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

1. Strategic Culture

Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space between the frontiers and the heartland.

This hypothesis appears to be upheld in this test case. Despite the desperate economic plight of Russian inhabitants and the current exodus by Russian citizens from the islands, the Russians will not consider withdrawal from the Kurils. The archipelago has become an integral part of the perceived critical line of defense on the country's periphery. In the highly politicized environment of Moscow, began in Gorbachev's era of *perestroika* , perpetuated with Yeltsin's assent to power, and continued today with the development of party politics, the mere mention of "retreat" from the Kurils is politically damaging.

Perhaps one reason for this particular sensitivity to the possible "loss" of the Kurils is the political organization of the islands within the region. The Kurils are

administratively under the direct control of the Russian Federation. Having "lost" all of the other Soviet Socialist Republics, and faced with rebellion from other autonomous republics and regions within the Russian Federation (such as Chechnya) it is unpalatable to the Russians to lose territory under the direct political administration of Moscow.

Hypothesis 2. States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining secure borders.

This hypothesis is not upheld in this test case. The Russians have no interest in expansion in the region, at least in the immediate area of the Kurils. The Russians have never claimed any portion of the Japanese mainland.[77] Their sole interest is to maintain their current territorial possessions, prevent Japanese economic exploitation (that is, fishing in Kuril Island waters) and gain Japanese and international recognition for their claim. As noted in the analysis of Hypothesis 1, however, any territorial concession would meet with intense political opposition and would be seriously damaging to the regime's credibility.

Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering public support for foreign policy objectives.

This hypothesis is upheld, based upon the extensive rhetoric that encompasses political debate in Moscow over the future disposition of the Kurils. Russian politicians are beginning to understand the power of nationalism as a force

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[77]This statement requires some qualification; after the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, Stalin did request that the Red Army establish and administer a zone of occupation in northern Hokkaido, modelled after the German occupation. President Truman steadfastly refused on the grounds that the Postdam Declaration provided for a consolidated administration over the defeated, occupied Japan. See Rees and Stephen. In retrospect, this effort by Stalin to gain a foothold on Hokkaido can be viewed as a territorial claim, but as a claim made on the basis of historical, cultural ties to the region, it is unfounded.

in Russian society, particularly in a society in which the previous regime suffered a crippling and demoralizing Cold War "defeat" at the hands of the United States, and in which a large portion of the Russian empire was lost, including the cradle of Russian civilization, Ukraine. There is clearly a "market" for revitalized nationalism as a elixir to soothe the bruised Russian national pride, and politicians are seizing on nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering support for their movements. This is true not only of the opposition parties and leaders, but for the government as well, which must respond to the attacks of opposition leaders. In this respect, because of the politicization of such issues, contemporary Russian foreign policy must appeal to nationalistic sentiment.

An appeal to Russian nationalistic sentiment is the only way to understand Rybkin's statement regarding the "beauty" of the Kuril Islands, Zhirinovsky's ridiculous threat to invade Tokyo. The same applies to other less ridiculous but equally effective statements that are clearly designed to appeal to Russian nationalism, and thereby prevent any deal with Japan that involves concession or compromise.

Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a support function.

As was true in the "near abroad" test case, this hypothesis is inconclusive. A variety of "players" within the government, including Boris Yeltsin, Viktor Chernomyrdin, and Ivan Rybkin have made contradictory statements regarding the Kuril dispute, and it is as of yet extremely difficult to determine the mechanisms and the processes by which Russian foreign policy is developed.

Two of the four strategic culture hypotheses were upheld in this test case.

2. Balance of Power

Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance of prestige, both at home and abroad.

This hypothesis is upheld. The review of Russian policy statements concerning the Kurils indicates an goal of preserving Russia's status as a great power. In statements aimed at a domestic audience, officials have made foreign policy statements that Russia will never relinquish its claim on the Kurils; they are indisputably Russian territory. Any other line of policy would be exploited by opposition parties and factions as a sign of weakness on the part of the Russian government.

The recent Russian display of resolve through the mobilization of resources to deter Japanese poaching in the Kurils provides further evidence of Russian resolve. The extensive poaching by Japanese commercial fishing fleets is an affront to Russian prestige and sovereignty in the region, and the exercise "Putina 94" is a clear indication of Russia's desire to regain control of the economic development of the region.

Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea.

This hypothesis is upheld, and is perhaps the single best example in this thesis of the validity of *Realpolitik* as a basis for the evaluation of contemporary Russian foreign policy. All other considerations aside, the Russians want to keep to Kurils to protect their strategic interests in the region, which include unhindered access to the Pacific Basin. Possession of the Kuril Islands gives Russia control of vital straits between the open ocean and the northern approaches to Vladivostok via the Sea of Okhotsk. The lessons of the vulnerability of shipping in the First Kuril Strait during World War II were not lost on them. The islands also provide

an important layer of outer defense against attack on the motherland, and guard the approaches to the Russian SSBN bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The aforementioned exercise "Putina 94" is again an example of Russian resolve to establish and maintain dominance on the waters around the Kuril Islands.

Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic or moral equivalence of territorial domination.

This hypothesis is upheld; the political bluster in Moscow over the disposition of the islands may be filled with hyperbole, but it is nonetheless a clear demonstration of Russia's "resolute refusal" to suffer the loss of sovereign Russian territory.[78] Following the premise of this hypothesis, the only possible resolution of the conflict with Japan aside from Japanese acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty (an unlikely scenario) the only method of settlement will involve a compromise in which Russia perceives that it will maintain the moral, or more likely, the economic equivalent of territorial domination. This might take the form of the initial proposal of Boris Yeltsin, who originally suggested that a free economic zone with joint protectorate status might provide an adequate solution. Given the current conditions of the Japanese and Russian economies and fishing industries, the Japanese would have the clear relative advantage in such an agreement. But if Yeltsin were to gain concessions from the Japanese that at a minimum give the perception of Russian dominance, a deal could be struck.

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[78]As of the time of this writing (December 1994) Russia continues to "talk around" the issue in its dialogue with Japan. In November 1994 talks in Tokyo, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets refused to place the Kuril Islands on the agenda, although he did inform the Japanese Foreign Minister that the islands' future must be settled according to the principles of "law and justice." Soskovets did agree that there should be full-scale negotiations on fishing rights in the area. See RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 November 1994.

Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, compensation, armament, alliance.

This hypothesis is upheld. Although it is difficult to discern the application of these methods in the Kurils case, it is nonetheless clear that Russia wants to maintain a presence on the Pacific Rim, and more specifically does not wish to yield to Japanese claims in the Kurils, as a means of containing the threat of Japanese expansion and growing influence over the Russian Far East. Russia is in somewhat of a quandary, needing the support of the strong Japanese economy for the development of reforms in Russia, especially in the Far East. However, Russia is wary of the development of too much Japanese influence over the region, given Japan's historical interest in expansion to the Asian mainland, and its traditional interest in the exploitation of maritime resources in Russian waters. In light of this perspective, Russia will likely pursue a balanced approach to relations with Japan, encouraging investment and the development of joint business ventures, while maintaining a highly visible presence in the region as a means of counterbalancing any increased Japanese influence in the Pacific Northwest. This means, above all, maintaining control of the Kuril Islands.

All four balance of power hypotheses were upheld in the Kurils Islands dispute test case; the balance of power explanatory theory is a clear "winner" in this test case, demonstrating greater explanatory power than the theory of strategic culture.

V. TEST CASE: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

A. TEST CASE DISCUSSION

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev quickly proclaimed a pro-Western policy. He addressed the Russian people in a 2 January 1992 newspaper article and shared with them his vision of foreign policy in the new era then dawning. He stressed the need for "fruitful cooperation" with the United States; he went so far as to refer to the West an "Russia's natural allies."[1] He obviously sought to distance Russia from previous Soviet policies of confrontation and competition with the West. Kozyrev stated,

> "We must have an active foreign policy and diplomacy that can use international recognition to secure our economic admission to the world community *and that can use this to secure assistance in meeting Russia's internal needs.*"(Emphasis added)[2]

There was definitely a desire to improve Russia's image in the international community, but the real motivation for pursuing a policy consistent with the Western approach was economics. Boris Yeltsin's government desperately needed financial support from the G-7 nations to fuel reform at home.[3] This staunchly pro-Western policy immediately drew criticism from conservative quarters in Russia.[4]

Western analysts were quick to identify the extensive Russian interests and influence in the Balkans, and to note the affect that Russian interests in the region

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[1] *Izvestia*, as reported in FBIS, 9 April 1992, pp. 34-35.

[2] FBIS, 9 April 1992.

[3] Vera Tolz, "The Burden of the Imperial Legacy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 20, 14 May 1993, p. 45.

[4] Allen Lynch and Reneo Lukic, "Russian Foreign Policy: Still Travelling a Rocky Road," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 44, 5 November 1993, p. 29.

had on Russia's Balkan policy. Some noted that Russia [like Greece] also had traditional ties to Serbia, which had the effect of paralyzing or delaying forceful action (on the part of the West) in several instances.[5] Also,"post-Soviet foreign policy toward the Balkans has been affected as much by domestic claims [in Russia] made on behalf of Serbia as by the international aspects of the Yugoslav wars."[6]

From 18 May to 27 May 1992, Kozyrev traveled to the former Yugoslavia and attempted to broker a cease fire among the warring factions. Although a cease fire was proclaimed, it quickly broke down.[7] Immediately after these events Russian resistance to the imposition of sanctions against the rump Yugoslavia was withdrawn and Russia voted in the United Nations Security Council on 30 May 1992 to support sanctions. The change in position was attributed to a realization that Russia was unable to broker a peace in the Balkans and would no longer tolerate Serbian aggression.[8]

In June 1992 the Russian newspaper *Den* obtained a copy of a classified memo from the Russian ambassador to the United Nations, Yurii Vorontsov, which stated that Moscow should support sanctions, and that Russia must not be associated with Milosevic especially on the eve of a summit with the United States. Kozyrev implicitly conceded that the document was accurate.[9] This revelation fueled criticism of Russian foreign policy, because the Russian actions were portrayed by conservatives and nationalists as an abandonment of Russian support for their

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[5]John Fenske, "The West and 'The Problem from Hell,'" Current History, Vol. 92, No. 577, p. 355.

[6]Lynch and Lukic, p. 26.

[7]Suzanne Crow, "Russia's Response to the Yugoslav Crisis," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 30, p. 31.

[8]Ibid., p. 32.

[9]Ibid.

Slavic Orthodox brethren in Serbia. It was a return of the Panslav argument that Russia had historically supported and needed to protect its Slavic brothers and coreligionists in the Balkans.[10]

On 10 July 1992, at a C.S.C.E. ministerial meeting in Helsinki, Russia participated in a condemnation rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for its military actions in other former Yugoslav repsublics. At this time Yeltsin also called for the creation of a rapid reaction force, ostensibly to enter the former Yugoslavia to establish and enforce a truce. In July 1992 Kozyrev held meetings with rump Yugoslav leader Milan Panic and encouraged Panic to radically alter Yugoslavia's course to one of peace and democracy.[11]

Russia recognized the Republic of Macedonia on 5 August 1992, a move that was a blow to Serbian interests and was meant to be a show of support for Bulgaria.[12] On 13 August 1992, Russia supported United Nations resolutions 770 and 771, which approved the use of military force to ensure the supply of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Hercegovina, and which permitted the use of that force to gain access to detention camps in Serbia and Montenegro, although at the same time Russia lobbied other Security Council members to allow the rump Yugoslavia to assume Yugoslavia's seat.[13] On 19 September 1992 Russia supported the United Nations Security Council resolution referring to the end of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[14] These actions indicated an overall return to *Realpolitik*: Russia was

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[10]Ibid., p. 35.

[11]Ibid., p. 31.

[12]Crow, "Russia and the Macedonia Question," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 45, 13 November 1992, p. 36.

[13]Crow, "Reading Moscow's Policies Toward the Rump Yugoslavia," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 1, No. 44, 6 November 1992, p. 14.

[14]Ibid., p. 15.

ultimately willing to sacrifice cultural and historical interests in Serbia in order to strengthen relations with Bulgaria and to demonstrate its ability to cooperate with the West.[15]

Throughout 1992 Kozyrev denied that Russia had surrendered its initiative and independence in foreign policy in the interest of gaining Western support. At the end of the first year of Russian independence, however, it had become obvious that Western financial aid was not going to come, at least not in the amount anticipated, and Kozyrev began proclaiming a foreign policy that was more independent of Western influence and more in line with Russian national interests as defined in the domestic political arena.

In December 1992 conservative member of parliament charged in *Pravda* that Russia lost $16 billion in 1992 as a result of the United Nations sanctions against Yugoslavia, Libya, and Iraq. While Kozyrev rejected the loss of trade argument, he nonetheless called for the lifting of sanctions, because these sanctions only served to isolate Serbia and Montenegro from the international community.[16]

As was noted in Chapter III, on December 14, 1992, Kozyrev delivered a speech at a ministerial meeting of the C.S.C.E. in Stockholm, Sweden in which he announced a shift in Russian foreign policy, and then railed against Western intervention in the successor states of the Soviet Union, and further declared that Moscow might use military force and economic pressure to reassert control over the former Soviet republics. With respect to the Balkan conflict, Kozyrev proclaimed Slavic solidarity with Serbia and demanded an end to sanctions against that nation. He promised that the Serbs would have the full support of "Great Russia." Despite Kozyrev's claim that he was "bluffing," Russian foreign policy regarding Bosnia became more assertive after his speech.

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[15]Crow, "Russia and the Macedonia Question," p. 37.

[16]Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 2, No. 12, 19 March 1993, p. 3.

The day after Kozyrev's speech Viktor Chernomyrdin, at the time perceived a to be a political conservative, succeeded committed reformer Yegor Gaidar as Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. On 16 December, the Security Council assumed responsibility for formulating Russian foreign policy, a move that isolated Kozyrev and, given the swing of the Prime Minister's chair in the Council of Ministers, appeared to give conservatives considerably more power in implementing their foreign policy agenda. Three days after Kozyrev's speech, on 17 December, the Russian parliament passed a resolution which called for the extension of sanctions to all three parties in the Bosnian conflict, demanded that Russia use its veto power to prevent the United Nations Security Council from authorizing any military activity in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and which called for humanitarian aid to rump Yugoslavia. Observers quickly noted the increasing role of Russian domestic politics in the formulation of Russian foreign policy.[17]

In January 1993 Yeltsin complained that the United States tended to "dictate" policy regarding Iraq and Yugoslavia and indicated that Russian interests did not always coincide with U. S. interests. Observers noted specific reasons why Russia signalled a change in policy at this particular time: the Russian domestic political environment was changing to a more conservative (and more nationalistic) bent; the nature of the Balkan conflict was changing (at the time war had resumed in Croatia, and a military no-fly zone had been imposed); and there appeared to be a weakening of Western consensus concerning policy in Bosnia.[18]

On 18 February 1993 the Russian parliament again passed a resolution on the Bosnian conflict, which called for the easing of sanctions against Serbia and the imposition of sanctions against Croatia. Russian foreign ministry officials also declared Russian opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia-

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[17]Crow, "Russia Adopts a More Active Policy," pp. 3-4.

[18]Ibid., p. 3.

Hercegovina, an action proposed by Muslim governments and which had gained some support in some Western states, notably the U. S.[19]

In February 1993 Russia proposed the following eight point plan for the resolution of the conflict:

1. Halt all fighting.
2. Adopt the Vance-Owen Plan, which called for the establishment of ten autonomous provinces based on ethnic divisions.
3. Lift sanctions against Serbia after it endorsed the Vance-Owen Plan.
4. Establish a United Nations peacekeeping force.
5. include Russian troops in that U. N. force.
6. Allow NATO to participate in the operations.
7. Introduce stricter controls over the Bosnian arms embargo.
8. Initiate war crimes investigations[20]

On 2 March 1993 Russia announced that it was willing to support humanitarian aid air drops over Bosnia-Hercegovina, and denied charges of secret arms deals with the Serbians.[21] The balance of 1993 saw a decrease in Russian initiatives and general support for Western policies.

In March 1994 Russian efforts to resolve the conflict again increased, both in concert with Western powers and on a unilateral basis. On 7 March 1994, Russia co-sponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution which coordinated a number of measures designed to maintain the truce around Sarajevo[22] and on 25 March Russia sent 100 paratroopers to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.[23] Meanwhile, on 31 March Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy

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[19]Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., p. 5.

[22]FBIS, 7 March 1994.

[23]FBIS, 25 March 1994.

Churkin announced the successful negotiation of a cease fire between Serbs and Croats in Krijina.[24] In early April 1994 Russia announced that it would send an additional 300 troops to Bosnia-Hercegovina for peacekeeping duty.[25]

Still, Russia persisted in its efforts to cultivate influence with the Serbs. In April 1994, in response to a Serbian artillery attack on U.N. positions in the town of Gorazde, the U.N. responded by calling in an air strike on the Serbian positions. The Russian response to this turn of events included what can only be called a defense of Serbian actions. On 17 April 1994, Kozyrev stated, " . . . after provocations from a Muslim warring group in Gorazde, the Serbs started using heavy artillery against the town, including the site where U.N. observers were deployed."[26] Note that the Russians were careful to qualify the Serbian action as a response to a Muslim attack. Kozyrev expressed the Russian opinion that NATO air strikes only made matters worse, and that " . . . every step by the Serb side will be accompanied by appropriate, decisive pressure on our part about the lifting of sanctions."[27] Thus in the immediate aftermath of Serbian artillery widely reported and condemned in the rest of the world Russia continued to pursue the lifting of sanctions against Serbia. Kozyrev would later assert that the NATO need to resort to force confirmed that Russia held the key to conflict resolution in Bosnia:

> "[After the NATO bombing raid in Bosnia] it became immediately apparent that Russia could not and should not be excluded from the common efforts to regulate the conflict in the

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[24]FBIS, 31 March 1994.

[25]FBIS, 1 April 1994.

[26]FBIS, 17 April 1994.

[27]FBIS, 17 April 1994.

Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and influence."[28]

As a postscript to this discussion, in late November 1994 a UN-backed NATO airstrike was conducted against a Krajina Serb airfield. This strike was initially supported by Moscow, although Kozyrev subsequently commented that NATO airstrikes should not become a common occurance and that such actions in the future would prompt the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from Bosnia. He also made the following statement: "We were assured that the strike was a preventative action and not a punishment. Let us hope it was really so."[29]

Duplicity continues in the Russian policy regarding Bosnia.

B. HYPOTHESIS TESTING

1. Strategic Culture

Hypothesis 1. States will have a preoccupation with security, demonstrating particular concern regarding loss of strategic depth, or the reduction of space between the frontiers and the heartland.

This hypothesis is not upheld in this particular test case, nor does this test case provide a tough test for the hypothesis. Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *peristroika* meant the end of conformity to the Soviet system in the Eastern European bloc, which lead to dissolution of the communist systems of the Eastern bloc states, and to the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact. By the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself, the Eastern European states were no longer part of the Soviet empire. The frontier had already been "rolled back" from the Iron Curtain to the borders of the Soviet Union proper. If there were a sense of loss of stretegic

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[28]Andrei V. Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 63.

[29]RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 November 1994.

depth in Eastern Europe, it occurred in 1989, before the period defined in this test case.

Furthermore, Yugoslavia was a special case within the body of communist states. Yugoslavia broke from the Soviet sphere of influence in 1948; any sense of loss experienced by the Soviets at the departure of Yugoslavia from the Cominform was long since past. The Soviets had a very limited, measured response to Yugoslavia's break in relations when it first occurred, especially when compared the Soviet response to Czechoslavakian attempts to reform in 1968.

Hypothesis 2. States will pursue expansion as a means of gaining or regaining secure borders.

This hypothesis is not upheld. By 1992 the former Yugoslav republics lay well beyond the frontier of the Russian Federation, or even the frontier of the former Soviet Union. In 1992 Russian concern for establishing secure borders were focused much closer to home than Yugoslavia. If Russian influence or control again extends into the Balkans, closer to Serbia, then a reevaulation of this hypothesis may be in order.

Hypothesis 3. States will appeal to nationalistic sentiment as a means of garnering public support for foreign policy objectives.

This hypothesis is upheld and composes the strongest argument for strategic culture as a foundation for analyzing Russian policy regarding the current Bosnian conflict. There is a historical precedent for the use of Russian nationalistic sentiment as a support for foreign policy objectives: the rise of Panslavism as a political and social force in Russia. At its inception, Panslavism had been a vague notion of cultural community among all Slavs. The term was first used by a Slovak intellectual and applied to an intellectual and cultural Slav renaissance in the first

half of the nineteenth century.[30] The Russian idea of Panslavism was far more aggressive: it could be defined as the furthering of the Tsar's ambitions in the Balkans.[31] Russian Panslavists saw Russia as the natural protector of all the Slavic peoples, and aspired to "liberate" the various Slavic nations from the Ottoman and later the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and then include them in the immediate Russian sphere of influence. Russia, in their eyes, was the "mother and protector for these peoples."[32] There was a second group of intellectuals within Russia, closely linked with the Panslavs, that sought Russian influence in the Balkans based on religious ties. These first two groups manifest the cultural aspect of Russian strategic goals. Yet a third group viewed the most important question of Russian foreign policy to be the dispensation of power and decisive influence at the Turkish Straits, which would in turn lead to supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean.[33] This group took a decidedly *Realpolitik* perspective.

Political and extreme Panslavism as it evolved in Russia was influenced by key intellectuals. Nikolai Danilevski (1822-85), for example, was an expert in the field of natural sciences, and he drew from Darwinism to define the goal of Panslavism to be the formation of a Slav confederation separate from Europe and under the hegemony and protection of Russia to which all Slavs would rally after acquiring their political freedom.[34] To such extremists, Russia was a cause rather

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[30]Charles T. Katsainos, The Theory and Practice of Russian Panslavism In Light of Russia's Expansionist Policies in the Balkans, Georgetown University Dissertation, Washington, DC, 1951, p. vii.

[31]Robert C. Binkley, Realism and Nationalism (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935), pp. 28-29.

[32]George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 28.

[33]Ibid., p. 29.

[34]Binkley, pp. 28-29.

than a nation, beyond geopolitics, impelled by faith, and bonded by armed force.[35] This greater Slav federation envisioned by the Panslavs was extensive and encompassed nearly all of the Balkan Peninsula and Eastern Europe.[36]

Influenced by Panslavist opinion in society, the Russian public reacted strongly to the brutal Turkish efforts to suppress Serbian uprisings in 1875; several thousand volunteers joined the Serbian army to fight the Turks. Tensions between Russia and the Turks mounted and the two sides declared war in April 1877.[37] Russia crossed the Danube in June 1877, won decisive victories and began an advance on Constantinople. After defeating Turkish forces at Plevna in December 1877 the Russian army resumed its march to Constantinople and was approaching the city when the Treaty of San Stefano was signed in March 1878. Russia made critical gains in this treaty, including additional territory in border regions in the Caucasus and Bessarabia. Rumania won independence and control over Dobrudja, Serbia and Montenegro gained independence and extensive territory including Bosnia-Hercegovina, and an large and autonomous Bulgaria was created.[38] San Stefano was seen as the "triumph of Russian Panslavism"[39] and its conclusion effectively meant the end of Ottoman control in Europe, except for Thrace, Albania,

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[35]Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 143.

[36]Katsainos, pp. 76-77.

[37]Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 387.

[38]George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 227.

[39]Katsainos, p. viii.

and (nominally) Bulgaria.[40] However, the Conference of Berlin saw a nascent coalition rise to oppose Russian gains at the expense of the Turks.[41]

As was the case in the tsarist period when Panslavist influences were manifest in Russian foreign policy, the Russians today appear to using domestic appeals to nationalist sentiment and cultural affinity in their Balkan policy. These tactics have three purposes: (1) build domestic support for their foreign policies; (2) justify their interest and involvement in the Balkans to the international community; and (3), appeal to Serbian public and official opinion on the basis of similar nationalist sentiment and cultural affinity. It must be noted that thus far the Russian Federation has not pursued a policy of territorial aggrandizement as the Panslavists in tsarist Russia sought.

Nonetheless, two comments by Kozyrev made in July 1994 confirm Russia's commitment to emphasize cultural ties as a means of justifying continued interests in the Balkans and to cultivate influence among the Serbs. Kozyrev stated that ". . . it seems to be a common belief, that Russia has a particular interest in or particular historical ties with the Serbs. That's probably true."[42] He then made an even stronger statement in the same interview which indicates that the Russian government is now listening to public opinion. He stated that ". . . it is a fact of life that a considerable part of Russian public opinion believes that Serbs are the closest

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[40]Ferdinand Schevill, A History of the Balkans (New York: Dorset Press, 1991), p. 364.

[41]Gordon Craig, Europe Since 1815 (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich College Publishers, 1974), p. 187.

[42]Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, and Suzanne Crow, "An Interview with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," RFE/RL Research Report, Vol. 3, No. 28, 15 July 1994, p. 36.

people to Russia in the Balkans, and they have to be protected. We have to take that into consideration."[43]

Hypothesis 4. Foreign policy will be formulated at the highest levels; the real foreign policy decisions will be made by the national leader and a close circle of advisors. Executive branches ministries and departments will be relegated to a support function.

This hypothesis is not upheld. If anything, the review of government statements and the criticism of conservative and nationalist politicians over Russian foreign policy provides strong evidence that domestic political forces have had a definite influence on the Russian policy regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina. Despite Kozyrev's denial, there has been a shift in Russian policy that corresponds with harsh criticism for the government and its handling of foreign policy. Analysts have noted that by the end of 1992 Russian domestic politics had assumed "cardinal importance" in the pattern of Russian policy in Bosnia-Hercegovina.[44] Once again consider Kozyrev's comment concerning the factor of public opinion. Decisions may ultimately be made at the highest levels of goevernment, but it also seems clear from this case that these decisions are increasingly influenced by a wide variety of factors, including general public opinion. This is a change from the pattern established in the tsarist and Soviet periods.

In the overall evaluation of the strategic culture hypotheses in this test case, only one of the four hypotheses was upheld.

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[43]Ibid.

[44]Lynch and Lukic, p. 32.

2. Balance of Power

Hypothesis 5. States will in principle focus on the establishment and maintenance of prestige, both at home and abroad.

This hypothesis is upheld. Despite its support for United Nations approved sanctions against Serbia, Russia has continued to indicate that it wants to serve as Serbia's protector.[45] Russia has called for the lifting of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and pressed for the continuation of the arms embargo against Bosnia-Hercegovina. Russia has also repeated attempted to broker cease fires and peace agreements in Bosnia, and for good reason. In approaching the Serbs the Russians can make themselves over to be a benevolent power that is willing to get involved, willing to intercede on behalf of their Slavic Orthodox brethren. It is also to the benefit of the Russians that the Serbs have no where else to turn in the international community, with the possible exception of Greece.

Playing up the role of protector of the Serbs has a strong domestic appeal in Russia and helps Yeltsin and his government considerably in their fight to maintain credibility and appeal among more conservative constituents in the Duma and the general public. In short, supporting the Serbs or even merely appearing to support the Serbs, is a good public relations move for the Yeltsin government.

Lastly, if Russia is ever able to broker a cease fire that holds, they will garner considerable attention and respect from the West, which thus far has proven at least as ineffective in coaxing an agreement from the warring factions. A Russian-engineered peace would confirm Russian claims of a special influence in the Balkans in the eyes of the West, and would demonstrate a diplomatic skill that would contribute significantly to Russian prestige in the international community.

Hypothesis 6. In foreign policy, whenever geographically possible, state expansion will have as one goal the acquisition and protection of access to the sea.

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[45]Crow, "Reading Moscow's Policies Toward the Rump Yugoslavia," p. 13.

This hypothesis is not upheld. It must be aknowledged, however, that this test case does not provide a tough test for the hypothesis. At the time the Soviet Union's dissolution in December 1991, both the territory of Yugoslavia and the adjacent Adriatic Sea were far from the Russian frontier and the Russian interest. Furthermore, Serbia proper is landlocked and Montenegro has limited access to the sea. Therefore, if Russia were cultivating interests and influence in Serbia and Montenegro it would be difficult to correlate that interest with a goal of acquiring additional access to the sea.

Hypothesis 7. States will resolutely refuse to suffer territorial loss without a struggle, unless there is an equitable exchange of territory (equitable from the national perspective) or the strong potential for the development of the economic or moral equivalence of territorial domination.

This hypothesis is upheld, although by itself it would not provide strong support for *Realpolitik*-based foreign policy. Despite claims of cultural interests in the Balkans, the Russians have espressed no interest in territorial claims in the region. Russia does, however, claim to hold the key to peace in the region and that can be seen as an attempt to gain "moral domination." Consider once again Kozyrev's statement following the NATO air strike on Serbian artillery positions near Gorazde:

> "[After the NATO bombing raid in Bosnia] it became immediately apparent that Russia could not and should not be excluded from the common efforts to regulate the conflict in the Balkans, a region where Russia has longtime interests and influence."[46]

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[46]Kozyrev, p. 66.

Hypothesis 8. Foreign policy will pursue one of the following methods in seeking to establish or maintain a "balance" in the international order: divide and rule, compensation, armament, alliance.

This hypothesis is upheld. At every turn Russia insists that it must heard in the important questions, that the new world order is not one that can be dominated by the United States or any other single power or alliance of powers. Kozyrev states the point clearly:

> ". . . the international order in the 21st century will not be a Pax Americana or any other version of bipolar or monopolar dominance. The United States does not have the capability to rule alone. Russia, while in a period of transitional difficulties, retains the inherent characteristics of a great power (technology, resources, weaponry)."[47]

Russians believe that they are a great power with interests in Europe and therefore have a right to be heard. Kozyrev made this point in his Stockholm speech: "While sticking to the course of joining Europe, we are distinctly conscious that our traditions are in large part, if not fundamentally, oriented toward Europe." That point is clear in the case of Russian foreign policy in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Three of four balance of power hypotheses were upheld in this test case. It must be noted that in this particular test case, Hypothesis 7 alone would not stand as a validation of balance of power theory. In concert with the other upheld hypotheses, however, Hypothesis 7 adds support to the balance of power theory. This comparative analysis is a clear "win" for balance of power theory, and demonstrates that the balance of power theory holds greater explanatory power than the strategic culture theory in the examination of Russian foreign policy regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina.

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[47]Ibid.

VI. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to systematically employ two explanatory theories as tools for the study of foreign policy, and to test the two theories against one another to determine their relative explanatory power.

In examining the results of the evaluation of the hypotheses in the three test cases, it is clear that balance of power theory emerges as the clear "winner" when compared with strategic cultural theory. The family of four hypotheses derived from the two explanatory theories were evaluated in each of the three test cases, thus yielding a total of twelve evaluation points for the two theories. In the case of strategic culture, the hypotheses were upheld in six of twelve opportunities. By comparison, in the balance of power case the hypotheses were upheld in ten of twelve opportunities. Both theories have great utility in the study of Russian foreign policy, but balance of power is the more powerful explanatory theory of the two.

A few significant problems were encountered in this thesis. In reviewing Russian policy statements regarding the three test cases it became obvious that in analysing foreign policy statements by members of the Russian government used in this study, it was extremely difficult to differentiate between policy statements and posturing statements. In some cases the statements chosen for analysis could have been a deliberate attempt to misstate a point, whether that deception be for domestic political purposes or for diplomatic maneuver. It is simply impossible to discern intent from the text of such statements, unless the spokesman later chose to reveal his intent. There were no instances of this last possibility, and therefore all statements had to be evaluated based on an assumption that they were valid reflections of Russian foreign policy.

Some of the hypotheses require additional consideration. It is difficult to differentiate between Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 even though they were derived from different theories; the difference between appeals to "nationalistic sentiment"

and the pursuit of "prestige" is a fine point, especially in the domestic political arena. This is largely because one of the fundamental themes of Russian nationalistic sentiment is the notion that "Russia is a great power." As a result of this inability to distinguish between an appeal to nationalistic sentiment and the pursuit of prestige, in each of the three test cases both Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 5 were upheld, and would most likely be upheld or not upheld in tandem, regardless of the test case chosen. Hypothesis 4 proved inconclusive in two of the three test cases, and was disproved in the third case not by direct evidence, but rather by deduction. Several of the "other theories" discussed in Chapter II were dismissed because they were predicated on a level of knowledge concerning Russian governmental organization and operation that is not yet available; this hypothesis suffered from a similar dearth of information. Its strength cannot be determined as of yet, and awaits increased knowledge of the workings of the decision-making mechanisms in Moscow.

This thesis was designed to be illustrative in nature and the promising results of this analysis indicate that the examination of additional test cases is in order, so that the utility of strategic culture- and balance of power-based theories as foundations for the examination of Russian foreign policy might be further demonstrated. There are a large number of Russian foreign policy issues which could serve as excellent test cases. The following issues could serve as test cases and would be of interest:

1. **Recent diplomatic initiatives regarding Iraq.** In October 1994 Iraq conducted a troop build-up along its border with Kuwait, which prompted widespread condemnation in the international community and led to the deployment of American forces to the region. Foreign Minister Kozyrev met with Saddam Hussein on 13 October in an attempt to defuse the crisis. Kozyrev then visited the United Nations, and proposed that the U. N. lift sanctions against Iraq in exchange

for Iraqi recognition of the Kuwaiti border. Kozyrev was critical of the Iraqi actions, but also stressed that "Iraq had no intention of invading [Kuwait]."[1]

The *Realpolitik*-based reasons for attempting to defuse the situation and to gain influence in Iraq are fairly easy to see: Russian prestige in the international community would be enhanced through the peaceful resolution of a crisis; increased Russian interest and influence in the Persian Gulf might serve as an acceptable "exchange of territory" in light of the loss of influence in Eastern Europe; Russian influence in Iraq might serve to "balance" U. S. influence and presence in the Gulf. However, certain financial motivations must also be acknowledged; Iraq owes Russia some eight billion dollars, and Boris Yeltsin's domestic position would be strengthened were Russia able to collect on that debt. The strategic culture-based reasons are less clear; analysis of this recently-developed issue might reveal such cultural influences.

2. The expansion of NATO, and particularly NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. Russia has not prevented Eastern European states from pursuing membership in NATO and has itself signalled an intention to participate in the Partnership for Peace program, but its ultimate goals regarding integration into NATO and its view of NATO membership for Eastern European states is still unclear. As was demonstrated in the "near abroad" test case, the fact that Russia "allowed" the fourteen other Soviet republics to proclaim their independence does not deny the existence of a Russian sentiment over the "loss" of empire, nor does it deny the existence of a Russian desire to reassert itself in the "near abroad." Given that Eastern Europe has long been considered to fall within the Russian sphere of influence, an analysis of Russian policy would most likely reveal elements of both balance of power- and strategic culture-driven thinking that are resistant to the notion of NATO extending membership to, say, Poland or Hungary. Kozyrev's repudiation of the 1 December 1994 decision by NATO foreign ministers to pursue

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[1] RFE/RL Daily Report, 18 October 1994.

expansion, and Russia's corresponding decision to defer participation in Partnership for Peace provide strong support for this view.[2]

In the examination of the "near abroad" test cases, a number of separate and distinct policy issues were examined in an attempt to demonstrate the overarching affect of the concept of the "near abroad" on Russian strategic thinking. However, a more detailed analysis of these issues would also be of great benefit. The following are some of the more prominent issues:

3. **The continuing ethnic conflict in Nagornyy-Karabakh.**
4. **Relations with the Baltic states as a whole.**
5. **The ethnic conflict in the Trans-Dniester region of Moldova.**
6. **The disposition of the Black Sea Fleet.**
7. **The civil war in Tadjikistan.**
8. **Abkhazian efforts to gain independence from Georgia.**

Lastly, the study of Russian bilateral relations with certain countries could provide a tough test for the comparative analysis of strategic culture- and balance of power- based theories. These bilateral relations could include the following issues:

9. **Contemporary bilateral relations with any of the former Soviet republics, but especially with Ukraine.**
10. **Contemporary bilateral relations with other states that have previously been considered to be in the Russian of Soviet sphere of influence, or in an area of particular interest to the Russians, or otherwise played a significant factor in Russian and Soviet foreign policy. Such countries might include the following: Finland, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Germany, Japan and China.**

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[2]RFE/RL Daily Report, 2 December 1994.

The utility of balance of power theory, and to a lesser extent, strategic culture theory, as bases for such analysis have been confirmed by this thesis, which has focused largely on prediction and explanation. But from this study one may also draw a general conclusion regarding a characteristic of contemporary Russian foreign policy.

The Russian Federation appears to be returning to the tsarist strategy of pursuing interests on both the *Realpolitik* and cultural level. Russian policy regarding Bosnia serves as an example of this type of "two-pronged" attack. Russian imperial foreign policy before 1917 pursued both great power interests of prestige enhancement and power aggrandizement, and yet at the same time cultivated cultural and historical interests in the region, on the basis of ethnic and religious ties. Today, Russia continues to emphasize its ethnic and religious connections with Serbia, and likewise asserts that the conflict in Bosnia simply cannot be resolved, and action cannot be taken, without consultation with Russia. Given the opportunity, Russia will pursue the achievement of its national interests in terms of both cultural/historical interests and *Realpolitik*-based calculations.

However, the strong performance of the balance of power theory relative to strategic culture theory suggests the possibility that if Russian balance of power-based interests and strategic culture-based interests are in conflict, then Russia will sacrifice its cultural interests for the betterment of its balance of power interests. This was true in tsarist foreign policies, when in many instances Russia "traded" away the Serbs in treaties and negotiations in order to strengthen their position with respect to gaining control of the Turkish Straits and Constantinople. In contemporary Russian foreign policy, Russia has maintained that it must play a special role as the guardian-sponsor of Serbia, but its voting record in the U.N. and the C.S.C.E. regarding sanctions against Serbia indicate a tendency to follow Western policy and thereby enhance its standing in the international community. Prestige is not so well-defined as an attempt to gain control of the Turkish Straits, but it is

nonetheless an important factor in the formulation of foreign policy in the Russian Federation -- more so than any culturally- or historically-based factor. The United States would do well to keep this in mind as it tries to understand Russian thinking in the post-Soviet era.

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