Effective Operational Deception: Learning the Lessons of Midway and Desert Storm.
Abstract
The successful application of military deception is guided by the principles of war and by the principles of military deception. In particular, the principles of economy of force and integration serve the operational planner by ensuring an efficient use of military deception. Two historical case studies are presented to illustrate the degree to which the above principles were applied during the Battle of Midway and operation DESERT STORM. The Japanese deception plan failed to adequately incorporate the economy of force principle by devoting too many carrier assets to the Aleutian campaign. Likewise, the coalition's amphibious landing deception plan utilized almost an entire division of embarked Marines to accomplish what a much smaller force could have done. Additionally, the amphibious deception plan was never fully integrated into the overall campaign plan, and indeed, became a deception plan by default. Alternative allocations of forces are suggested that would have led to more efficient deception plans, and lessons learned are highlighted to promote the consideration of the principles of economy of force and integration into future operational planning.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA293375
Entities
People
- Robert W. Alcala
Organizations
- Naval War College