Diesel Submarine Adversaries, Potent or Impotent?
Abstract
The fundamental idea that the dIesel submarines of potential enemies probably do not constitute a significant threat to the operational commander conducting operations. From the Sea is presented. This concept is developed by examining the experiences of the United States submarine force in the Pacific in the first eighteen months of World War II, and from the submarine related experiences of the British and Argentineans in the Falklands Crisis. The historical lessons from the examples chosen suggest that mere ownership of a capable submarine platform and torpedoes is not enough to ensure or even suggest tactical success. Instead, it is only the first step. Adequate peacetime training is the vital second step. Unfortunately for many of our adversaries, the means to achieve adequate training is beyond their grasp, hence their submarines are probably not a significant threat to our forces. We should re-think our plans accordingly, seeing if this idea can restore options thought denied.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 13, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA293376
Entities
People
- William S. Murray
Organizations
- Naval War College