Brilliant Attack: The need for Autonomous Standoff Weapons in Airfield Attack Missions,
Abstract
Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the airfield attack subset of the counter-air role became increasingly hazardous to attacking aircrews due to improvements and proliferation of anti-air weapons. The United States and coalition air forces in Operation Desert Storm relied primarily on direct overflight and short standoff (man-in-the-loop) missions to perform airfield attacks, requiring numerous support aircraft, and resulting in aircraft losses. With only a single funded stealthy aircraft procurement program (F-22) in the near future, the need for weapons which allow non-stealth aircraft to more efficiently attack heavily defended airfield targets will exist well into the future. This monograph describes how the development of moderate cost, all weather, intermediate range, standoff autonomous weapons (SAWs) combined with the appropriate doctrine, would improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the airfield attack mission at the tactical level of war. As background, this monograph presents data from the 1967 and 1973 Arab- Israeli wars to describe the evolution of airfield attack tactics, and the resulting trends in aircraft attrition from these missions. It also uses the United States Air Force commissioned Gulf Air Power Survey to analyze the nature and deficiencies of all coalition airfield attacks during Operation Desert Storm.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 12, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA293645
Entities
People
- James Riggins
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College