The Final Assault: A Doctrinal Analysis of Actions on the Objective.
Abstract
This monograph addresses whether current doctrine adequately prepares armor and mechanized infantry forces to successfully conduct the final assault of a prepared position. Offensive operations culminate with actions on the objective, yet observations from the US Army Combat Training Centers suggest that, as a rule, heavy battalion/ task forces are frequently unable to accomplish this critical task. To identity threads of continuity, this monograph researches the origins of assault theory, and traces both the historical and contemporary application assault doctrine. The research findings are compared to current doctrine and suggest implications for future doctrinal development and training. This monograph first examines the theoretical foundation of assault theory. Drawing from a wide variety of theorists, who's contributions extend from ancient times to the present, their ideas yield valuable principles which transcend, time, culture and technology. These principles represent a point of departure for the subsequent historical analysis of actions on the objective. Beginning with World War I and extending to Desert Storm, military history is analyzed to discover new ideas, and confirm or deny those theoretical precepts identified by the theoretical research. Contemporary experiences of heavy unit training at the US Army's Combat Training Centers complete the analysis.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 17, 1994
- Accession Number
- ADA293646
Entities
People
- Stuart A. Whitehead
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College