



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Prospects for U.S.-Korean Naval Relations in the 21st Century

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Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Center for Naval Analyses

Workshop Rapporteurs:

Sung Hwan Wie (KIDA), Chang Su Kim (KIDA), Perry Wood (Hudson Institute), David Carlson (U.S. Army), Christopher Yung (CNA)

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
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
**Prospects for U.S.–Korean Naval
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
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Foreword

In October 1994, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) and the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) cosponsored a workshop in Seoul, Republic of Korea (ROK), to examine the prospects for United States-Korean naval relations over the next ten to 15 years. Navy and Marine Corps specialists, Asia defense analysts, and scholars of Korea attended the meeting, as did government representatives from both countries. Although discussions were not for attribution, papers prepared for the conference are available from either KIDA or CNA.

The purpose of the conference was a candid exchange of views on the potential significance and nature of naval cooperation between the two countries from the present to the early decades of the 21st century. Participants examined (1) the effect of three scenarios on regional perceptions of security (continued confrontation with North Korea, peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas, and unification), and (2) South Korean and U.S. naval force structures, strategies, and types of cooperation. The participants also looked at possible measures for improving Navy and Marine Corps cooperation and at the role of multilateral security initiatives and organizations in promoting cooperation between the two navies.

Common themes emerged in the papers presented and the discussions that followed: the continued importance of the navies' relationship, the increasing significance of the ROK Navy if rapprochement between North and South continues, and the high value of interoperability between the U.S. and ROK navies. Equally notable were the differences of opinion between the two groups on the prospects for the security of Asia, the definition of useful naval cooperation, the durability of U.S. presence in the Far East, and the appropriate roles and missions of the respective navies. From the perspective of the conference organizers, exposing these differences of opinion represents a useful first step toward a deeper and more substantial common understanding of the naval relationships between them.

The sponsoring institutions gratefully acknowledge the outstanding support provided by the KIDA and CNA staffs in preparing for the conference in Seoul, and in preparing this report. Special thanks to Perry Wood of the Hudson Institute, who supported the workshop as a CNA subcontractor, and to Lt. Col. David Carlson (U.S. Army), a visiting Fellow at KIDA, who also served as one of the workshop rapporteurs.

Introduction and Summary

Prompted by the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new trends in the security relations in the Asia-Pacific region (APR), the Center for Naval Analyses and the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses held a conference in Seoul, Republic of Korea, from 17 to 20 October 1994 to examine the potential for naval relations between the United States and the Republic of Korea into the 21st century. The conference had the following objectives: identify political, economic, and security trends both on the Korean Peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region that affect or would be affected by improved U.S.-ROK Navy and Marine Corps relations; identify alternative strategies, roles, and missions for the U.S. and ROK navies and marine corps; and examine the opportunities for U.S. and ROK Navy/Marine cooperation, either bilaterally or within a multilateral framework.

Twelve papers (six Korean and six U.S.) presented at the conference covered these subjects, accompanied by commentary and discussion. The presentations stimulated candid discussion and highlighted the particular differences and similarities of opinions of the Korean and the American participants. Appendices A through D contain lists of participants and observers. The conference agenda is outlined in appendix E.

Overview of Conference

The conference began with an examination of trends in the security environment of the APR over the next ten to 15 years; identification of possible concerns, i.e., possible adversaries for defense planners in the 21st century; and the creation of a security environment for common reference in subsequent presentations.

Participants examined strategic developments on the Korean Peninsula and their effect on the navies and militaries of the region. Their purpose was to test the sensitivity of Northeast Asian naval/defense planning to greater or lesser likelihood of Korean unification. Participants also examined current and projected U.S. and ROK naval strategies to determine whether the future navy roles, missions, and force structures might vary with different future scenarios on the Korean Peninsula (e.g., continuation of confrontation, peaceful coexistence, and unification). They considered specific requirements and opportunities available for naval cooperation, including combined exercises and training, personnel exchanges, research activities, water-space management, multinational humanitarian disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations.

Two presentations focused on the prospects for increased U.S. and ROK Marine Corps cooperation. They served as reminders that the potential for naval cooperation included the Marines. Cooperation proposals included combined Marine Corps operations in missions ranging from amphibious flank attacks on an invading North Korean army to out-of-area humanitarian operations and disaster relief.

Finally, the participants examined the potential pitfalls of U.S.-ROK naval cooperation, and considered how other nations in the Asia-Pacific region might react negatively to such a relationship. During these presentations, the participants discussed the possible reactions of Japan, Russia, and China to a closer U.S.-South Korean naval relationship. That discussion included the benefits and drawbacks of various kinds of multilateral security dialogues in support of U.S.-ROK cooperation and potential reactions to a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation initiative.

Conclusions

The conference reaffirmed that the naval relationship between the two countries is still valued. No Korean or American presenter, discussant, or observer broached the idea that the U.S. and South Korean naval relationship should be reduced or eliminated. There were some differences of opinion over the nature of that relationship, the specific division of labor, and whether the U.S. Navy would stay in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, almost all participants held that the naval relationship is even more valuable now than during the Cold War.

Conference participants agreed that the importance of the ROK Navy (ROKN) will increase as Korean unification becomes a reality. Such increased importance clearly implies consideration of a ROKN regional role. Participants disagreed over (1) when strategists should consider the Peninsula stable enough to start diverting resources from Army programs to Navy and Air Force programs, and (2) how much a process of building up ROK naval capabilities, presumably at the ROK Army's expense, might diminish the ROK Army's ability to deter North Korea before unification.

All participants agreed on the importance of ROKN/USN interoperability. One presenter suggested that Korea acquire both aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. However, no Korean or American presenter, discussant, or observer suggested that the ROK Navy should expand its capabilities by purchasing advanced naval platforms and weapons from other countries. Some of the participants suggested reforming the U.S. foreign military sales (FMS)

process and perhaps making more types of operational information (e.g., Naval Warfare Publications, or NWPs) available to South Korea.

The participants also agreed that multilateral security dialogues and organizations were good for averting disputes and promoting transparency in the Asia-Pacific region, and that multilateralism could encourage dialogue and cooperation within the APR. They cautioned that multilateralism should not be regarded as the primary means of managing all security issues, and asserted instead that naval cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region should continue to be based on a solid foundation of bilateral cooperation between the United States and the other countries in the region.

The KIDA participants tended to have a more pessimistic perspective of security in the APR over the next ten to 15 years. In particular, they saw possibilities of arms races and war erupting between the countries of Northeast Asia—China, Japan, Korea, and Russia. The CNA participants, who believed that the incentives for regional cooperation outweigh the disincentives, were more optimistic. Most U.S. participants believed that the growing trade internal to the APR, the preoccupation of most APR countries with internal problems, and their enduring interest in avoiding devastating war should prevent conflict from erupting over the next 15 years.

Some Korean participants concentrated on the continuing threat from North Korea. Thus, they were less inclined to accept scenarios and defense policies in which North Korea played no role. Other Koreans and the American participants were more inclined to imagine strategic situations in which a unified Korea had to face a post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. KIDA participants questioned the longevity of America's military presence in the APR. They pointed to a declining trend in defense budgets to show that United States military presence in the region would also decline.

CNA participants argued that the U.S. military presence is durable and, given America's economic stake in the region, not likely to be significantly reduced in the next five years. President Clinton's commitment to the Korean Peninsula at the most recent Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) and the Navy's *Forward...From the Sea* doctrine¹ were cited as evidence that the United States had no intention of leaving the APR.

¹ The 1992 paper *From the Sea* defined the strategic concept intended to change the U.S. Naval priorities from operations on the sea toward power projection and employment of naval forces to influence events in the world's littoral regions. *Forward...From the Sea* updates and expands the 1992 paper.

Both sides agreed that better interoperability would improve the ROK Navy's capability to operate with the U.S. Navy in blue water. Nevertheless, some disagreement arose between U.S. and South Korean participants over what "improving interoperability" meant. U.S. participants tended to stress enhancing the two sides' ability to communicate with one another. They held that unless South Korea upgraded its command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C⁴I) capability, interoperability improvements would be difficult. They believed that the ROK modernization program should develop C⁴I concurrently, on pain of falling far behind other countries in the region. By contrast, the Korean participants emphasized that interoperability primarily means upgrading the ROKN platform and weapons capabilities.

Overall, the conference was a success. Unconstrained dialogue raised issues and perspectives that will help define the USN-ROKN relationships in the future. Both sides agreed to hold another workshop in 1995.

Different Perspectives

Despite considerable agreement on many issues discussed above, a notable feature of the 1994 KIDA-CNA conference were the different South Korean and American perspectives on a number of subjects. A summary of those differences follows.

The Asia-Pacific Region: Stable Evolution or Escalating Conflict?

Many U.S. participants noted that, although the possibility of war and conflict in Asia is always present, a number of factors could reduce the likelihood of conflict over the next ten to 15 years. They argued that the countries of the Asia-Pacific region have an interest in averting war and maintaining peace. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was said to be concentrating on economic development and is in no position to challenge the United States or Japan militarily. Thus, the Chinese government would continue to do its part to avoid war. Some examples were cited: the Chinese have put forth proposals to peacefully resolve the Spratly dispute, albeit to their advantage; they probably deserve some credit in helping to resolve the recent diplomatic gridlock with North Korea; and they have worked toward making the PRC border with Russia less confrontational.

Russia was deemed to have more interest in maintaining a peaceful APR than in expending its resources to create a troubled one; its economic and financial concerns effectively prevent it from building forces for foreign military adventures. Russia appears to be interested in expanding its trade with the countries of the Far East and would more likely pursue joint economic development partnerships like the Tumen River project than bully other countries in the region.

U.S. participants conceded hypothetically that Japan could initiate instability and insecurity in the APR by announcing de facto independence from the U.S. security relationship or by building nuclear-weapon or power-projection capabilities. Such behavior could stimulate a region-wide arms race. U.S. participants doubted that any of these are likely. One U.S. participant pointed out that the U.S.-Japan security relationship is fundamental to Japanese foreign policy. He doubted that Japan would seriously contemplate such moves and added that Japan needs the U.S.-Japan security relationship to make Japanese foreign policy palatable to the other countries of Asia. Thus, a firm security relationship

with the U.S. is mutually beneficial to the U.S. and Japan. In short, as long as the United States and Japan find this relationship mutually advantageous, Japan would not move away from it.

Another U.S. participant downplayed the dangers of the so-called Asian arms race. He said that the recent purchases of advanced, conventional weaponry in the APR is less an "arms race" than an "arms walk"—more a move to modernize than a buildup. This perspective is illustrated by the absence of shore-based facilities and infrastructure in many of the APR countries that are capable of supporting expanding naval warfighting capabilities. The same participant added that the nation-state is coming into its own in the APR. Growing prosperity provides money for advanced weapons, and former empires and colonies are consolidating into nations with specific national interests and increasingly conventional security concerns. As a result, these countries have been buying modern conventional platforms and weapons to hedge against future threats and to help assure their participation in the technological revolution.

By contrast, some Korean presenters, discussants, and observers appeared to have a more pessimistic view of Asia's future. The North Korean development of the Nodong missile, for example, enables North Korea to attack Japan and China, and this development could stimulate future arms races in Northeast Asia. Beyond the problems posed by North Korea, the Asia-Pacific region has other emerging security problems. One Korean participant pointed out that over the past four years, China has invested 10 to 12 percent of its budget in a defense buildup. If this trend continues, China's military capability is predicted to grow to such a point that it will pose the greatest threat to the countries of the APR. In addition, China was said to have more than 500 nuclear weapons, ranging from the tactical to ICBMs, and a triad of delivery systems to implement its nuclear plans.

Adding to the instability of the region, as one KIDA participant pointed out, is the growing military capability of Japan. Japan's plans to develop Theater High-Altitude Area Defenses (THAAD), will allow Japan to defend itself from missile attacks from throughout the region, but at the same time inspire other actors (e.g., both Koreas, Russia, and China) to acquire more missiles. Furthermore, the Koreans argued that Japan has very advanced technology. Where and how it decides to apply that technology remains unclear.

Other Korean participants pointed to Japan's already significant military buildup. In 1993, Japan had 64 principal surface combatants, i.e., the

world's third largest surface fleet just after the U.S. and Russian fleets. Another Korean participant argued that the Japanese Constitution cannot be considered a constraint on a Japanese military growth. He argued that after the Gulf War, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) dispatched its minesweepers to the scene despite constitutional constraints on sending military forces abroad.

As for Russia, one Korean participant said that, at present, although Russia lacks the resources to assert itself in Northeast Asia, it has a deep-rooted strategic interest in that region. It recognizes the importance of the Korean Peninsula because it can serve as a means for Russia to check China, Japan, and the United States. In the longer term, Russia will seek to increase its influence in the APR by enhancing its military capability. The Korean participant pointed out that although many Russian warships in the Pacific fleet have been retired, the Russian fleet still has 86 submarines deployed (including 21 SSBNs), 49 principal surface combatants (including one aircraft carrier and 14 cruisers), 55 patrol and coastal combatants, and 220 Navy combat aircraft.

Korean participants pointed to the inevitable withdrawal of the United States from the region as a particular reason for concern. They cited the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) document and the U.S. withdrawal from the Philippines as evidence. Many Korean participants argued that a U.S. withdrawal from the APR would lead to a power vacuum, which other countries (i.e., China or Japan) would be tempted to fill. This effect would be magnified, one Korean participant argued, because the APR lacks a multilateral security regime to help prevent arms races and to foster confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

The Durability and Effectiveness of U.S. Military Presence in Asia

All U.S. participants said that U.S. military presence is not likely to be eliminated or reduced soon. One participant emphasized that the U.S. military presence in Asia is well over a century old. It enjoys broad support within the United States, and is not a casual, easily discarded policy. He argued that there is no movement within the U.S. to disengage U.S. forces from the APR and no interest group that encourages doing so. In fact, the participant argued that the U.S. commitment to Asia might increase given America's huge economic stake in the region.

Other U.S. participants pointed out that the Presidential National Security Strategy and the U.S. Navy's *Forward...From the Sea* doctrine commit

the U.S. to maintain a presence in the APR. Another participant pointed out that the 26th U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) Communiqué, signed by Secretary of Defense Perry and Minister of National Defense Rhee, commits the United States to maintain U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea as long as the people of Korea want them there.

The U.S. participants argued that there are a number of reasons why America's commitment to stay forward is credible: The U.S. continues to have interests abroad. Forward presence symbolizes and adds credibility to the U.S. commitment to other countries; it enables the U.S. to respond to crises; and it facilitates military operations, including operations other than war.

One American participant said that regardless of what happens on the Korean Peninsula—continuation of conflict or peaceful unification—U.S. naval presence in the APR will remain a useful policy tool. If relations with North Korea were to worsen, the U.S. naval presence would still contribute to the deterrence of a North Korean attack. If the Peninsula stabilizes, it will become harder to justify continued presence of U.S. ground forces to either the Korean or the American public. In such circumstances, the U.S. Navy would maintain its presence, for several purposes: (1) to help Korea develop a limited blue-water navy to deal with regional contingencies; (2) to provide alternative forces for common naval missions; and (3) to symbolize the continued U.S. commitment to Korea.

As noted earlier, many Korean participants assumed the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the region based on a trend of reduced U.S. defense budgets, the scheduled reduction of 6,000 troops in Korea as laid out in the EASI, and the U.S. withdrawal from its bases in the Philippines. Korean participants also anticipated that Congress's criticism of U.S. military presence abroad will continue and grow. Korean participants saw economic and domestic pressures within the United States as creating political pressures to pull back U.S. forces from overseas.

A few Korean participants questioned the effectiveness of U.S. military power in the APR, even assuming that the U.S. intends to remain. One participant pointed out that reducing the U.S. Navy's fleet to 346 ships, as outlined in the Department of Navy (DON) 1993 Posture Statement, is inconsistent with a strategy of being able to engage in two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). He claimed that the U.S. Navy would lack the ships for an effective two-MRC strategy.

In response, American participants argued that a reduction in U.S. vessels would be offset by advances in the technological capabilities of tomorrow's U.S. fleets. Today's high technology allows three ships to do what once required five. One U.S. participant pointed to how advancements in space-based systems, joint communication networks, and precision navigation and targeting upgraded U.S. military capabilities and more than compensated for reductions in platform numbers.

Finally, the American participants did not suggest replacing U.S. ground forces with naval forces while the North Korean threat still exists. The possible increase in naval force as ground forces decline will make sense when North Korea is no longer a threat.

The ROK Navy and Marine Corps: A North Korean Focus or a Regional Focus?

With about 1 million active North Korean ground troops, 26 infantry or motorized infantry divisions, 14 armored brigades, 25 North Korean submarines, and the prospect of North Korean nuclear weapons preoccupying South Korean defense planners, it is understandable that many Korean participants remained preoccupied with U.S.-ROK naval cooperation against the present threat. On the other hand, most American participants, who were accustomed to grappling with strategic and political problems spanning the globe and were more conscious of global changes, were naturally eager to examine strategic situations in Asia in which the Koreas had already been unified.

Conference discussions either raised or implied the question: Should the ROKN and the ROK Marine Corps (ROKMC) continue to have a North Korean focus (and, if so, for how long), or should they plan for other future regional contingencies (and if so, to what extent)? The various answers to this question depended on whether the participant was thinking of a longer continuation of the confrontation with North Korea or was willing to contemplate a strategic situation in which the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula had been resolved.

The Short Term: Continuation of Confrontation

A conference participant said that the "fundamental objective of ROK naval strategy in the present situation and in the near future is to carry out operations to deter and defend against North Korean maritime provocations." This formulation normally implies a principally South Korean Navy designed to blunt a North Korean amphibious attack or stop North Korean infiltration from the sea. Yet Korean participants advocated expanding ROKN capabilities to take the offensive against North Korea in maritime operations.

One Korean participant argued that because the North Korean Navy's strength vis-a-vis the ROKN lies in naval air superiority (in the initial stages of war), and in submarine operations, mine warfare, amphibious raids, and coastal protection, South Korea should consider enhancing its navy's capabilities to overcome North Korean advantages in these areas. For the purpose of deterrence, he suggested improvements in ROKN force projection in its capability to close enemy SLOCs, its capability to wage mine warfare against major ports of the enemy, its combat capability to protect ports and coastal areas based on a sea-denial strategy, and its surface fleet combat and core strike capabilities.

Another participant reminded the conference attendees of the importance of the ROK Marine Corps for ROK defense against North Korean invasion or infiltration in the current situation. Korea has 1,340 nautical miles of coastline (about 8.6 times the length of the DMZ) and about 3,300 islands. Furthermore, the weather in Korea permits landing operations for most of the year, with the exception of the winter months.

A U.S. participant noted the importance of amphibious operations to the defense of Korea. He cited the Inchon Landings during the 1950-1953 Korean War, and said that using ROK and U.S. Marine forces in amphibious operations to flank an invading North Korean army could prove important in another one. An amphibious warfare capability allows the U.S. and ROK to choose the ground for military operations against North Korea.

A Korean participant argued that the ROKMC should concentrate on: (1) an increase in ROKMC mobility and maneuverability; (2) weapons that are lightweight, precise, and lethal to fight while maneuvering; (3) a flexible command-and-control structure in order to launch counterattacks quickly; (4) the use of helicopters to "vertically envelope" the enemy; (5) self-sustenance, since an ROK supply system may be vulnerable to enemy harassment; (6) the ability to operate behind enemy lines as partisans or guerillas; and (7) autonomous Marine Corps airlift.

Another Korean participant argued that the Marine Corps should concentrate on coastal defense and bolstering the ROK Army's position against oncoming North Korean armor. He thought that raising ROK Marines for flanking and maneuvering missions detracted from the ROK's strategy of deterring North Korea with large ground forces.

The Long Term: Post-Unification of the Peninsula

The conference participants who, for purposes of discussion, assumed that the North Korean threat no longer existed suggested more adventurous roles for the future ROK Navy and Marine Corps. One participant noted that the ROK could not presently deal with regional contingencies. The ROK depends entirely on the United States to handle military crises off the Korean Peninsula and would find it difficult to manage a contingency involving China or Japan over the next 15 years if the United States were no longer present. Thus, he argued that the ROK should begin now to build up its naval and air forces to deal with a range of regional contingencies.

Another Korean participant said that the long-term role of the ROK Navy should be to support maritime cooperation on a regional level, and to be able to carry out a wide range of operations to counter potential maritime threats from the countries surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the ROKN should help raise Korea's international standing through naval diplomacy.

Another Korean participant argued that, over the long term, the ROKN must develop into a blue-water navy. He claimed the presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the region had actually inhibited this goal because ROK defense planners have always relied on Seventh Fleet sea control and power projection. A long-term goal of the ROKN, then, must be to implement a "Mahanian maritime strategy of sea power in support of national policy objectives of economic prosperity, and a regional role in the Asia-Pacific area."

The same participant argued for the inclusion of two small aircraft carriers in a small but modern and effective fleet, within two decades. He also called for the development of surface action groups (SAGs), consisting of guided missile frigates and Aegis-system destroyers to support carrier operations. He said future ROKN carrier operations would be carried out in cooperation with the U.S. Navy.

Most U.S. participants were less enthusiastic about having the ROK Navy procure aircraft carriers. Along with some Korean participants, they were concerned with the regional implications of such a move, and had difficulty seeing how carriers would serve any practical Korean naval purpose. One participant suggested that both the Chinese and the Japanese would be seriously concerned if the ROK Navy acquired carriers or other significant power-projection capability.

Another Korean participant said that the future purpose of the ROK Navy will be to deal with future adversaries invading Korean maritime territory. These adversaries, he said, will be equipped with platforms and weapons of high speed, long range, high precision, stealthiness, and destructive power. Over-the-horizon capabilities will prove crucial in this strategic environment. Thus, the ROKN must develop into a force capable of conducting effective sea-denial operations, which involve combined hit-and-run tactics, covert attacks, offensive and defensive mining, and submarine coastal defense operations.

The same participant added that it would be extremely difficult for Korea to build or procure the platforms sufficient to implement a sea-control strategy in Northeast Asia. Thus, it will be necessary to develop a navy

equipped with a capability superior to one naval task group of a potential adversary. He suggested Korea develop two escort flotillas in the style of the Japanese MSDF.

U.S. participants agreed that the incentives for the ROK Navy to assume a regional role will grow as Korea unifies. One U.S. participant said it made sense for Korea to begin investing in naval assets, to play a greater role in Northeast Asia. He said that he would not advocate aircraft carrier purchases or construction any time soon, but would begin constructing the infrastructure for an expanded navy. He suggested, as an example, investing now in enhanced C⁴I.

Another U.S. participant said that a post-unification ROKN should have some blue-water capability to cooperate with the U.S. Navy in a major contingency. This is a good reason for a more robust naval relationship.

A number of ideas on post-unification futures were debated inconclusively. One Korean participant argued that the ROKMC should be equipped to launch airborne assaults onto the territories of Korea's immediate neighbors. Other Korean participants disagreed and said that the ability to land Marine forces behind enemy lines makes little military sense in a post-unification world where Korea would lack the ability to provide air cover for ROK Marines so deployed. One participant suggested that the future long-term role of the ROKMC should be similar to the role played by the U.S. Marine Corps at present—that is, an expeditionary force used to protect interests overseas.

Another Korean participant argued that Marine forces require air superiority and massive logistical support. These two requirements would place an unaffordable financial burden on Korea. This participant, therefore, could envisage only joint ROK-U.S. Marine Corps operations. He added that Korea, as a small nation, does not have to cross vast oceans to fight its wars, and, thus, does not require a long-range expeditionary force. It makes more sense to use airborne special forces for any of the limited expeditionary missions envisaged by ROKMC supporters.

Hedging Bets: Transition From the Short to the Long Term

If the large North Korean threat is still the priority for South Korean defense considerations, most participants agreed that the long lead times required for naval construction and the uncertainty of future threats suggest that South Korea begin building now for a greater regional role in the early decades of the 21st century. An American participant said that it

makes more sense for the ROK military to put its marginal dollars into developing naval and air forces instead of putting them into technological improvements for ROK infantry divisions. He emphasized that he did not mean that current defense expenditures on ROK Army programs should be curtailed and diverted to ROK Navy programs; these are still necessary to deter the North Korean threat. He meant only that marginal dollars or funds meant for Army-related R&D projects might bring greater returns if invested in the ROK's future regional role.

Another Korean participant agreed with the point about long lead times and added that at present the Republic of Korea needs a fleet of very advanced ships, including the KDX destroyer (currently in development by the ROK) and ships with Aegis capability. He pointed out that it took the ROK ten years to develop the KDX. It will take at least another ten to 15 years to further develop and build another KDX. It is imperative that the ROK begin a building program immediately if it wants a fleet that can deal with regional contingencies once the Koreas are unified.

United States–Republic of Korea Naval Cooperation in the 21st Century

Naval and Marine Corps Strategies: The Short Term

The debate over the nature, scope, and roles and missions involved in U.S.–ROK Navy/Marine Corps cooperation also depended on whether the discussions centered around the current confrontation with North Korea or a post-unification scenario.

American participants said that naval forces are useful in bolstering the U.S.–ROK deterrence posture against North Korea. The proximity of the Seventh Fleet and the ability of the United States to transport forces from the continental U.S. (CONUS) in times of crisis on the Korean Peninsula would continue to influence North Korean planning. To this point, a U.S. presenter said that even if the U.S. no longer had access to bases in Japan, the U.S. Navy could still meet and support a response to a Korean crisis from CONUS. Although forward-deployed forces are important initially, follow-on forces would inevitably come from CONUS. The U.S. participants said that this concept did not mean that the U.S. intends to leave Japan, but that the U.S. could still defend Korea even under such difficult conditions as having no bases in Japan.

The participants also reiterated the importance of the U.S.–ROK Marine Corps relationship in deterring North Korean attack and providing a mobile counterstrike capability should deterrence fail. They cited the creation of the Combined Marine Forces Command (CMFC) as a significant event. The creation of the CMFC transformed the ROK Marine Corps from a mostly defensive force to one with mobile, offensive capability to launch counterattacks against North Korea. It facilitated the implementation of an amphibious warfare strategy against North Korea, in which U.S. and ROK militaries could choose where to attack. Finally, they pointed out that the U.S. Marines would bring much to a Korean scenario: U.S. Marine forces from Hawaii and CONUS would serve as the backbone of a rapid American response to a North Korean attack, and they would also bring infrastructure and consumables to mount operations against North Korea.

Some Korean participants were skeptical of the portrayal of U.S. naval forces as contributing to deterrence of North Korea. They were also skeptical about the suggestion that U.S. naval forces might someday replace U.S. ground forces in South Korea, politically and militarily. They gave the following arguments: naval ordnance is not as effective for the tasks

now assigned to ground-based air forces in Korea; carrier-based aircraft are limited in number; carrier aircraft have farther to fly for missions on the Korean Peninsula than do ground-based aircraft located in the ROK; naval forces are flexible, but so flexible that they can be withdrawn to suit U.S. interests, and; a solid commitment to the defense of an ally requires that the U.S. leave some ground and air forces on allied soil, as trip-wires.

In response to the argument that naval power is less effective than ground-based air power and U.S. Army units in dealing with the North Korean threat, American participants said that: (1) although there are fewer naval aircraft deployed on a carrier than on an air base, these aircraft are just as capable as their Air Force counterparts to deal with North Korea; (2) aircraft operating off carriers need not travel farther to strike North Korean targets than Air Force aircraft, because the carrier can be moved to the western side of the Korean Peninsula where much of the action of a Korean scenario is likely to take place; and (3) no participant had suggested that the U.S. Navy take over the responsibilities of the U.S. Army and Air Force in deterring and fighting another Korean War. Rather, they had suggested that the U.S. Navy serve as the *enabling* force for the other services, enhancing the U.S. military's effectiveness in dealing with a North Korean scenario. As long as North Korea remains a threat to the ROK, U.S. ground and air forces should remain in Korea.

One U.S. participant said that he disagreed with the idea that expanding U.S.-ROK naval cooperation would degrade deterrence of North Korea. He said that the challenge for both the United States and the Republic of Korea will be to modernize naval forces not only to perform a range of operations in regional contingencies but also to deter the North Korean threat.

A Korean presenter suggested that to enhance U.S.-ROK deterrence of North Korea, the two navies should demonstrate an increasing capability to intervene with maritime forces and to use sealift to rapidly reinforce the U.S. and ROK forces. He suggested continuous ROKN-USN combined operational planning, exercises, and training to cement the naval alliance and to demonstrate firm, combined commitment to deter and defend against potential enemies.

Another Korean presenter concurred, and said that to deter the North Korean maritime threat, the ROKN, in cooperation with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, has forward-deployed surface forces on frontline waters and carried out patrol operations. Furthermore, the two navies have conducted regular combined maritime maneuver exercises to display combined U.S.-ROK naval presence. If deterrence breaks down, the presenter said, and if the

U.S. Seventh Fleet is not deployed in the waters adjacent to South Korea, the ROK Navy will have to conduct independent defense operations for at least three to four days at the initial stage of the war. Because the ROKN's current capability is insufficient for counterattack, it will have to conduct purely defensive operations until the arrival of the Seventh Fleet. This will be a dangerous stage of the war because the North Korean Navy is numerically superior to the ROK Navy, the presenter said. Thus, unless the U.S. Seventh Fleet is always present in the area, North Korea can launch preemptive maritime attacks on South Korea with virtual impunity. These factors argue for ROKN cooperation with the U.S. Navy, but also for the ROKN to grow enough to gain some sea-control capability.

Naval and Marine Corps Strategies: The Long Term

North Korea aside, participants reached no consensus on future roles and missions for their respective naval services. Korean participants tended to envisage a more independent role for the ROKN and ROKMC than did their U.S. counterparts. One Korean participant suggested the creation of small but modern and effective ROKN carrier task groups. These would operate with a reduced U.S. naval force to carry out coalition missions. When pressed further over the details of this suggestion, he added that the carriers involved would be small (less than 40,000 tons) and would carry relatively old aircraft, such as the A-6, or attack helicopters. He added that in the future the ROKN might be called upon to operate with the USN in the defense of sea lines of communications (SLOCs), such as the "North American lane" and the "Korea-Japan lane."

Another Korean participant said that he agreed with the American idea of using U.S. naval forces as a replacement for reduced U.S. ground forces in Korea. A unified Korea would be at the heart of Northeast Asia, surrounded by larger powers in the region. Enhanced naval cooperation between the U.S. and the ROK would keep the U.S. in the region as balancer or mediator. It would also convince the other countries of the region that Korea had only good intentions (as exemplified by its close relationship with the U.S.), and it could usefully complement reduced capabilities of a smaller, future U.S. force.

Still another Korean participant suggested that the ROK Navy be prepared to deal with a wide range of future contingencies without necessarily relying on U.S. naval forces. Cooperation would be welcome in dealing with a number of crises, but the ROK Navy and the ROK government must plan for a time or for situations when the U.S. is not necessarily involved. For example, he asked, would the United States get involved in a Japan-Korean dispute over the Tokto Islands? In response, one U.S.

participant said he doubted that the U.S. would participate on either side but would work for a peaceful bilateral or, if necessary, multilateral resolution.

Most U.S. participants agreed that a U.S.–ROK naval relationship in a post-unification setting would be helpful to both countries. They preferred that the future ROK Navy develop a niche within a future U.S. naval cooperation arrangement in the APR. One Korean participant said that Japan has essentially followed this strategy—that is, cooperating within the umbrella of U.S. naval presence while developing a special role for itself. This presenter said the Japanese have been successful in developing theater missile defense and Aegis-like technologies to the point that they can now cooperate with the United States with greater equality.

Other participants said that in a post-unification world, USN–ROKN cooperation would allay suspicions in the APR and, therefore, could serve as a good foundation for the creation of a multinational coalition in the region. They emphasized that ROKN expansion offers an opportunity for the ROKN to help the USN stretch its capabilities across the globe. To take advantage of this opportunity, the U.S. should provide the appropriate technology, assets, and training to help the ROKN transform into a cooperative blue-water navy.

Another U.S. participant thought it important for ROK defense and naval planners to assume that the U.S. would remain in the area and, therefore, that ROK naval strategy of any kind could be defined as one in cooperation with the United States. Naval cooperation after unification would make up for a reduced U.S. force, and U.S. forces in the region, cooperating with the APR navies, would serve as the balancer or facilitator of military relations among the countries of the APR. This would be particularly true for relations between such countries as Japan and Korea.

With regard to the future long-term roles, missions, and objectives of the ROKMC/USMC relationship, one U.S. participant said he foresaw joint U.S.–ROK Marine Corps cooperation in such operations as disaster relief and humanitarian interventions.

Finally, Korean participants said that in a post-unification setting in which U.S. Army forces have been reduced, the cooperative relationship between the U.S. and ROK Marine Corps might become an important link between the two countries.

The Requirements for Improved Bilateral Cooperation

According to some participants, it makes sense to pursue certain types of bilateral naval cooperation, regardless of the future of the Korean Peninsula or the strategic situation in Asia. Some examples are: security assistance (e.g., foreign military sales); operational exercises (e.g., RIMPAC); facility access (e.g., liberty, training, and logistics); political military cooperation (e.g., navy-to-navy staff talks); personnel exchanges (e.g., the midshipman cruise); and educational opportunities (e.g., foreign students attending the U.S. Naval Academy). Such types of cooperation provide the foundation for future, expanded naval cooperation.

Some of the Korean participants pointed out that cooperation in these areas has been relatively good since the beginning of the cooperative naval relationship in the late 1940s. Naval cooperation between the U.S. and the ROK provide the ROKN with the basics of seamanship and maintenance techniques. The basic level of interoperability, as it stands now, and the ability to communicate with one another through navy-to-navy staff talks reflect the cooperation of the past 40 years. In short, the two navies are in a strong position to design better ways to cooperate with one another.

To move beyond these fundamental areas of cooperation, however, the two navies will have to address a number of operational, organizational, and political problems. One U.S. participant said that increased cooperation between the two navies will require thinking about the types of operations that the two will engage in. Would the two navies be cooperating under a permanent umbrella organization such as an alliance? Would their cooperation be temporary—tailored to meet a certain contingency then immediately disbanded after the crisis or the mission was complete? Would the operation be out of area? Answering these questions will help address other, more complex questions: What type of command arrangements would be required in combined U.S.–ROK operations? Would such cooperation require a new treaty or other agreement between the U.S. and ROK governments at some future date with respect to combined out-of-area missions? Would a new treaty or other agreement be required between the U.S. and ROK governments because the United Nations or Combined Forces Command umbrella would no longer exist? What role would the United Nations play in such a cooperative arrangement? What roles and missions would the ROKN be assigned?

On the question of command arrangements, U.S. participants said that any future naval cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea would involve a Korea responsible for its own command

structure and its own fleet operations. This arrangement would be similar to the one the USN currently has with Japan.

One Korean participant said that U.S.-ROK naval cooperation could not grow until the Korean Navy was provided with better platforms and naval assets so that it was in a position to operate with the U.S. Navy, and until after the U.S. has provided a better sense of the U.S. Navy's role and strategy in the APR.

In response, a U.S. participant suggested that ROK policy-makers look at the U.S. Navy's *...From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea* doctrines for intended American naval strategy. He suggested that the ROK Navy make an effort to develop a similar doctrinal statement outlining its naval strategy, and suggested this as a possible topic for a future conference.

Another Korean participant said that improved U.S.-ROK naval cooperation requires that the U.S. provide technologies, publications on operations and tactics, and other information to increase interoperability. The Korean participants said that U.S. assistance in these areas would help persuade the Korean National Assembly and the Korean public to purchase U.S. weapons systems. Furthermore, this participant argued that the Korean Navy requires U.S. intelligence support. For example, tactical intelligence would be needed for out-of-area surface and subsurface operations.

The same participant suggested improving professional educational exchanges by making more courses and institutions in the United States available to ROK naval officers. Currently, for example, ROK students attending the Naval Post-Graduate school in Monterey are not permitted to enroll in some courses.²

Finally, this participant argued for Korea to erect small-scale basic support facilities in Korean ports in preparation for emergencies handled jointly by the U.S. and ROK navies. With these facilities, U.S. ships could visit Korea more often, acclimate Korean and U.S. citizens to the existence of U.S. access to small naval facilities in the ROK, and perhaps prepare the way for replacing withdrawn U.S. ground troops with U.S. naval forces.

² Some courses at the Naval Post-Graduate School, the Naval War College and other U.S. service institutes are not open to non-U.S. officers because of the security classifications these presentations presently bear. For more information on the current state of naval cooperation, see *U.S. and ROK Navy Relations: The Evolution of a Special Relationship*, by Perry Wood, with contributions from RAdm. (Ret.) Lawrence Vogt and Thomas J. Hirschfeld, Center for Naval Analyses, June 1994.

Another Korean participant argued that the single most significant improvement in the relationship would have to be in U.S. weapon transfers to the Republic of Korea. In the 21st century, the lethality of weapons will have increased, and Korea's adversaries will be able to reach Korea's shores much faster than in the past. Thus, the U.S. must provide the Korean Navy with certain technologies (e.g., strike capabilities) to deal with such threats.

With respect to U.S. weapon transfers to the ROK, American participants argued that the U.S. has already gone to great lengths to accommodate ROKN needs where possible. One U.S. participant pointed out that the U.S. Navy leadership, including the Chief of Naval Operations, is committed to assisting the ROKN submarine program.

The same U.S. participant conceded that the Korean KDX (Destroyer) program was difficult for the U.S. to help with, because of the complexity of FMS laws. He added that, in response to expressed Korean interest, the U.S. is reforming procedures for releasing Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs). Previously, the very NWPs that could prove useful to the ROKN required unanimous release authority from all NATO countries.

Another American participant added that the United States has made available a number of theater command-and-control systems to Korea. He cited the Contingency Tactical Air Control Automated Planning (CTAAP) system as an example, and reminded the conference participants that Korea was the only ally to benefit from this type of technology transfer.

All the participants at the conference emphasized interoperability between the two navies. In contrast to the Koreans' perspective that interoperability primarily means upgrading the ROKN platform and weapons capabilities, the American participants saw improved communication between the current navies as a necessary first step leading toward an enhanced, interoperable C⁴I capability.

Participants from both sides also pointed out that increased bilateral naval cooperation may require a plan of action capable of accommodating Korean and U.S. domestic political considerations. Throughout the conference, the Korean participants alluded to domestic political pressure within the United States to withdraw or reduce forces in the APR. Some held that the American public may not understand why the United States Navy has to stay engaged in Northeast Asia to cooperate with a newly unified Korea. American political and military leaders may have to convince the public on the merits of U.S.-ROK naval cooperation. The same can be said of Korean politicians and military leaders if evolving circum-

stances (e.g., a need to balance U.S. presence in Japan with U.S. naval presence in Korea) require the stationing of U.S. naval forces in such Korean ports as Chinhae.

Potential Problems of U.S.-ROK Naval Cooperation

Some conference attendees cautioned that U.S.-ROK naval cooperation also implies dangers and pitfalls. One American participant pointed out that the two countries should be sensitive to Japanese perceptions.

Another participant said if U.S.-ROK bilateral relationship expanded to include Japan, Russia and China could feel threatened. U.S. participants pointed out the disadvantages of Korea involving itself in multinational coalitions that do not include Japan. If the United States were involved in such a coalition, Japan might not feel threatened. However, if the United States did not participate, Japan would see itself as the target of such an arrangement. Similarly, a bilateral Korean-Chinese naval relationship might prove upsetting to the Japanese. Most important, the U.S. has good relations with both Korea and Japan and would not be disposed to sacrifice its relations with either.

American participants were concerned that Korean naval cooperation with other Northeast Asian countries could prove destabilizing if it (1) did not involve the United States, (2) left out China, Russia, or Japan, or (3) created circumstances in which the U.S. was faced with favoring one partner over another. Post-Cold War conditions have created a situation in which the U.S. has evolved into the region's honest broker, as the only naval power capable of balancing interests in the APR, and as potential mediator between opposing states.

Korean participants pointed out that the U.S.-ROK naval relationship had moved beyond the point where one navy was subordinate, because the Republic of Korea has come into its own economically, politically, and socially. Any future U.S.-ROK naval relationship must be on an equal footing, or the overall relationship between the two countries could be in jeopardy.

Multinational Naval Cooperation, Coalitions, Collective Security, and the U.S.-ROK Naval Relationship

The final conference topic was the prospect for multilateral initiatives in the APR and the effect of such initiatives on naval cooperation. One U.S. participant pointed out that most governments are now concentrating on domestic matters and some great powers have become more decen-

tralized: thus, many countries may avoid unilateral military adventures, and it will prove more difficult to form actual alliances. Possibilities for multinational approaches to manage international disputes, therefore, may grow in the Asia-Pacific region.

Participants generally agreed that possible types of multilateral initiatives included an enlarged APEC; an evolving ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); an Asian Collective Security System; a building-block approach; a "Four Plus Two" type of arrangement; and a trilateral security arrangement involving the United States, Japan, and Korea.

The Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC) was established to address economic issues. However, conference participants said that because it brings together heads of state, it could also discuss security issues. APEC could not address the China-Taiwan conflict (Taiwan is not recognized as a sovereign state by APEC members), but it could be useful for airing opinions and devising and promoting CSBMs.

Similarly, the ASEAN Regional Forum was said to provide a good platform to discuss APR security issues. For its first meeting, held in July 1994, the ASEAN states, invited the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and EC as dialogue partners, and Russia, China, Vietnam and Papua New Guinea as observer states. Thus, the forum was valuable for promoting transparency and exchanging perspectives on security. Participants at the KIDA-CNA conference postulated that the ARF could become useful for resolving conflicts in 15 years. They doubted that an actual collective security system in Asia had much chance of success, citing asymmetries of interests within the APR as the primary reason.

Participants also said that a Northeast Asian security forum, modeled after the "Four Plus Two" initiatives (a forum that brought together China, the United States, Russia, Japan, and the two Koreas) would also have limited potential. Because of the continuing hostile and unpredictable nature of North Korea, they also believed that such a forum would not be considered feasible until after unification.

A trilateral U.S.-Japan-ROK structure was also considered infeasible at present. Korean participants cited the long history of animosity between Japan and Korea as the primary obstacle. In 15 years, however, after a great deal of encouragement from the United States, the three countries might be able to develop such a cooperative arrangement.

One U.S. participant thought a building-block approach to security had the best chance of taking hold in a region as diverse as the Asia-Pacific. The building-block or layered approach made no effort to impose a region-wide multilateral security structure on the countries of the region. Instead, it called for the formation of sub-regional arrangements, followed by efforts to link them together or build them one on top of the other, if required. This would help answer questions such as who would participate in out-of-area operations, because countries in Northeast Asia, for example, would not be required to send forces outside that area unless each wished to do so.

One participant said that because the layered or building-block approach to cooperative operations is the best candidate for future multinational cooperation and because the United States is the only country involved in the region that can serve as facilitator or mediator, effective multilateral security initiatives would have to begin with U.S. bilateral relations with the states of the region. A solid U.S.-ROK naval relationship, then, could serve as one building block in a multilayered APR coalition effort.

A Korean participant pointed out that alliances between states are "threat driven," "integration driven," or "profit driven." Threat-driven alliances are preoccupied with specific adversaries and, therefore, are not prone to surrender autonomy to some collective entity. Integration-driven alliances are less preoccupied with an adversary, but are concerned with maintaining contact, exchanging information, and forming closer ties with other states. These types of alliances are not averse to creating loose multinational coalitions to discuss security issues, promote transparency, and brainstorm over region-wide security problems. Finally, profit-driven alliances recognize the benefits of surrendering some degree of sovereignty in exchange for the benefits of closer military, economic, and political cooperation with other states. Because the current U.S.-ROK alliance is threat-driven, the present prospects for multilateral security structures in Northeast Asia are not good. However, after unification, the evolution of the U.S.-Korean alliance toward a profit-driven alliance would be possible. Once the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea bilateral relationships mature into profit-driven alliances, we can think of a trilateral naval relationship involving the United States, Japan, and Korea.

Another participant said that the United States has taken steps to promote multilateral security initiatives in Asia. The RIMPAC exercise series has helped promote interoperability among the navies of the region. Success has required RIMPAC participants to learn to communicate with one another, and to develop similar refueling procedures and common tactics. The participant added that the U.S. Pacific Fleet found, early in

Operation Desert Storm, that it could operate better with the Australians than with the U.S. Atlantic Fleet—a direct result of RIMPAC and other naval exercises.

Another American participant concurred and said that RIMPAC could be a foundation for a future trilateral relationship between the United States, Japan, and the ROK. The three countries could eventually create a trilateral regime to handle protection of fisheries and maritime resources, patrolling of EEZs, and the establishment of common maritime traffic rules in Northeast Asian waters.

Conclusion

Over the course of three days, conference participants reached consensus on the following:

- The U.S.–ROK naval relationship will remain valuable regardless of what eventually transpires on the Korean Peninsula.
- The role of the ROK Navy will grow with Korean unification. An ROK Navy with a regional focus could help the U.S. Navy deal with regional contingencies.
- Improving interoperability is central to enhancing the future of the ROK–U.S. naval relationship. Improvements in ROKN capabilities are best achieved in cooperation with the U.S. Navy.
- U.S.–ROK naval cooperation in such areas as navy-to-navy staff talks, personnel and educational exchanges, exercises, and facility access has been good over the past 40-plus years.
- Multilateral security initiatives and dialogues are useful in promoting transparency and encouraging habits of cooperation and dialogue; however, these initiatives do not replace solid bilateral security relations such as the U.S.–ROK defense relationship. The naval relationship between the U.S. and South Korea provides a necessary building block for future multilateral security initiatives.

Equally interesting were the differences in the perspectives of the U.S. and South Korean participants. These differences will have implications for improving the relationship, defining current and future USN–ROKN roles and missions, formulating naval strategy, and determining what missions the ROKN and ROKMC should develop. These different perspectives included the following:

- U.S. participants tended to be more optimistic than the Korean participants over the future security environment in Asia.
- U.S. participants insisted that U.S. military presence in Asia is permanent and unlikely to be significantly reduced or eliminated. Most Korean participants were somewhat skeptical.
- Korean participants saw interoperability mostly in terms of acquiring the platforms and weapons that would make the ROKN a

more capable partner. American participants called for improvements in capabilities, such as improved C⁴I.

- Korean participants complained of the Americans' reluctance to sell South Korea the naval assets it needs to be a player in the region. American participants said that the U.S. Navy has been very helpful in the ROKN's technological development. They gave examples and stressed acquisition of capabilities over platforms.
- Most Korean participants saw their post-unification Navy and Marine Corps role as independent from, but cooperative with, the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Most American participants wanted South Korea to develop blue-water niches within some as-yet-undefined future American-influenced naval cooperative system in Asia.

In addition to drawing out differences and similarities of opinion, the conference also generated some recommendations for improving the relationships between the two countries' navies and marine corps:

- The ROKN could write a strategy white paper similar to the USN's *...From the Sea*. As a result, U.S. Navy planners would be in a better position to understand the ROKN's hardware needs.
- The U.S. Government could reform its FMS procedures to ease the sale of naval assets to countries with whom the U.S. has close cooperative military relationships or treaty obligations. The U.S. should also simplify ROKN access to tactical information like Naval Warfare Publications.
- The U.S. should increase opportunities for South Korean naval officers to attend U.S. military educational institutions, and courses within these institutions.
- ROK and U.S. strategists should consider such important issues as: what SLOCs the ROKN should be concerned about; what the future ROK radius of defense should be; whether future naval cooperation will be under a permanent organization or ad hoc; the nature of cooperative bilateral agreements to deal with out-of-area operations; and what the specific post-unification roles and missions of the ROKN and the ROKMC should be.

- CNA participants cautioned ROK planners to take into account the sensitivities of Korea's neighbors.
- KIDA participants cautioned U.S. participants not to treat Korea as an unequal ally. Korea has come into its own economically and politically.
- CNA participants suggested that the USN in Northeast Asia might serve as the facilitator of relations between the Koreans and the Japanese.
- Future efforts to build a multinational security forum or institution should be based on the foundation of existing U.S. bilateral relationships with the countries of Asia. Conference participants recommended a measured building-block or layered approach to forming multilateral security relationships in the APR.
- Use of Korean support facilities in preparation for emergencies should be handled jointly by the U.S. and ROK navies. The USN should be encouraged to visit these facilities frequently to acquaint Korean and American citizens with the fact of U.S. access to Korean facilities.³

The workshop ended with agreement to conduct a second workshop concentrating on the year 2010 (to avoid confusing future naval planning of a unified Korea with the present problems associated with North Korea), and with some tentative agreement to run the next bilateral workshop or trilateral seminar with a suitable Japanese institute, with a focus on developing multilateral naval cooperation in the APR.

Subjects to be covered in such discussions could include:

- Post-Cold War operational scenarios, including but not confined to war risk and uncertainty, and non-lethal missions, as well as the usual threat scenarios.

³ This recommendation would be consistent with the "places, not bases" approach that Admiral Charles Larson (USCINCPAC) outlined in his Cooperative Engagement Strategy, in which the United States would seek access to facilities throughout the Asia-Pacific region instead of relying on large U.S.-run military bases in East Asia.

- Roles and missions for the Navy; divisions of labor between ROK, U.S., and Japan; and suggestions about when to choose bilateral or multilateral cooperation modes.
- How to ensure that particular types of bilateral or trilateral naval cooperation do not provoke other parties in the region.

The participants agreed that if a trilateral workshop was not appropriate at this time, participants would build on the discoveries of the first conference for another bilateral round and consult one another further. Overall, the conference participants considered the workshop a success, and found the perspectives and opinions expressed at the conference to be enlightening. They look forward to the follow-on conference to be held in Washington, DC, before the end of 1995.

Appendix A: CNA Participants

Name	Paper presented or role
Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld Center for Naval Analyses	Co-chairman
Prof. Paul Bracken Yale University	"South Korean Naval Development"
Cdr. Charles Dixon United States Navy	"Alternative Force Postures & Missions in the APR"
Mr. Paul Kreisberg Woodrow Wilson Center	"Strategic Change in N.E. Asia to 2010"
Lt. Gen. H.C. Stackpole USMC (Ret.)	"ROK and U.S. Marine Corps and the Future"
RAdm. Larry Vogt Navy (Ret.)	"Multinational Naval U.S. Cooperation in Northeast Asia"
Dr. David Zvijac Center for Naval Analyses	"U.S.-South Korean Naval Cooperation"
Mr. Perry Wood Hudson Institute	Rapporteur
Mr. Christopher Yung Center for Naval Analyses	Rapporteur

Appendix B: CNA Guest List

Name	Title
RAdm. Lee Watkins	Commander, Naval Forces Korea
Maj. Gen. R.L. Smith	C-5, Combined Forces Command
Col. Sands Robnick	Chief of Staff, Commander, Naval Forces Korea
Col. Michael Cross	Deputy C-5, Policy Division, Combined Forces Command
Lt. Col. George Simpson	East Asia Branch, Plans, Policies & Operations, USMC
Capt. Robert Felt	Joint United States Military Assistance Group
Capt. William Peterson	N3, U.S. Seventh Fleet
Cdr. Leland Bradshaw	Naval Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Seoul
Dr. Desmond Wilson	CNA Representative to Commander, Seventh Fleet

Appendix C: KIDA Participants

Name	Paper presented or role
Capt. Kye-Ryong Rhoe Korea Institute for Defense	Project co-director and presenter, "Alternatives for the ROK Forces Development"
Prof. Yong-Sup Han National Defense University	"Strategic Changes in North Asia and Korean Defense Planning"
Cdr. In-Soo Lim ROK Navy	"The Strategic Shift in Korea and the Navies in the Northwest Pacific"
Prof. Hyun-Ki Kim National Defense University	"ROK's Strategic Elements and Future Development of the Marines"
Dr. Sung-Hwan Wie Korea Institute for Defense Analyses	"Prospective Options for ROK-U.S. Naval Cooperation"
RAdm. (L.) Young-O Kang ROK Navy (Ret.)	"Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of ROK-U.S. Naval Cooperation"
Gen. Jae-Chang Kim ROK Army (Ret.)	Co-chairman
Dr. Jong-Ryool Lee Secretary General, ROK National Assembly	Co-chairman
VAdm. Duk-Dong Kang 2nd Vice Chairman, ROK JCS	* Co-chairman

Appendix C: KIDA Participants (Continued)

Name	Paper presented or role
Dr. Eun-Sang Won Korea Institute for Defense Analyses	Co-chairman
Dr. Young-Koo Cha Korea Institute for Defense Analyses	Co-chairman
Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh Korea Institute for Defense Analyses	Discussant
Col. In-Ki Lee ROK Marine Corps	Discussant
RAdm. (L.) Joon-Tae Bae Deputy Director of Operations ROK JCS	Discussant
LCdr. Suk-Choon Yoon ROKN HQ	Discussant
Dr. Chang-Su Kim Korea Institute for Defense Analyses	Rapporteur
Lt. Col. David E. Carlson U.S. Army	Rapporteur

Appendix D: KIDA Guest List

Name	Title
VAdm. Tae Sup Yim, ROK Navy	Vice Chief of Naval Operations, ROKN HQ
Lt. Gen. Sang-Moo Lee ROK Marine Corps	Commandant, ROK Marine Corps
Lt. Gen. In-Kyun Chung ROK Army (Ret.)	Special Adviser to KIDA
RAdm. Young-Kil Suh	Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Policy Planning, ROKN HQ
M.Gen. Kook-Bon Chung ROK Marine Corps	DCJCS for Readiness Evaluation, ROK JCS
RAdm. (L) Wan-Bok Lee	Commander, Welfare & Service Support Corps, ROKN
Brig. Gen. An-Do Kwon	Deputy Director for Policy, ROK Ministry of National Defense
Brig. Gen. Young-Se Lee ROK Marine Corps	Deputy Chief, ROK Marine Corps Command
RAdm. Duk-Soo Kim	Deputy DCNO for Operations, ROKN HQ
Capt. Chang-Sik Chung	Director, Policy Analysis

**Appendix D: KIDA Guest List
(Continued)**

Name	Title
Capt. Chil-Sung Park	Director, Naval Operations Analysis Group, ROKN HQ
Capt. Jong-Min Kim	Director, Force Planning Division, Office of DCNO for Operations, ROKN HQ
Capt. Moon-Young Kim	Head, Maritime Research Center, Naval Academy
Capt. Hyuk-Soo Kim	Director, Naval Operations Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, ROKN HQ
Capt. Young-Hyun Chung	Korea Defense Information Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Midshipman Dong-Ki You	Naval Academy
Midshipman Doo-Hyun Kim	Naval Academy

Appendix E: Schedule of the KIDA-CNA Conference

Monday, October 17, 1994 (First Day)

0930-1010	Welcoming Remarks by Lt. General Jae Hwa Park, President of KIDA
	Opening Remarks by Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld, CNA representative
	Congratulatory Address by Hong-Yeol Kim, CNO of ROKN
1010-1230	<u>First Session</u> How the Nature and Pace of Strategic Change in Northeast Asia Affect the Composition of Naval Forces <u>Moderators:</u> Gen. Jae-Chang Kim, ROKA (Ret.), Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld (CNA)
1010-1040	Presentation by Mr. Paul Kreisberg, "Strategic Change in Northeast Asia to 2010"
1040-1110	Presentation by Dr. Yong-Sup Han, "Strategic Changes in Northeast Asia and Korea's Defense Planning for the 21st Century"
1110-1130	Break

1130–1230	Discussion (Inputs from Dr. Kwan-Chi Oh, KIDA and CNA presenter. General discussion.)
1230–1400	Lunch
1400–1630	<p><u>Second Session</u></p> <p>How Changes on the Korean Peninsula Influence the Military Force Structure of Actors in the Region, and Their Naval Planning</p> <p><u>Moderators:</u> Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld (CNA) and Jong-Ryool Lee, Secretary General, ROK National Assembly</p>
1400–1430	Presentation by Dr. In-Soo Lim, Commander, ROKN, "The Strategic Shift in Korea and the Navies in the Northwest Pacific"
1430–1500	Presentation by Prof. Paul Bracken, "South Korean Naval Development: Competition and Cooperation"
1500–1600	Discussion (Inputs from Dr. Chae-Ha Pak, KIDA, and CNA presenter. General discussion.)
1600–1630	Break
1630–1700	Summary of first day's presentations and discussions

Tuesday, October 18, 1994 (Second Day)

0900-1110

Third Session

**Naval Alternatives for the ROKN
and the USN**

Moderators: Duk-Dong Kang, Vice
Chairman ROK JCS, Vice Admiral
ROKN, and Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld
(CNA)

0900-0935

Presentation by Capt. Kye-Ryong
Rhoe, "Alternatives for the Development
of Korean Naval Forces"

0935-1000

Presentation by Cdr. Charles Dixon
USN, "Alternative Force Postures
and Missions in the Asia-Pacific Region"

1000-1050

Discussion (Input from Dr. Young-Woo
Lee, KIDA, and CNA presenter. General
discussion.)

1050-1100

Break

1110-1240

Fourth Session

**U.S.-ROK Marine Corps Cooperation in
an Era of Change**

Moderator: Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld
(CNA)

1110-1135

Presentation by Lt. Gen. Henry C.
Stackpole, III, "The ROK and U.S. Marine
Corps and the Future"

1135-1200

Presentation by Dr. Hyun-Ki Kim
(ROK NDU), "ROK's Strategic Elements
and the Future Development of the
Marines"

1200-1240	Discussion (Input from In-Ki Lee, Deputy Director, ROKMC Headquarters, and Colonel ROKMC. General discussion.)
1240-1410	Lunch
1410-1610	<u>Fifth Session</u> The Purpose, Scope, and Contents of ROK-U.S. Naval Cooperation <u>Moderators:</u> Dr. Eun-Sang Won (KIDA) and Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld (CNA)
1410-1440	Presentation by Dr. Sung-Hwan Wie (KIDA), "Prospective Options for Republic of Korea and United States Naval Cooperation"
1440-1510	Presentation by Dr. David Zvijac (CNA), "United States-South Korean Naval Cooperation"
1510-1610	Discussion (Input from Joon-Tae Bae, Deputy Director for Operations, JCS, Rear Admiral (L) ROKN, and CNA presenter. General discussion.)
1610-1630	Break
1630-1700	Summary of second day's presentations and discussions
1900	Dinner at MND Club, hosted by KIDA President

Wednesday, October 19, 1994 (Free Day)

CNA participants pay courtesy call on U.S. Embassy and United States Forces, Korea.

Thursday, October 20, 1994 (Fourth Day)

0910-1110	<u>Sixth Session</u> The Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of Naval Cooperation <u>Moderators:</u> Mr. Thomas Hirschfeld (CNA) and Dr. Young-Koo Cha (KIDA)
0910-0940	Presentation by RAdm. (Ret.) Larry Vogt, "Multinational Naval Cooperation in Northeast Asia: Some Plausible Considerations for 2010 Based on What We Know in 1994"
0940-1010	Presentation by RAdm. (Ret.) Young-O Kang, "The Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of ROK-U.S. Naval Cooperation Focused Largely on Interaction With Other Regional Players"
1010-1030	Break
1030-1130	Discussion (Input from LCdr. Suk-Jun Yoon, ROKN, and CNA presenter. General discussion.)
1130-1230	Preparation for Wrap-Up
1230-1400	Working Lunch and Wrap-Up Session Summary and Conclusions Identification of Key Findings Identification of Topics for 2nd Conference