Operation Peace for Galilee. Operational Brilliance-Strategic Failure.
Abstract
On 6 June 1982, Israel invaded the neighboring state of Lebanon in Operation "Peace for Galilee". The planning and execution of this invasion is examined from an operational-strategic perspective. Tasked with carrying out the invasion, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) prepared detailed operational plans which used the principles of warfare to maximize Israel's advantages while minimizing its disadvantages. Upon execution of the plan, IDF units overran south Lebanon in a matter of days in spite of ardous terrain and stiff resistance. However, what was to have been a three day operation stretched into two months of combat followed by a bloody three year occupation of Lebanon. The strategic failure of the IDF despite the brilliance of its operational and tactical performance provides a number of valuable operational lessons. First, regardless of operational excellence, strategic success is unlikely when military operations fail to support policy. Second, a failure to match political and military objectives can cause major problems in the execution of military operations. Moreover, when using military force to deal with a primarily political problem, the identification of an enemy center of gravity based solely on military operations will preclude strategic success. Finally, failure to recognize the culminating point of victory in a military operation can lead to strategic overextension, exhaustion, and eventual defeat. (RWJ)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 06, 1995
- Accession Number
- ADA293847
Entities
People
- Bradley M. Jacobs
Organizations
- Naval War College